Style may be faid to be figurative when the literal interpretation, according to the ufual fenfe of words, and the conftruction of them, would lead a perfon to mistake the fense; as, for inftance, when any thing is fignified by a term which was not originally affixed to it; when the terms which are used to exprefs any thing would, if interpreted literally, lead a perfon to imagine it was greater or lefs than it is; and when the form of the fentence is fuch as, when explained by the rules of grammar only, doth not truly express the state of mind of him that uses it.

Notwithstanding this, ftyle that is merely figurative and ornamented, is far from being calculated to deceive. For whenever it is used, no other language, or mode of speech, could give so true an idea of the state of the speaker's mind, though it is confeffed to be by no means literally expreffive of that state. For inftance, when Virgil calls the two Scipios, the Thunderbolts of War, he makes use of an ornamented and highly-figurative expreffion, not corresponding to his real fentiments; for he would never have replied in the affirmative, if he had been afked seriously whether he really imagined they were two thunderbolts; and yet no plainer terms, though more expreffive of their true character, would have given his readers fo clear an idea of the force and impetuofity which he meant to afcribe to thofe heroes.

Again, when the fame excellent and correct poet says that mount Etna threw its fires as high as the ftars, nobody taxes him. with a defigned falfehood; though his expreffions be not literally true, and we are fure he could not but have been fenfible of it himself at the time that he made ufe of them: but nothing fhort of an hyperbole could have given us a true image of the effort of his imagination, to exprefs his idea of the very great height of those flames.

Lastly,

Laftly, when Æneas, in the fame poet, in the midst of the relation of his adventures, comes to mention Sicily, instead of faying, in fo many words, that his father died there, addreffes himfelf directly to his father, and exclaims, Hic me, pater optime, feffum deferis; do any of his readers imagine he really conceived his father to be within hearing? But no fimple narration could fufficiently have expreffed that ftrong regret, and tender affection, which the revival of his father's memory awakened in his mind. We naturally perfonify every thing that caufes us much pleasure or pain, and a vivid recollection makes every thing feem prefent. Thus this direct address to the dead Anchifes, though, ftrictly speaking, without the leaft foundation, gives us the truest idea of the unfeigned grief of Æneas, and of the affecting sense he had of his lofs, and therefore lets us into the true ftate of his mind; not, indeed, by a direct interpretation of his words, but in a more certain, though an indirect manner, by means of those circumftances which always accompany that state of mind.

Figurative fpeech, therefore, is indicative of a perfon's real feelings and state of mind, not by means of the words it confists of, confidered as figns of feparate ideas, and interpreted according to their common acceptation; but as circumftances naturally attending those feelings which compose any state of mind. Those figurative expreffions, therefore, are fcarce confidered and attended to as words, but are viewed in the fame light as attitudes, geftures, and looks, which are infinitely more expreffive of fentiments and feelings than words can poffibly be.

Since, however, the literal impropriety of figurative expreffions is excufed only on account of their being confidered as indications of thofe feelings and fentiments which no words, literally interpreted, could defcribe, they should never be used but

when the fituation of the person who uses them is fuch as will render those feelings and fentiments natural. Otherwise, there being nothing left to excuse and cover the impropriety of the figure, the words present nothing but the naked abfurdity, and the writer is detected, either in pretending to feelings that could have no existence, or in afferting what is apparently false and contradictory. This observation may be applied to every figure of fpeech; and as it is an observation of confiderable consequence, it will be frequently repeated, and applied to the particular figures, when they come to be separately explained and illustrated.

LECTURE

LECTURE XII.

The Divifion of this Part of the Work into what affects the PASSIONS, JUDGMENT, and IMAGINATION.

Of the Effect of VIVID REPRESENTATION, the Use of the PRESENT TENSE in defcribing paft Scenes, and of PARTICULAR NAMES and CIRCUMSTANCES.

HAV

AVING confidered the nature of tafte, and of figurative language in general, I proceed to confider diftinctly the feveral objects that offer themselves to our attention respecting the ornament that fentiment admits of. Thefe, as they were before pointed out, are either fome of the more remarkable and general affections of the ftronger paffions; thofe forms of address which are adapted to engage affent, or those finer feelings which conftitute the pleasures of the imagination. Each of these three objects will engage our attention in the order in which they are here

mentioned.

The first obfervation I shall make on the general affections of the paffions, is, that they are engaged, and we feel ourselves interested, in proportion to the vividness of our ideas of those objects and circumftances which contribute to excite them. The genuine

and

and proper ufe of the paffions undoubtedly is to rouze men to juft and vigorous action upon every emergency, without the flow intervention of reason. It is, therefore, wifely provided, that they should be raised by the immediate view and apprehension of the circumstances proper for their exertion. Being, therefore, blind and mechanical principles, they can only be connected with the view of fuitable circumftances; fo that, whenever these are presented, whether the paffion would, in fact, be useful or not, it cannot fail to be excited, and to rife to its ufual height.

This obfervation fupplies us with a reason why our minds are as fenfibly affected with scenes of past, or even of ideal distress, as with a mere relation of what is present and real. All the advantage that the latter circumftances united have, is, that they engage us to think more intenfely of the cafe, which will confequently make the ideas more vivid, and the fcene more interesting. But that scenes of ideal diftress have as much power over the imagination as scenes of diftrefs that are paft, cannot but be allowed, when we confider, that even reason can plead nothing more in favour of the one than of the other; fince the paffion is equally unavailing in both cafes. Why may I not, with reason, be as much interested in the adventures of Æneas or Telemachus, as in those of Themiftocles, Xenophon, or any of the heroes of Greece or Rome? If the one never had any existence, neither have the other any at prefent, which, with refpect to the final caufes of our paffions, is the fame thing.

The faithful hiftorian, and the writer of romances, having the fame access to the springs of the human paffions, it is no wonder that the latter generally moves them more forcibly, fince he hath the choice of every circumftance that contributes to raise them; whereas the former hath nothing in his power but the difpofition

of