The arguments used by the plaintiff's said directors, sufficient to furnish the council might apply in ordinary cases, necessary funds to purchase said lands, but in the case at bar it seems the Su- pay for said plans and specifications, to preme and Superior Courts have already erect said buildings and furnish the ruled the question of law raised by the same, in connection with any sum or affidavit of defence. sums of money in the hands or control of the said directors of the poor and any sum of money realized from the sale of the site and buildings of the present almshouse, together with all moneys now rightfully belonging to the poor board, by whomever the same may be held or deposited, which moneys shall be turned over to the use of the county commissioners for such purposes only. Corroborative of those decisions, the Legislature passed an Act, approved March 20, 1917, P. L. 4, which supplemented the said Act of 1804, as follows: "The said commissioners shall have "Section I. Be it enacted, &c., that the directors of the poor and of the house of employment for the County of York, whenever in the opinion of a majority of said directors the lands, "The directors of the poor, with the buildings, and furnishings for maintain-approval of the court of quarter sesing the poor in said county of York are sions of the County of York, are authinadequate, unsuitable, and unsafe for orized to sell the site and buildings of the proper maintaining of the poor the present almshouse, and apply the within the said County of York, be, and proceeds of such sale as herein above they are hereby, authorized to meet and directed. to determine and fix upon, and to purchase, such land or lands as to them, or a majority of them, may appear most the power, and it shall be their duty, to eligible and suitable, for the purpose of assess, levy, and collect, together with the erection of proper, adequate, and other county rates and levies, and on the secure buildings for the employment and same subjects of taxation, an amount support of the poor in the County of sufficient to gradually reduce the said York. The said directors, or a majority loan and entirely cancel the same within of them, are authorized to have pre- thirty years. Whenever the said buildpared plans and specifications for any ings shall be finished and completed the building or buildings to be erected upon said directors of the poor shall certify lands so purchased by the said directors, their proceedings to the clerk of the and to cause the necessary buildings to court of quarter sessions of said York be erected upon the said lands accord- County; whereupon the said court shall ing to the said plans and specifications: appoint three competent and disinterestProvided, however, that before the said ed persons viewers, view and directors shall purchase any lands or let thoroughly examine said buildings, and any contract for the erection of said report to the court whether the said conbuildings, according to plans and speci- tract or contracts have been faithfully fications adopted, they shall advertise in and fully performed and completed, and two or more newspapers of general cir- until such report be so made final payculation in the County of York for bids ment on said contract or contracts shall or offers of lands for said purposes, and not be made and paid. The said viewers for bids for the erection of buildings on shall be entitled to five dollars per day said lands according to the said plans for each day necessarily engaged in the and specifications, and the letting of the performance of their duties." contract or contracts for the erection of said buildings, shall first be approved by the court of quarter sessions of the County of York. "To carry out the provisions of this act, the county commissioners of York County shall have the power, and it shall be their duty, to procure a loan, at a rate of interest not exceeding six per centum, on estimates furnished by the to It is not necessary to answer in detail the various arguments advanced by the counsel for plaintiff, because it is apparent to this court that the law controlling the rights and duties of the Directors of the Poor and of the House of Employment for the County of York were prescribed by the Acts creating the Poor District of York County, viz: the said Act of 1804, and the Act of 1866, P. L. 110, as described by the Supreme and Superior Courts. Even if state officers did order or direct the said directors to erect a new almshouse, such orders or directions could not carry with them such an authority as would allow more privileges than the legislature which created them gave. Schaeffer, P. J., January 31, 1925.The appellant is engaged in the business of plumbing and steam heating. It appears from the agreed statement of facts that he maintains a shop in the City of Reading, at which he keeps on hand a small supply of fixtures and material necessary in his business. He installs As said by Mr. Justice Head, in ren-plumbing and heating plants in buildings dering the opinion for the Superior owned by others, upon receipt of orders Court in the case of Taylor vs. Poor or in pursuance of contracts duly made; District, 50 Pa. Supr. Ct., page 322: he makes repairs to plumbing and heat"In considering the question whether or ing systems. He purchases from others not the power here claimed exists by the material consisting of pipes, valves, implication, it is to be remembered that radiators, boilers, toilets, bathtubs, the general fundamental principle re- necessary fixtures, etc., which in the qquires a strict construction of such year 1923 amounted to $21,175.80, and grants by the legislature. The power fits, adapts and assembles such material claimed by the corporation must be to the work for which he has been emfound clearly written within its charter." ployed or for which he has contracted. It is well known to this court that the He and his employees expend labor upon almshouse was not destroyed, but was the material in so fitting, adapting and still in use, and, despite the orders which assembling it; during the year 1923 he were given, as related in plaintiff's state-paid for labor employed in this work ment, it is still used as a harbor and re-the sum of $11,738.86. At his shop he fuse for the poor of York County. And now, March 9, 1925, the question of law raised by the affidavit of defence is decided in favor of the defendants. C. P. of Miller's Appeal Berks Co. Taxation-Mercantile license also sold certain articles and material at retail aggregating the sum of $510.48. Is the appellant a "retail vender of or retail dealer in goods, wares and merchandise" within the provisions of the Act of May 2, 1899, P. L. 184, and as such subject to the annual tax upon gross volume of business transacted? A vender or dealer in the popular and tax-therefore in the statuory sense of the Act 2 May, 1899, P. L. 184-Act word, is not one who buys to keep, or 9 April, 1870, P. L. 59-Plumbers.. of makes to sell, but one who buys to sell again: Norris Brothers v. The Commonwealth, 27 Pa. 494. A person engaged in the business plumbing and steam heating is not a retail In considering this question, we have, vender of or dealer in goods, wares and merchandise subject to the annual tax upon the fortunately, several decisions for our gross volume of business transacted under guidance. In the case of Com. vs. the provisions of the Act 2 May, 1899, P. L. 184, with respect to the material supplied Gormly, 173 Pa. 586, the issue was subby him in the execution of his contracts, or stantially the same as that now presentin the installation of plumbing or of heat-ed: was a plumber a "dealer in goods, plumbing or heating systems; but he is a wares and merchandise" and as such dealer within the meaning of said Act as liable to the mercantile license tax under ing plants upon order, or in his repairs to to the goods, wares and merchandise sold in his shop and, if such sales exceed the "sum or value of five hundred dollars per annum,' the total amount of such sales is taxable, as provided by the Act 9 April 1870, P. L. 59. Appeal from rating of appraiser for mercantile tax. C. H. Ruhl, for the appellant. the then existing laws imposing such tax? The court, in the opinion by Mr. Justice Green, says that the plumber is neither a manufacturer nor a dealer, in the strict sense of the latter term. "He does not buy to sell the articles he uses. He does not sell them in the literal sense and he only buys them when he has a job of work to do for which he requires them. As between the dealer and him self, he is the consumer. He needs the and that he also pay the cost of this aparticles in his business. He puts them peal; and that judgment is hereby directin buildings putting his own work upon ed to be entered to that extent in favor them, but when they are placed there of the Commonwealth and against the they are not in the same shape as when apellant. he received them, but as a compact whole composed of all the materials re- C. P. of Lancaster Co. quired for the purpose, no matter from Donovan Co. v. Troup Music House what source he obtained them.” We also have before us the exhaustive opinion recently filed by Judge Hargest of the Court of Common Pleas of Conversion of bailed goods-Assump Though a defendant dealt in good faith with an apparent owner and thus obtained posession of chattels belonging to another, it is a conversion if such defendant refuses or is unable to return such chattels to the rightful owner on request and he renders himself liable in damages to such rightful owner, or the owner may waive the tort and recover from him in an action for goods sold and delivered though the defendant made no promise to pay. Affidavit of defence raising question of law. J. Andrew Frantz, for plaintiff. Dauphin County, in the case of Com-sit-Waiver of tort. It is apparent, however, that as to the goods, wares and merchandise sold in his shop, the defendant is a dealer, for these articles he bought to sell again. He did not manufacture them; he performed no work upon them; nor were they joined by his labor to other articles to make an entirely different, compact whole. As the sum or value of the goods so sold by him in 1923, exceeded the sum of five hundred dollars, the defendant is taxable upon the whole of such sales: Act of April 9, 1870, P. L. Hassler, J., January 17, 1925.-In its statement, the plaintiff alleges as its action the following facts: On February 18, 1918, it leased a Victrola to one, William A. Cooper, retaining title in the same. On or about August 15, 1921, the said Cooper traded the said Victrola, so belonging to the plaintiff, to the defendant, who took posession of it. Subsequently, plaintiff made demand on the defendant for a return of the Victrola or payment of its value. This demand was not complied with. It is further alleged that the defendant has disposed of the Victrola. An affidavit of defense raising a question of law has been fild by the defendant, which questions the right of the plaintiff to recover, for the reason that as it is not alleged in the statement that any contractual relation, either oral or written, express or implied, exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, it sets forth no cause of action. Even though a defendant dealt in good faith with an apparent owner and thus obtained posession of chattles belonging to another, it is a conversion, if such defendant refuses or is unable to return to the rightful owner such chat tels upon request, and he renders him- In Balliet v. Brown, 103 Pa. 546, it is decided that where there is a conversion of chattels, there is an implied sale of them, and the owner can waive the tort and sue in assumpsit for goods sold and delivered upon the implied contract. pay, just as if the sale had been proven.' The facts alleged in the plaintiff's statement meet all the requirements of these cases to show a good cause of action. It is alleged in it that it, the plaintiff, is the owner of the Victrola; that it was taken by the defendant from a third person who had possession of it; that the defendant refused upon request to return it to the plaintiff, the rightful owner; and that the defendant has disposed (that is, parted with possession) of it. Under these circumstances, the cases above cited show that, even though the defendant did not in fact promise or intend to promise to pay for it, the law makes such promise for him, and on it the plaintiff's right to sue in assumpsit rests. The question of law raised in the affidavit of defense is decided against the defendant, and it is given fifteen days from the date of this opinion to file an affidavit of defense. In Reese & Sons Company v. Western Exposition Society, 44 Pa. Superior Ct. 381, Judge Head, after reference to the general rule that assumpsit will not lie in all cases for goods wrongfully taken by another and still in his possession, says: "There can be no doubt of the existence of a general rule which in substance declares that, where the personal C. P. of property of one has been wrongfully tak Lackawanna Co. en by another and remains in his pos- Incorporation of America Lithuanian session, the owner cannot recover its price or value in an action of assumpsit. * * * There are, however, and have been long a number of exceptions to the general rule, as widely and as completely recognized as the rule itself. Thus, where is could be shown that the goods wrongfully converted had been sold, it has been held that the owner might waive the tort and maintain an action of assumpsit for their price. The principle on which the exception appears to rest is, that the wrongdoer has, by selling the goods, asserted in the strongest manner his title to and right of dominion over them. He has put it out of his power to respond in an action against him for the recovery of the goods themselves. He has voluntarily placed himself in the attitude of one who had bought the goods, and although he did not in fact promise or intend to promise to pay for them, the law makes such promise for him, and it is upon the promise thus raised by the law the plaintiff's right to maintain assumpsit rests. Even where no such sale has been in fact shown, the law has, under certain circumstances, presumed such sale and again raised the promise on the part of the defendant to Political Club Charter application-More than one purpose contained-Act of July 15, 1897, P. L. 283. A petition for a charter for a corporation of the first class, not for profit, must be devoted to a single purpose mentioned in either the Act of 1874 or Act of 1897. Petition for incorporation. Refused. Edwards, P. J., January 5, 1925.Looking at the title of the proposed corporation it would appear that the intention of the petitioners is to form a political club. There are several common pleas decisions which hold that an incorporation for such a purpose does not come within any of the provisions of the Act of 1897, P. L. 283, relating to the creation of corporations "not for profit." Regardless, however, of this question, the present application must be refused for other reasons. An examination of the petition shows that more than one purpose is set forth therein. According to the words of the petition it is stated that tion of the "American Lithuanian Politi"the purposes of the American Lithuan- cal Club," of Carbondale, is refused. ian Club are as follows." Then follows the statement in these words: C. P. of York Co. "To promote an interest in a knowl- Automotive Stores Corporation v. edge of local and national political questions among Americans of Lithuanian ancestry; to encourage and aid persons of Lithuanian ancestry and citizenship in becoming citizens of the United States; Leachey Plaintiff's statement Sufficiency clusion of law. to provide a meeting place where those General averments-Averments of conpersons of Lithuanian parentage and their friends may meet for social purposes; and to provide for members of the intended club or corporation a system of sick and death benefits to be conducted a mutual and non-profit making on basis." In an action by a corporation for the price of stock alleged to have been sold to the de tendant, an averment that the plaintiff accepted the defendant's subscription and delivered to him the stock is an expression of a conclusion of law based on facts not disclosed; the defendant is entitled to know by what party, when and where the alleged ac ceptance and delivery are alleged to have been made; and if the acceptance was in writing a copy of the same should be set A fair inference from the somewhat vague language of the first part of the statement is that the petitioners intend to form a political club. In the same para-statement which contained only such general graph two other purposes are mentioned, averments was stricken off. forth in the statement; and a plaintiff's viz., a club for social purposes, and a so- Motion to strike off the plaintiff's ciety for beneficial or protective pur-statement in Automotive Stores Corpoposes. In other words, we find before us ration vs. William N. Leschey, No. III, an attempt to form a club or corporation August Term, 1924, in the Court of for two of the fourteen purposes named Common Pleas of York Co., Pa. Motion in section 2 of the Act of 1897 providing allowed. for corporations of the first class-not Robert C. Fluhrer and Cochran, Wil for profit, in addition to the political liams & Kain, for defendant and motion. Niles & Neff, contra. item. It should be understood that under the Act of 1897, as well as under the prior Act of 1874, a corporation not for Wanner, P. J., April 20th, 1925.—It is profit must be devoted to a single pur-contended that because the plaintiff is a pose mentioned in either act. If a peti- corporation, acting through agents, offition for incorporation may include two cers, or duly authorized representatives purposes, it would follow that such peti- of some kind, the mere allegation that it tion may also include the fourteen pur-"accepted" certain subscriptions, and poses named in the act, which, of course, would be an anomaly, and contrary to any rule of practice. that it "delivered" certain stocks, is not specific enough to show what the specific acts were, or by whom they were performed, which constituted an acceptance or a delivery. We are leaving undecided the question of granting a charter for a purely political purpose. However, if such an inWhether or not they amounted to a lecorporation were legal it could not be gal acceptance, or a legal delivery, is a granted on the present petition, because question of law, and the mere statement of the discrimination contained in the that the plaintiff "accepted" or "delivseventh paragraph, which confines the ered" anything, is the expression of a prospective membership to members of conclusion of law, based on facts not disthe Roman Catholic Church. Such a re- closed. The defendant is entitled to striction would be perfectly proper in a know by what party, and when and petition for a charter under the first or where, the alleged acceptance and delivsecond purpose enumerated in the act ery respectively are alleged to have been providing for the incorporation of cor-made, so that he may know whether to porations of the first class. admit or whether to deny the said allega Now, January 5, 1925, the incorpora- tions. If the alleged acceptance was in |