the ruin of commerce, afford a lively proof of the mischiefs of a currency exclusively under the control of the states.1 § 1115. It will be hereafter seen, that this is an exclusive power in congress, the states being expressly prohibited from coining money. And it has been said by an eminent statesman,2 that it is difficult to maintain, on the face of the constitution itself and independent of long continued practice, the doctrine, that the states, not being at liberty to coin money, can authorize the circulation of bank paper, as currency, at all. His reasoning deserves grave consideration, and is to the following effect. The states cannot coin money. Can they, then, coin that, which becomes the actual and almost universal substitute for money? Is not the right of issuing paper, intended for circulation in the place, and as the representative of metallic currency, derived merely from the power of coining and regulating the metallic currency? Could congress, if it did not possess the power of coining money and regulating the value of foreign coins, create a bank with the power to circulate bills? It would be difficult to make it out. Where, then, do the states, to whom all control over the metallic currency is altogether prohibited, obtain this power? It is true, that in other countries, private I During the late war with Great Britain, (1812 to 1814,) in consequence of the banks of the Middle, and Southern, and Western states having suspended specie payments for their bank notes, they depreciated as low as 25 per cent. discount from their nominal value. The duties on inports were, however, paid and received in the local currency; and the consequence was, that goods imported at Baltimore paid 20 per cent. less duty, than the same goods paid, when imported into Boston. This was a plain practical violation of the provision of the constitution, that all duties, imports, and excises shall be uniform. 2 Mr. Webster's Speech on the Bank of the United States, 25th and 28th of May, 1832. bankers, having no legal authority over the coin, issue notes for circulation. But this they do always with the consent of government, express or implied; and government restrains and regulates all their operations at its pleasure. It would be a startling proposition in any other part of the world, that the prerogative of coining money, held by government, was liable to be defeated, counteracted, or impeded by another prerogative, held in other hands, of authorizing a paper circulation. It is further to be observed, that the states cannot issue bills of credit; not that they cannot make them a legal tender; but that they cannot issue them at all. This is a clear indication of the intent of the constitution to restrain the states, as well from establishing a paper circulation, as from interfering with the metallic circulation. Banks have been created by states with no capital whatever, their notes being put in circulation simply on the credit of the state. What are the issues of such banks, but bills of credit issued by the state? § 1116. Whatever may be the force of this reasoning, it is probably too late to correct the error, if error there be, in the assumption of this power by the states, since it has an inveterate practice in its favour through a very long period, and indeed ever since the adoption of the constitution. § 1117. The other power, "to fix the standard of "weights and measures," was, doubtless, given from like motives of public policy, for the sake of uniformity, and the convenience of commerce.2 Hitherto, however, it has remained a dormant power, from the many 1 This opinion is not peculiar to Mr. Webster. It was maintained by the late Hon. Samuel Dexter, one of the ablest statesmen and lawyers, who have adorned the annals of our country. 2 The Federalist, No. 42. 2 difficulties attendant upon the subject, although it has been repeatedly brought to the attention of congress in most elaborate reports.1 Until congress shall fix a standard, the understanding seems to be, that the states possess the power to fix their own weights and measures; or, at least, the existing standards at the adoption of the constitution remain in full force. Under the confederation, congress possessed the like exclusive power. In England, the power to regulate weights and measures is said by Mr. Justice Blackstone to belong to the royal prerogative. But it has been remarked by a learned commentator on his work, that the power cannot, with propriety, be referred to the king's prerogative; for, from Magna Charta to the present time, there are above twenty acts of parliament to fix and establish the standard and uniformity of weights and measures." § 1118. The next power of congress is, "to provide "for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and "current coin of the United States." This power would naturally flow, as an incident, from the antecedent powers to borrow money, and regulate the coinage; and, indeed, without it those powers would be without any adequate sanction. This power would seem to be exclusive of that of the states, since it grows out of the constitution, as an appropriate means to carry into effect other delegated powers, not antecedently existing in the states." 1 Among these, none are more elaborate and exact, than that of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. J. Q. Adams, while they were respectively at the head of the department of state. 2 Rawle on the Constitution, ch. 9, p. 102. 4 1 Black. Comm. 276. 5 1 Black. Comm. 276; Christian's note, (16.) 3 Art. 9. • See Rawle on Constitution, ch. 9, p. 103; The Federalist, No. 42. CHAPTER XVIII. POWER TO ESTABLISH POST-OFFICES AND POST ROADS. § 1119. The next power of congress is, "to estab"lish post-offices and post-roads." The nature and extent of this power, both theoretically and practically, are of great importance, and have given rise to much ardent controversy. It deserves, therefore, a deliberate examination. It was passed over by the Federalist with a single remark, as a power not likely to be disputed in its exercise, or to be deemed dangerous by its scope. The "power," says the Federalist, "of establishing post-roads must, in every view, be a harmless power; and may, perhaps, by judicious management, become productive of great public conveniency. Nothing, which tends to facilitate the intercourse between the states, can be deemed unworthy of the public care." 1 One cannot but feel, at the present time, an inclination to smile at the guarded caution of these expressions, and the hesitating avowal of the importance of the power. It affords, perhaps, one of the most striking proofs, how much the growth and prosperity of the country have outstripped the most sanguine anticipations of our most enlightened patriots. § 1120. The post-office establishment has already become one of the most beneficent, and useful establishments under the national government. It circulates intelligence of a commercial, political, intellectual, and 1 The Federalist, No. 42. 2 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 265; Rawle on the Const. ch. 9, p. 103. private nature, with incredible speed and regularity. It thus administers, in a very high degree, to the comfort, the interests, and the necessities of persons, in every rank and station of life. It brings the most distant places and persons, as it were, in contact with each other; and thus softens the anxieties, increases the enjoyments, and cheers the solitude of millions of hearts. It imparts a new influence and impulse to private intercourse; and, by a wider diffusion of knowledge, enables political rights and duties to be performed with more uniformity and sound judgment. It is not less effective, as an instrument of the government in its own operations. In peace, it enables it without ostentation or expense to send its orders, and direct its measures for the public good, and transfer its funds, and apply its powers, with a facility and promptitude, which, compared with the tardy operations, and imbecile expedients of former times, seem like the wonders of magic. In war it is, if possible, still more important and useful, communicating intelligence vital to the movements of armies and navies, and the operations and duties of warfare, with a rapidity, which, if it does not always ensure victory, at least, in many instances, guards against defeat and ruin. Thus, its influences have become, in a public, as well as private view, of incalculable value to the permanent interests of the Union. It is obvious at a moment's glance at the subject, that the establishment in the hands of the states would have been wholly inadequate to these objects; and the impracticability of a uniformity of system would have introduced infinite delays and inconveniences; and burthened the mails with an endless variety of vexatious taxations, and regulations. No one, accustomed to the retardations of the post in passing through inde |