BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

AND

THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

NO. XXVII.

JULY, 1850.

ARTICLE I.

MAN THE IMAGE OF GOD.

By Rev. Edward Beecher, D. D., Boston.

It is a fundamental question in all theology, and in all religious experience, are the relations of the divine and the human mind such that it is possible to have a true knowledge of God?

It is commonly assumed that such is the fact, and systems of theology are constructed, and the reality of an intelligible and rational religious experience is defended on the assumption that it is possible to know God, and to commune with him. And yet there is a form of scepticism which at the present time is extensively prevalent, which denies the possibility of any such knowledge, and thus strikes a blow at the root of all such theology, and all such religious experience. Moreover in the writings even of some of the most orthodox divines, there are the germs of a scepticism concerning the reality of our knowledge of God, in some respects, which when fully developed lead to similar results — results which they above all others on reflection would repudiate. And yet, vitally important as this question is, it has rarely if ever been directly, fully and formally considered, as its importance demands.

It is our purpose to invite the attention of thinking minds to this subject, by a few remarks on some of the prominent points which it involves.

We shall first inquire how that knowledge of God is obtained, which is at the basis of all our common systems of theology, and of religious experience, and then pass in review some of the modes in which the reality of that knowledge is assailed.

Such knowledge of God as has been adverted to is obtained by the assumption that God designedly made the human mind in his own image, in order that every man might have in himself the means of knowing God and thus the power of communing with him. By assuming that the mind is made in the image of God it is meant that God and man alike have rational powers, that is, the powers requisite for the perception of truth, for the comparison of objects, and for judging of the value of results; that they have the power of choosing ends, and of forming plans to gain those ends; that they have the power of benevolent emotion or love;—that they have the power to perceive and to feel, what is honorable and right, so that they are capable of pleasant or painful emotions as they are conscious of regarding or disregarding truth and right in their conduct, and that in these respects the divine and human mind so far correspond that by knowing the human mind, we can know the divine.

That our current systems of theology are in fact based upon this assumption is too obvious to need a labored proof. It is enough to advert to a few illustrations of the fact. Take then any of the doctrinal treatises of the elder President Edwards, for example that on the End for which God created the World, and it is obvious at a glance that the idea of God which pervades that treatise, the only idea which could render such a discussion possible, is taken from the human mind. If man had not the power to consider the nature and relations of things, to select an end for which he will act, and to put in operation a system of means to gain that end, and if he did not assume the existence of similar powers in God, he could neither raise, discuss or understand the question considered in that profound and fundamental dissertation. The whole of the introduction, containing explanations of terms and general positions, discriminating between chief and inferior ends, and ultimate and subordinate ends, in relation to God, consists entirely of illustrations taken from the actions of men with reference to such ends, in choosing them and forming plans to obtain them. In like manner, in his treatise on the Will, he argues that a determination of the will may be virtuous and praiseworthy, though necessary, thus: "God is necessarily holy, and his will is necessarily determined to what is good." He also argues against the Arminians on the ground that they concede the truth of this position. Here is a most manifest assumption on both sides that man, so far at least as the will is concerned, is truly in the image of God, so as to authorize reasoning from the divine to the human mind. Indeed in one instance in his work on the will, Edwards thus explicitly states this assumption as the basis of his reasoning:1

1 Part II. § 5.

"The essential qualities of a moral agent are in God, in the greatest possible perfection; such as understanding to perceive the difference between moral good and evil; a capacity of discerning that moral worthiness and demerit, by which some things are praiseworthy, others deserving of blame and punishment; and also a capacity of choice, and choice guided by understanding, and a power of acting according to his choice or pleasure, and being capable of doing those things which are in the highest sense praiseworthy. And herein does very much consist that image of God wherein he made man (Gen. 1: 26, 27 and 9: 6), by which God distinguished man from beasts, viz. in those faculties and principles of nature whereby he is capable of moral agency. In like manner in Calvin's Institutes, in his discussion of election, predestination and decrees, a similar use of language constantly occurs, and the whole discussion would in a moment become utterly unintelligible if it were to be denied that election, predestination and decrees in the actions of man, are in kind the same as election, predestination and decrees in God, although put forth on a much smaller scale by man than by God. But it is needless to multiply such illustrations. All ideas of moral government, law, authority, love, providence, justice, grace, mercy with reference to God—which are the staple of all theological systems, fall away the moment that we deny the assumption now under consideration.

Equally true is it that the prevalent doctrines concerning religious experience rest upon the same assumption. A God is always assumed and described as the object of love, whose intellect, affections, will, and moral nature, are in kind, although not in degree, like those found in the human mind. The very idea of communion with God implies such a similarity of nature and faculties, that common views, ends and interests are possible between God and man, that man can so understand the ends of God as to adopt them as his own, and the interests of God, as to identify his own with them, and the feelings of God as to respond to them in devoted and intelligent love. But universal as is this assumption, no efforts are commonly made to evince its truth. Indeed it is an assumption so natural and necessary, that it seems rarely if ever to occur to those who make it, that its correctness can be called in question. This, however, is by no means the case. It not only can be, but is called in question, and that extensively.

In the first place, the system of Pantheism, known in all ages, but of late extensively revived even in Christendom, is in its essential nature, an explicit denial of its truth. The fundamental element of that system is a denial of the personality of the Deity. But the central

' Book III. Chap. 21.

element of personality is the will. This, as essential in selecting ends and forming plans, together with the intellect to guide the emotions to influence it, and with power in its turn to affect or control them, is absolutely essential to any conception of a person. All this Pantheism renounces, and instead of a personal God with intellect, affections, will, ends and plans, introduces one great self-existent substance, including in itself the whole universe, but without self-consciousness, intellect, affections, ends or plans. It has simply an inward tendency or power, to unfold itself in various evolutions, now of matter, and now of mind. Man is the highest development of this deity; in him alone he becomes self-conscious. Of course under such a system all ideas of law, responsibility, and a moral government administered by a personal God disappear.

The bolder and more consistent forms of Pantheism readily admit, avow, and defend these results, and treat all ideas of a personal God derived from the personal attributes of the human mind as merely the delusions of anthropopathy or anthropomorphism. But there are others who refuse to be classed with these, who yet call in question, or it may be deny, the conformity of our ideas of God as a personal God to the reality of his being, and thus virtually reduce him to the condition of a God unknown at least to us. In this class we may without injustice place the distinguished scholar Schleiermacher. Indeed, the charge of Pantheism has been brought against him without hesitation. Although his admirers strenuously defend him against this charge,1 yet thus much at least is true; he maintains that a great degree of piety can exist among such as deny the truth of our common conceptions of a personal God. Moreover he asserts in his own person that “when the idea of God is derived in too great a degree from human relations, and God is conceived of as personally exercising thought and volition, it is brought down into the sphere of opposition and controversy." By reäction from such a view of a personal God, there arises according to him, a view in which the Supreme Being is represented not as personally exercising thought and volition, but as the universal necessity, exalted above all personal attributes, and producing and combining every mode of thought and existence." Here then we seem to have placed before us in contrast a personal God, and the God of Pantheism. In view of this contrast, Schleiermacher remarks, "Nothing seems more unwarrantable than for the adherents of the one conception, to charge those with a godless spirit, who repelled by the force of anthropomorphism, have taken refuge in the other; or, for those on the other hand, to accuse their opponents of adopting an idolatrous service, and

See especially the Letters of George Ripley to Andrews Norton.

to regard their piety as without value, on account of the human character of their conceptions of God. A man may be truly religious, whether he incline to one of these conceptions or the other; but his religious spirit, the consciousness of God in his inward feeling, must be better than the conception which he has formed; and the more he identifies this with the essence of religion, the less does he understand himself. Subsequently to this he remarks that both views are "defective" and that "neither corresponds to its object." He also says: "It cannot be maintained that the admission of one or the other of these conceptions in and for itself can be taken as the sign of a more or less perfect religion." His object in these statements is to show that all "are not despisers of religion who cannot reconcile themselves with the personality of the Supreme Being, as it is commonly represented." He concedes, indeed, that there is an "almost inevitable necessity of admitting it," and disavows all purpose to weaken the conviction of it in any mind that holds it. Yet he is of opinion that the origin of this necessity can be explained, and that the truth of the conception is so questionable, that "among truly religious men there have never been zealots, enthusiasts or fanatics for this notion." With reference to the charge of atheism often brought against the advocates of Pantheistic views, he thus remarks: "So far, as indeed has often been the case, as atheism has been understood to mean nothing but hesitation and uncertainty in regard to this conception, the sincerely pious will view the existence of this around them with great composure; and there has always been something which they deem far more irreligious, as indeed it is, namely, the want of an immediate consciousness of the Godhead in the feelings of the soul. They will be the slowest to believe that any man in fact can be entirely destitute of religion; for before such a person can exist, they know, that he must be totally deprived of feeling, and degraded with the peculiar attributes of his being, into a mere animal; since he only in their opinion, who is so deeply degraded, can lose the consciousness of God in the universe and in ourselves, the Divine Life and Energy by which all things subsist." Of the ideas here presented of the nature of religion it is not our purpose at this time fully to speak. It is enough to say that these views directly tend, as we have previously remarked, to produce a scepticism which strikes a blow at the root of all our current systems of theology, The idea that the human and common views of religious experience. mind was designedly made in the image of God in order that we may be enabled to understand him, is rejected; and all communion with

1 Ripley's third Letter to Andrews Norton, pp. 39, 40.

of