8

ORIGIN OF HEREDITARY MONARCHY,

but pacific competition; - the term of whose authority would gradually be prolonged to that of his natural life, and afterwards extended to the lives of his remotest descendants. The advantages which seem to us to be peculiar to this arrangement are, first, to disarm the ambition of dangerous and turbulent individuals, by removing the great prize of Supreme authority, at all times, and entirely, from competition; and, secondly, to render this authority itself more manageable and less hazardous, by delivering it over peaceably, and upon expressed or understood conditions, to an hereditary prince; instead of letting it be seized upon by a fortunate conqueror, who would think himself entitled to use it as conquerors commonly use their booty— for his own exclusive gratification.

The steps, then, by which we are conducted to the justification of Hereditary Monarchy, are shortly as follows. Admitting all men to be equal in rights, they can never be equal in natural endowments,-nor long equal in wealth and other acquisitions:- Absolute liberty, therefore, or equal participation of power, is altogether out of the question; and a kind of Aristocracy, or disorderly and fluctuating supremacy of the richest and most accomplished, may be considered as the primeval state of society. Now this, even if it could be supposed to be peaceable and permanent, is by no means a desirable state for the persons subjected to this multifarious and irregular authority. But it is plain that it could not be peaceable—that even among the rich, and the accomplished, and the daring, some would be more rich, more daring, and more accomplished than the rest; and that those in the foremost ranks who were most nearly on an equality, would be armed against each other by mutual jealousy and ambition; while those who were a little lower would combine, out of envy and resentment, to defeat or resist, by their junction, the pretensions of the few who had thus outstripped their original associates. Thus there would not only be no liberty or security for the body of the people, but the whole would be exposed to the horror and distraction of perpetual intestine contentions. The creation of one Sovereign, therefore, whom the whole so

AND FULL JUSTIFICATION.

9

ciety would acknowledge as supreme, was a great point gained for tranquillity as well as individual independence; and in order to avoid the certain evils of perpetual struggles for dominion, and the imminent hazard of falling at last under the absolute will of an exasperated conqueror, nothing could be so wisely devised as to agree upon the nomination of a King; and thus to get rid of a multitude of petty tyrants, and the risk of military despotism, by the establishment of a legitimate monarchy. The first king would probably be the most popular and powerful individual in the community; and the first idea would in all likelihood be to appoint his successor on account of the same qualifications: But it would speedily be discovered, that this would give rise at the death of every sovereign-and indeed, prospectively, long before itto the same fatal competitions and dissensions, which had formerly been perpetual; and not only hazard a civil war on every accession, but bring the successful competitor, to the throne, with feelings of extreme hostility towards one half of his subjects, and of extreme partiality to the other. The chances of not finding eminent talents for command in the person of the sovereign, therefore, would soon be seen to be a far less evil than the sanguinary competitions that would ensue, if merit were made the sole ground of preferment; and a very little reflection, or experience, would also serve to show, that the sort of merit which was most likely to succeed in such a competition, did not promise a more desirable sovereign than might be probably reckoned on, in the common course of hereditary succession. The only safe course, therefore, was, to take this Great Prize altogether out of the Lottery of human life-to make the supreme dignity in the state, professedly and altogether independent of merit or popularity; and to fix it immutably in a place quite out of the career of ambition.

This great point then was gained by the mere institution of Monarchy, and by rendering it hereditary: The chief cause of internal discord was removed, and the most dangerous incentive to ambition placed in a great measure beyond the sphere of its operation ;-and this we have always considered to be the peculiar and charac

10 KINGS MUST HAVE REAL, BUT LIMITED POWERS.

teristic advantage of that form of government. A pretty important chapter, however, remains, as to the extent of the Powers that ought to be vested in the Monarch, and the nature of the Checks by which the limitation of those powers should be rendered effectual. And here it will be readily understood, that considering, as we do, the chief advantage of monarchy to consist in its taking away the occasions of contention for the First Place in the state, and in a manner neutralizing that place by separating it entirely from any notion of merit or popularity in the possessor-we cannot consistently be for allotting a greater measure of actual power to it than is absolutely necessary for answering this purpose. Our notions of this measure, however, are by no means of a jealous or penurious description. We must give enough of real power, and distinction and prerogative, to make it truly and substantially the first place in the State, and also to make it impossible for the occupiers of inferior places to endanger the general peace by their contentions;-for, otherwise, the whole evils which its institution was meant to obviate would recur with accumulated force, and the same fatal competitions be renewed among persons of disorderly ambition, for those other situations, by whatever name they might be called, in which, though nominally subordinate to the throne, the actual powers of sovereignty were embodied. But, on the other hand, we would give no powers to the Sovereign, or to any other officer in the community, beyond what were evidently required for the public good;—and no powers at all, on the exercise of which there was not an efficient control, and for the use of which there was not a substantial responsibility. It is in the reconciling of these two conditions that the whole difficulty of the theory of a perfect monarchy consists. If you do not control your sovereign, he will be in danger of becoming a despot; and if you do control him, there is danger, unless you choose the depository of this control with singular caution, that you create another power, that is uncontrolled and uncontrollableto be the prey of audacious leaders and outrageous factions, in spite of the hereditary settlement of the nomi

NECESSARY LIMITS OF ALL POWER.

11

nal sovereignty. Though there is some difficulty, however, in this problem, and though we learn from history, that various errors have been committed in an attempt at its practical solution, yet we do not conceive it as by any means insoluble; and think indeed that, with the lights which we may derive from the experience of our own constitution, its demonstration may be effected by a very moderate exertion of sagacity. It will be best understood, however, by a short view of the nature of the powers to be controlled, and of the system of checks which have, at different times, been actually resorted to.

In the first place, then, we must beg leave to remind our readers, however superfluous it may appear, that as kings are now generally allowed to be mere mortals, they cannot of themselves have any greater powers, either of body or mind, than other individuals, and must in fact be inferior in both respects to very many of their subjects. Whatever powers they have, therefore, must be powers conferred upon them by the consent of the stronger part of their subjects, and are in fact really and truly the powers of those persons. The most absolute despot accordingly, of whom history furnishes any record, must have governed merely by the free will of those who chose to obey him, in compelling the rest of his subjects to obedience. The Sultan, as Mr. Hume remarks, may indeed drive the bulk of his unarmed subjects, like brutes, by mere force; but he must lead his armed Janissaries like men, by their reason and free will. And so it is in all other governments: The power of the sovereign is nothing else than the power-the actual force of muscle or of mind-which a certain part of his subjects choose to lend for carrying his orders into effect; and the check or limit to this power is, in all cases, ultimately and in effect, nothing else than their refusal to act any longer as the instruments of his pleasure. The check, therefore, is substantially the same in kind, in all cases whatever; and must necessarily exist in full vigour in every country in the world; though the likelihood of its beneficial application depends greatly on the structure of society in each particular nation; and the

12 SAME CONTROULING POWER SUCCESSFULLY VESTED IN

possibility of applying it with ease and safety must result wholly from the contrivances that have been adopted to make it bear, at once gradually and steadily, on the power it is destined to regulate. It is here accordingly, and here only, that there is any material difference between a good and a bad constitution of Monarchical government. The ultimate and only real limit to what is called the power of the sovereign, is the refusal of the consent or co-operation of those who possess the substantial power of the community, and who, during their voluntary concert with the sovereign, allow this power of theirs to pass under his name. In considering whether this refusal is likely to be wisely and beneficially interposed, it is material therefore to inquire in whom, in any particular case, the power of interposing it is vested; or, in other words, in what individuals the actual power of coercing and compelling the submission of the bulk of the community is intrinsically vested. If every individual were equally gifted, and equally situated, the answer would be, In the numerical majority: But as this never can be the case, this power will frequently be found to reside in a very small proportion of the whole society.

In rude times, when there is little intelligence or means of concert and communication, a very moderate number of armed and disciplined forces will be able, so long as they keep together, to overawe, and actually overpower the whole unarmed inhabitants, even of an extensive region; and accordingly, in such times, the necessity of procuring the good will and consent of the Soldiery, is the only check upon the power of the Sovereign; or, in other words, the soldiers may do what they chooseand their nominal master can do nothing which they do not choose. Such is the state of the worst despotisms. The check upon the royal authority is the same in substance as in the best administered monarchies, viz. the refusal of the consent or co-operation of those who possess for the time the natural power of the community: But, from the unfortunate structure of society, which (in the case supposed) vests this substantial power in a few bands of disciplined ruffians, the check will scarcely