CHAP. III.

OF IDEAS OF ONE SENSE.

OF our Simple Ideas, some come into the mind by one sense only:—some by more senses than one:~ some by reflection only:-and others by all the ways of sensation and reflection.

All Ideas of colours, sounds, smells, and tastes, come in only by one sense. The most considerable of those belonging to the touch, are, heat, cold, and solidity; the rest consisting almost wholly in the sensible configuration, as, smooth, rough,--or adhesion of the parts, as, hard, soft, tough, brittle.

We have many more simple Ideas than we have names for; the variety of smells, for instance, are expressed by, sweet, and stinking; though the smells

of

a rose and a violet, both sweet, are very distinct, &c. &c.

CHAP IV.

OF SOLIDITY.

WE receive the Idea of solidity by the touch; it arises from the resistance we find in a body to the entrance of another body into the place it possesses.

space.

:

I consider impenetrability as a consequence of solidity, rather than solidity itself. This is the idea belongs to body, whereby we conceive it to fill Space differs from Solidity in this, that it will allow two bodies moved towards each other to touch and hardness consists in a firm cohesion of the parts of matter, making up masses of a sensible bulk, so that the whole does not easily change its figure. This cohesion of parts gives no more solidity to the hardest body than to the softest:-water is as solid as adamant: for that a diamond will more easily resist the approach of two bodies than water, is owing to the seperability of the parts of water by a

side motion.

In an experiment made at Florence, water confined in a hollow globe of gold, and screwed in a press, exuded through the pores of the gold.

The extension of body is the cohesion or continuity of solid, separable, moveable parts: the extension of space is the continuity of unsolid, inseparable, immoveable parts. Of pure space, then, and solidity, I think I can attain distinct ideas.

CHAP. V.

OF SIMPLE IDEAS BY MORE THAN ONE SENSE.

THE Ideas got by more than one sense, are of space, or extension, figure, rest, and motion: for these make impressions both on the eyes and touch.

CHAP. VI.

OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF REFLECTION.

SIMPLE Ideas of reflection are the operations of the mind about its other ideas: such are perception, or thinking, volition, or willing. The power of thinking is called the understanding; the power of volition, the will; these are denominated faculties.

CHAP. VII.

OF SIMPLE IDEAS BOTH OF SENSATION AND REFLECTION.

THE simple Ideas which we get by all the ways of sensation and reflection, are; pleasure, or, delight, pain, or, uneasiness, power, existence, unity.

Pleasure and pain, whether of mind or body, signify, whatever delights or molests us.-The mind can choose among its ideas which it will think on; and has a perception of delight joined to several thoughts and sensations. Pain is in many cases annexed to the very ideas which delight us; as in the different degrees of heat. Existence and Unity are suggested to us by every object without and every idea within. The idea of Power is got by observing that we can move our own bodies at pleasure,-and that natural bodies are constantly producing effects in one another.

Succession is another idea which, though suggested by the senses, is more constantly offered by the train of ideas passing through our minds without inintermission.

CHAP. VIII.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING SIMPLE

IDEAS.

POSITIVE Ideas sometimes arise from privative causes: that is the causes which produce them are barely privations in those subjects from which we

derive those Ideas. Were I enquiring into the natural causes of perception, I should offer this as a reason why a privative cause may produce a positive Idea:-that, All sensation being produced in us only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits, variously agitated by external objects, the abatement of any former motion must as neçessarily produce a new Idea, as the variation or increase of it. Does not the shadow of a man, which consists of the absence of light, cause as clear an idea in the mind as a man himself? Indeed, we have negative names which stand for the absence of positive ideas; as, insipid, silence, annihilation, denoting the absence of the positive Ideas, taste, sound, being. But it will be hard to determine whether we have really any positive ideas from privative causes, till it be determined, whether rest be any more a privation than motion. We must no more suppose our Ideas to be exact images of the qualities of bodies, than the 'names we give our deas to be exact images of them. The power in ny body to produce an Idea, I call a quality in that body. Thus a snow ball producing the ideas of white, cold, round, its powers to produce those Ideas I call qualities. I sometimes put the Ideas for the qualities themselves.

Primary qualities are such as are utterly inseparable from body in whatsoever state it be: viz. soli