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thousand dollars remaining unexpended "This Ict is declared to be remedial. Its of the 1923 funding bonds amounting to purpose is to settle and to afford relief $175,000?
from uncertainty and insecurity with rePertaining to this inquiry our attention spect to rights, status and other legal reis called to the terms on which the 1923 lations, and is to be liberally construed bonds were issued and sold. The terms and administered.” were "for the purpose of funding a por- Notwithstanding the fact that the protion of the floating, temporary and cur- visions of the Act should be liberally conrent indebtedness of the said school dis- strued, we cannot avoid stating that its trict.” The “Hoating” and “temporary” privileges should be extended only in indebtedness evidently represented the cases which clearly come within the indebtedness then existing, in one form terms of the Act. In the case at bar we or another; and the "current" indebted-are of the opinion that the petitioner is ness must also have existed at the same entitled to a declaratory judgment. time. Indeed, the legal signification of Now, March 13, 1924, the court is of the word "current" is: “Now passing or the opinion that the school district of present in its progress." Nor can we the borough of Dunmore has no right overlook the meaning of the term "fund- under the law to apply to the payment of ing.” It applies to the process of col- its present current indebtedness any part lecting together a variety of outstanding of the fifty thousand dollars remaining debts against private or municipal cor-junexpended of the proceeds of the 1923 porations. By no rule of construction issue of funding bonds which amounted may it be held that bonds issued in 1923 to $175,000, and judgment is rendered to to cover, inter alia, current indebtedness that effect. can be made to include expenses incurr- Cost of this proceeding to be paid by ed in February or March, 1924, several the school district. months after the bonds were sold. The Act of 1923, providing for decla-C. P. of
York Co. ratory judgments, is a new departure in Pennsylvania legislation and deserves
Zumbrum v. Rudisill some discussion. What is the meaning of a declaratory judgment? The ordinary definition is: A judgment which Il'orkmen's compensation Persons simply declares the rights of the parties, or expresses the opinion of the court on engaged in agriculture-Casual employa question of law, without ordering any-ment. thing to be done. The Act in question has been very carefully drawn. It con- vated by a tenant, who'employed men to cut
An owner of a farm, occupied and cultitains sixteen sections. The first, second, timber on the farm for sale and not for use third and fourth sections give a broad for farming purposes, was not within the
provisions of the clause of the Workmen's and comprehensive statement of the gen- Compensation excluding persons eral scope of the law and the nature of gaged in agriculture from the provision of the cases in which its aid may be invok- Where one was employed for a season's ed. All kinds of cases, under certain woodcutting, although he was killed while at conditions, are within its purview. Con-worko very soon after he began work, his
employment was not casual in character so tracts, deeds, wills, trusts, statutes, muni-jas to exclude him from the provisions of the cipal ordinances and franchises—these
Workmen's Compensation Act. and many other subjects which give rise Appeal from Workmen's Compensato legal relations may come at some time tion Board of Pennsylvania, in Lottie V. or another within the operation of this Zumbrum v. Solomon J. Rudisill, claim Act of Assembly. Even a jury trial may petition No. 16686, in the Court of Combe ordered when a proceeding under the mon Pleas of York County, Pa., No. 63, Act involves the determination of an is- January Term, 1924. Affirmed. sue of fact, in the same manner as such
Niles & Neff, for the claimant. issues are tried in other civil actions.
Section 12 of the Act is as follows: T. F. Chrostwaite, for the defendant.
Wanner, P. J., May 6th, 1924.–At the to distant markets, it was held to be a time when the deceased was injured, the separate business, in which an injured defendant was not living on his farm employee could recover damages under where it occurred, or personally engaged the Workmen's Compensation Act. The in farming, but was living as a retired same rule as to the liability of employers farmer in the Borough of Hanover. His was recognized in the following cases: farm was in the hands of a tenant for Strump v. Keller, 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 462; cultivation by the year.
Palumbo V. Fuller Co., 122 Atl. 63; Defendant himself, independently of Pliska v. Hatton Lumber Co., 3 Neglithe tenant farmer, was engaged in cut-gence Compensation Cases Annotated, ting timber for the market, from the 699 n; Haugher v. Walker Co., et. al. farm, as a project separate from the cul- 121 Atl. 200; Klein v. McCleary, 192 N. tivation of the land.
W. 106; Marietta v. Quayle, 137 N. E. The deceased was hired to cut timber 61-62; Kappas v. Warren, 13 N. C. C. for the defendant and while being so
A. 92; Jenkins v. Pieratt, 13 N. C. C. A. employed, with others, was accidentally 97n. killed by a falling tree. It seems to have
It is also quite apparent that this been purely an accident for the hap- wood cutting was not such a merely caspening of which no negligence is charge- ual employment as would exempt the deable against either party.
fendant from liability for accidental inThese facts being found by the Work-juries to employees so engaged. It was
a business project in which he had been men's Compensation Board, on compe- engaged during the former tent and admissible testimony, constitute which he was continuing at the time of
year, the basis of fact for the decision of the the accident and its resulting injury to Under the well settled construction of evidence that though the deceased was
the employee. It also appears from the the Workmen's Compensation Act of killed very soon after he began work, hiş June 2, 1915, P. I. 736, the defendant's liability for the accident depends upon cutting on the defendant's farm: Gay
employment was for the season's wood whether or not the employment of the deceased was in the ordinary course of
nor v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 1916 A, the farming business, or whether the Thompson v. Twiss, 97. Atl. 328-329.
I. R. A. 363-365-366, and cases cited; wood cutting, in which he was injured,
Under these authorities we find no was an enterprise separate and distinct
clear error in the findings of fact or confrom the cultivation of the farm. If the wood cutting was in the ordinary course rendered in this case is based.
clusions of law upon which the decision of husbandry, for the purpose of pro
And now, to wit, May 6th, 1924: The curing firewood, or for the purpose of clearing the land, for cultivation as farm exceptions to the rulings of the Workland, or for any object in the range of a
men's Compensation Board are overfarmer's use of the land, the defendant decision of said board is hereby affirmed.
ruled. The appeal is dismissed and the would be exempt from liability. But as neither the defendant, nor his
Susquehanna Co. tenant, was engaged in this timber cutting operation as a part of the cultiva- Mooney's Insolvency tion of the farm, or for use of the wood for farming purposes, it is apparently a
Insolvency - Petition for receiver ---separate enterprise, disconnected from farming purposes, and intended as a sep- Death of insolvent--Abatement of pro
a arate scource of profit. The defendant ceedings--Act of June 4, 1901. had a lumber vard in the Borough of
4. Hanover, where some of this lumber Whose, pending a petition for the appointWas sold. In a similar case, where the under the Act of June 4. 1901, P. L. 404, the
ment of a receiver in insolvency proceedings farmer, in addition to farming, also car- insolvent dies, the proceedings abate, and the ried on a truck transportation business laureators of the insolvent will not be substi
C. P. of
Proceedings in insolvency are purely stat- for the Western District of Pennsylutory, nd the court in exercising its authority is limited by the statute.
vania, under the United States BankMotion for substitution, and motion to ruptcy Act then existing, which bear abate proceedings.
strong analogy in provisions and pur
poses to the Pennsylvania Act of 1901 l'an Scoten & Litile, for petitioning now under consideration. This decision creditor.
leans strongly against the right of sub
stitution at bar, and that these proF. i. & E. L. Davies, contra.
ceedings abated by the death of Perry S. Smith, P. J., Sept. 10, 1923.- The Mooney, the alleged insolvent, such was above are proceedings pending under the there decided. Judge McCandless states: provisions of the Act of June 4, 1901, "The question for our consideration is, P. L. 104, entitled "An act relating to does the death of McDonald terminate insolvency," in which, February 20,
in which, February 20, the proceedings in a court of bank1923, was filed the petition of I. D. ruptcy?" Ilawley, an alleged creditor of Perry S. In his discussion he finds within the Viooney, claimed to be insolvent, setting provisions of the Bankruptcy Act no auforth facts within the act. Same day, thority to take the substitution prayed rule was granted to show cause why a for. It must be by a species of judicial receiver should not be appointed of the legislation, which is a dangerous enproperty of the said Perry S. Mooney. croachment
the constitutional Before the return-day of the rule, an an- rights of congress," and unwarranted; swer by him was filed denying in extenso nor can the principles of equity practice the petitioner's allegations, and date fixed be thus applied to such legislation. “Comfor hearing; but prior thereto the al- | prehensive in its terms,” drawing a disleged insolvent died, his will was pro-tinction between “involuntary" bankbated and letters testamentary by the ruptcy sought to be established by credregister of wills of Susquehanna county itors and that occasioned by the “volungranted to John W. Van Vetchen and tary" act of the debtor, in which it seems Julia K. Van Vetchen, whereupon the the statute provided for a continuance of present alternative rules were granted. the proceedings after his death “in the
Involved in this controversy, the main same manner as if he had lived,” he question to be determined is whether the adds: "With what propriety can you death of Perry S. Mooney at the stage visit (what he terms penal provisions of of the proceedings, before hearing and the act) upon a representative man,
, decree appointing receiver, if any should upon the executor, who is the appointee, have been appointed, abates the pro- and post-mortem the legitimate repreceedings or not. If so, then substitution sentative of the dead man, of the executors as parties respondent and derives all his authority from the would, of course, be denied; otherwise, register of wills.” it is apparent such substitution is a mat
We should here note that in the case ter of right.
cited the death of the alleged insolvent The Act of 1901 is silent as to the ef- occurred before trial by jury for the defect of the death of alleged insolvent on termination of the question of his insolthe proceedings. No provision is made vency, being the method provided by the for such a contingency therein, and no Bankruptcy Act. Here, before the judicial decision directly in point by the hearing before the court for the same Pennsylvania courts, and the research by purpose and appointment of receiver, as the learned counsel engaged and our provided by the Pennsylvania Statute of selves is rewarded by finding the only 1901, these analogies must be regarded case which seems to have a substantial in judicial interpretation of statutes, for hearing on the subject. It is that of In which we cite Sproul, Receiver, v. Murre John V. McDonald, a bankrupt, 10 ray, 156 Pa. 293; and it has been many Phila. 273, decided by McCandless, J., in times held that the Act of 1901 is essenthe District Court of the United Statestially a bankrupt act, and so regarded
may be allowed on
same might not
when up for interpretation with relation 0. C. of
Lancaster Co. to Federal Acts of Bankruptcy, as, see Estate of Jacob F. Sheaffer, dec'd numerous citations in note 2, Purdon's Digest, page 1924, and equally "comprehensive" in its provisions.
The weight of authority in other jur- Decedent's estate --- Lawyer's fees isdictions interpreting and applying sim
Contract for. ilar legislation is in agreement with Judge McCandless' opinion and conclu- Counsel fees of one-third of the amount sions, as, see German-American Semi- meruit even though the original agreement nary v. Saenger, 33 N. W. Repr. 301; allowing the
be binding, United Elevator Co. v. Collier, 188 s. where the counsel, after a struggle of twen
ty-five years, succeeded in getting through W. Repr. 1127; Saginaw Bank v. Duf-congress and recovering from the government field, 122 N. W. Repr. 186; 12 Cyc. 55; iected.
a repayment of whiskey tax wrongfully coli Corput Juris 179. Proceedings in insolvency are purely vember 8, 1923. Dismissed.
Exceptions to adjudication filed Nostatutory, and the court, in exercising its authority, is thereby limited: Freeman v. Chas. W. Eaby, for exceptions. Griswold, 34 Pac. Repr. 327. We have examined the various Penn
John 11. Nauman and John A. Coyle, sylvania statutes negativing abatement of contra. various proceedings, but find none that
Smith, P. J., February 14, 1924.-Excan apply at bar and at common law any suit abated by the death of a party be-exander, “sole heir of Jacob F. Sheaffer,
ception is taken by Bertha Sheaffer Alfore trial or verdict: i Cyc. 47.
deceased,” to the award of “$11,351.67 We are constrained to follow the rea- to John A. Nauman and The Lancaster soning and adopt the conclusion of the Trust Company, executors of the will of court in 10 Phila. 273, above cited, W. U. Hensel, deceased, Dudley & rather than the inferences contra sought Michener and John A. Coyle, Esqs.' to be drawn by the learned counsel for the award covered a proportional share the creditor petitioner from the language of one-third of the amount recovered by of the 36th section of the Act of 1901, the above-named counsel from the govwhich they interpret as making provision ernment as fees, and as provided by a for restoration of property to "legal written agreement between Clayton G. representatives" of the alleged insolvent Landis, administrator of the estate of upon certain conditions therein stated as David B. Landis, deceased, and counsel. applying to the case at bar. The diffi- There is no such written agreement beculty with this view is that there has yet tween Peter E. Slaymaker, administrator been no adjudication before death, and d. b. n. c. t. a. of the estate of Sheaffer, the statute creates no lien by filing the
nor was there a specific parol contract. petition or granting the rule only.
Whether a contract other than the one We are, therefore, after careful con- with Landis, administrator, is necessary sideration, of the opinion that we must to enforce that one against both estates declare the proceedings abated, and the is doubtful, but if the contention of order for substitution cannot be made as counsel for exceptant--that as to the asked for, realizing, as expressed by Sheaffer estate a recovery can be had Judge McCandless in his opinion, the ap- only on a quantum meruit-is sustained, parent justice to be afforded the peti- it can not be to his advantage. To estitioning creditor by a full hearing, but mate the value of the services of counsel which we are precluded from granting in who were able to steer successfully the absence of statutory authority, and through the congress of the United as we have found none exists.
States a claim saturated with whiskey, as And now, to wit, Sept. 10, 1923, all was this one, would require a measure proceedings at bar are declared abated fully as large as the one agreed upon. and the rule for substitution discharged." Their accomplishment seems almost mir
aculous when one considers the moral lumped and defendant is unable to prodarkness which dims the intellect and perly answer them. dulls the conscience of many congress- 2. Each of the claims made by plainmen when called on to meet any question tiff in paragraph five should be included related to alcohol. This exception and the exceptions numbered.
in a separate paragraph consecutively filed by Clayton G. Landis, administrator, are dismissed, and the adjudication copy of the "drawings” for which claim
3. Plaintiff has failed to attach a is confirmed absolutely.
is made in paragraph 5, or shown any
reason why it could not or should not be C. P. of
The fifth section of the Practice Act Doll v. Stauffer
1915 requires that "every pleading shall contain
a statement in a conPlaintiff's statement-W'ant of neces
cise and summary form of the material
facts on which the party pleadings relies sary particulars-Striking off.
for his claim, but not the
ferences or conclusions of law." A plaintiff's statement in an action to recover the cost of erecting a dwelling house, The fifth paragraph of the statement in which it is shown that the dwelling was erected under a contract, and there are items says that, at the special instance and reof claim for work and materials furnished in quest of the defendant, the plaintiff supaddition to, or more costly than those re
plied certain materials and performed quired by the contract, in accordance with modifications of the contract, full particu- certain labor in and about the erection lars of the materials and labor so furnished of a dwelling (which the defendant had must be set out.
contracted with the plaintiff to erect for Such a statement, where the additional materials and labor furnished were set out him, the defendant) partly by changing as “a porch was constructed,” “the plumbing the plans as shown by said contract, and was changed," "a refrigerator was installed," was stricken off because it did not set forth informed what the “changing of plans” ete with the charges made for each item, partly by new additions, but we are not the necessary particulars.
or the "new additions" consisted of. Motion to strike off the plaintiff's | That neglected information renders those statement in L. A. Doll v. Ralph F. general statements but inferences of the Stauffer, No. 67 October Term, 1923, in narrator without supplying the defendthe Court of Common Pleas of York ant with the necessary notice which County, Pa. Motion allowed.
would enable him to respond by an af
firmation or denial. It is necessary to John d. Hoober, for motion.
state the facts as to what plans were John L. Ronse, contra.
changed, as to how
the plans were
changed, and what the new and addiRoss, J., February 27, 1924.—The de- tional features consist of. fendant has filed a motion to strike off There is an attempt at describing thus : plaintiff's statement in this case, for the "a porch constructed,” “and the labor following reasons:
and material for said porch is of the rea1. The statement does not contain in sonable, fair and proper value of concise and summary form the material $165.00"; the clothes closet was changed facts on which plaintiff relies for his into a clothes-room, and the labor and claim, in that paragraph 5 contains eight material for said clothes room is of the separate claims for alleged now, addi- reasonable, fair and proper value of tional and changed work done by plain- $10.00, so the statement sets forth; "the tiff. In none of said claims are details front door was changed,” giving the given as to the items of labor and ma- value of the labor and material at $15; terial entering into them and as to the "the plumbing was changed,” giving the amounts charged for each item, and the value of labor and material at $75.00; time when such labor and material was "the electric wiring was changed,” giving furnished. Each of said claims is the value of the labor and material at