of the most difficult portions of the New Testament; perhaps I might even say, as the greatest problem in it which yet remains to be fully solved. Certain it is, that there are many readers who still find doubts springing up, and meet with difficulties, which they feel unable to solve. May I not venture to believe, without any assumption on my part, that these will be ready to welcome any serious attempt to aid them in the removal of their embarrassments? Having in a great measure satisfied my own mind, it is natural for me to hope, that I thing in the way of assisting others to satisfy their minds.

may do some

That I have been wholly impartial in my investigations and decisions, and have never dogmatized, is not for me to assert. I can only say, that I have aimed to be what the first requires, and not to do the last. So far as partiality or dogmatism may cleave to my performance, so far I can reasonably expect nothing but injury to the efforts I have made in order to convince others. With such views, I could not well aim to admit the one or practise the other. It is however for the reader to say, after all, whether I have in fact admitted or done what is contrary to my intention. If he shall acquit me in both respects, I would hope that he will lend me a listening ear, and weigh seriously what is advanced, like one who feels that he must give an account, before he comes to conclusions opposite to those which seem to me at least to be deducible, in a fair and direct manner, from the teachings of the beloved apostle.

The nature of my undertaking has led me to indulge in various remarks on several topics, which rigid order in exegesis or scientific theology might be bound to exclude. But if these are not irrelevant, nor unmeaning, the reader I hope will cheerfully concede me the privilege of such an indulgence. I may perhaps reasonably ask, that, with such objects as I have in view, I may not be confined within the stricter rules of mere philological or theological discussion.

The closing part of the present disquisition may be regarded, by some, as uncalled for and inapposite. I can only say, for the purpose of vindicating it, that its design is to point out what connection, in my view, the great truths which John teaches have, with the Christian's highest spiritual experience and his most pressing wants. The number of those who will assent to the views there expressed, I am confident is very great. From those who may dissent, I would solicit an indulgent lenity toward me, in regard to the expression of feelings which I could not well suppress. My earnest hope and wishes are, that it may not, in their minds, impair in any measure the force of what is said in the pages that precede the close.]

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος.

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.

'Ev dozy is an exact translation of

in Gen. 1: 1; and this last verse is plainly the prototype and exemplar of John 1: 1-3, with the exception that a new personage, viz. the Logos, is introduced by the apostle. Strictly speaking, the word n designates the exact

point when time began. But in John the assertion is, that at that point the Logos was already in existence, v. In the sequel we have the assertion, that the Logos created all things without any exception, which have been created. Of course the Logos himself is assumed to be an uncreated being. In effect, therefore, ¿v doxy in such a construction is equivalent to the phrase πρὸ τοῦ τὴν γῆν ποιῆσαι, Ριον. 8: 22, which there is parallel to and explains iv dox It is also equivalent to πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι, in John 17: 5; to πρὸ καταβολῆς xóoμov, in John 17: 24 and Eph. 1: 4; also to noò rov aiworos in Prov. 8: 23. And although in strictness of speech év dox does not of itself directly indicate eternity, yet in consequence of its connection here, and by implication, it necessarily designates, or rather implies, this idea. What is uncreated must be eternal; that which existed before all things, or (to use the language of John) before any one created thing, must be eternal; the author of all created things, must of course be self-existent.

The affirmation that der here means the beginning of the Gospeldispensation (Crellius), is so plainly against the tenor of the context, that scarcely any critics have been found to patronize it. The creation of all things is said (v. 3) to have been accomplished by the Logos; and in v. 10 it is affirmed that the world was created by him. In neither case can the Christian church be meant,(as Crellius would have it). Not in the first, for návra never has such a meaning; not in the second, because the assertion is made by John, that this same world which the Logos created did not know him, while the special characteristic of Christians is, that "they know the only true God and Jesus Christ whom he has sent."

In a grammatical respect, the word dox, as here employed, would seem to demand the article. So our version: "In the beginning ;" and so in most languages that have the article. But in Greek, this word is one of those which by usage and special license frequently omit the article, even when (as in the present case) they have a meaning that is monadic and specific. Accordingly, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, ἐξ ἀρχῆς

and iv doxy (all without the article), are frequent both in the N. Test., the Sept., and in the Greek classics. (See Win. N. T. Gram. § 18.) It should be noted, moreover, that our idiom would employ a mode of expression somewhat different from that of the text. We should say: "At the beginning," (not in). But in has become familiar to us, by reason of the biblical mode of expression.

v, was, i. e. existed; or, to translate more exactly according to the Imperfect tense, was existing. This is the nearest we can come to giving the relative sense of the Greek Imperf. in our language. The relative sense in this case has respect to something else in the past, which existed or was done. This is designated in v. 9 and the sequel, which exhibit the Logos in his incarnate condition. His antecedent condition is contrasted with his incarnate one; and as both belong to the past time, the Imperf. is employed in its proper sense, viz. that of denoting action or being in the past, antecedent to something else that was or was done in the past. To say, as some have said, that of itself denotes timeless existence (like ¿orí in Osòs έσrí), seems not to be well founded in the laws of grammatical usage. The assertion of the eternity of the Logos depends not on the use of y, but on the nature of the declarations respecting him. Our simple English preterite (was) fails to give here the relative sense of the Greek, as already remarked; nor can we easily remedy this difficulty in our language, for the expression was existing would seem to be in a measure unusual and cumbrous.

'O Aoyos, the Word. According to the general usage of the Greek language, λóyos may designate either word or wisdom (reason). But in the language of the O. Test. and of the New, λóyos never has the meaning of reason, understanding, or wisdom, in God. The usual form, in relation to God, is ó kóros vov Oɛov. But with such a limitation, the meaning of λóyos is quite diverse from that in our text, (Rev.13: 19 only excepted). God's word means, in both Testaments, something spoken by him, or some communication or message from him. But in what possible sense could it be said, that such a word was "with him," or that it "became flesh and dwelt amongst us?"

Equally remote from the sense of 2óyos, here in John, is that of wisdom or reason; for (1), such a meaning of λóyos is without any example in the Scriptures, which usually express it by σοφία τοῦ Θεοῦ, and sometimes by καρδία, νους, οι πνεῦμα. It cannot well be supposed that John has here departed from the elsewhere universal usage of the Scriptures. But (2), if this could be supposed, then in what possible sense can it be said of wisdom or reason, that it "became incarnate and dwelt among us?" (v. 14.)

From whatever source the appellation now in question may have

been derived, it is plain that the word is not employed in any of its ordinary senses. If it could be shown that John meant to employ it merely in the way of personification, then, whether we give the meaning of word or wisdom to it, we might easily interpret it in reference to merely a creating or enlightening and saving power; for we have parallels in the O. Test. of the like nature, e. g. Ps. 33: 6. Prov. 8: 22 seq., where, to the word of God and to wisdom, creative power and saving influence are ascribed. But the assertion of the incarnation of the Logos (v.14) forbids us to regard it as à personification here either of word or wisdom. A hypostasis it must be. Even the very first assertion respecting it, viz. that it was with God, indicates this; for what could be the design of the writer in asserting here, that God's wisdom (as an attribute) was with him? Did any one ever doubt, or need to be informed, whether the wisdom of any being is with him? And even if information of this kind were intended to be given, would not the writer have said: ἐν αὐτῷ, and not πρὸς αὐτόν ? As to word, such an assertion would be unintelligible and unmeaning. Besides, to this Logos is ascribed both life and light (v. 4), where the form of expression (¿ avro indicates more than that the Logos was merely the instrumental cause of life and light, for it fully expresses the idea that he was the source of both. John even goes farther than this in the strength of his expression. In 1 John 1: 1, 2, he calls him, first, the Logos of life; and then he declares that "the Life... the eternal Life that was with the Father (ngos ròv naτégα), was exhibited to us in a visible and tangible shape." So in John 1: 9 he is called the true Light of men, and in 8: 12, the Light of the world.

If now we compare these and the like expressions together, and give them their proper force, how can they be supposed to indicate less, than that they are intended to designate attributives which belong to a hypostasis? And in this, indeed, nearly all classes of interpreters appear at present to be united. But in respect to the nature and rank of this hypostasis, there is, as there long has been, a great diversity of sentiment. But our present concern is merely with the appellation Logos, and not with the rank which the being so named holds. In accordance with this we ask: Why did John so name him? And in giving him such a name, what was the special signification which he attached to it?

One thing, at least, seems to be quite probable, if not certain, in respect to this matter. Every rational and sober writer wishes and expects to be understood by his readers. Consequently he employs language which he supposes will be intelligible to them. On this ground we must suppose, that John employed the word Logos here in a sense which his contemporary readers would be able to understand. There must

then have been something in the linguistic usage of that period, among the Hebrews or the Hebrew Greeks, which led the apostle to employ the appellation in question, or, at all events, which led him to suppose that it might be understood. Do the Scriptures, or does the history of the Hebrew usus loquendi of that period, cast any light on this subject?

A careful examination of the Scriptures will lead us to see, that the Hebrews were accustomed to speak of the word of God in a manner which not unfrequently led to personification; and at times they expressed themselves almost as if it were a hypostasis. The foundation of this seems to be laid in Gen. 1:3," God said: Let there be light; and there was light." This is equivalent to a declaration that the word of God has in it a creative power. Expressly after this tenor is Ps. 23: 6, "By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth." There can indeed be no reasonable ground to doubt, that all this is figurative, or (in other words) that it is a symbolical representation of God's executive power or energy. The analogy, which leads to and forms the basis of such representations, is easily explained. Words are with us the signs of internal ideas, feelings, desires, purposes, etc.; and, consequently, they are as it were the outward development or representation of the internal man, or of the energies of the soul. Words are the means or instruments by which we make our desire or will known, and cause it to be executed. Nay, so closely connected are they with us, that they become the usual medium by which we carry on the process of thinking. Carrying over now to the Godhead, (as is usual in cases of representation without number), the analogy drawn from human things, the sacred writers have represented his word as accomplishing the purposes of his will. Hence a creating power, a life-giving power, a regenerating power, an enlightening power, and the like, are ascribed to the word of God. Not unfrequently is it spoken of in such a way as would seem, at first view, to indicate that it is regarded as a being, a hypostasis, which possesses and exercises attributes of its own. It is easy to illustrate and confirm this view, from both the O. Test. and the New.

Thus, in accordance with Gen. 1: 3 and Ps. 33: 6, it is said in Heb. 11:3, that "the worlds were framed by the word of God." So in 2 Pet. 3:5,"By the word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth.” This word is a life-giving power: "Man doth not live by bread only, but by every word which proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord," Deut. 8: 3. Matt. 4: 4. Luke 4: 4. It gives spiritual as well as physical life: Thy word hath quickened me," Ps. 119: 50; and so 1 Pet 1: 23, "Born of incorruptible seed... by the word of God which liveth and abideth forever." It has attributes or qualities ascribed to it; e. g.