human concerns. In England the supreme power of the nation resides in parliament; and, in a legal sense, it is so omnipotent, that it has authority to change the whole structure of the constitution, without resort to any confirmation of the people. There is, indeed, little danger, that it will so do, as long as the people are fairly represented in it. But still it does, theoretically speaking, possess the power; and it has actually exercised it so far, as to change the succession to the crown, and mould to its will some portions of the internal structure of the constitution.2

§ 1825. Upon the subject of the national constitution, we may adopt without hesitation the language of a learned commentator. "Nor," says he, "can we too much applaud a constitution, which thus provides a safe and peaceable remedy for its own defects, as they may, from time to time, be discovered. A change of government in other countries is almost always attended with convulsions, which threaten its entire dis

The Federalist disposes of this article in the following brief, but decisive, manner: "That useful alterations will be suggested by experience, could not but be foreseen. It was requisite, therefore, that a mode for introducing them should be provided. The mode preferred by the convention seems to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against that extreme facility, which would render the constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults. It, moreover, equally enables the general, and the state governments to originate the amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side, or the other. The exception, in favour of the equality of suffrage in the senate, was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the states, implied and secured by that principle of representation in one branch of the legislature; and was probably insisted on by the states particularly attached to that equality. The other exception must have been admitted on the same considerations, which produced the privilege defended by it." The Federalist, No. 43.

2 See 1 Black. Comm. 90, 91, 146, 147, 151, 152, 160, 161, 162, 210 to 218.

solution ; and with scenes of horror, which deter mankind from every attempt to correct abuses, or remove oppressions, until they have become altogether intolerable. In America we may reasonably hope, that neither of these evils need be apprehended. Nor is there any reason to fear, that this provision in the constitution will produce any instability in the government. The mode, both of originating and ratifying amendments, (in either mode, which the constitution directs,) must necessarily be attended with such obstacles and delays, as must prove a sufficient bar against light or frequent innovations. And, as a further security against them, the same article further provides, that no amendment, which may be made prior to the year 1808, shall, in 'any manner affect those clauses of the ninth section of the first article, which relate to the migration or importation of such persons, as the states may think proper to allow; and to the manner, in which direct taxes shall be laid; and that no state shall, without its consent, be deprived of its equal suffrage in the senate." 1

1 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 371, 372.

CHAPTER XLII.

PUBLIC DEBTS

SUPREMACY OF CONSTITUTION

AND LAWS.

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§ 1826. THE first clause of the sixth article of the constitution is: "All debts contracted, and engagements entered into before the adoption of this consti"tution, shall be as valid against the United States, "under this constitution, as under the confederation."1

§ 1827. This can be considered in no other light, than as a declaratory proposition, resulting from the law of nations, and the moral obligations of society. Nothing is more clear upon reason or general law, than the doctrine, that revolutions in government have, or rather ought to have, no effect whatsoever upon private rights, and contracts, or upon the public obligations of nations. It results from the first principles of moral duty, and responsibility, deducible from the law of nature, and applied to the intercourse and social relations of nations. A change in the political form of a society ought to have no power to produce a dissolution of any of its moral obligations."

§ 1828. This declaration was probably inserted in the constitution, not only as a solemn recognition of the obligations of the government resulting from na

1 See Journ. of Convention, 291.

2 See Jackson v. Luun, 3 John. Cas. 109; Kelly v. Harrison, 2 John. Cas. 29; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 50.

3 See Rutherforth, Inst. B. 2, ch. 9, § 1, 2; Id. ch. 10, § 14; Vattel, Prelim. Dis. § 2, 9; B. 2, ch. 1, § 1, ch. 5, § 64, ch. 14, § 214, 215, 216.

4 The Federalist, No. 43; Rutherforth, Inst. B. 2, ch. 10, § 14, 15; Grotius, B. 2, ch. 9, § 8, 9.

tional law; but for the more complete satisfaction and security of the public creditors, foreign as well as domestic. The articles of confederation contained a similar stipulation in respect to the bills of credit emitted, monies borrowed, and debts contracted, by or under the authority of congress, before the ratification of the confederation.1

§ 1829. Reasonable as this provision seems to be, it did not wholly escape the animadversions of that critical spirit, which was perpetually on the search to detect defects, and to disparage the merits of the constitution. It was said, that the validity of all engagements made to, as well as made by, the United States, ought to have been expressly asserted. It is surprising, that the authors of such an objection should have overlooked the obvious consideration, that, as all engagements are in their nature reciprocal, an assertion of their validity on one side, necessarily involves their validity on the other; and that, as this article is but declaratory, the establishment of it in debts entered into by the government, unavoidably included a recognition of it in engagements with the government.* The shorter and plainer answer is that pronounced by the law of nations, that states neither lose any of their rights, nor are discharged from any of their obligations, by a change in the form of their civil government.3 More was scarcely necessary, than to have declared, that all future contracts by and with the United States should be valid, and binding upon the parties.

11 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 368; Confederation, Art. 12.

2 The Federalist, No. 43, No. 84.

3 The Federalist, No. 84; Rutherforth, B. 2, ch. 10, § 14, 15; Grotius, B. 2, ch. 9, § 8, 9.

§ 1830. The next clause is, "This constitution, "and the laws of the United States, which shall be "made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or "which shall be made, under the authority of the United "States, shall be the supreme law of the land. And "the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."

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1

§ 1831. The propriety of this clause would seem to result from the very nature of the constitution. If it was to establish a national government, that government ought, to the extent of its powers and rights, to be supreme. It would be a perfect solecism to affirm, that a national government should exist with certain powers; and yet, that in the exercise of those powers it should not be supreme. What other inference could have been drawn, than of their supremacy, if the constitution had been totally silent? And surely a positive affirmance of that, which is necessarily implied, cannot in a case of such vital importance be deemed unimportant. The very circumstance, that a question might be made, would irresistibly lead to the conclusion, that it ought not to be left to inference. A law, by the very meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It is a rule, which those, to whom it is prescribed, are bound to observe. This results from every political association. If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter into a larger political society, the laws, which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers entrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those

1 See Journal of Convention, p. 222, 282, 293.