have been expected to be less than considerable. The Spaniards lost several officers and wounded yesterday, but I have not any return of them. I have the honour to be, &c. The Marquis of Wellington, &c. Santa Marta de Cubo, July 1, 1813. Sir, On the 29th of June last, I had the honour to acquaint you, for the information of his excellency the general in chief of the national armies, that the Caçadores and grenadiers of the first brigade of the first division of this army had assaulted and taken the fort of Santa de Pancorbo. I have now the satisfaction of acquainting you, that at eight o'clock this morning, the castle of Santa Engracia, or principal fort of Pancorbo, surrendered by capitulation. The garrison consisted of 650 men; they had provisions for several days no very great quantity of water, and that not of a good quality. There were found in the castle twenty pieces of cannon, of a calibre from 16 to 4 pounds, many gun-carriages, and a sufficient quantity of ammunition for a regular defence. The garrison surrendered under the enclosed articles of capitulation, and will march to-morrow morning for Burgos. From the 28th, the day on which the fort of Santa Marta was taken, I had posted the sharp-shooters in the vicinity of the walls of the fort, and, by blockading it most vigorously, I cut off all communication with the spring from which they provided themselves with water. The different detachments employ ed upon this service performed their duty with a steadiness and valour deserving every praise; and the enemy could no longer procure their water without imminent risk. Taking advantage of this circumstance, I ordered several numerous detachments to establish themselves as near the wall as possible, and out of the range of the enemy's guns. A quantity of ladders, and other necessary implements, were procured for attacking the castle; but being anxious to adopt every necessary step for economizing the lives of my men, I hinted a second time to the governor to surrender, which he consented to accede to, under condition of being carried back to France with his garrison; but he yielded at last, upon my refusing to admit this condition, and threatening to take the place by storm. The successful result of this business is not a little owing to the intelligence and judgment which my aide-decamp, Lieut. Colonel Joze Maria Reyna displayed during the course of his conferences with the governor. The result of the lieutenantcolonel's negociation has proved of no little advantage to us. During the space of 24 hours, a battery for six pieces had been constructed on the summit of the hill, by the indefatigable exertions of the sappers of the army (and several peasants), under the direction of the commandant-general of the engineers, Marshal de Campo Don Manuel Japino, and six pieces of cannon, which had been collected by the colonel, major-general of the artillery, Don Matias Ferraz, were got upon the bill with the greatest activity, under the direction of the colonel, whơ N 2. was was ably assisted by the lieutenant colonel of artillery, Don José Jarabia, and the serjeant-major, Don Bartolomo Gutierrez, and other subaltern officers. Eight hours after the battery was commenced, the guns began to open upon the enemy, and besides causing him considerable loss, impressed him with sufficient respect for us. I cannot but call the attention of the general in chief of the national armies to the valour and activity displayed upon this occasion by Brigadier-General Don Jozé Latorre, commanding the 1st brigade of infantry; by the chief of the staff of the army, colonel Don Miguel Desmaysieres, who scarcely took one moment's rest during the siege, which lasted three days, and to the good conduct of the officers of the staff who were placed under his orders, and that of the commander and officers of the infantry and cavalry which composed the besieging corps. I must also notice the meritorious conduct of my aides-de-camp Lieut.-Colonels Don José de Ruiz, Don Jozé Maria Reyna, Don Victor Vinader, and Lieutenant Don Benito Diaz, and of my military secretary Don Joze Serfate and Salagar, who carried my orders, on several occasions, to the very walls of the enemy's fort, heedless of the latter's fire. The enemy kept up a brisk fire from his guns, &c. but the loss which he occasioned us has been very inconsiderable. The enemy's surrendering the place created great regret among the troops, who had consented to take it by assault, and they only console themselves with the hope of there being some more places to conquer. I bave put a small garrison into the fort of Pancorbo, and shall supply it immediately with provisions and water; but I shall not make any addition to the works, without knowing first the intentions of the general in chief relative to the demolition or preservation of this place. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) EL CONDE DE EBISBAL. To Don Louis de Wimpffen, &c. [Here follows the capitulation of the Fort Santa Engracia de Pancorbo, by which the garrison are made prisoners of war, and are allowed the honours of war; the officers to retain their swords, horses, and baggage; and the serjeants and soldiers their effects, and be furnished with means of transport, and to be exchanged by the first cartel that takes place, and they will for that purpose be removed to as small a distance as possible.] Extract of a letter from the Marquess of Wellington, dated Ostiz, July 3. I have reported, in my dispatch of this day, that Lieut.-General Sir John Murray had raised the siege of Tarragona, and had em、 barked, leaving behind him a portion of his artillery. On this transaction I do not think myself sufficiently informed to be able to write more. I enclose copics of the letters which I have received relating to Tarragona. Camp before Tarragona, June 9. My lord,-In my letter of May the 28th, I had the honour to inform your lordship, that, in obedience to your lordship's instructions, the British army was then embarking. embarking. On the 31st we sailed, and anchored to the eastward of Salon point, on the evening of the 2d inst. On the 3d the army disembarked, and I invested Tarragona. Previous to coming to an anchor, I detached Lieut.-Colonel Prevost's brigade, under convoy of the Brune, to attack the fort of St. Philippe; and in the night, General Copons, at my request, detached a brigade of infantry to co-operate. The brigade of Col. Prevost consists of the 2d, 67th, and the battalion of Roll Dillon; and to these was subsequently joined the brigade of Spanish troops coramanded by Col. Lander. The fort has been taken, and I have the honour to enclose Colonel Prevost's report to me, with the returns which he has sent. A This capture, in the present situation of our affairs, is of great importance, as it blocks up the nearest and most accessible road from Tortosa to Tarragona. Admiral Hallowell, with that alacrity and zeal for which he is much distinguished, sent Captain Adam, in the Invincible, to conduct the naval part of the expedition, and added the Thames, Capt. Peyton; Volcano, Captain Carrol; Strombolo, Captain Stoddart; Brune, Captain Badcock. Lieut.Col. Prevost speaks highly of the exertions of those officers and their men, and I know how valuable and important their services were found to be. The troops of both nations bore their fatigue and performed their duty with the greatest alacrity and spirit, and deserve every commendation. The lieutenant-colonel has, in a former dispatch, particuarly noticed the gallantry and good conduct of Ensign Nelson, of the 67th, and Ensign John Dermot, of Roll Dillon's battalion. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) J. MURRAY, Lieut.-Gen. His Excellency the Marquess of Wellington. P. S. I have omitted to say, that Captain Carrol's services were particularly meritorious; and Lieut. Corbyn, of the Invincible, who commanded a battery manned by seamen, kept up a well-directed and heavy fire. The importance of this acquisition, and the rapidity with which the fort has been taken, make it quite unnecessary for me to say how much I approve of the conduct of LieutenantColonel Prevost and of Captain Adam. [Here follows a letter from Colonel Prevost relative to the capture of Col de Balaguer.] mand. In my private letter of the 7th instant, I mentioned to your lordship the reports of the assemblage of the French forces at Barcelona, and that Marshal Suchet was likewise in march from Valencia; and stated it as my opinion, that should these reports be confirmed, the object your lordship had in view could not be accomplished. Unfortunately these rumours proved true, and reluctantly I resolved upon raising the siege and embarking the army, as the only means of avoiding a general action, which must have been fought under every disadvantage. I cannot at at this moment refer to dates, but it is sufficient for the present to state, that the French force at Barcelona was never rated to me at less than S000, and that previous to their march it would amount to 10,000, with 14 pieces of artillery. I have, however, no account that it ever exceeded eight, and that is the number on which my calculation was formed. This force, upon the evening of the 9th, or morning of the 10th, marched out, from Barcelona, and entered Villa Franca, at four o'clock in the evening of the 11th, from whence it was reported to me to march at 12 o'clock at night for Vendrells, distant only 18 or 20 miles from Tarragona by the great road, and a few miles further by another road, by which cannon can easily pass. On the 9th or 10th the arrival of Marshal Suchet at Va Jencia was made known to me; his exact force was never perfectly ascertained, but from the intelligence received from Valencia, he marched from thence with 9000 men, and certainly in the rear of that place had the power of draw ing great reinforcements to his army. To these corps must be added, a body of 1000 men, which had previously arrived at Tortosa, and another corps, independent of the garrison of 2,500 men, who had arrived at Lerida. These corps, which I am sure I do not exaggerate, amount to 20,500 men,with which, in four or five days, Marshal Suchet could attack the allied army, if he thought proper; or avoid an action, if he wished still more to reinforce his army. Your lordship, on the other hand, will observe, that I could scarcely bring into the field 12,000 men, and that the army of Catalonia was stated to me at 8,500, making 20,500, of which two British, and two Spanish divisions were at the Col de Balaguer, and could not be withdrawn; and I could not leave less than 2,500 to cover the artil lery and stores, and to contain the garrison of Tarragona. The two corps, at the least, would amɔunt to upwards of 4,500 men, leaving me 16,000 men to meet the best French troops in Spain, amounting to upwards of 20,000. I am sure there is nobody more willing to give full credit to the gallantry of the Spanish troops. than I am, but your lordship well knows that they are unable to move, and I could not therefore depend upon the execution of any order which necessarily obliged them to make a movement; and of troops of this description I had about 13,000 men; unless, therefore, I could place them in position, which, as the French had the option of fighting when and where they pleased, it was impossible I could place any reliance upon them. My My British and German troops amounted only to 4500. Perhaps your lordship may be of opinion, that under these circumstances, I ought to have risked an action, had no other unfavourable objections existed; but when your lordship is informed, that I had no possibility of retreat if unsuccessful,-that there would have been no hopes of embarkation if followed,-and that the army must have been unavoidably lost, if beat,-I venture to hope that your lordship will think, however much it is to be regretted, that I have adopted the only means of maintaining entire, or indeed of saving, an army on which so much depends. I feel the greater confidence in this hope, on reverting to the 13th paragraph of your lordship's general instructions for the conduct of the campaign. I am fully aware there are many circumstances which may require further information, and upon all parts I shall be happy to give every explanation in my power. Your lordship perhaps may be of opinion that the place should have been taken; but as it was far too strong to storm, I believe it not only to have been impossible, but that we should not have taken it in eight or ten days: my only regret is, that I continued the siege so long. Induced by the hopes of the reinforcements I expected, I continued it to the last moment, and fortunately the weather proving favour> able, the troops were embarked without molestation. On this favourable circumstance I could not depend for another day, and therefore, having taken my part, I immediately put it in execution, and I regret to say, that I was in consequence, obliged to leave the guns in the most advanced batteries. Had I remained another day, they might have been brought off; but this risk I would not run, when the existence of the army was at stake, not only from unfavourable weather, but from the appearance of an enemy, in whose presence I could not have embarked perhaps at all, certainly not without suffering a great loss, and without the possibility of deriving any advantage. I have only further at this time to add, should blame be attached to the failure of the expedition, no share of it can fall on Admiral Hallowell, who conducted the naval branch of it. From that distinguished officer I have met with every assistance and co-operation in his power; and I think it only justice to him to state, that it was his opinion that the cannon in the batteries might have been saved by remaining ill the night, and that they then could have been brought off. This, however, was a risk I did not wish to run for so trifling an object, and preferred losing them to the chance of the embarkation being opposed, and of an eventual much more serious loss. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) J. MURRAY, Lieut.-General. To the Marquis of Wellington, K. G. &c. |