ations upon the power; since it is obvious, that emergencies may arise, which would require the most various, and independent exercises of it. The country would otherwise be in danger of losing both its liberty and its sovereignty, from its dread of investing the public councils with the power of defending it. It would be more willing to submit to foreign conquest, than to domestic rule. § 1179. But in times of peace the power may be at least equally important, though not so often required to be put in full exercise. The United States are surrounded by the colonies and dependencies of potent foreign governments, whose maritime power may furnish them with the means of annoyance, and mischief, and invasion. To guard ourselves against evils of this sort, it is indispensable for us to have proper forts and garrisons, stationed at the weak points, to overawe or check incursions. Besides; it will be equally important to protect our frontiers against the Indians, and keep them in a state of due submission and control.1 The garrisons can be furnished only by occasional detachments of militia, or by regular troops in the pay of the government. The first would be impracticable, or extremely inconvenient, if not positively pernicious. The militia would not, in times of profound peace, submit to be dragged from their occupations and families to perform such a disagreeable duty. And if they would, the increased expenses of a frequent rotation in the service; the loss of time and labour; and the breaking up of the ordinary employments of life; would make it an extremely ineligible scheme of military power. The true and proper recourse should, there 1 The Federalist, No. 24, 25; 2 Elliot's Debates, 292, 293. 2 fore, be to a permanent, but small standing army for such purposes. And it would only be, when our neighbours should greatly increase their military force, that prudénce and a due regard to our own safety would require any augmentation of our own. It would be wholly unjustifiable to throw upon the states the defence of their own frontiers, either against the Indians, or against foreign foes. The burthen would often be disproportionate to their means, and the benefit would often be largely shared by the neighbouring states. The common defence should be provided for out of the common treasury. The existence of a federal government, and at the same time of military establishments under state authority, are not less at variance with each other, than a due supply of the federal treasury, and the system of quotas and requisitions.3 § 1180. It is important also to consider, that the surest means of avoiding war is to be prepared for it in peace. If a prohibition should be imposed upon the United' States against raising armies in time of peace, it would present the extraordinary spectacle to the world of a nation incapacitated by a constitution of its own choice from preparing for defence before an actual invasion. As formal denunciations of war are in modern times often neglected, and are never necessary, the presence of an enemy within our territories would be required, before the government would be warranted to begin levies of men for the protection of the state. The blow must be received, before any attempts could be made to ward it off, or to return it. Such a course of conduct would at all times invite aggression and insult; and enable a formidable rival or secret enemy to seize upon 1 The Federalist, No. 24; 2 Elliot's Debates, 292, 293. 2 The Federalist, No. 24, 41. 3 Id. No. 25. the country, as a defenceless prey; or to drain its resources by a levy of contributions, at once irresistible and ruinous.1 It would be in vain to look to the militia for an adequate defence under such circumstances. This reliance came very near losing us our independence, and was the occasion of the useless expenditure of many millions. The history of other countries, and our past experience, admonish us, that a regular force, well disciplined and well supplied, is the cheapest, and the only effectual means of resisting the inroads of a well disciplined foreign army. In short, under such circumstances the constitution must be either violated, (as it in fact was by the states under the confederation,3) or our liberties must be placed in extreme jeopardy. Too much precaution often leads to as many difficulties, as too much confidence. How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could in like manner prohibit the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can be only regulated by the means and the danger of attack. They will, in fact, ever be determined by these rules, and no other. It will be in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of selfpreservation.* § 1181. But the dangers from abroad are not alone those, which are to be guarded against in the structure of the national government. Cases may occur, and indeed are contemplated by the constitution itself to occur, in which military force may be indispensable to enforce the laws, or to suppress domestic insurrections. Where the resistance is confined to a few insurgents, the sup 1 The Federalist, No. 25; 2 Elliot's Debates, 92, 93. 2 The Federalist, No. 25, 41. 4 The Federalist, No. 41; 3 Elliot's Debates, 305. 3 Id. 25. pression may be ordinarily, and safely confided to the militia. But where it is extensive, and especially if it should pervade one, or more states, it may become important and even necessary to employ regular troops, as at once the most effective, and the most economical force.'. Without the power to employ such a force in time of peace for domestic purposes, it is plain, that the government might be in danger of being overthrown by the combinations of a single faction.2 § 1182. The danger of an undue exercise of the power is purely imaginary. It can never be exerted, but by the representatives of the people of the states; and it must be safe there, or there can be no safety at all in any republican form of government. Our notions, indeed, of the dangers of standing armies in time of peace, are derived in a great measure from the principles and examples of our English ancestors. In England, the king possessed the power of raising armies in the time of peace according to his own good pleasure. And this prerogative was justly esteemed dangerous to the public liberties. Upon the revolution of 1688, parliament wisely insisted upon a bill of rights, which should furnish an adequate security for the future. But how was this done? Not by prohibiting standing armies altogether in time of peace; but (as has been already seen) by prohibiting them without the consent of parliament. This is the very proposition contained in the constitution; for congress can alone raise armies; and may put them down, whenever they choose. 1 The Federalist, No. 28, 26. 4 The Federalist, No. 26; 1 Black. Comm. 413. not to withhold it.' 66 § 1183. It may be admitted, that standing armies may prove dangerous to the state. But it is equally true, that the want of them may also prove dangerous to the state. What then is to be done? The true course is to check the undue exercise of the power, This the constitution has attempted to do by providing, that "no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years." Thus, unless the necessary supplies are voted by the representatives of the people every two years, the whole establishment must fall. Congress may indeed, by an act for this purpose, disband a standing army at any time; or vote the supplies only for one year, or for a shorter period. But the constitution is imperative, that no appropriation shall prospectively reach beyond the biennial period. So that there would seem to be every human security against the possible abuse of the power.2 § 1184. But, here again it was objected, that the executive might keep up a standing army in time of peace, notwithstanding no supplies should be voted. But how can this possibly be done? The army cannot go without supplies; it may be disbanded at the pleasure of the legislature; and it would be absolutely impossible for any president, against the will of the nation, to keep up a standing army in terrorem populi.3 § 1185. It was also asked, why an appropriation should not be annually made, instead of biennially, as is the case in the British parliament. The answer is, that congress may in their pleasure limit the appropriation 4 1 The Federalist, No. 41; 2 Elliot's Debates, 93, 308, 309. 2 The Federalist, No. 26, 41. 3 The Federalist, No. 26. 4 1 Tucker's Black. Comm. App. 272; 1 Black. Comm. 414, 415. VOL. III. 10 |