The division of beings into Bodies and Spirits, does not prove Space and Body the same; which those who deny, attempt to prove by this dilemma: -"Either this space is something or nothing; if nothing be between two bodies, they must necessarily touch : and if space be something, is it body or spi it."-But I ask, how they know that there can be none but solid beings without thought, (i. e. Bodies) and thinking beings without extension, (i. e. Spirits) ? I do not pretend to know, whether this space void of body, be substance or accident. I ask, whether Substance be applied in the same sense, to the infinite incomprehensible God, to finite spirit, and to body; and if so, whether agreeing in the common nature of ́substance, they only differ in modifications of it ? which will be a very harsh doctrine. If body be not supposed infinite, which I think no one will affirm, could a man, placed by God at the extremity of corporeal beings, stretch his hand beyond his body ? if he could, there must be space : if he could not, there must be some external hindrance: and I ask, is that hindrance substance or accident?—It is as fair then to conclude, that where nothing hinders, a body put in motion may move on, as that where nothing is between two bodies, they must necessarily touch: for pure space is sufficient to take away the necessity of mutual contact, but not sufficient to stop motion.

:

Those who assert the impossibility of space without matter, not only make body infinite, but deny God's power to annihilate any part of matter and whoever allows that he can annihilate any part of matter admits the possibility of a vacuum. The motion of bodies too within our view plainly evinces

a vacuum.

It is not necessary to prove the real existence of a vacuum, but only the idea of it; since the question is, whether the idea of space or extension be the same with the idea of body? which is plain from the dispute about vacuum and plenum. The idea of extension joins itself so inseparably to most visible and tangible qualities, that some are apt to conclude the essence of body to be extension. But let them reflect on their ideas of tastes and smells, as much as on those of sight and touch, and examine their ideas of hunger, thirst, and several other pains, they will find that they include in them no idea of extension at all; which is but an affection of body, as well as the rest. If those ideas which are constantly joined to all others, are therefore concluded to be their essences, then Unity will be the essence of every thing, being conjoined with every object of sensation or reflection. To avoid confusion it were better to apply extension only to matter, and expansion to space in general, with or without solid matter possessing it; so as to say, space is expanded and body

is extended. "The knowing precisely what our words stand for, would, I imagine, in this, as well as a great many other cases, quickly end the dispute. For I am apt to think, that men, when they come to examine them, find their simple ideas all generally to agree, though in discourse with one another, they perhaps confound one another with different names. I imagine that men who abstract their thoughts, and do well examine the Ideas of their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking; however they may perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of the several schools or sects they have been bred up in though amongst unthinking men, who examine not scrupulously and carefully their own Ideas, and strip them not from the marks men use for them, but confound them with words, there must be endless dispute, wrangling, and jargon, especially if they be learned bookish men, devoted to some sect, and accustomed to the language of it; and have learned to talk after others. But if it should happen, that any two thinking men should really have different Ideas, I do not see how they could discourse or argue one with another. Here I must not be mistaken, to think that every floating imagination in men's brains is presently of that sort of Ideas I speak of. "Tis not easy for the mind to put off those confused notions and prejudices it has imbibed from custom, inadvertency, and common

conversation it requires pains and assiduity to examine its Ideas, until it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones, out of which they are compounded: and to see which, amongst its simple ones, have or have not a necessary connection and dependance one upon another. Until a man doth this in the primary and original notions of things, he builds upon floating and uncertain principles, and will often find himself at a loss,"

CHAP. XIV.

OF DURATION.

THE Idea of duration is got from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of succession. The answer of a great man to one who asked, What Time was-Si non rogas intelligo, (which amounts to this -the more I set myself to think of it, the less I understand it) might perhaps persuade one that Time which reveals all other things, is itself not to be discovered. The distance between any parts of the succession of Ideas in our minds, or between the appearance of any two ideas, is what we call duration for while we are thinking, or receiving succes

sively several ideas, we know that we exist; and so we call the continuation of our existence the duration of ourselves. When the succession of Ideas ceases, our Idea of duration ceases with it, as is the case in a sound sleep. It would be the same with a waking man, if he could keep only one Idea in his mind; for it is plain that when our thoughts are intently fixed on one thing, time seems much shorter than it is.

If during sleep we dream and have a variety of ideas, we have also a sensation of Duration, and of the length of it. From experience we know how to make allowance for the length of duration while we sleep, or are not thinking; just as we know how to apply the idea of extension to distances where no body is seen or felt.

Motion only produces the idea of succession by producing a train of distinguishable ideas; for a body really moving gives us no perception of motion, unless it brings a train of successive ideas; as we learn from a calm at sea, when looking on the sun, sea, or ship, we perceive no motion in either, though it is certain that two of the bodies at least have moved a great way.

There seem to be certain bounds to the quickness. and slowness of the succession of our Ideas: we cannot perceive the succession of a cannon ball on account of its quickness, nor of the hands of clocks,