for war and conquest, an appearance of comparative promptness and energy was exhibited by our allies; whilst in our case, interests of great gravity and extent, stringent orders against any breach of neutrality from the Home Authorities and from our minister at Pekin, all Exeter Hall and half England braying sympathy with the rebels, many of our own merchants and others being considerably interested in the continuance of disturbances, and a cloud of small local officials playing, as usual, at "diplomacy," rendered it impossible for our general, hampered as he was by his instructions, to rush into a war which might have assumed large proportions, with the same alacrity as the representatives of other nations which had less to risk. While admitting then the activity and energy evinced by the French here as elsewhere when fighting was concerned, it can be no breach of the entente cordiale to point out one particular wherein it appears to the writer, credit is assumed by the French and their admiral on rather dubious grounds, viz., the origin of the idea of disciplining and drilling Chinese levies on the model of European troops. This, (page 893), is distinctly claimed for Admiral Protet, whose idea, we are told, was adopted and extended by the allied commanders, commencing in May, 1862. Claims of this sort, if allowed to go by default, pass into history as admitted, and might some day have the seriously bad effect of inducing the "public," to believe that élan and energy have decayed among ourselves, but are evergreen with our bellicose neighbours. It is for this reason that the writer ventures to think that a bare memorandum of what the English did towards re-organising the Chinese Imperial forces might not unworthily find a place among the records of our Army.

The first attempt at drill of Chinese was made, it would appear, at Canton in 1858. A large force of Chinese labourers and "coolies" had been recruited at Hong Kong, and were stationed at Canton under command of Captain (since Major) John Temple, of the Madras Arty. As this force constituted the entire land-transport of our troops, it continued necessarily to be kept up in readiness for active service (it being remembered that until the capture of Shek-tsing in 1859, we were constantly in a state of war at Canton). When our barracks and establishments had, by its aid, been put into good permanent working order, the demand for coolies' labour slackened, and it struck Major Temple, who was an officer of much intelligence, that the baneful effects of idleness among his men might be obviated by teaching them drill at their leisure hours, which he accordingly did, with no slight success; the performance of the "Bamboo Rifles," as they were popularly called, in squad and company drill, being very suggestive of what might be done in this direction. This, however, was not the proper use of the coolies, and ceased whenever their services were required for transport.

Nothing further appears to have been done towards disciplining Chinese until Li, the Futai or Governor of the Province of Kiangsu, organised in the year 1861 a Malay force under the well-known American Ward, which is about the first instance of foreign soldiers in the Chinese employ. These did excellent service; but as Ward's sphere of operations extended, it became necessary to increase his force, and native Chinese soldiers were enlisted and drilled by him, somewhat on European or American principles, under the Futai's orders; and to this latter -an officer of great civil and military capacity, though not much liked by Europeans-belongs, in all probability, the merit of being the first to adopt the suggestions constantly being made to him by the English and other foreign officials, as well as by the gentlemen in the employ of the Imperial Customs. Our experience in the field with the Canton coolies in the campaigns. of 1857 and 1860, had shown every one who knew what a soldier was, that the Chinese possessed some of the highest military qualities. Some of us did, under the influence of the Bengal Mutiny, even think they might be in time, equal or superior to the Indian troops, whom the Revue ungraciously and with little truth calls "soldats chétifs."

Everything was thus ready for the moment when Ward required men, having found the Malays, though brave in action, difficult to procure, very expensive, and hard to manage; and to him, with his well-known partiality for the Chinese (evinced by his marrying a woman of the country, to whom on his death he left much of his property, and by many other proofs of confidence), belongs, no doubt, the crystallisation of this idea of disciplining Chinese, which was at the time in the thoughts of all who did think. Ward was not at first supported or even encouraged by either French or English (witness his arrest on board H.M.S. Urgent); but when his idea had developed itself, he was patronised and in every way assisted and countenanced-not by the French, but by Admiral Sir James Hope, a man of clear views, honest purpose, unusual ability, and extraordiary firmness and courage, whom the writer, speaking merely from experience and knowledge, having no professional or personal connection with the admiral, would emphatically say was the real "âme de la campagne" up to the latest hour of his residence in mid-China.

The French were not slow to follow Ward's example in their Sü-kia-hwei (or "Sikkaway") force; and it is but just to say that the military bearing and proficiency of their Zouave-like Celestials was not surpassed, if indeed equalled, by any of the contingents afterwards raised under our own officers. But about the same time started up also a number of other disciplined brigades. At Tientsin, Brigadier-General Sir Charles Staveley justly fearing what might occur on the evacuation of the town by

the British, and the cessation of the active and firm government established there during two years, had encouraged the Chinese to embody disciplined forces; and as early as February 1862, a mounted battery of Manchu Artillery, besides some 200 Chinese gunners, had been organised and armed by Lieutenant Cane of the Royal Artillery, under the Commissioner of Customs, TsungHau; together with two battalions of Infantry under Lieutenants Gould 31st Regiment, and Kingsley, 67th Regiment. This force attained considerable completeness, and was, after we had evacuated Tientsin in the summer, employed against some local rebels under Captain (since Brevet-Major) Coney, 67th Regiment, with advantage. Immediately on General Staveley's arrival at Shanghai, in the summer of 1862, he at once raised similar forces; a mortar battery of soldiers in the Futai's employ were drilled under Lieutenant Cane and employed at the second capture of Kiating; and two battalions of Infantry were raised under Lieutenant Kingsley, 67th, and Jebb, 31st Regiment. At the same time some 200 gun Lascars were raised for the artillery and drilled under Lieutenant Cane; most of these men were afterwards drafted into Lieut.-Col. Gordon's force and formed the élite of his artillery. Though originally enlisted by Captain Bradshaw, R.A., as coolies to assist in the artillery work, circumstances had gradually transformed them into artillery-men proper; and as such they were ultimately employed. Lieut. Kingsley's Reg. was afterwards sent to assist in holding the town of Sung-Kiang about 30 miles from Shanghai; Captain Stack, 67th Regiment, and Lieut. Cane, R.A. were also ordered to this town to assist in the instruction of a native army under Burgevine, but their duties were strictly confined to simple drill, and they were expressly forbidden to interfere in the organisation or command of the corps.

In the meantime the French at Ningpo had formed a native force under Captain D'Aiguebelle of their Navy, and several other Europeans, military men and others; and an Anglo-Chinese force, under a Mr. Cook was established at Chang Chau. Instruction was also given at Canton to a force of "Ki-hia" artillery and infantry under British officers of these arms; and a similar body was raised at Shanghai by the Futai, (who probably perceived that the command of his troops passed from himself into the hands of the British, when foreign military officers were employed in their instruction) under command of Mr. Macartney, formerly assistantsurgeon in the 99th Regiment, a man of considerable quickness and general information, who attached himself altogether to the Chinese, and became very useful to his employers.

The "Ward" Force, after the death of its leader (killed in action in February 1863,) fell into the hands of the American Burgevine, a man of unquestioned courage, but quite unfit in other respects for such a command. To him was attached, as staff-officer, or rather as British resident, Captain (since Brevet

Major) Holland, Royal Marines, an officer who had shown much. zeal and activity in the various small operations carried on in the immediate vicinity of Shanghai by Admiral Hope, previous to the arrival of the land troops, but who was not equally successful in independent, or quasi-independent command. He succeeded Burgevine as chief of the Sungkiang, or "Ward" Force, but unfortunately met with a severe and total repulse at the attack of Taitsang, a walled town in possession of the rebels, about thirty miles north of Shanghai. The force then came into the hands of Captain (since Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel) C. G. Gordon, Royal Engineers, an officer of extraordinary science, tactical skill, and coup d'œil, under whom, in conjunction with the army of the Futai and the other disciplined troops, it obtained the successes which culminated in the capture of Suchau; by aid of which event the Futai was enabled to take Nanking, which put an end to organised resistance, and virtually to the rebelllion as such.

This force has since been continued at Fa-hwa near Shanghai, is a nucleus of instruction, under Major Gammell, 31st Regiment, and other officers. The drill of the Chinese troops at Canton still continues languidly; but the necessity having passed away, and money being more required for the reconstruction of the civil system in the districts formerly overrun by the rebels, than for war expenses, it would seem that these battalions are now sustained by the Chinese authorities more in deference to the wish of the allied officials than for any other reason.

The officers of these various troops were for the most part English or American adventurers. A considerable number of British non-commissioned officers and soldiers were allowed to purchase their discharge and take service in the Chinese contingents; no attempt was made (except in special instances) to obtain trained officers.

A large number of persons, the great majority of whom were British, were at various times in the employ of the Chinese Governor-General and local officers; there do not, however, appear to be any grounds to hope that the experience thus gained will induce the Chinese to make any radical alteration in their military system. Good faith was generally kept with the officers thus employed--all were well paid-many were rewarded and decorated; but though the immense work of civil reconstruction to which the Chinese government has had to address itself since the suppression of the rebellion has scarcely as yet left leisure for the inauguration of a new system, still it does not appear that the necessity for a better military organisation has as yet been fully apprehended by the Imperial advisers; and indeed it must be recollected that there was not much to encourage those who favoured the employment of foreigners, in the character of the soldiers of for*The writer is not inclined to consider the Futai's justice on the rebel "wrongs” at Nanking as either unnecessary cruelty or breach of faith.

tune who composed the bulk of Ward's officers-or in the trouble caused by the events of the latter portion of Burgevine's life, in the (to Chinese ideas) unwarranted interference of foreign officers in the course of the Futai's justice at Nanking.

This, however, is digression, and on a subject of too wide a scope to be resolved here. The writer's object was merely to place on record (as a counterblast to the assumptions of the Revue) a rough outline of the part taken by Great Britain in developing the military recources of the Chinese Empire; and to show that, in the actual military operations against the rebels, although the French did organise Chinese corps at Ningpo and Sü-kia-hwei, did fight side by side with us in the field, and did suffer the severe loss of their admiral, yet that the leadership and onus belli, as was but just, considering our larger interests, fell on the British; and that, without disparagement of our allies, to Admiral Hope belongs the honour of having first employed and afterwards by his advice and influence continued the employment (amid no slight opposition) of British troops in the suppression of the insurrection, and of having by the countenance and assistance given to Ward, commenced and fostered the valuable system of Chinese semi-regular troops under foreign officers. His policy and views were adopted by the British officers in China, at the head of whom was then Brigadier-General Staveley; and by means of the aid lent to the Imperialists in instruction, stores, officers and men by the English (in which work the French assisted as far as the means at their disposal in China allowed), the Futai was materially aided in the progress of his plans for the subjugation of the portions of Kiangsu province occupied by the rebels, until at length his armies, seconded by the great military ability of Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, and with the "moral support" of the British under Major-General W. G. Brown, (who did all he was permitted, and even more, for the common cause; though his good sense and courage in taking very decided measures on his own responsibility at an important crisis have not yet been sufficiently appreciated at home), succeeded in finally extirpating that malignant canker which had for thirteen long years so sorely troubled the peaceful and industrious people of the Eastern provinces of the Inner land.

THE LATE KING OF THE BELGIANS.

The senior officer of the British Army has followed the aged Combermere, and the King of the Belgians rests from the toils of a life more than ordinarily laborious. His military career was begun and continued through a critical period. Invited by his sister, the wife of the Grand Duke Constantine of Russia, he went to that country and assumed the command of a cavalry regiment which