unless those operations contravene its provisions.-New York Produce Exchange v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. et al., (1898) 7 I. C. C. R. 612, 658.

natural flow of trade and commerce, but rather to secure perfect freedom of competition between carriers.-New York Produce Exchange v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. et al., (1898) 7 I. C. C. R. 612, 682.

19. The Interstate Commerce Act is

not intended to prevent competition between carriers.-Allen & Lewis v. Oregon Rd. & Nav. Co. et al., (1899) 98 Fed. Rep. 16, 22; s. c. 106 Fed. Rep. 265.

14. Within the limits of the exercise of intelligent good faith in the conduct of their business, and subject to the two leading prohibitions that their charges shall not be unjust or unreasonable, and that they shall not unjustly diseriminate 80 as to give undue pref- 20. The Act was not designed to preerence or disadvantage to persons or vent competition between different roads, traffic similarly circumstanced, the act but rather to encourage it.-Interstate to regulate commerce leaves common Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. carriers as they were at the common Ry. Co., (1905) 141 Fed. Rep. 1003, 1014. law, free to make special rates looking to 21. It is not the purpose of the Act to the increase of their business, to classify prevent competition between different their traffic, to adjust and apportion their carriers.-Interstate Commerce Commisrates so as to meet the necessities of sion v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co., (1892) 145 commerce and of their own situation and U. S. 263, 276, 12 Sup. Ct. R. 844, 36 L. relation to it, and, generally, to manage | Ed. 699. their important interests upon the same principles which are regarded as sound and adopted in other trades and pursuits.Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co., (1896), 74 Fed. Rep. 715, 723, 21 C. C. A. 51, 41 U. S. App. 453. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co., (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 37, 50.

Special contracts with shippers.

15. The Interstate Commerce Act, when it took effect, abrogated all existing contracts with common carriers for special interstate rates.-Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald & M. Const. Co., (1894) 41 Neb. 374, 59 N. W. 838.

16. All special contracts or traffic arrangements between carrier and shipper are not forbidden by the Act, but only such as operate unfairly, and evidence undue favoritism toward one, or deprive another of his just rights.-Laurel Cotton Mills v. Gulf & S. I. R. Co., (1904) 84 Miss. 339, 37 So. 137, 66 L. R. A. 453. With respect to differences between financial or business conditions not resulting from arbitrary action of carrier.

With respect to conflicting state statutes or general laws.

Commerce Act supersede and abrogate all
22. The provisions of the Interstate
conflicting state statutes and general laws.
(1900) 106 Tenn. 73, 59 S. W. 134; Rail-
-Atlanta, K. & N. Ry. Co. v. Horne,
way Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 99, 15 Sup. Ct.
R. 802, 39 L. Ed. 910.

II. CONSTRUCTION OF ACT.
IN GENERAL, 23-27.
WITH RESPECT TO COMMON-LAW RIGHTS,
28.
WITH RESPECT TO RIGHT OF CARRIER

TO MAKE CONTRACTS AND ADOPT
PROPER BUSINESS METHODS, 29.
WITH RESPECT TO TARIFF LAWS, 30.
CONSTRUCTION BY COMMISSION
WHEN SAME SHOULD BE TREATED AS
READ INTO ACT, 31.
In general.

first instance to assume its own construc-
23. Every carrier has the right in the
tion of the Act.-Re Disabled Soldiers and
Sailors, (1887) 1 I. C. C. R. 28.

must be read and understood in the light 24. In construing the Act, each section of every other section.-Boston Fruit & Produce Exchange v. New York & N. E. Rd. Co. et al., (1891) 4 I. C. C. R. 664, 678, 3 I. C. R. 493.

17. The Interstate Commerce Act is intended to prohibit arbitrary differences and inequalities in the rates and methods of doing business of the carrier, and not differences between financial and busi-purpose and the evils sought to be reme25. In construing the Act, its general ness conditions resulting from other died must be considered. Furthermore, causes.-Interstate Commerce Commission parts of the Act are not to be so construed v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. as to defeat other important features; nor Rep. 409, 427. is such a construction to be adopted, in whole or in part, as may tend to prevent the proper enforcement of the legislative purpose.-Van Patten v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (1897) 81 Fed. Rep. 545.

With respect to competition.
See "Competition.

18. It is not the purpose of the Act to fetter competition, nor interfere with the

26. Where different constructions of ulars, construed, such construction should the Act are possible, that construction will be treated as read into the Act and should be adopted which will promote and facil- be followed in all strictly identical cases. itate commerce, rather than one which-New York, N. H. & H. Rd. Co. v. Interwill hamper or destroy it.-Texas & P. state Commerce Commission, (1906) 200 Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commis- U. S. 361, 26 Sup. Ct. R. 272, 50 L. Ed. sion, (1896) 162 U. S. 197, 218, 16 Sup. 515.

Ct. R. 666, 40 L. Ed. 940.

27. The great purpose of the Act, whilst seeking to prevent unreasonable rates, is to secure equality of rates and to destroy favoritism. To this extent the Act is remedial and should be so interpreted as reasonably to accomplish such purpose.-New York, N. H. & H. Rd. Co. V. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1906) 200 U. S. 361, 26 Sup. Ct. R. 272, 50 L. Ed. 515, affirming I. C. C. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 128 Fed. Rep. 59.. With respect to common-law rights.

III. WHEN ACT BECAME EFFECTIVE.
Hepburn Act.

32. The Interstate Commerce Act, as amended June 29, 1906, was approved by the President on that date. By joint resolution of Congress approved on June 30, 1906, it was provided that the Act should not take effect until 60 days after its approval by the President. Held, that the Act became effective on June 29, 1906, and that the resolution was therefore powerless to postpone that which already had occurred on June 29.-United States v. Standard Oil Co., (1907) 148 Fed. Rep. 719, 722.

ADJUSTING RATES.

28. The Act is not to be construed as taking away common law rights existing at the date of its enactment, unless that result is imperatively required; that is, unless such preëxisting rights are so repugnant to the Act that their survival would render its provisions nugatory.-Texas & See "Rates," 407-713. P. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., (1907) 204 U. S. 426, 437, 27 Sup. Ct. R. 350.

ADVANCE IN RATES.

With respect to right of carrier to make See "Rates," 361-406.
contracts and adopt proper business
methods.

29. The Interstate Commerce Act is not to be so construed as to abridge or take away the common law right of the carrier to make contracts, and adopt proper business methods, further than its terms and recognized purposes require.-Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. 409, 426.

With respect to tariff laws.

30. It was not intended by Congress that the Act should be so construed as to make it coöperate with the policy of the tariff laws.-Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Inter. state Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197, 221, 16 Sup. Ct. R. 666, 40 L.

Ed. 940.

ADVANCEMENTS.

For construction of switch track, repayment of, see "Allowances," 6, 7.

ADVANTAGE.

See "Preference or prejudice."

AGENTS.

See "Station agent."

As parties to offenses, see "Criminal pros-
Contract between shipper and his agent
ecution," 66-70.
"Contracts,'

to secure cut rates, see

25. Denial of carload rate on less than carload lots combined into carload by forwarding agent, see "Rates," 987. General freight agent, testimony of, to prove rates on file with Commission, see Schedules or tariffs," 250.

Land and immigration agents, free passes in favor of, see "Free transportation,"

16.

I. ALLOWANCE TO SHIPPER FOR | exclusively on through trips from Chicago SERVICE OR INSTRUMENTAL

to New York and made regularly a large mileage, the sum paid to the Express company was excessive. The earnings of the Express company from the mileage received were 50% per annum on its capital

ALLOWANCE FOR USE OF SPECIAL LIVE-stock, after deducting for repairs and salSTOCK CARS, 4.

ALLOWANCE FOR COMPRESSION OF COT-
TON, 5.

ALLOWANCE TO REPAY COST OF CON

STRUCTING SIDE TRACK, 6, 7. ELEVATOR ALLOWANCES, 8-10. In general.

aries. Held, that the payment of the
mileage to the Express company amounted
to a rebate from the rate of transporta-
tion, and gave undue preference to some
shippers of live stock and subjected other
shippers to undue prejudice.-Shamberg v.
4 I. C. C. R. 630, 3 I. C. R. 502.
Delaware, L. & W. Rd. Co. et al., (1891)

Allowance for compression of cotton.

was

An

1. Under section 15 of the Act a carrier may make a "just and reasonable" allowance to a shipper for any service or instrumentality furnished by him in connection 5. Defendant's line extended northerly with the transportation of his property. from South McAlester, Ind. Terr., through Held, that this provision must be read in Muskogee, Ind. Terr., to St. Louis. A cotconnection with the other provisions of ton compress was operated at Muskogee the Act forbidding and making unlawful by a professional compressor who any arrangement or practice that results neither a buyer nor seller of cotton. in undue preference or unjust discrimina- other compress was operated at South Mction in favor of one shipper as against Alester by a company which bought and others, or that results in a rebate or de-sold cotton in large quantities. Defendparture from the lawfully published rates; that if the allowance involves a profit over and above the actual cost of the service rendered, it becomes, when made to a shipper, a rebate and an unlawful discrimination to the extent of the profit realized. -Re Allowances to Elevators by U. P. Rd. Co., (1907) 12 I. C. C. R. 85. Allowance for use of tank cars.

ant's policy was to require compression at compress nearest the point of origin of the cotton, but with respect to cotton originating at or near Muskogee, defendant permitted the same to be shipped to South McAlester for compression, and thence shipped back through Muskogee to destination at through rate from original point of shipment. For this extra hauling to South McAlester and return defendant re2. The carrier may justly make a rea-ceived no compensation. The privilege of sonable allowance to owners of tank cars

for the use of such cars.--Rice v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co.. (1888) 1 I. C. C. R. 503,

1 I. C. R. 722.

3. A rate of three-fourths of a cent per mile paid by a carrier for the use of tank cars in which to transport oil, held reason able.-Scofield et al. v. Lake Shore & M. S.

Ry. Co., (1888) 2 I. C. C. R. 90, 120, 2 I.

C. R. 67.

Allowance for use of special live-stock

cars.

4. S. & S. were engaged in shipping live stock from Chicago to New York. The L. Express Co. was owned or controlled by S. & S., and was organized for the purpose of furnishing special live-stock cars to defendant. While the use of the cars thus furnished was ostensibly open to all shippers, the number was limited so that substantially all the business done by them was that of S. & S. and shippers in their care. Defendant refused to haul private cars of other companies. The mileage paid by defendant was the usual 4 of a cent per mile, but because the cars were used

The

from points in that vicinity, for compresshipping cotton from South McAlester, or sion at Muskogee was not allowed. bale, was paid by defendant. Out of this charge for compression, about 50 cents per of from 15 to 20 cents per bale. sum the compress company made a profit The Compress company at McAlester, being a large shipper of cotton, thus secured an advantage, by the amount of profit realized from compression, over other shippers not owning compresses. The exception to the rule requiring compression at compress nearest the point of origin was justified by defendant on the ground that the compress company at McAlester had threatened to divert its shipments to another road if the exception were not made. Held, that when defendant declared a policy with respect to compression at the nearest point, it could not vary that rule so as to give the compress company at McAlester the opportunity to avoid it and thereby receive an advantage which was not given to shippers generally; that the threat of the compress company at Mc

Alester to divert its shipments to another road was not the character of competition which would justify defendant in making a discrimination in favor of that company.-Muskogee Commercial Club v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., (1907) 12 I. C. C. R. 312.

Allowance to repay cost of constructing side track.

6. An arrangement whereby a carrier undertakes to repay advancements made by a shipper for the construction of a switch track by making an allowance to such shipper of a definite amount on each earload of freight shipped to or from his manufacturing plant, should be evidenced by a written contract, a copy of which should be filed with the Commission.Weleetka Light & W. Co. v. Fort Smith & W. R. Co., (1907) 12 I. C. C. R. 503.

plaint was made that the allowance for transfer was exorbitant and unreasonable and amounted to an unlawful concession. P. & Co. did not pay more for grain than other buyers, and the facts indicated, in view of similar charges elsewhere, that that company was not unduly remunerated. Held, that it was proper and legitimate for the Union Pacific to enter into the arrangement mentioned; that the transfer charge was not unlawful.-Re Allowances to Elevators by the U. P. Rd. Co., (1904) 10 I. C. C. R. 309.

10. P. & Co. were owners of grain elevators at Kansas City, Mo., and Council Bluffs, Ia. For the purpose of securing prompt release of its car equipment at Kansas City and Council Bluffs, the Union Pacific Railroad arranged with P. & Co. to transfer grain from its cars at those 7. The Commission does not approve points into P. & Co's. elevators, an allow the practice of some carriers of repaying ance of 14 cents per 100 pounds being advancements made by a shipper for the paid for the service. P. & Co. were also construction of a switch track by making large dealers in grain, and they therefore an allowance to such shipper of a definite performed a service for themselves and for amount on each carload of freight shipped their own grain, although operating the to or from his manufacturing plant. Such elevators under contract with the railroad an arrangement presents too much the ap- company. The allowance paid for elevapearance of a purchase of property by the tion yielded P. & Co. an appreciable profit carrier with transportation, which is con- which was used by that company to adtrary to the principles of the Act.-vantage in the buying and shipping of Weleetka Light & W. Co. v. Fort Smith & W. R. Co., (1907) 12 I. C. C. R. 503. Elevator allowances.

8. Having the right under the law to provide elevation for its shippers, a railroad company may either construct and operate an elevator of its own, or may furnish elevation facilities to its shippers by making an arrangement with the owner of an elevator for such service. The amount of compensation paid to the owner for rendering the service is not a matter of concern either to shippers or to other carriers, unless in some way it enters into the rates charged, thus making them excessive, or unless by some device a portion of the allowance is returned to shippers, thus effecting a rebate. Re Allowances to Elevators by U. P. Rd. Co., (1907) 12 I. C. C. R. 85.

9. The eastern terminals of the Union Pacific Railroad are at Council Bluffs, Ia., and Kansas City, Mo. The Union Pacific entered into contracts with P. & Co., under which the latter erected elevators at Couneil Bluffs and Kansas City for transfer of grain at those terminals. The Union Pacific agreed to pay P. & Co. 14 cents per 100 pounds for the service. P. & Co. were large buyers and shippers of grain at points on the Union Pacific system. Com

grain. Held, that as the allowance involved a profit over and above the actual cost of the service rendered, it became a rebate to the extent of the profit realized; that the allowance should not exceed the actual cost of the service rendered, or 34 of a cent per 100 pounds.-Re Allowances to Elevators by U. P. Rd. Co., (1907) 12 I. C. C. R. 85.

II. ALLOWANCE OF DIVISION

JOINT RATE TO ROAD OWNED OR
CONTROLLED BY SHIPPER.

OF