the time limitation, brings the commence- their civil rights during their term of serment of the action within the period pre-vice and to enable them to devote their scribed in the contract. entire energy to the military needs of the Nation, and to this end the following provisions are made for the temporary suspension of legal proceedings and transactions which may prejudice the civil rights of persons in such service during the continuance of the present war.

The defendant, however, contends that the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act only gives relief from statutory limitations of the time within which suits may be brought by or against parties in the military service of the United States. But it will be observed that the Act excludes the period of military service from any The preamble of a statute should be time "Now or hereafter to be limited by considered in ascertaining the legislative any law" for the bringing of such ac-intent in passing it, and when that is detions, whether the same accrued prior to termined the Act should be liberally conor during the period of such service." strued and applied so as to render it efThis form of expression seems to be in- fective: Steinfield vs. Mass. Bonding tended to include not only limitations by Co., 112 Atl. 800. statute but all such as are enforceable A review of this subject with citations by any law. Limitations in lawful con- of cases holding the Soldiers' and Sailtracts have always been held to be en-ors' Civil Relief Act to be applicable to forceable at law, and this specific limita- limitations of the time for bringing suit, tion in bills of lading has been sustained in contracts, as well as limitations by staby the courts: Concordia Silk Hosiery tute, will be found in the annotations to Co., v. Pa. R. R. Co., 69 Pa. Super. Ct. Erickson vs. Macey, 16 A. L. R. 1322361; Scattergood v. Michigan Central R. 1327. R. Co., 69 Pa. Super Ct. 367.

Certain objections to the formal acThe language of a contract is the law curacy of the statement have been inof the contract, if it be a lawful one, and cluded in this statutory demurrer, which a limitation within it of the time for if material, should have been made the bringing an action thereon is, therefore, basis of a motion to strike off the statea limitation by law, just as the enforcement, but which are entirely ineffective ment of any other part of the contract in support of this demurrer. is an enforcement thereof by the law: Steinfield v. Mass. Bonding Co., 112 Atl.

800.

And now to wit, October 6th, 1924: The defendant's demurrer is over-ruled.

O. C. of

Brownback's Estate

Berks Co.

Wills-Widow taking against willRights of legatees.

To confine the application of the act to statutory limitations, would defeat its manifest purpose to give relief from all civil litigation to persons in the military. service. To protect them only against limitations by statute of their right to bring actions, would leave them at the mercy of all parties who might desire to enforce against them similar limitations Where a widow takes against a will, and fixed by contracts. It is inconcerivable her claims against the estate have been satthat a result should have been contem-isfied, it is the duty of the court to dispose of the balance in the estate as nearly in acplated so entirely at variance with the clearly expressed purpose of the Act, as set forth in the preamble thereof, which is as follows: "For the purpose of enabling the United States the more successfully to prosecute and carry on the war in which it is at present engaged, protection is hereby extended to persons in military service of the United States in order to prevent prejudice or injury to

cordance with the provisions of the will as is possible under the

'stances of the case.

Sur Distribution.

particular circum

Leonard G. Yoder, for Accountant.

Schaeffer, P. J., June 14, 1924.-The decedent died on the 24th of January, 1923, testate and married, leaving to survive him a widow, Susan Brownback,

who is still living. By his last will and residuary fund. True, she is not mentestament, he provided as follows with tioned in the residuary clause; the widow respect to the distribution of this fund: is. The result is that while the widow "I have authorized my relief bene- steps out of the residuary fund, Ceceli fits paid to my executor, out of which he McDermott steps in. Consequently, the shall pay all expenses, funeral and set- widow's election in no wise affects the tlement of estate and what is left he is right of Ceceli McDermott to what reto pay over to Ceceli McDermott." mains of the "relief benefits" after the 2. "What is left of my estate I give debts have been paid. It merely postin equal shares to Harry Brownback, Le-pones the payment of Ceceli's legacy unvin Brownback Moyer, C. Levin Emes, til the widow's rights in the estate have Geo. W. Duncan and my wife, Susan been satisfied. The widow's interest havBrownback." ing now been taken care of, we have no

The account contains the proceeds of doubt that Ceceli McDermott is entitled personal estate, principal and income. to her legacy. This is all in accordance Of principal, the balance for distribution with the rule that where a widow has is shown to be $1,347.48, and of income, taken against a will and her claims. $52.89. An additional credit of $3.80, against the estate under the law have paid to the County of Berks for the 1923 been satisfied, it is the duty of the court state tax, has been asked for, and is al- to dispose of the balance in the estate as lowed. With respect to the distribution, nearly in accordance with the provisions it appears that Susan Brownback, the of the will as is possible under the partiwidow, on February 9, 1923, filed her re-cular circumstances of the case. This fusal to abide by the terms of the will, we have now done, and the balance, after and elected to take her interest in the es- the payment of the widow and the legacy tate at law. The next of kin of testator, to Ceceli McDermott will be distributed being collateral, the widow under the in- to the residuary legatees named in the terstate act of 1917 is entitled to one-half will, excluding the widow. Distribution of the estate. As to the balance, it ap- accordingly. pears that the "relief benefits" which are

the subject of the first provision of the Q. S. of
will, hereinbefore quoted, amounted to
$1,250.00, out of which the funeral ex-
penses and costs of administration,
amounting to $1,085.00 were paid, leav-
ing a balance in this fund of $165.00.

Allegheny Co.

In Re Polling Place

Elections--Polling place-Petition to

This balance, in our opinion, is distribu-change-Quarter sessions court-County table to the special legatee, Ceceli McDermott.

We do not agree with the accountant that the widow's election to take against. the will so operated as to deprive this legatee of this legacy. The widow, by her action, has abandoned whatever rights she had under the will, and elected to take those rights which are given her under the intestate laws. But she takes nothing until the debts have been paid. Of whatever then remains, she takes half. Under the law, then, accountant seems to think that she consumes whatever Ceceli McDermott may have been entitled to under the will; but there is no reason for denying Ceceli's right to be subrogated for her special legacy to the

commissioners Jurisdiction Acts of 1895, 1903 and 1919.

A petition to change the polling place in an election district presented to the quarter sessions court was quashed for want of jurisdiction, where the petition was presented more than three weeks before election, as under the Act of 1903, P. L. 187, it was a matter for the county commissioners. This court has jurisdiction to change the polling place when such a change is sought within three weeks of an election.

Jurisdiction being fundamental, it is the duty of the court sua sponte to quash a proceeding not brought within its statutory authority, even when the question is not raised by the parties.

The quarter sessions court had no power polling place in to grant or refuse a petition to change the an election district filed

more than three weeks prior to an election. atory Act of 1919, P. L. 769, repealed the Act

The Act of 1903, P. L. 187, and the amend

of May 18, 1895, P. L. 106, and vested this "Section 2. All acts or parts of acts, power in the county commissioners. Proceedings quashed.

Petition to change polling place.

M. B. Lesher, for petitioners.

general, special or local inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed."

Section 1 of the Act of 1919, P. L. 769, amends Section 1 of the Act of

"Section I.

Carpenter, J., August 20, 1924.-Un- 1903. As amended it reads: der date August 8, 1924, on petition of Be it enacted, &c., That qualified voters of the district, a prelim-it shall be lawful for the county commisinary order was signed, fixing August sioners of any county of this Common15th for hearing and directing that no-wealth, at any time at least three weeks tice be given the county commissioners prior to any general, municipal, townand also by not less than five hand bills ship, or special election; for any reason posted in conspicuous places "at least five that may seem proper to the county comdays before the hearing," the order being missioners, upon a petition of at least ten printed on the back of the petition. A qualified electors of any township or protest was subsequently filed, signed by election division, and after written notice a number of voters, and on the day set to the occupant or owner of said polling for hearing the matter was taken under place, at least one week before the hearadvisement. ing on said petition, to change the poll

As the change of polling place is auth-ing-place of said township or election diorized by law and the petition did not revision: Provided, however, That upon fer to any Act of Assembly relating to the presentation of a petition to the the subjject matter thereof we deemed it county commissioners, on or before the advisable to examine the statutes relating day of hearing of said petition for the thereto. An inspection of the papers dis- change, signed by a majority of the regclosed the fact that the hand bills were istered electors of the said township or election division, and sworn to by one of posted August 13th, and for this reason alone the order prayed for would not be the qualified electors thereof, objecting made. The question of jurisdiction was to such change of the polling-place, said not raised. The Act of May 18, 1893, county commissioners shall not make any P. L. 106, empowers the courts of quar-change in the said polling-place of said ter sessions to change the polling places township or election division. And proin any election district on petition of at least ten qualified electors of the district and repeals all inconsistent acts. The Act of 1903, P. L. 187, authorizes the county commissioners to change polling places. This Act is brief and we quote it at length:

vided further: that the said county commissioners may, in their discretion, direct that an election be held to settle the question as to where the said polling-place shall be located."

Section 2 repeals all acts or parts of acts, general, special or local, inconsistent therewith.

In 1906 Judge Butler held that the words "election division" in the Act of 1903 meant election division of a township. 19 D. R. 782.

In 1916 Judge Ferguson held that the words quoted applied to every election district in the State. 25 D. R. 993.

"Section I. Be it enacted, &c., That it shall be lawful for the county commissioners of any county of this Commonwealth, at any time at least three weeks prior to any general, municipal, township or special election, for any reason that may seem proper to the county commissioners, upon a petition of at least ten qualified electors of any township elec- In 1920 Judge Koch held that by the tion division, to change the polling place Act of 1903, as amended by the Act of of said township or election division: 1919, the county commissioners are auProvided, however, that the said county thorized to change the polling-place commissioners may, in their discretion, where the petition is filed more than direct that an election be held to settle three weeks prior to the election. 29 D. the question as to where the said polling R. 678. place shall be located.

We cannot better express our views

than in the words of Judge Fox, who, C. P. of
"In re Polling Place," 69 P. L. J. 751—
2, said:

York Co.

Thomas v. Employers Liability
Assurance Corporation

Insurance against liability for injury

"We are in accord with the reasons for the decisions in the last two mentioned cases, and for the further reason that in the amending Act of 1919 in the seventh by automobile-Variance of policy by line of Section 1 the word 'or' is inserted parole-Substitution of insured without between the words 'township' and 'elec-endorsement on policy-Limitation of

tion division,' which word in the Act of

1903, Section 1, line eight, does not ap-agent's power--Effect of agent's conduct pear, showing that the legislature intend-on policy.

ed it to extend to more than the polling- When a person dealing with an insurance place in a township or township division.agent is by the circumstances put on notice

that he is a special agent, or that his powers are otherwise limited, such person is bound

at his peril to ascertain and take notice of the limitations imposed.

General agents of an insurance company

"We are of the opinion that in a case where the petition is presented more than three weeks before an approaching elec-have no power to waive any express condition, as specified in the Act, that the court of quarter sessions does not have jurisdiction, but that the county commis-provisions, the only method by which its

sioners do have the same, but in a case where the petition is presented less than three weeks before such approaching election the court of quarter sessions still retains exclusive jurisdiction.

tions in the policy.

Where a policy of insurance expressly pro

vides that an agent can not waive any of its

conditions can be changed, unless it can be shown that the company knew of and assented to the change, is by written endorsement

properly signed.

An insurance company may be estopped by the authorized acts of its agent, or by

misrepresentations of its general agent; but mere statement of opinion, given by an agent without the assent of his principal, will not create a waiver of a plainly expressed stipu

have known.

An insurance company may waive a con

"This petition being presented to us lation which the plaintiff knew or ought to more than three weeks prior to any approaching general, municipal, township or special election, we are of the opinion that the county commissioners have jur-pressed agreement endorsed on the policy; isdiction of the matter, and that the court but the mere statement of opinion, expressed

dition in its policy by parole, although it contains a stipulation that there shall be no

waiver of any condition except by an

ex

by an agent is not enough to constitute such

of quarter sessions is without jurisdic-a waiver. tion."

Where the owner of an automobile insured against personal liability, while the car is driven by himself, died before the policy of

insurance was delivered to him, and the the automobile, that if she desired, the policy could be made to protect her, if she would indicate the person who would drive the automobile, and some time later she expressed her desire to have the benefit of the insur

agent informeed his widow, the legatee of

The authority for changing polling places is purely statutory. The Act of 1893 vesting this power in the courts of quarter sessions was repealed by the Act of 1903. The latter Act and the amendatory Act of 1919 vest authority to change polling places in the county commission-office of the insurance company, giving no

ers.

Jurisdiction being fundamental, it is the duty of the court sua sponte to quash this proceeding.

ance under the policy mentioned and named

the person who would drive the automobile,

and the agent wrote a letter to the general

tice of the death of the insured in the original policy, of the desire to have the insured changed, and the name of the person who

will drive the automobile, there being, how

ever, no evidence that this letter was received

by the company or that it acted upon the

information therein contained, and subsequently the agent informed the legatee of the

policy has reverted to her and that no en

automobile that the interest in the original the preliminary clause of the agreement dorsement or other action was necessary, and is that "The Employers' Liability Asthat she might use the automobile, driven by surance Corporation, Limited, of Lonthe person designated by her, with the as- don, England, * does hereby surance that she would be protected by the policy; and where the policy contained a agree with the assured named in the destipulation that its terms should not be clarations attached hereto, and hereby made a part thereof," &c.

varied without the written endorsement of

the officers of the company, and no such en

dorsement had been made: it was Held that

the legatee of the automobile could not recover for damages she had sustained while the automobile was driven by the person de

signated as her driver.

Sur affidavit of defense raising ques tions of law in Mary C. Thomas vs. Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited of London, England, No. 164 August Term, 1923, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Pa. Judgment for defendant.

Niles & Neff, for plaintiff.

Items 1 and 2 of said Declaration state that the name of the assured is Walter J. Thomas, 219 Arch Street, York, Pennsylvania.

6. Under the provisions of the will of the said Walter J. Thomas, deceased, the automobile in question became the property of the plaintiff.

7. On February 19, 1921, the said Stallsmith notified the plaintiff, administratrix c. t. a., that he had received the policy (or contract) of insurance on the automobile issued to the said decedent, and she could have the benefit of it if she desired and would give him the name of Ross, J., June 23, 1924.-The facts the person who would operate for her stated by the plaintiff, in numbered para- [ instead of Walter J. Thomas, the person graphs, are substantially as follows: therein named as operator.

George S. Love, for defendant.

I. The defendant company is a cor- 8. On or about March 5, 1921, the poration doing business in the Common-plaintiff notified said Stallsmith that she wealth of Pennsylvania, with Samuel would accept and pay for said contract Appleton manager and attorney for the if it would protect her on said automoUnited States, and W. A. L. Laughton bile while driven by her son, W. Frankand Company its general agent, formerly lin Thomas; and said Stallsmith assured at 420 Walnut Street, now at 311-313 Walnut Street, Philadelphia.

2. R. O. Stallsmith was the local agent of defendant at York, Pennsylvania, during the time covered by the transactions herein referred to.

her that he would do whatever might be necessary to cover the said automobile as owned by her and operated by her said son in the same way it had been intended to cover said automobile during her said husband's life and while operated by him. 9. On the same day, March 5, 1921, Stallsmith notified her (plaintiff) that he had communicated the fact of the death of the said Walter J. Thomas to the defendant, and that the said policy had re

4. The said decedent, Walter J. Tho-verted to his wife, said plaintiff, and unmas, died February 16, 1921.

til further notice the said car would be driven principally by her son, W. Franklin Thomas, and that thereafter the said policy would be effective in favor of Mary C. Thomas when driven by her said son, W. Franklin Thomas.

5. Prior to his death, the said Walter J. Thomas had been the holder of a liability insurance contract issued by the defendant corporation, which expired February 19, 1921, when a renewal insurance policy or contract was prepared, ex- IO. On the same day, March 5, 1921, ecuted and forwarded to the local agent the said Stallsmith wrote to the general of the defendant corporation, R. O. Stall-agent of the defendant company, W. A. smith. A copy of the contract is an- L. Laughton & Company, a letter (Exnexed to the plaintiff's sworn statement hibit C) and enclosed it in a duly stampas "Exhibit A." ed envelope directed to W. A. L. Laughton & Co., 420 Walnut Street, Philadel

A reference to that exhibit shows that