lands, above thirty in number, which equally perplex the antiquary and the architect. In our sober latitude, and in a land neither teeming with wealth nor familiar with luxury, a stranger will not find any of those exciting amusements which he may have witnessed in richer countries and among an idler people. We cannot offer him either the bull-fight or the carnival, and he must recross the Tweed to enjoy in perfection the excitement of the turf, or shudder at the brutality of the prize-ring; but, what he may value more, we can show him our heath and our river sports, where the genius of man strives with the sagacity of instinct, and where animal life is sacrificed less for amusement than for use. We can show him the games and contests of our northern clans; the schools of heroes, ever ready at the call of their country—loyal even to worthless sovereigns, and faithful even in a doubtful cause. To the stranger of graver mood Scotland presents objects of contemplation of equal interest and importance. In her institutions for religious and secular education will be found arrangements to admire and to imitate; and in the reaction of knowledge upon the character and habits of her people, the philosopher may discover new lines of study, and the statesman new principles of government. SIR DAVID BREWSTER,

MODERN CREEDS AND CONFESSIONS. THERE is, indeed, a question which lies behind this onea question of great difficulty, and of vast importance, viz., What is the nature and kind of opinion in theology which justifies and calls for the forming of a separate communion? Our ideas on this subject are very much formed on the

historical events of the Reformation, and perhaps on a few of later years. But those events themselves have generally been determined by causes with which a deliberate consideration of principle in this matter had very little to do. The necessity which had arisen from an entire revolt from the Romish system compelled, or seemed to compel, men to review the very foundations of Christian theology, and to draw up new and elaborate definitions of belief. The relations in which these stand to modern thought is one of the great difficulties of our time. There has been a drift-a slow, gradual, and in its progress an insensible drift-of opinion separating more or less the present generation from the conceptions of the time when those confessions and articles were composed; and probably there is not one of the leading churches of the Reformation whose members could cordially unite if their common confession had now to be drawn up for the first time. Their creeds and articles remain unchanged, not, for the most part, because of the general agreement they secure, but because of the greater disagreement which any modifications would occasion. They cannot be touched, because different parties would desire to alter them in diametrically opposite directions. Some parts of those creeds generally, we may hope, the more essential parts -are indeed held, and held as firmly as before; but other parts are held, if held at all, with less of emphasis and belief; whilst there are generally some portions over which we pass, or desire to pass, in silence. Under these circumstances, the question is always liable to arise-What divergence of teaching and belief is to be held as legitimate and consistent with loyalty to the distinguishing characteristics of the society to which we may belong? There are some churches in which, from accidental circum

stances, this question falls to be decided by courts in which men preside who are invested with the character of the civil judge. I say this arises from accidental circumstances, because such I consider those circumstances to be which have led to what we call Established Churches—that is, to churches whose creeds and governments are directly supported and embodied in systems of legislation. Even in the case of an Established Church it may be so arranged, as we know, that questions of doctrine shall be decided by ecclesiastical tribunals—that is, by men who have no other judicial character than that which attaches to them as holding office in the Church to which they belong. And this must be the system in all Churches which are unconnected with the State. Their government must be conducted as the government of all other voluntary associations is conducted—according to their own rules of procedure, and their own principles of decision. There are many men who do not yet perceive this necessity—who are indeed unwilling to see it, because they cling to that which they have been accustomed to regard as the "protection of the law," because they like the security which its august procedure gives them for perfect fairness, perfect candour, perfect openness to conviction-for all those characteristics, in short, which sanctify the position of the judge, and give authority to those who administer. the law. There is a feeling widely spread that all this cannot be expected, or cannot be had, in the self-constituted tribunals of ecclesiastical rule. You may say that this is the language and the thought of men who have been born and bred in leading strings as regards some of the primary obligations of Christian life-who have no conception of the duties, or, indeed, the necessities, which must devolve upon the members of a Christian Church in the position

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in which most churches already are, and in which probably all churches must, sooner or later, come to be. This may be true, and I think it is true. But, alas! that there should be so much foundation for the distrust with which all purely religious bodies are regarded, even in the discharge of functions which belong to them in common with all other organised societies of men. Will the training of the Christian life, and the high and holy obligations of Christian duty-will these never train men to judge of others with the justice and impartiality which are secured in a purely secular calling? Will the bonds of Christian brotherhood, which ought to be so strong in the connexion they form, and so pure in the affections they inspire-will these never secure for the forming of opinion within our minds, and for the discharge of duty towards other men, those fine perceptions of justice and truth which are the glory of mere professional honour? DUKE OF Argyll.

THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. FOR six hundred years, the principle of Parliamentary election has been this, that the majority of the voices of a constituency to which the writ of the Crown was issued should elect a member or members to sit in this House, and no others. Now, bear this in mind. You are urged to accept this proposition of a most important character— which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has denounced in the strongest language, of which Lord Derby says the mischief can only be bounded by the narrowness of its operation-when it has never come before the public for discussion at all. In all the discussions which have taken place this year or last, at all the meetings which have been

held, whether under roof or under the open sky, there has never been any debate, discussion, or consideration whatever on the principle now offered to us in this clause. It has come down to this House, and I would suggest, without unfairly urging my views, that the House of Commons should at least suspend its judgment in favour of this proposition until it has been a longer period before the country, and the constituencies have had an opportunity of considering it and making up their minds upon it. It is often said that we are not delegates; and if we are not delegates we are not rulers. We are sent here to represent the general views of our constituents; and we have morally no power to cut off the influence of those constituents, to make fundamental changes in the Constitution, and vary, alter, and overthrow the practice of six hundred years. This House is not in favour of it, because a majority of 140 voted against it, and you have no right, therefore, to agree to such a proposition, because a House which is not representative, which has no direct influence in it, and no member of which can vote for a member of this House, chooses to suggest it. I say that it is an unintelligible and unbelieving thing that this House should, under these circumstances, agree to a proposition making this fundamental change in our Constitution, and altering and in point of fact crippling the power of four of the largest constituencies in the kingdom. Now, which are these four constituencies that you are asked thus to treat? appeal to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and I know some of the difficulties of his position; but still he is accessible to reason on a matter of this kind, and he has been disposed to take them very much into his confidence. Now, I believe that, if a census were taken to-day, those four boroughs would be found to have a population of

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