We think the plaintiff's statement | plaintiff upon information and belief, it must be stricken from the records, be- does not conclude or include also the cause of the defendant's motion and the averment of an expectation to be able to reasons given in support of said motion. prove the facts alleged." And now, April 7th, 1924: Plaintiff's statement of claim is stricken off, with leave to the plaintiff to file a supplemental or amended statement within fifteen days from this date, in accordance with the requirements of the Practice Act 1915. C. P. of Kurey v. Koczenocz Lehigh Co. On April 2nd, 1923, this court filed an opinion by President Judge Reno, in the case of Henry Schleicher v. Norman J. Hunsicker, No. 189, January Term, 1922, on motion to strike off a statement in an appeal case, inte alia, as follows: "The legislative mandate subjecting appeals to the court of common pleas from judgments of justices of the peace to the provisions of the Practice Act of 1915, is, at best, an unscientific extension of the principles of pleading to proceedings which immemorially have been con Practice, C. P.-Appeals from justice ducted ore tenus. Therefore, we are not -Pleading Plaintiff's statement Striking off—Affidavit-Acts of April 14, 1921, P. L. 144, and May 14, 1915, P. L. 483. of the peace, and thereby providing for a disposed to be astute or assiduous in discovering defects in the statements and affidavits of defense. Unless a party can affirmatively show that he is actually injured or prejudiced by the pleading, or that the preparation of his case for trial is thereby made more difficult, we will The Act of April 14, 1921, P. L. 144, amend-not encourage in limine examination of ing the Practice Act of May 14, 1915, P. L. such pleadings. This disposition does 483, so as to include appeals from justices not arise from any desire to shirk the plaintiff's statement and affidavit of defense labors incident thereto, but results from on such appeals, will be liberally construed. an ambition to save parties the expense A plaintiff's statement of claim, on an ap- and delay involved by such procedure. peal from a justice of the peace, will not be stricken from the record, because the affida- Litigants are entitled to an easy, cheap vit is made upon information and belief and effective system of judicature without an averment of an expectation to be able to prove the facts alleged. whereby controversies involving comSchleicher v Hunsicker, 10 Leh. C. L. J. paratively small amounts may be speed 181, followed. Appeal from justice. Motion to strike off plaintiff's statement. Motion dismissed. William H. Schneller, for plaintiff. motion. Iobst, J., March 3, 1924. This proceeding is an appeal from a justice of the peace. ily adjudicated. That system the people provided through constitutional provisions creating justice' courts, and although the legislature has now placed an onerous obstacle in the way of the complete realization of that aim, we shall not lend our assistance to thwart it entirely by applying to these pleadings the strict rules of technical common law pleading. The reasons which support this conclusion would support a like determination concerning motions to strike off pleadings in actions originally instituted here. The Practice Act of 1915 was designed On July 21st, 1923, the defendant filed to simplify, not complicate, the process a motion to strike plaintiff's statement of pleadings; and the motion to strike from the record, alleging the following reason, "Plaintiff's statement of claim is in violation of the Practice Act, nineteen fifteen, in that the affidavit in and to said statement of claim is insufficient in law for the reason that being made by the The plaintiff filed his statement of claim on July 5th, 1923. off should be employed only when the form of the pleading under attack is so flagrant a violation of the provisions of the act that an adversary is actually injured and prejudiced thereby. Unless that factor appears, the questions raised by the motion are likely to be merely was filed against Donald M. Stewart, academic, and, to that extent, tempt lit- owner or reputed owner, and was for the igants to indulge in a vain pursuit of the payment of a debt due to the plaintiff as shadow instead of the substance of their contractor in the repair, erection and claims. That court best serves the law construction of said building. The whole which, while affording parties every fa- amount of the work done and the macility for securing even and exact jus-terials furnished aggregated $7,283.19, tice, also discourages anything that tends and the credit admitted to have been reto obstruct and delay its proceedings |ceived was $6,063.21. On October 13, without promoting the great end of all 1923, the defendant presented his petilitigation. However, while we have thus tion, asking that the lien be stricken off, indicated our views upon motions to and thereupon this rule was granted. strike off pleadings generally, the present determination applied only to the pleadings on appeals from justices of the peace." The court will not now deviate from this opinion. The sole ground upon which the defendant rests his case is "that the mechanic's lien does not set forth with sufficient clearness and detail the kind of labor and material furnished, but only sets forth the name to whom the amount is due, and the amount, neglecting, in all cases, to set forth the kind of labor, hours, etc., and the nature and character Now, March 3rd, 1924, the motion to strike plaintiff's statement of claim from the record is dismissed and the defendant is directed to file his affidavit of de-of the material furnished." If this is fense within fifteen days. necessary, the lien must be stricken off, because, while he sets forth certain bills as having been paid for labor and materials, he does not indicate the kind of labor or materials. I am convinced that he was not bound to do this. In the recent case of Citizens Bank of Mechanic's lien-When sufficiently Palmerton v. Lesko, 277 Pa. 174 (Ad specific. vance Reports), Mr. Justice Simpson said: "The objection to the lumped A mechanic's lien filed by a contractor for labor and materials furnished will not be items' in them is of no avail, because the stricken off because it only sets forth the claimants were not sub-contractors, but amount and the name to whom due and not did their work under contracts with the the kind of labor, and number of hours, and the nature and character of the materials owners or their agent. Russell v. Bell, furnished where the contracts were with the 44 Pa. 47; Murphy v. Bear, 240 Pa. 448.” owner. Rule to strike off mechanic's lien. Harry L. Raub, Jr., for rule. * * *" In a late case decided in this court (Steinback's Sons v. Keystone Oil Service Company, 38 Lanc. Law Review 547) it was also held that "a mechanic's lien will not be stricken off because no Landis, P. J., January 19, 1924.-On dates when the labor was done or materials furnished are set out, and the hours August 23, 1923, the plaintiff filed a mechanic's lien for $1,219.98, against "all of labor and materials furnished are that certain tract of land, on which is lumped, where the contract was with the erected a three and one-half story brick owner of the premises dwelling house, situated on the west side the same effect is Brennan v. Kennedy, of and known as No. 318 North Duke 69 Pa. Superior Ct. 77. It seems to me Street, in the City of Lancaster, Penn- that, in view of these authorities, it is sylvania. Containing in front on said needless to discuss this question at further length. North Duke Street thirty-two and two and one-quarter inches, and extending in depth of that of that width two hundred and forty-five feet." The lien Το The rule to strike off the mechanic's lien is now discharged. Rule discharged. Axle & Spring Co., 270 Pa. 476. It follows that the referee did not err in awarding compensation. His findings of fact are supported by proof, and his conclusions of law follow as of course.' of law and award of the referee are affirmed, and the appeal is dismissed."" Workmen's compensation-Power of (c) The findings of fact, conclusions court on appeal-Evidence to sustain findings-Res gestae-Compensable injury. courts are limited to a determination of the The referee selected by the Workmen's Compensation Board heard the witnesses in the case and, from the evi On appeals from the Workmen's Compen-dence produced, found the facts upon sation Board, the revisory powers of the which compensation was awarded to the question whether there is evidence to sup-grandchildren of the decedent whose port the findings, and whether the law has death was the subject of the claim and been properly applied to them. Where the findings of fact by the referee inquiry. and the Compensation Board are based on Upon appeal from the finding and evidence which leads to a reasonable infer-award of the referee, the Workmen's ence supporting the findings, they will be sustained. Compensation Board heard the case de Statements made by the injured person novo, and, by an opinion rendered while his injuries were being dressed were properly admitted as part of the res gestae. An injury, to be compensable, need not arise out of the employment, it need only oc cur in the course of it. through one of their number, Commissioner Paul W. Houck, discussed and affirmed the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and confirmed C. Donald Swartz and Niles & Neff the award of compensation. with him, for appellant. Robert S. Frey, for appellee. As we now view the law, our duties, not so conclusive, are similar to the duties of the appellate courts, as proRoss, J., April 14th, 1924.-This is an nounced in the recent case of Rodman appeal from a decision of the Work- vs. Smedley, 276 Pa. 296, in the opinion men's Compensation Board taken by the by Mr. Justice Walling, on page 298: defendant, The American Chain Com- "Our revisory powers are limited to a pany. It was arguel at the regular term determination of the question whether of Argument Court, March 18, 1924. there is evidence to support the finding, The allegations of error upon which the defendant (The American Chain Company) bases its appeal, are as follows: "I. The learned board erred in finding the following facts: (a) That the decedent met with an accidental injury in the course of his employment.' (b) "That a causal connection between the injury and the decedent's death was proven.' "2. The learned board erred in its conclusions of law in awarding compensation to the claimant, which are as follows: (a) 'We are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence in the case to warrant the finding that the decedent met with an accidental injury while in the course of his employment.' (b) 'In our opinion the medical testimony in the case meets the requirement laid down by the Supreme Court in Fink v. Sheldon and whether the law has been properly applied to them, and does not enable us to weigh conflicting evidence or decide what inferences should be drawn thereform." Under that rule, we have reviewed all the evidence in the light of the foregoing exceptions or allegations of error, and find that the evidence was sufficient upon which to base the facts found by the referee and affirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Board. "That the decedent met with an accidental injury in the course of his employment," as found by the Compensation Board, is an entirely reasonable conclusion under the testimony produced. It is not necessary for us to go into a detailed discussion of the evidence, but to quote from the typewritten brief filed by defendant's counsel, there is no doubt that the defendant's first complaint of injury was at or immediately after the jury, to be compensable, must arise imtime he was performing, as a regular mediately out of the employment. That employee of the defendant, some work is the law in some states, but, as was which had evidently caused an abrasion on one of his fingers, which caused the application of remedies by the first aid nurse of the defendant. said by Mr. Justice Schaffer, in the opinion rendered for the Supreme Court, in Laraio v. Pennsylvania R. R., 277 Pa. 382, 385, "The injury, to be compenThere was some evidence which would sable, does not have to arise out of the lead to the reasonable inference that the employment; it need only occur in course abrasion was caused by the contact of of it. Statutes containing the double reiron against an old or former "scratch" quirement, that the accident must arise on his finger, but, "an accident sustained out of and in course of employment, in the course of employment from an necessarily limit the field of recovery to unexplained cause is compensable": a smaller area than we have provided.' Laraio v. Pennsylvania R. R., 277 Pa. 382; Balch v. Budd Mfg. Co., 277 Pa. 548. What he told the foreman as to the accident, showing him the injured finger, and what the foreman told him, to apply at once to the "First Aid department,' and what he told the nurse at the First Aid department when she examined his injury and applied salve and dressed it, of course, were not statements that could be considered admissible as conclusive evidence, but we think, under the circumstances developed under all the evidence in this case, these statements were a part of the res gestae: Guyer v. Equitable Gas Co., 279 Pa. 5. April 14th, 1924: We affirm the findings and awards made by the Workmen's Compensation Board, and direct that judgment be entered accordingly. Attachment-Requirements must be strictly complied with-Bond must be thorizing the issuing of writs of attachment A party, in order to be entitled to the benefits of these The bond, under the Act of 1887, must be We also agree with the referee and the Compensation Board in concluding, as a matter of law, that the evidence of Dr. Gemmill, the attending physician, who testified that, in his opinion, he, the decedent, died as a result of septicaemia following the injury to his finger. This was competent testimony which was evidently believed by the referee and the Compensation Board, and we think with-filing the bond which, or the approval of it in the rule as illustrated by the opinion by, the prothonotary, will not be sufficient. of Mr. Justice Walling rendered for the It is too late after the writ has been issued or executed to ask for such approval; neither Supreme Court in Guyer v. Equitable can a new or sufficient bond be filed or apGas Co., 279 Pa. 5, and the authorities proved as cited in that opinion on page 7. We think this review of our examination of the evidence taken before the referee and the Compensation Board is sufficient to demonstrate, together with the reports of the referee and Commissioner Houck, that the findings are well sustained by the evidence and that the conclusions of law are supported by established rules. approved by a judge of the court of common pleas, before the attachment can be issued, a substitute for a bond already filed and found to be defective. Rules to dissolve attachment. Henry C. Baur, for plaintiff. Hirt, J., March 31, 1924.-A fraudulent debtor's attachment issued on the affidavit of plaintiff, alleging that defendant is attempting to secrete his propThe brief of the defendant's counsel erty with intent to cheat and defraud indicates that they believe that the in-plaintiff. A bond was filed in accord ance with the act of assembly as to form, The bond, under the Act of 1887, except that the bond is not drawn to the must be approved by a judge of the Commonwealth for the use of defendant, court of common pleas, before the atbut directly to the defendant. The bond tachment can be issued; filing the bond was not approved by the court, however, with, or the approval of it by, the probut was filed in the office of the prothon-thonotary, will not be sufficient. It is otary without any approval. Defendant presented his petition to dissolve the attachment, alleging that he is not indebted to plaintiff in any sum whatever, and further, that he has not concealed nor attempted to conceal his property with the intent to defraud plaintiff. On February 11th defendant asked leave to file additional reasons for the dissolving of the attachment, alleging that the affidavit and bond are insufficient and not in accordance with the act of assembly. too late after the writ has been issued or executed to ask for such approval; neither can a new and sufficient bond be filed or approved as a substitute for a bond already filed and found to be defective": Elliott v. Plukart, 6 C. C. R. 151. And now, March 31, 1924, the rule granted December 6, 1923, on defendant's motion to dissolve the attachment, is made absolute, and it is ordered that defendant file an affidavit of defense to plaintiff's statement of claim within 15 days. In this case personal service was had and a motion to dissolve rather than to quash is the proper practice, and the general appearance of the defendant is not a waiver of the defects in the affi- C. P. of davit or the bond, for even though the attachment be dissolved, the suit goes on: Biddle v. Black, 99 Pa. 380. The subject of a motion to dissolve either may be allegations of defects in Allegheny Co. Deidrick v. Russell & Co. et al. Pleading and practice-Replevin the affidavit and bond, or may consist in Statement of claim-Anticipation-Dea denial of the facts alleged in the affi davit. In the latter event depositions murrer-Damages-Oath-Act of 1901 must be taken in order to determine the An affidavit of defense in the nature of a demurrer under the Practice Act of 1915 has issue of fact, but not in the former, for-Practice Act of 1915. We are of the opinion that on the amended motion the attachment must be dissolved for technical defects in the bond. "The language of the acts of assembly authorizing the issuing of writs of attachment against fraudulent debtors is imperative, and must receive a strict construction. A party, in order to be entitled to the benefits of these acts, must comply with all the requirements. A common law demurrer may yet be filed in such cases, but this is a dilatory plea and must be supported by a proper affidavit as provided for in Amended Court Rule No. 137. A statement of claim in replevin shall be verified by oath and shall consist of a concise statement of plaintiff's demand setting forth the facts upon which his title to the goods and chattels is based. The lease forms no part of plaintiff's statement, and the matter of damages claimed for the violation of planitiff's rights under it may only be set up in his reply to defendant's affidavit of defense. Amended Court Rule No. 139 must be Demurrer sustained with leave adhered to. to amend. Statutory demurrer to declaration in replevin. Overruled. Raymond D. Evans, for plaintiff. Leonard S. Levin, for defendants. |