Act, P. L. 557, also Uniform Laws An-continue so to do to the end of my life, notated, vol. I (Sales Act), p. 190. But she is to be rewarded in the sum of three in case of an executory contract the title thousand dollars ($3,000.00); any of my does not pass so long as some material children who dispute this claim must be thing remains for the seller to do to put disinherited." It appears that on Octothe goods in deliverable condition (here, ber 16, 1916, the decedent assigned and if for no other reason, a failure to attach transferred to the said Jennie K. Jacoby the labels) Swift, et al., v. Morrison 40 shares of Pennsylvania Railroad (Pa.), 2 W. N. C. 699; J. B. Bradford stock, then of the value of $57.75 per Piano Co. v. Hecker, 162 Wis. 335, 156 share, or a total value of $2,310. This N, W. 140; Whitney v. Hall, 82 Mich. assignment was executed in the presence 580, 47 N. W. 27; Automatic Time-of two reputable citizens, who both tesTable Adv. Co. v. Automatic Time-tified that the testator stated that Mrs. Table Co., 208 Mass. 252, 94 N. E. 462. Jacoby had been taking care of him for The assignment of error is overruled quite a while and he wanted her to have and the judgment is affirmed. the stock to the value of about $2.000. The witnesses further on said the testaof Pa. tor wanted to present her with it for having taken care of him. The question which confronts us is, Was this gift to Jennie K. Jacoby in satisfaction pro tanto of the legacy given to her? It will Super. Ct. Appeal in Alexander's Estate Will--Ademption of legacy given for be noticed that in the codicil the legacy services. given as a reward for faithful attendance upon the testator was conditioned Where a testator is not the parent of the upon such attendance continuing to the legatee or does not stand in loco parentis, no presumption arises that a prior legacy is sat-end of his life. At the transfer of the isfied by a subsequent payment or gift; but stock the same purpose, that is, the rewhen a legacy is given to a stranger for award for faithful attendance, as departicular purpose and the testator subsequently makes a payment or gift to the lega-clared. tee for the same purpose, such payment or legacy to the extent of the amount of the gift is presumed to be a satisfaction of the gift. While a distinction may be drawn between the gift and the legacy in that the gift was a reward for past service and the legacy for past and future Appeal of Jennie K. Jacoby to the Su-service, still the general purpose was the perior Court of Pa., in the estate of Sol- same. Where a testator is not the paromon A. Alexander, deceased, No. 18, ent of the legatee or does not stand in March Term, 1924, from the decree of loco parentis, no presumption arises the Orphans' Court of York County, dis-that a prior legacy is satisfied by a submissing exceptions to the report of the sequent payment or gift, but when a leauditor. gacy is given to a stranger for a particular purpose and the testator subsequentThe opinion of Ross, J., dismissing ex-ly makes a payment or gift to the legatee ceptions, is reported in 36 Y. R. L. 205. Affirmed and modified. for the same purpose, such payment or gift is presumed to be a satisfaction of the legacy to the extent of the amount of James G. Glessner, for appellant. the gift: Keiper's Appeal, 124 Pa. 193; Walter B. Hays, for appellee. Estate of Paul Ritter, 10 Pa. Superior Court 352; Johnson's Estate, 201 Pa. Trexler, J., May 1, 1924.--By a codi-1513; Benson's Estate, 209 Pa. 108; Apcil to the will of Solomon A. Alexander, peal of Ursinus College, 23 W. N. C. dated June 21st, 1916, he disposed of 261; 40 Cyc. 1916; Richardson v. Evepart of his estate as follows: "I, Solo-land, 1 L. R. A. 203. It is settled in a mon A. Alexander, of York, Pennsyl- number of cases that a legacy to be vania, do assert that my nurse, Mrs. Jen-adeemed by a subsequent gift, the gift nie K. Jacoby, has attended me faith- and the legacy must be ejusdem generis. fully for so many years and should she Swoope's Appeal, 27 Pa. 58; Miner v. It has been the rule for upwards of forty fill a vacancy of an elective office by the ap years in the Nineteenth Judicial District to Atherton, 35 Pa. 528. It is argued by the appellant that the legacy was to be paid in money and the gift of the rail-pointment of one of the same political per road stock was in kind and not of the same nature as money. The answer to this is that the intention of the testator was that the railroad stock should be re and this rule was followed in the appointsuasion as the immediate prior incumbent; ment of a township tax collector, where the fitness of the applicant within the rule was unquestioned. garded as money. He set the value at In re petitions for the appointment of about $2,000.00. This was the amount, a tax collector in Springettsbury Townwhich in his mind he was giving his ship, in the Court of Quarter Sessions nurse in anticipation of part of the le-of York County, Pa. gacy he had provided in his will. The learned auditor states the proposition George S. Love, for the petitioners, thus: "The donor of land or specific praying for the appointment of Ralph A. chattels is not supposed to have in mind Knaub. John 1. Hoober, for the petitioners, the money value of the thing given, and the gift is not, therefore, presumed to be a satisfaction of a prior pecuniary le-Praying for the appopintment of Frank B. Snyder. gacy; but where it appears from the donor's expression that he does have in mind the pecuniary value of his gift and gives it as equivalent of so much money, then, in a case where the presumption applies, the gift will be presumed to be a satisfaction of the prior legacy, no matter how unlike the two may be." In re Lawes, L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 81; Holmes v. Holmes, I Brown Ch. 555, 28 Eng. Rep. 1295; Bengough v. Walker, 15 Vesey, Jr., 502; Pym v. Lockyear, 5 Myline & C. 48, 41 Eng. Rep. 283; in re Jacques (1903), Ch. 267. No Pennsylvania I cases bearing on this precise question have been found. We think, however, that the amount to be deducted from appellant's legacy in satisfaction pro tante should be two thousand dollars, instead of twenty-three hundred and ten, and to that extent the order entered below is modified. The order of the Orphans' Court is affirmed with the modification that the amount to be deducted from appellant's legacy is fixed at two thousand dollars. Costs of this appeal to be paid by the Ross, J., June 23rd, 1924.-On petition of numerous electors, filed June 2, 1924. for the reasons in said petition stated, the court granted a rule to show cause why the office of tax collector in said Springettsbury] township should not be declared vacant. The rule was made returnable to June 16, 1924, and was served upon the supervisors and township auditors and school directors. of said township. At the return day, the rule was made absolute and the office of tax collector was declared vacant. After the office had been declared vacant, numerous electors of said township presented petitions. One set of petitioners requested the court to appoint one Frank B. Snyder, a resident of said township, and another of said petitions prayed the court to appoint Ralph A. Knaub to fill the vacancy. It appeared that Frank B. Snyder is a member of the Republican party, and Ralph A. Knaub is a member of the Democratic party. The original incumbent of said office of tax collector was duly elected at the annual election in 1921 as the Democratic candidate for York Co. said office. It has been a rule, for upwards of forty years, in this judicial dis Tax Collector in Springetts-trict, to fill a vacancy caused by the bury Township death, resignation, or for other reasons, of an elective officer with one of the same political persuasion as the immedi Appointments by the court to fill vaately prior incumbent. We see no reacancies Political affiliations of ap- son to deviate from the well established custom, and no reason has been ad pointees. ment. vanced which would cause us to question tiff filed his bill in equity praying for the ability of Ralph A. Knaub to fill the specific performance of an alleged agreevacancy for the unexpired term for ment for the sale of certain real estate. which the said John F. Knaub was To this bill of complaint the defendants elected. filed a demurred admitting the facts but The number of signers on Ralph A. asking for the dismissal of the bill on the Knaub's petition was more than twice the grounds that plaintiff was not entitled in number that the petition of Frank B. law to the decree prayed for. DefendSnyder contained, but the well estab-ant's third and fourth reasons are the vilished custom of the bench in this judi- tal questions involved; "Third, The bill cial district is observed in this appoint-does not set out any contract in writing, nor any contract enforceable specifically We will appoint the said Ralph A. in a court of equity"; "Fourth, that said Knaub to fill the vacancy in the office of Exhibit A, attached to said bill, is insuftax collector in Springettsbury Town- ficient and unenforcible in a court of ship for the unexpired term of John F. equity in that (a) the property is not deKnaub, the former tax collector, and will scribed, (b) the description is inaccurconfirm the said appointment upon the ate, (c) the description is insufficient, approval by this court of the bond re- (d) the essential elments required by the quired by law to be filed in the office of statute of frauds are lacking in said Exthe clerk of this court, and the said ap-hibit A, and must be shown by parol." pointee taking the obligation required by Exhibit A of plaintiff's bill is the law to be administered to the incumbent agreement relied upon for a decree of of this office. The bond to be given by specific performance and reads as folthe said appointee, before approval by lows: this court, must be approved in writing by the supervisors of said Township of Springettsbury, and by the commission-Twenty-five ers of the County of York, and these ap- property 328 N. 5th St., which we hereprovals shall be filed in the office of the by agree to sell to him for $6566, clear clerk of the quarter sessions court be-of all incumbrances. Deed delivered by fore the approval and sanction of this us on or before Jan. 1st. Owner will court will be given to the appointment take $1500--2nd mortgage. and the bond required thereby. C. P. of Cassone v. Winter Lehigh Co. Indefinite $25.00 "November 28, 1923. Received of Wm. D. Cassone JULIA WINTER, LUDWIG WINTER." The question presented here is, will at court of equity enforce specific performance of an agreement for the sale of real estate, of which there is no written evidence except a receipt for part of the purchase price where such receipts set forth a certain street number without designating the city, borough, town or township wherein said property may A court of equity will not enforce the spe- be located and without further desigcific performance of a contract to convey real estate, where said contract, being a mere nating whether the street number reprereceipt for the down money, describes the property merely by number and street, with-sents either a vacant lot, dwelling house or business place? Real estate Contracts contract-Specific performance-Equity -Statute of frauds and perjuries. out designating a city or town. Bill in equity. Demurrer. Demurrer sustained. Butz & Rupp, for plaintiff. It is a settled rule in equity, that specific performance of a contract will not be decreed unless its terms are clear and capable of ascertainment from the instrument itself. It is equally true that no court should by mere conjecture or Iobst, J., March 17, 1924.-The plain- 'guess decree a performance of a con Daniel M. Garrahan, for defendants. tract not complete in itself and thus per- tracts for the sale of land shall be in chance decree that which the parties writing can only be met by proof in never intended or contemplated. A court writing of the complete contract. An inof equity may exercise its discretion in strument which is not self-sustaining and decreeing specific performance, but which requires verbal evidence to supply should a court be required to determine any essential part, is not a compliance the location of land where the instru- with the statute." This doctrine has been ment relied upon itself fails to set forth reaffirmed in all of the Supreme Court such location? The paper or receipt cases down to the present. See 267 Pa., marked "Exhibit A" designates a street page 28; 271 Pa., page 260; 274 Pa., number, to wit, "328 N. 5th St." Fifth page 417. Street where? It may be Allentown, While it is true that real estate may Pa.; it may be Bethlehem, Pa.; or for be described by reference to a place, a that matter any other city or town. The plot, a lot number, or a prior conveyance want of a more specific location can only or by name, such as "Hotel Duquesne be determined by parol evidence supplied property;" "The Fleming Farm by both parties to the suit. The statute French Creek," and other designated of frauds requires that a contract for names, as recited in the opinion in the the sale of land, to be enforced, must be case of O'Connell v. Cease, 267 Pa., page in writing. It cannot be by parol. It is 288, at page 293; yet in these cases we by Parol where it requires verbal testi- have the location of the property desigmony to supply any essential part of it. nated or at least so characterized by To supply anything essential or eexplan- name or otherwise that the intended loatory in such written contract by parol cation can be drawn from the instrutestimony would open the door which is ment itself. This is not true in the inshut by the statute. This cannot be done.stant case. While we have a street num"A contract for the sale of lands is with-ber, we have no other location. The in the statute of frauds and therefore court cannot guess that it was the intent void and unenforcible, if parol testimony to convey 328 N. 5th Street, Allentown, be required to establish any essential part Pa., as set forth in the bill for the reaof it. The alleged vendor's receipt for a son that the receipt, the instrument repayment on account of 'the price to be lied on, is silent as to city or town and paid by me for a lot of ground fronting leaves no reasonable inference from about 190 feet on the P. R. R. in the which we can draw any such conclusion. Twenty-first Ward, Pittsburgh,' failing We are guided in arriving at this conto identify and describe the land sold, is clusion by the case of Weisenberger, et. inadmissible in proof of title." Mellon al., v. Huebner, 264 Pa., page 316. The v. Davison, 123 Pa., page 298. On page opinion in this case, written by Mr. Jus302 the opinion states, "On the trial of tice Simpson, recites that plaintiff filed this case the plaintiff offered in evidence a bill in equity praying specific performthe receipt, and the two drafts severally ance of an agreement for the sale of real and together, with an offer to show by estate, to which a demurrer was filed. parol testimony that the land described The receipt relied on was similar to the in the receipt applies to the land de-receipt involved in this case in that it described in the praecipe and writ. Also, scribed the property in question as lothat the defendant had no other real es-cated at "3 and Spruce." The court held tate in the Twenty-first Ward of the City "The part of the paper above the date is of Pittsburgh. Also a tender of the balance of purchase money. The court rejected the evidence." See also Hammer v. McEldowney, 46 Pa., page 334. Soles v. Hickman, 20 Pa., page 180. Cypher's ordinary printed letter head, and even if a court would be justified in assuming therefrom the property referred to was in South Bethlehem, and that "3 and Spruce" meant 3rd and In the case of Lllewellyn v. The sun- Spruce Streets in that city, the statute of nyside Coal Co., 242 Pa., page 517, the frauds would still apply, for the receipt Supreme Court held "that the require- does not specify the size of the property, ment of the statute of frauds that con- or whether it is at the corner of “3 and Spruce" and, if it is, at which corner. Funding Bonds." These bonds were See, also, Cohen v. Jones, 274 Pa., page sold and the bonded indebtedness of the 417, at page 419, where the court distin- school district was increased "for the guished that case from the case of Weis- purpose of funding a portion of the enberger v. Huebner above referred to. floating, temporary and current indebtedIn the light of these decisions, defend-ness of the said school district." ants' demurrer is sustained and com- 2. There now remains in the treasury plainant's bill dismissed. of the school district unexpended from Now, March 17th, 1924, the court sus-the proceeds of the sale of said bonds, tains the defendants' demurrer to the bill the sum of $50,000. of complaint, and the bill of complaint is therefore dismissed at the costs of plaintiff. Declaratory judgment-Act of June 18, 1923, P. L. 8.40—Schools-Right to use balance of bond issue for payment of current expenses. A declaratory judgment is a judgment which simply declares the rights of the par ties, or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law, without ordering anything to be done. 3. The district is now confronted with the necessity of borrowing money for the purpose of paying current expenses of the district, namely, the salaries of teachers and other employees, unless it may use the money remaining unexpended from the proceeds of the sale of said bonds. 4. The school district is laboring under an uncertainty as to its right to use the said money for the purpose of paying the said current expepnses; and it prays the court to render a de therefore claratory judgment deciding the right of the district in the premises under the power granted to the court by the Act of 1923, P. L. 840. The Act providing for declamatory judgments is a very recent one, and we know of no case in Pennsylvania in which the powers granted by the Act The Act of June 18, 1923, P. L. 840, is de-have been discussed or even considered. clared to be remedial. Its purpose is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and Any case involving the operation of this other legal relations and is to be liberally law should be carefully scrutinized. The construed and administered. Nevertheless danger is that the court may be frequently called upon to render an opinion on a point of law. Let us take the case at bar, for instance. The Dunmore school insecurity with respect to rights, status and its privileges should be extended only in cases which clearly come within the terms of the act. A school district can not use part of the proceeds of an issue of bonds made in 1923 for the "purpose of funding a portion of the Petition for declaratory judgment. district has employed an attorney whose duty is to instruct the school board on questions of law. He is undoubtedly paid an adequate salary for that purpose. Why not take his advice and act upon his judgment? The answer to this question is that there is now an Act of Assembly Edwards, P. J., March 13, 1924.-The permitting an application to the court for petition in the above case is presented by a declaratory judgment or decree in a the school district of the borough of case like the one involved in the present Dunmore, through its attorney, Frank proceedings. An examination of the M. Walsh, praying for a declaratory Act and of the petition has convinced us judgment as to a certain matter or ques- that the petitioner is entitled to the retion set forth in the petition. The facts lief prayed for. stated are as follows: I. In the year 1923 the said school district issued and sold bonds to the amount of $175,000, known as the "1923 The question to be decided may be stated as follows: Can the Dunmore school district apply to the payment of its present current indebtedness the fifty |