Thus have thirteen millions and a half of men either forsaken or been torn from peace, home, and friends, to follow leaders whose triumphs were ever attended by lamentation and woe; thus in the brief space of fifty years have above thirteen million soldiers been raised; and, deducting therefrom the strength of the army in 1839, thus have 13,214,422 men been sacrificed at the beck of folly, guilt, or ambition.

The conclusion of "Justice Militaire" is so pithy, so prudent, and withal so apposite to our own situation, that we gladly avail ourselves of it:

Whatever may be the exigencies of events, we should err in wishing to form in an instant institutions or masses which were to remain immutable and homogeneous. Potter's earth is rapidly annealed and formed into the required shape; but not so granite, not so brass. Nevertheless, from this moment the State ought to arouse itself, and diligently apply night and day to the work of military reformation.

It would be unjust to take leave of the various publications on military jurisprudence in France, without alluding briefly to the Manuel de Législation Militaire, par C. N. Gouvot; a work totally unlike any publication in our Service, and containing valuable information on a variety of subjects, as the following index to the Manuel will show:

Organization: Avancement: Solde; Classement; Indemnité de route; Convois militaires; Transports de la guerre: Lits militaires et logement des troupes chez l'habitant; Casernement: Retraites, pensions, et secours; Traitement de réforme; Des ordres royaux; Droits et règles d'admission dans les hôpitaux; Rang et séances des autorités civiles, et militaires; Honneurs militaires; Honneurs funèbres.

It is equally incumbent on us to point attention to the admirable Manual of Capt. Griffiths, of the Artillery, which forms the best existing guide to the forms and spirit of British military law.

If space permitted we could still further strengthen our arguments in favour of a revision of the English military code, especially with reference to the proceedings of courts-martial. If the opinions we have been induced to throw out do not assist in effecting this object,-if the shrewd remarks of foreigners will not open the eyes of Britain to its imperfections, if the sensible advice contained in the Dedication of Major Hough's Military Authorities, as well as every day's experience, will make no impression where improvement should originate, at all events we have done our duty in sounding the tocsin; and we quit the subject with an earnest hope that our labour has not been in vain.

ADMIRALS MATHEWS AND LESTOCK.

BY JOSEPH ALLEN.

AN inquiry into the merits of a controversy which convulsed the naval and political world nearly a century since, may, at first sight, appear unnecessary and uninteresting; but when it is remembered that the materials for a correct understanding of the affair (of no mean importance in an historical point of view) are scattered over many hundreds of pages in different and scarce works, a fair and impartial exposition of the whole may not be deemed altogether uncalled for.

Towards the latter end of the year 1741, Commodore Richard Lestock sailed from England with a squadron to reinforce Admiral Nicholas Haddock, in the Mediterranean; and the latter being obliged from ill health to return home, the command of the fleet devolved on the Commodore, who, on the 13th March, 1743, was advanced to the rank of Rear-Admiral of the White.

Under the Rear-Admiral, the fleet was very actively and judiciously employed in watching the motions of the French and Spaniards, and in defeating many of their plans.

On the 27th May, Vice-Admiral Thomas Mathews arrived out from England in the Namur, and assumed the command. From some causes, which have not transpired, a deeply-rooted animosity subsisted between the Vice-Admiral and his second in command, from which most of the dire results so inimical to the Service arose. If we are to be guided by Mr. Charnock, in his Biographia Navalis, the faults were entirely those of the junior; but on the other hand we shall adduce facts to prove, that fully an equal, if not infinitely greater, proportion of blame, will accrue to the senior officer.

Nothing could have been more unpropitious than the first meeting of the two Admirals. Vice-Admiral Mathews, on arriving off Villa Franca, where the Rear-Admiral with the body of the fleet was at anchor, was immediately waited upon by the latter, who in his barge proceeded alongside the Namur to compliment the Commander-in-Chief on his arrival. This mark of respect, however, does not appear to have met with a very gracious return. Upon the deck of the Namur were several Sardinian officers of rank, standing by the Admiral's side, when the latter, without asking any explanation he might have wished for, is reported to have harshly reprimanded the Rear-Admiral, saying, "He was surprised that as Mr.* Lestock had been so long in the Service, he had neglected to comply with the instructions given to him, by neither writing nor sending a frigate to meet him at Gibraltar." To this rebuke, the Rear-Admiral replied, by assuring the Admiral he had fulfilled both those requests; and added, that if his letters or the frigate had not reached the Admiral, the fault did not rest with him. From this time the Vice and Rear Admirals maintained a respectful distance. When one was in port, the other was at sea; and as the Commanderin-Chief was also invested with the character of Ambassador Extraor

*The usual appellative of all officers at this period.

U. S. MAG., No. 164, JULY, 1842.

Y

dinary, &c., to the King of Sardinia, he had ample opportunity of avoiding a meeting with a man so disagreeable to him, by attending to his diplomatic duties.

At this time the French and Spaniards possessed a large fleet in Toulon, which it became the object of the British fleet to watch; and the Rear-Admiral having on one occasion entered Hyères Bay, and found a fine anchorage for his fleet, fixed upon this as the rendezvous, instead of Villa Franca. From this commanding position he could have full information of the enemy's movements, without sustaining the damages and losses of spars, attendant upon keeping the sea in that tempestuous part of the Mediterranean. The shores and islands of this bay were not then, as they have since been, fortified; and the British fleet lay unmolested in a secure roadstead, a little to the westward of the small rocky island on which now stands the powerful fort Bregançon.

One evil certainly attended this safety from gales and squalls, which the fleet under Sir John Jervis for so long a period successfully contended against, and that was the loss of experience which the fleet under the latter Admiral acquired. It was not, however, a matter of choice with Rear*-Admiral Lestock, for the quantity of stores at Mahon were barely sufficient to supply the wants of the cruising frigates, and would have been wholly unable to meet the requirements of the fleet. A new establishment for masting the ships had about this time been issued; and many being over-masted, were continually losing topmasts and yards in their occasional cruises; so that the Bay of Hyères was indeed an anchorage of much consequence. An anonymous writer, present in the fleet, who published a letter and narrative in the year 1745 †, states, in reference to this anchorage,-"It saved also a great expense, and many seamen's lives to His Majesty: it kept the fleet in good order, and constant readiness for sailing. The officers and seamen were fattening in a fine climate with indolence, and slumbering without anxiety."

On the 28th December, 1743, Admiral Mathews rejoined the fleet in Hyères Bay. In the mean while the enemy's fleet in Toulon had been using every effort to complete for sea, and many ingenious devices were had recourse to in order to inspire their own crews with courage, and overwhelm the British with dismay. The French ships were each provided with a kind of bridge, the lower part being affixed to the laniards of the lower rigging, and triced up to the shrouds, so as to be lowered upon a ship alongside, and form a gangway for the boarders. "Another subtle invention of destruction," says the writer to which allusion has already been made, "was a contrivance to let drop boxes of combustibles from their yard-arms to set us on fire; scythes, very long, to cut our rigging, and the nettings which they had heard we had provided to catch the boarders in, if they should inconsiderately attempt this silly stratagem."

About the middle of January, 1743-4, the 20-gun ship Winchelsea, * Or rather Vice-Admiral, for to this rank he was advanced on the 26th December, 1743.

"The History of the Mediterranean Fleet from 1741 to 1744, with the original letters that passed between the Admirals Mathews and Lestock; also all the other tracts on that important affair. London, MDCCXLV."

Capt. William Marsh, was ordered off Toulon to watch the motions of the enemy's fleet, then hourly expected to put to sea; and this ship, in the teeth of a succession of heavy gales, persevered in keeping sight of the harbour, and in communicating the enemy's movements, until at length the Franco-Spanish fleet put to sea.

At 3h. P.M., on the 8th February, the Winchelsea hove in sight off the Western or Petite-Passe, and made the signal (by hoisting a blue ensign at the main-topmast-head, and dipping it several times,) for the enemy's having put to sea. The fleet was instantly in a bustle; but having unmoored, hove short and remained so all night.

At daybreak on the 9th, part of the enemy's fleet was seen at anchor near Toulon, from the British fleet; but it being nearly calm, neither fleet weighed until 10h. A.M., when a light breeze sprang up from the westward. Vice-Admiral Lestock, with his division, was ordered to lead; but the wind falling lighter, and coming more from seaward, the fleet did not succeed in clearing the Grand Passe that day, and reanchored for the night. All this time the enemy was in sight, manœuvring, and making preparation for receiving the British.

On the 10th, the signal was again made to weigh; and the fleet accordingly got under sail with the land wind. At 7h. A.M., the Admiral made the signal for the fleet to form the line of battle ahead, with the starboard tacks aboard. So slight, however, was the skill or obedience of the different Captains, that in endeavouring to execute the evolution the utmost confusion took place. The writer before referred to, thus describes the situation of the fleet :-"The little wind and a high western swell, with the unaccountable impatience and forwardness of many of the ships in crowding and pressing upon one another, whose unseasonable eagerness was not to be held in by order and discipline, hindered the fleet from getting out of the bay in the disposition of battle, according to the signal abroad. No less than twelve or fourteen ships of the van and centre, with both their chiefs, were got into the southern passage, where there is no anchoring; mixed in an heap-heads and sterns athwart just upon being on board of one another entirely governed and conducted by the swell, with all their boats endeavouring to tow them clear of this imminent danger." The ships, however, fortunately escaped without serious damage; and at a little past noon, the body of the combined fleet was observed bearing about south-west, distant four or five leagues. The enemy appeared standing towards the British fleet, with a westerly wind, while the latter had a breeze from the eastward. At noon, on this day, the Boyne and Chichester joined from England; and the force, including thirteen three-decked ships*, then under Admiral Mathews, was as follows, in the order of sailing :

* All ships of 80 guns and upwards, were at this period three-deckers.

70

80

Nassau, Capt. James Lloyd.

60 Warwick, Capt. Temple West.

70 Stirling Castle, Capt. Thomas Cooper.

The order of sailing was as follows:-Revenge to lead on the starboard tack, and Stirling Castle on the larboard; and consequently on the occasion of the fight about to be recorded, the above order was reversed, and the Stirling Castle led the British van. The same reversal took place with respect to the combined fleet, in consequence of which the Borée led, and the Isabella became the rear ship in the line of battle.. The Franco-Spanish fleet was as follows:

At 2h. P.M., before the fleet had got well clear of the island of Porquerolle, the British Admiral commenced throwing out signals, but so imperfect was the code in use at that time, and, indeed, for years subsequently, that their only effect was to puzzle those to whom they were addressedAt 3h. the signal was made for a line abreast, and with a light easterly breeze the fleet stood off to the southward. Notwithstanding every exertion, however, the fleet, when night closed in, was still much scattered, and the Vice-Admiral's division a long distance astern. The enemy's fleet, on the other hand, was in tolerably good order, and under easy sail on the larboard tack. Being further from the land, the Franco-Spanish fleet commanded a steadier breeze, as did also the British van and centre.