OUR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE WEST INDIES.

As there have recently appeared in the United Service Magazine several articles touching the merits and defects of the West India Regiments, it may not be unsuitable to make a few remarks upou the general utility of our military system in the West Indies.

It may be taken for granted that, with the exception of a few points held for strategical reasons, there can be but two objects in maintaining expensive garrisons in our Colonial possessions, firstly for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, and secondly for preservation of internal tranquillity. Now with two exceptions to be referred to hereafter, all our West Indian Stations are islands, and therefore so long as England remains Mistress of the Sea, foreign aggression is an impossibility and there is no need of a military force to guard against it, if unhappily the command of the sea should ever be lost, were there ten times as many troops in the West India Islands as at present, they would be simply of no use; for with the exception of Antigua, where as a matter of course we have neither troops nor fortress, and of St. Lucia which has been given up as a military station, there is not one defensible place among them. A single gunboat with rifle command could in a few hours lay in ruins the most important towns in all the Islands, without the possibility of a shot being fired at her in return; for instance, Kingston the chief town of Jamaica, Nassau of New Providence, Bridgetown of Barbados, Port of Spain of Trinidad, George town of Demerara, and Belize of Honduras. Port Royal, Jamaica, our only dock-yard in the West Indies-so called it must be presumed because there is nothing like a dock in the whole place-certainly mounts a whole lot of guns "monté" en barbette, but has neither shelter nor accommodation for the men who would have to work them; and as Kingston could be shelled without approaching the batteries of Port Royal, and as troops could be landed almost anywhere round the coast, the use of the fortifications of Port Royal are not very apparent.

Barbados is similarly situated, only it has no pretension to forts, nor in fact to be defensible in any way whatever, the other islands are not worth mention. So much for the islands, but two of our possessions in this part of the world, although classed with the West Indies, are situated upon the main land, viz. Demerara, or British Guiana; and British Honduras. The former of these is quite rich and powerful enough to take care of itself in the event of any trouble arising with the Indian tribes on its boundaries, but though it was, alone a dozen years back, troubled with some rather serious internal disturbances it has never suffered from external aggression. British Honduras is differently placed, to begin with it is the most insignificant of Colonies, and secondly it is generally

governed by men who are making their first experiment in administration, and whose minds are strongly excited by the title of Commander-in-Chief which is attached to the office of Govenor. It is singular but certainly true, that the power of disposing of an armed force, however small it may be, exercises a remarkable fascination over the imagination of civilians, and they never rest till that power is an accomplished fact, which generally happens in this wise. On the frontiers of British Honduras are some tribes or rather families of miserable half starved Indians, and it sometimes happens that, impelled by famine or by their natural theft, some of these poor wretches cross the River" Hondo," our boundary, and carry off a cow; instantly the soul of the Govenor is inflamed with martial ardour. The colony is proclaimed invaded, ships are chartered, and troops sent up to the scene of action, of course by the time they arrive there is not a vestige of an Indian to be seen, they have eaten their cow, and gone on their way rejoicing. The troops return to their quarters, the Governor writes a flaming dispatch to the Colonial Office, and the officer commanding the troops another equally flaming to the Horse Guards, and if all goes well the Governor gets a C.B. and the promise of a better Government, and the officer commanding gets his brevet, and is able to record in his War Services, "That he commanded the troops during the disturbances in the Northern district, for which he received the thanks of H.R.H. the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief," (Vide Hart); and finally as playing with soldiers, even on a limited scale, is a costly amusement, a Bill is sent into the Imperial Government for three or four thousand pounds to pay the expenses. This used to be the invariable routine, but as the Home Government has lately grown stingy and says the colony must pay the expenses of any such pleasure parties, for the future we shall hear no more of British territories being invaded by the Indians.

So much for the use of troops in the West Indies for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression. Let us now consider them as a means of preserving internal tranquillity. It might reasonably be supposed that communities which have so far risen in the scale of civilization as to have houses of Assembly, Legislative and Executive Councils, and all the paraphermalia of responsible government, would be capable of providing for their own internal economy: but, as anyone who is conversant with the West Indies is quite aware that the whole affair is a ludicrous caricature of Constitutional Government, the Imperial is still in some measure compelled to look after the Island executive.

It is generally admitted that it is most inexpedient for the Military to come into collision with civilians, and therefore in disturbances soldiers are never called out except in cases of absolute necessity, and so, to guard against the possibilty of a most improbable eventuality, there are maintained in the West Indies, two batteries R.A., two European and three West India Regiments with all the

customary staff and departments. Now a strong well organised Police Force, liberally supplied with well-paid European Inspectors and Sergeants, who should in all cases be discharged Non-Commissioned officers of good character, would be incomparably more efficient at one fourth or rather one eighth of the expense, and instead of being kept continually at one spot waiting for the chance of anything turning up, they would be constantly and usefully employed in detached parties all over the different Islands, and should any serious disturbances arrive they could be quickly concentrated without any of the fuss, Red Tape and delays that seem as an invariable accompaniment to the moving of troops in the West Indies; 800 men, 400 for the Jamaica and a like number for the Barbados command would be ample, this number could easily be selected from the West India Regiments-they would retain their arms, (which would be kept in an armory,) and go through an annual course of drill, in order that they might be able to act efficiently as soldiers if ever their services in that capacity should unfortunately be required; by these means, taking into consideration the cost of transport and other incidentals, there would at one swoop be a saving from a quarter to half a million a year, which is respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Right Hon. the Secretary of State for War.

On the West Coast of Africa, this plan would perhaps have to undergo some modification, that is if we are to continue the humane and Christian policy of Exeter Hall, and sacrifice our soldiers and sailors for the sake of doing very questionable good to most unquestionable savages; but even there it might perhaps be as well to put it out of the power of the Governors to turn amateur soldiers and get up Ashantee Wars on their own accounts.

West India Regiments are a mistake-emphatically a mistake. The Negro has no military aptitude whatever. It is quite true that with the most unremitting vigilance, and the strictest discipline he may be brought up to a certain measure of efficiency, in fact a regiment quartered in Jamaica about six years ago won great praise from Major-General Pringle Taylor, for the perfection of its interior economy, and for its steadiness on parade. But how was this brought about? from the fact of its having for its commanding officer a thorough soldier and strict disciplinarian, who had spent his life in the regiment and had commanded it for many years, who had brought it out of chaos, and the darling wish of whose heart was to keep it in decent order; and so this one regiment was exceptionally efficient, but for all that the negro has no military aptitude, he cannot be made to take a pride in himself. Slacken the reins for one instant, and he reverts to the lazy slovenly slouching creature he was when caught as a recruit; moreover, his invincible propensity to lying and thieving is against him, and it is not given to every regiment to have a commanding officer who has devoted his whole life to it. A West India climate is not favourable

to the development of zeal, and ill-treated by the War Office, and snubbed by the Horse Guards, not many West Indian officers are animated by so strict a sense of duty as to devote more time than they can help to such thankless and unpalatable labour as the superintendance of Black soldiers.

One of the writers in the United" seems to apprehend danger in case of disturbance, from the likelihood that the troops would make common cause with their friends; no fear of that, a Negro has no natural affections, and he would just as soon stick his bayonet into the "wame" of his father or brother as into that of a perfect stranger; moreover, for some inscrutable reason, as soon as he becomes a soldier he looks upon all civilians as his natural enemies. Another writer or the same, I forget which, suggests that Government might farm out the Blacks as labourers to the planters. That is absurd, at present they are soldiers, and in future it would not be easy to get recruits to work for one shilling a day when they could get two or three if they chose to work for themselves, besides it would be very impolitic for Government to attempt to interfere between capital and labour. One thing remains, withdraw the European Regiments, and if the black troops are fit for service (they will fight if well led) send them to India and China, and spare some of our own men. If they are not fit for this, they are fit for nothing, and should be disbanded at once and the officers relieved from a service which is a cross between penal servitude and transportation for life. October 30, 1865. A.W.E.

Since the above lines were written, news has arrived of a serious outbreak that has occurred at Jamaica, if the suggestions contained in this article had been followed, viz. that a strong well organised police force had been employed at various points of the island, instead of a quantity of troops concentrated within a radius of a few miles, the outbreak would have been impossible; it shows, however, that there is no danger of the black troops making common cause with the natives, and it shows too of how thin a varnish is composed the Christianity and civilization of these black darlings of Exeter Hall.

THE RECENT STORMS AND THE READINGS OF THE BAROMETER.

BY J. GLASHIER, F.R.S.

The very stormy weather which has ushered in the present year will ever remain fixed in men's minds by a fearful maritime catastrophe. The steamship London, bound to Melbourne, with colonists and emigrants, has gone down within three or four days' sail of Plymouth, carrying with her at least two hundred and twenty precious lives. Nineteen souls are all that have escaped from the vessel to bring us this dreadful intelligence, and of these only three are passengers. The story is but too

complete, as the engineer, Mr. Greenhill, relates it. Not the slightest chance exists of another creature reaching land out of two hundred and thirty-nine; for the survivors, five minutes after shoving off in the port cutter, saw the London go down stern foremost with all remaining on board. The vessel left Plymouth on Saturday, the 6th inst., "and ran at once into frightful weather in the Channel. On the 7th and 8th it blew fiercely, on the 9th the ship lost jib-boom, foretop-mast, topgallant-mast, and royal-mast, and the port lifeboat was washed away; on the 10th she put about to try to get back, but the terrific cross-sea constantly broke over her, and carrying away her hatches got into the engine-room and extinguished the fires. On Wednesday the passengers were baling out the water with buckets; but four of the stern ports were smashed, and, as it was impossible to stop the leak, the sea came in as it liked. The ship had gone down already as low as the main chains when the boats were lowered. The first capsized; the second is that which escaped, and which was driven before the hurricane for twenty hours, and all but swamped, when the Italian barque Marianople picked up its freight of nineteen. As these men left the London, the miserable passengers and the remainder of the crew were lowering two other boats, but before they could reach the water the vessel went down.

Accordingly a few observations at the present time will not be inappropriate on the variations in the readings of the barometer at the Royal Observatory, Greenwich, from September 12 to November 30, making altogether eighty days. These readings are shown on the accompanying diagram and table, together with the general directions of the wind on every day, as determined from the records of Osler's Self-Registering Anemometer, and the number of miles of horizontal movement of the air, as self-registered by the use of Robinson's Anemometer.

It will be remembered that during the latter part of this period there have been successive heavy gales of wind upon our coasts, causing sad disasters at sea, and calling very frequently into use the services of the life-boats of the National Life-boat Institution, and these, in most cases, have been attended with success in the saving of life; but unhappily in some few instances, as must ever be the case, the gales were so violent that life has been lost; and the most noble efforts on the part of the life-boat crews, after toiling in some instances through the midnight storms, have failed entirely, the boats being unable to reach the distressed ships.

A few particulars of the readings of the barometer during the period preceding these storms, and during their continuance, cannot also fail to be useful and interesting to the brave men who are ever ready to go off in those life-boats, as well as to sailors and fishermen generally.

The barometer from the 1st of September to the 6th day stood