DISCOURSE VIII.

ELECTION SERMON.

THOU SHALT PROVIDE OUT OF ALL THE PEOPLE ABLE MEN, SUCH AS FEAR GOD, MEN OF TRUTH, HATING COVETOUSNESS; AND PLACE SUCH OVER THEM TO BE RULERS.- Exodus xviii. 21.

ALMIGHTY God, who governs the world, generally carries on the designs of his government by the instrumentality of subordinate agents, hereby giving scope and opportunity to his creatures to become the ministers for good to one another, in the exercise of the various powers and capacities with which he has endowed them. Though, for the vindication of his honor, to dispel the darkness and give a check to the idolatry and vice which overspread the world, and in order to prepare mankind for the reception of a Saviour, to be manifested in due time, God was pleased to take the Jewish nation under his particular care and protection, and to become their political law-giver and head; yet he made use of the agency of some of that people in the administration of his government. The legislative power he seems to have reserved wholly to himself, there being no evidence that any of the rulers or assemblies of the people had authority to make laws; but the judicial and executive powers were intrusted with men. At the first institution of the government, Moses seems to have exercised the judicial authority wholly by himself. In this business he was employed from morning till even

ing, when Jethro, his father-in-law, the priest and prince of Midian, came to visit him. This wise man - for such

he surely was observed to Moses that this business was too heavy for him, and what he was not able to perform alone; and therefore advised him to appoint proper persons to bear the burden with him, provided it was agreeable to the divine will. Moses, it is said in the context, hearkened to the voice of his father-in-law, and did all that he had said. There can be no doubt but that God approved this measure, though it was first suggested by a pagan, otherwise it would not have been adopted. It seems, indeed, to have been highly expedient, and even necessary. From whence it appears that even in this government, which was so immediately the work of God, room was left for men to make such appointments as by experience should be found necessary for the due administration of it. The general plan was laid by God, and he was the sole legislator. This was necessary in that age of darkness, idolatry, and vice. Mankind seem to have been too ignorant and corrupt to form a constitution and a code of laws in any good measure adapted to promote their piety, virtue, and happiness; but God left many smaller matters to be regulated by the wisdom and discretion of the people. This is agreeable to a general rule of the divine conduct, which is, not to accomplish that in a supernatural or miraculous way which may be done by the exertion of human powers.

It is said in the context that, in compliance with the advice of Jethro, Moses chose able men, and made them rulers; but it is generally supposed that they were chosen by the people. This is asserted by Josephus, and plainly intimated by Moses in his recapitulatory discourse, recorded in the first chapter of Deuteronomy, where he says to the people, "I spake unto you, saying, I am not able to bear

you myself alone: take ye wise men, and understanding, and known among your tribes, and I will make them rulers over you." So that these officers were without doubt elected by the people, though introduced by Moses into their office. And, indeed, the Jews always exercised this right of choosing their own rulers; even Saul and David, and all their successors in the throne, were made kings by the voice of the people. This natural and important right God never deprived them of, though they had shown so much folly and perverseness in rejecting him and desiring to have a king like the nations around them.

The business for which Jethro advised that these rulers should be chosen was, to decide the smaller and less difficult matters of controversy that arose among the people, while causes of greater consequence were to be brought before Moses; so that they were a sort of inferior judicial officers or judges of inferior courts. Though they were not officers of the highest dignity and authority in the state, yet the Midianitish sage advised that they should be “able men, such as fear God; men of truth, hating covetousness;" judging that such men only were fit for office. He has here in a few words pointed out to us what sort of men are proper to be put in authority, whether in a higher or lower station; for if such qualifications are necessary for this inferior office, they must surely be more so for the higher and supreme offices in government. And the consideration of these qualifications is what I principally intend in the following discourse. But, before I enter upon this, I would give a little attention to two or three other points. Accordingly, I shall consider,

I. The necessity of civil government to the happiness of mankind.

a See 1 Sam. xi., xv.; 2 Sam. ii., iv., v., viii.

II. The right of the people to choose their own rulers. III. The business of rulers in general.

These particulars being finished in a few words, I shall then,

IV. Particularly consider the qualifications pointed out in the text as necessary for civil rulers.

After which, the subject will be applied to the present occasion.

I. Let us consider the necessity of civil government for the happiness of mankind. Men have, in all ages and nations, been induced, by a sense of their wants and weaknesses, as well as by their love of society, to keep up some intercourse with one another. A man totally separated from his species would be less able to provide for himself than almost any other creature. Some sort of society, some intercourse with other men, is necessary to his happiness, if not to his very existence.

Suppose, then, a number of men living near together, and maintaining that intercourse which is necessary for the supply of their wants, but without any laws or government established among them by mutual consent, or in what is called a state of nature;-in this state every one has an equal right to liberty, and to do what he thinks. proper. The love of liberty is natural to all. It appears the first, operates the most forcibly, and is extinguished the last of any of our passions. And this principle would lead every man to pursue and enjoy everything to which he had an inclination. Several persons would no doubt desire and pursue the same thing, which only one could enjoy; hence contests would arise, and, no. one else having a right to interfere, they must be settled by the parties; but prejudice and self-love would render them partial judges, and probably prevent an amicable settlement, so that the dispute must at last be ended by the strongest

arm, and thus the liberty of the weak would be destroyed by the power of the strong. Every unsuccessful competitor would think himself injured by another's seizing that to which, in his own opinion, he had an equal right, and would endeavor to obtain compensation. This would provoke retaliation, and naturally lead on to an endless reciprocation of injuries. The injured, who found himself unable to contend with his adversary, would call in the assistance of some more powerful combatant to avenge his cause. The aggressor, too, would endeavor to strengthen himself for defence, by associates; and thus parties would. be formed for rapine, devastation, and murder, and the peaceful state of nature soon be exchanged for a number of little, contending tyrannies, or for one successful one that should swallow up all the rest. This would generally be the case where men should attempt to live without laws or government; nor can they any way secure themselves against all manner of violence and injuries from bad men but by uniting together in society, agreeing upon some universal rules to be observed by all; - that controversies shall be determined, not by the parties concerned, but by disinterested judges, and according to established rules; that their determinations shall be enforced by the joint power of the whole community, either in punishing the injurious or protecting the innocent. Man is not to be trusted with his unbounded love of liberty, unless it is under some other restraint than what arises from his own reason or the law of God, - these, in many instances, would make but a feeble resistance to his lust or avarice; and he would pursue his liberty to the destruction of his fellow-creatures, if he was not restrained by human laws and punishment.

Let us next consider,

1 See pp. 86, note a; 280, 285.- ED.