thousand dollars remaining unexpended "This Act is declared to be remedial. Its of the 1923 funding bonds amounting to $175,000? purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations, and is to be liberally construed and administered." Pertaining to this inquiry our attention is called to the terms on which the 1923 bonds were issued and sold. The terms were "for the purpose of funding a por- Notwithstanding the fact that the protion of the floating, temporary and cur- visions of the Act should be liberally conrent indebtedness of the said school dis- strued, we cannot avoid stating that its trict." The "floating" and "temporary" privileges should be extended only in indebtedness evidently represented the cases which clearly come within the indebtedness then existing, in one form terms of the Act. In the case at bar we or another; and the "current" indebted-are of the opinion that the petitioner is ness must also have existed at the same entitled to a declaratory judgment. time. Indeed, the legal signification of Now, March 13, 1924, the court is of the word "current" is: "Now passing or the opinion that the school district of present in its progress." Nor can we the borough of Dunmore has no right overlook the meaning of the term "fund- under the law to apply to the payment of ing." It applies to the process of col- its present current indebtedness any part lecting together a variety of outstanding of the fifty thousand dollars remaining debts against private or municipal cor-junexpended of the proceeds of the 1923 porations. By no rule of construction issue of funding bonds which amounted may it be held that bonds issued in 1923 to $175,000, and judgment is rendered to to cover, inter alia, current indebtedness that effect. can be made to include expenses incurr- Cost of this proceeding to be paid by ed in February or March, 1924, several the school district. months after the bonds were sold. The Act of 1923, providing for declaratory judgments, is a new departure in Pennsylvania legislation and deserves some discussion. What is the meaning of a declaratory judgment? The ordinary definition is: A judgment which simply declares the rights of the parties, or expresses the opinion of the court on engaged in agriculture-Casual employa question of law, without ordering any-ment. thing to be done. The Act in question has been very carefully drawn. It contains sixteen sections. The first, second, third and fourth sections give a broad and comprehensive statement of the gen-Compensation Act excluding persons eral scope of the law and the nature of gaged in agriculture from the provision of the cases in which its aid may be invok An owner of a farm, occupied and cultivated by a tenant, who employed men to cut timber on the farm for sale and not for use for farming purposes, was not within the provisions of the clause of the Workmen's the act. en employment was not casual in character so as to exclude him from the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Where one was employed for a season's ed. All kinds of cases, under certain woodcutting, although he was killed while at conditions, are within its purview. Con-work very soon after he began work, his tracts, deeds, wills, trusts, statutes, municipal ordinances and franchises-these and many other subjects which give rise. to legal relations may come at some time or another within the operation of this Act of Assembly. Even a jury trial may be ordered when a proceeding under the Act involves the determination of an issue of fact, in the same manner as such issues are tried in other civil actions. Section 12 of the Act is as follows: Appeal from Workmen's Compensation Board of Pennsylvania, in Lottie V. Zumbrum v. Solomon J. Rudisill, claim petition No. 16686, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Pa., No. 63, January Term, 1924. Affirmed. Niles & Neff, for the claimant. T. F. Chrostwaite, for the defendant. Wanner, P. J., May 6th, 1924.-At the to distant markets, it was held to be a time when the deceased was injured, the separate business, in which an injured defendant was not living on his farm employee could recover damages under where it occurred, or personally engaged the Workmen's Compensation Act. The in farming, but was living as a retired same rule as to the liability of employers farmer in the Borough of Hanover. His was recognized in the following cases: farm was in the hands of a tenant for Strump v. Keller, 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 462; cultivation by the year. Palumbo v. Fuller Co., 122 Atl. 63; Defendant himself, independently of Pliska v. Hatton Lumber Co., 3 Neglithe tenant farmer, was engaged in cut-gence Compensation Cases Annotated, ting timber for the market, from the farm, as a project separate from the cultivation of the land. 699 n; Haugher v. Walker Co., et. al. The deceased was hired to cut timber for the defendant and while being so employed, with others, was accidentally 97n. killed by a falling tree. It seems to have It is also quite apparent that this been purely an accident for the hap-wood cutting was not such a merely caspening of which no negligence is charge-ual employment as would exempt the deable against either party. fendant from liability for accidental in case. These facts being found by the Work-juries to employees so engaged. It was a business project in which he had been men's Compensation Board, on compe-engaged during the former year, and tent and admissible testimony, constitute which he was continuing at the time of the basis of fact for the decision of the the accident and its resulting injury to Under the well settled construction of evidence that though the deceased was the employee. It also appears from the the Workmen's Compensation Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736, the defendant's liability for the accident depends upon whether or not the employment of the deceased was in the ordinary course of the farming business, or whether the wood cutting, in which he was injured, was an enterprise separate and distinct from the cultivation of the farm. If the wood cutting was in the ordinary course of husbandry, for the purpose of procuring firewood, or for the purpose of clearing the land, for cultivation as farm land, or for any object in the range of a farmer's use of the land, the defendant would be exempt from liability. killed very soon after he began work, his Under these authorities we find no clear error in the findings of fact or con- And now, to wit, May 6th, 1924: The C. P. of over Susquehanna Co. Mooney's Insolvency Insolvency-Petition for receiver But as neither the defendant, nor his tenant, was engaged in this timber cutting operation as a part of the cultivation of the farm, or for use of the wood for farming purposes, it is apparently a separate enterprise, disconnected from farming purposes, and intended as a sep-Death of insolvent-.1batement of proarate scource of profit. The defendant ceedings--Act of June 4, 1901. had a lumber yard in the Borough of Hanover, where some of this lumber was sold. In a similar case, where the under the Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 404, the farmer, in addition to farming, also car-insolvent dies, the proceedings abate, and the ried on a truck transportation business executors of the insolvent will not be substi Where, pending a petition for the appointment of a receiver in insolvency proceedings tuted for him of record. Proceedings in insolvency are purely statutory, nd the court in exercising its authority is limited by the statute. Motion for substitution, and motion to abate proceedings. for the Western District of Pennsylvania, under the United States Bankruptcy Act then existing, which bear strong analogy in provisions and purposes to the Pennsylvania Act of 1901 Van Scoten & Little, for petitioning now under consideration. This decision creditor. F. A. & E. L. Davies, contra. leans strongly against the right of sub- court of bank Smith, P. J., Sept. 10, 1923.-The above are proceedings pending under the provisions of the Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 404, entitled "An act relating to insolvency," in which, February 20, 1923, was filed the petition of I. D. Hawley, an alleged creditor of Perry S. In his discussion he finds within the Mooney, claimed to be insolvent, setting provisions of the Bankruptcy Act no auforth facts within the act. Same day, thority to take the substitution prayed rule was granted to show cause why a for. It must be by a species of judicial receiver should not be appointed of the legislation, which "is a dangerous enproperty of the said Perry S. Mooney. croachment upon the constitutional Before the return-day of the rule, an an-rights of congress," and unwarranted; swer by him was filed denying in extenso nor can the principles of equity practice the petitioner's allegations, and date fixed be thus applied to such legislation. "Comfor hearing; but prior thereto the al-prehensive in its terms," drawing a disleged insolvent died, his will was pro-tinction between "involuntary" bankbated and letters testamentary by the ruptcy sought to be established by credregister of wills of Susquehanna county itors and that occasioned by the "volungranted to John W. Van Vetchen and tary" act of the debtor, in which it seems Julia K. Van Vetchen, whereupon the the statute provided for a continuance of present alternative rules were granted. the proceedings after his death "in the Involved in this controversy, the main same manner as if he had lived," he question to be determined is whether the adds: "With what propriety can you death of Perry S. Mooney at the stage visit (what he terms penal provisions of of the proceedings, before hearing and the act) upon a representative man, decree appointing receiver, if any should upon the executor, who is the appointee, have been appointed, abates the pro- and post-mortem the legitimate repreceedings or not. If so, then substitution sentative of the dead man, of the executors as parties respondent and derives all his authority from the would, of course, be denied; otherwise, register of wills." it is apparent such substitution is a matter of right. * * * We should here note that in the case cited the death of the alleged insolvent The Act of 1901 is silent as to the ef- occurred before trial by jury for the defect of the death of alleged insolvent on termination of the question of his insolthe proceedings. No provision is made vency, being the method provided by the for such a contingency therein, and no Bankruptcy Act. Here, before the judicial decision directly in point by the hearing before the court for the same Pennsylvania courts, and the research by purpose and appointment of receiver, as the learned counsel engaged and our-provided by the Pennsylvania Statute of selves is rewarded by finding the only 1901, these analogies must be regarded case which seems to have a substantial in judicial interpretation of statutes, for bearing on the subject. It is that of In which we cite Sproul, Receiver, v. Murre John V. McDonald, a bankrupt, 10 ray, 156 Pa. 293; and it has been many Phila. 273, decided by McCandless, J., in times held that the Act of 1901 is essenthe District Court of the United States tially a bankrupt act, and so regarded when up for interpretation with relation O. C. of Lancaster Co. to Federal Acts of Bankruptcy, as, see Estate of Jacob F. Sheaffer, dec'd numerous citations in note 2, Purdon's Digest, page 1924, and equally "comprehensive" in its provisions. Decedent's estate-Lawyer's fees Contract for. Counsel fees of one-third of the amount The weight of authority in other jurisdictions interpreting and applying similar legislation is in agreement with Judge McCandless' opinion and conclusions, as, see German-American Semi-recovered may be allowed on a quantum nary v. Saenger, 33 N. W. Repr. 301; United Elevator Co. v. Collier, 188 S. W. Repr. 1127; Saginaw Bank v. Duffield, 122 N. W. Repr. 186; 12 Cyc. 55; 1 Corput Juris 179. Proceedings in insolvency are purely statutory, and the court, in exercising its authority, is thereby limited : Freeman v. Griswold, 34 Pac. Repr. 327. meruit even though the original agreement vember 8, 1923. Dismissed. Chas. W. Eaby, for exceptions. John A. Nauman and John A. Coyle, contra. We have examined the various Pennsylvania statutes negativing abatement of various proceedings, but find none that Smith, P. J., February 14, 1924.-Excan apply at bar and at common law any ception is taken by Bertha Sheaffer Alsuit abated by the death of a party be-exander, "sole heir of Jacob F. Sheaffer, fore trial or verdict: 1 Cyc. 47. We are constrained to follow the reasoning and adopt the conclusion of the court in 10 Phila. 273, above cited, rather than the inferences contra sought to be drawn by the learned counsel for the creditor petitioner from the language of the 36th section of the Act of 1901, which they interpret as making provision for restoration of property to "legal representatives" of the alleged insolvent upon certain conditions therein stated as applying to the case at bar. The difficulty with this view is that there has yet been no adjudication before death, and the statute creates no lien by filing the petition or granting the rule only. deceased," to the award of "$11,351.67 to John A. Nauman and The Lancaster Trust Company, executors of the will of W. U. Hensel, deceased, Dudley & Michener and John A. Coyle, Esqs." The award covered a proportional share of one-third of the amount recovered by the above-named counsel from the government as fees, and as provided by a written agreement between Clayton G. Landis, administrator of the estate of David B. Landis, deceased, and counsel. There is no such written agreement between Peter E. Slaymaker, administrator d. b. n. c. t. a. of the estate of Sheaffer, nor was there a specific parol contract. Whether a contract other than the one We are, therefore, after careful con- with Landis, administrator, is necessary sideration, of the opinion that we must to enforce that one against both estates declare the proceedings abated, and the is doubtful, but if the contention of order for substitution cannot be made as counsel for exceptant--that as to the asked for, realizing, as expressed by Sheaffer estate a recovery can be had Judge McCandless in his opinion, the ap- only on a quantum meruit-is sustained, parent justice to be afforded the petitioning creditor by a full hearing, but which we are precluded from granting in the absence of statutory authority, and as we have found none exists. And now, to wit, Sept. 10, 1923, all proceedings at bar are declared abated and the rule for substitution discharged. it can not be to his advantage. To estimate the value of the services of counsel who were able to steer successfully through the congress of the United States a claim saturated with whiskey, as was this one, would require a measure fully as large as the one agreed upon. Their accomplishment seems almost mir aculous when one considers the moral lumped and defendant is unable to prodarkness which dims the intellect and perly answer them. dulls the conscience of many congress- 2. Each of the claims made by plainmen when called on to meet any question tiff in paragraph five should be included related to alcohol. in a separate paragraph consecutively This exception and the exceptions numbered. filed by Clayton G. Landis, administrator, are dismissed, and the adjudication is confirmed absolutely. 3. Plaintiff has failed to attach a copy of the "drawings" for which claim is made in paragraph 5, or shown any reason why it could not or should not be done." The fifth section of the Practice Act 1915 requires that "every pleading shall contain * * * a statement in a concise and summary form of the material facts on which the party pleadings relies for his claim, but not the * * ferences or conclusions of law." in The fifth paragraph of the statement says that, at the special instance and request of the defendant, the plaintiff supplied certain materials and performed certain labor in and about the erection A plaintiff's statement in an action to recover the cost of erecting a dwelling house, in which it is shown that the dwelling was erected under a contract, and there are items of claim for work and materials furnished in addition to, or more costly than those required by the contract, in accordance with modifications of the contract, full particulars of the materials and labor so furnished of a dwelling (which the defendant had must be set out. Such a statement, where the additional materials and labor furnished were set out as "a porch was constructed," "the plumbing was changed," "a refrigerator was installed," etc., with the charges made for each item, was stricken off because it did not set forth the necessary particulars. Motion to strike off the plaintiff's statement in L. A. Doll v. Ralph F. Stauffer, No. 67 October Term, 1923, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Pa. Motion allowed. John A. Hoober, for motion. Ross, J., February 27, 1924.-The defendant has filed a motion to strike off plaintiff's statement in this case, for the following reasons: contracted with the plaintiff to erect for him, the defendant) partly by changing the plans as shown by said contract, and partly by new additions, but we are not informed what the "changing of plans" or the "new additions" consisted of. That neglected information renders those general statements but inferences of the narrator without supplying the defendant with the necessary notice which would enable him to respond by an affirmation or denial. It is necessary to state the facts as to what plans were changed, as to how the plans were changed, and what the new and additional features consist of. There is an attempt at describing thus: "a porch constructed," "and the labor and material for said porch is of the reaI. The statement does not contain in sonable, fair and proper value of concise and summary form the material $165.00"; the clothes closet was changed facts on which plaintiff relies for his into a clothes-room, and the labor and claim, in that paragraph 5 contains eight material for said clothes room is of the separate claims for alleged now, addi- reasonable, fair and proper value of tional and changed work done by plain- $40.00, so the statement sets forth; "the tiff. In none of said claims are details front door was changed," giving the given as to the items of labor and ma- value of the labor and material at $15; terial entering into them and as to the "the plumbing was changed," giving the amounts charged for each item, and the value of labor and material at $75.00; time when such labor and material was "the electric wiring was changed," giving furnished. Each of said claims is the value of the labor and material at |