in the military service all white men residents of the Confederate States between the ages of seventeen and fifty; notwithstanding the law of May 1, 1863, provided for the transfer of all seamen and ordinary seamen from the army to the navy, in practice this law was almost entirely disregarded-the only favorable response that was made to numerous calls made on the army for seamen, under this law, was to an order from the War Department of March 22, 1864, which directed the transfer to the navy of 1,200 men, under which 960 men were transferred from all the armies on the east of the Mississippi River. The law of October 2, 1862, gave the right of election to all persons enrolled, or about to be enrolled, at any time before being assigned to any company, who should prefer the navy or marine corps, to be enlisted in that service, but this availed very little to the navy; and notwithstanding naval officers were sent to the different conscript camps to facilitate recruiting for the navy, a favorable result was not attained; hence, recruiting for the navy was barely sufficient to supply the deficiencies occasioned by deaths, discharges and desertions. In 1864 the whole number of enlisted men in the navy was 3,674.

The United States naval register of 1861 shows a navy of 90 vessels, of which number 21 are designated as unserviceable, 27 available but not in commission, and 42 in commission; there were distributed to the home squadron 12 vessels of 187 guns; Mediterranean, 3 vessels, 37 guns; coast of Brazil, 2 vessels, 53 guns; East Indies, 3 vessels, 42 guns; while those in the Pacific aggregated the 42 vessels in commission, which mounted 555 guns, and with over 7,000 men. With the vessels not then in commission, but which were immediately put in commission, Admiral Porter enumerates as the "old navy," 76 vessels, mounting 1,783 guns. Mr. Welles, the United States Secretary of the Navy, took immediate steps for the purchase of 136 vessels, which were altered and commissioned, and mounted with 518 guns; and also began the construction in different yards, both of the government and of private parties, 52 vessels to carry 256 guns, which, by December of 1861, composed a navy of 264 vessels, carrying 2,557 guns, manned by 22,000 seamen, and of an aggregate tonnage of 218,016 tons. Prof. Soley enumerates five distinct measures which were immediately adopted by the Administration at Washington to increase the naval force:

First. To buy everything afloat that could be made of service-a measure which was impossible for Mr. Mallory to imitate, because in the Confederacy there was nothing afloat to buy, and no money with which to purchase.

Second. The United States immediately began, and pushed with unexampled energy, the construction of eight sloops-ofwar. This was another measure impossible to Mr. Mallory,

who had neither ship-yards nor ship-carpenters, neither the means of building nor the power to buy.

Third. To contract with private parties for the construction of heavily armed iron-plated screw gunboats; these "ninety-day gunboats" were for service at sea. Nine of these gunboats passed the forts below New Orleans with Admiral Farragut.

Fourth. For service in narrow waters, twelve paddlewheel steamers -" double-ender "- and twenty-seven of a larger class; some of which were of iron, were contracted for and built with the greatest dispatch.

Fifth. The iron-clads.

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In addition to these five types of vessels, there was also an "immense river fleet, composed of river steamboat rams, iron-clads, tin-clads, and mortar boats"; and lastly, under the sting of the Alabama, the Florida, and other commercedestroyers." the Federal government undertook the construction of a class of war-vessels,― large wooden steamers, with fine lines, excessively long and sharp and narrow, of light draft for their size, in which every quality was sacrificed to speed"-their main purpose was to destroy the "commercedestroyers," as well as, under other circumstances, "to do a little commerce-destroying themselves." The Appendix to Prof. Soley's "Blockade and Cruisers" shows 126 wooden vessels constructed between 1861 and 1865, mounting 1.307 guns, and 74 iron-clads, mounting 213 guns-a total of 200 vessels, mounting 1,520 guns.

Against that naval force, Prof. Soley says:

"The Confederate States had at its disposal a small number of trained officers, some of these, like Buchanan, Semmes, Brown, Maffitt, and Brooke, were men of extraordinary professional qualities; but, except its officers, the Confederate government had nothing in the shape of a navy. It had not a single ship-of-war. It had no abundant fleet of merchantvessels in its ports from which to draw reserves. It had no seamen, for its people were not given to seafaring pursuits. Its only ship-yards were Norfolk and Pensacola. Norfolk, with its immense supplies of ordnance and equipment, was, indeed, valuable; but though the 300 Dahlgren guns captured in the yard were a permanent acquisition, the yard itself was lost when the war was one-fourth over. The South was without any large force of skilled mechanics; and such as it had were early summoned to the army. There were only three rolling mills in the country, two of which were in Tennessee; and the third, at Alabama, was unfitted for heavy work. There were hardly any machine shops that were prepared to supply the best kind of workmanship, and in the beginning the only foundry capable of casting heavy guns was the Tredegar Iron Works, which, under the direction of Commander Brooke, was employed to its fullest capacity. Worst of all, there was no raw materials, except the timber that was standing in the forests. Under these circumstances, no general plan of naval policy on a large scale could be carried out, and the conflict on the Southern side became a species of partisan, desultory warfare."

Without assenting to the conclusion of Prof. Soley, it must be admitted that his picture of Confederate naval prospects at the beginning of the war is not overdrawn or too highly

colored. Not dismayed by the unpromising prospects before him, Secretary Mallory obtained the passage of the secret acts of Congress of May 10, 1861, which authorized the dispatch of Naval Agent James D. Bulloch to England, where he arrived on June 4, 1861. But, anticipating legislation on March 13th, an officer was sent to New York to examine and ascertain whether vessels could be purchased there suitable for war purposes; and, if he could, to procure them. On the 19th of March, an engineer officer was dispatched to New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore in search of suitable vessels for naval purposes, and his report was that but one vessel of the character desired could be found in any Northern city, and that was the steamer Caroline, of Philadelphia. There negotiations were rendered abortive by the outbreak in Baltimore on the passage of Massachusetts troops through that city, and the agents returned to Montgomery. The agents in Canada reported, 5th of June, that the U. S. government had secured every available steamer in Canadian waters.

The subject of iron-clad ships was brought by the Navy Department to the attention of the naval committee by letter of May 8, 1861, in which Mr. Mallory, after reviewing the history of iron-clad ships in England and France, continued:

"I regard the possession of an iron-armored ship as a matter of the first necessity. Such a vessel at this time could traverse the entire coast of the United States, prevent all blockades, and encounter, with a fair prospect of success, their entire navy.

"If to cope with them upon the sea, we follow their example and build wooden ships, we shall have to construct several at one time, for one or two ships will fall an easy prey to her comparatively numerous steam frigates. But inequality of numbers may be compensated by invulnerability, and thus not only does economy but naval success dictate the wisdom and expediency of fighting iron against wood without regard to first cost. Should the committee deem it expedient to begin at once the construction of such a ship, not a moment should be lost. An agent of the department will leave for England in a day or two charged with the duty of purchasing vessels, and by him the first step in the measure may be taken."

The recommendation of that letter was embodied in a law, and the Merrimac was expected to be the kind of vessel therein suggested. The report of the Secretary of the Navy, July 18, 1861, says:

"The frigate Merrimac has been raised and docked at an expense of $6,000, and the necessary repairs to hull and machinery to place her in her former condition is estimated by experts at $450,000. The vessel would then be in the river, and by the blockade of the enemy's fleets and batteries rendered comparatively useless. It has, therefore, been determined to shield her completely with three-inch iron, placed at such angles as to render her ball-proof, to complete her at the earliest moment, to arm her with the heaviest ordnance, and to send her at once against the enemy's fleet. It is believed that thus prepared she will be able to contend successfully against the heaviest of the enemy's ships, and to drive them from Hampton Roads and the ports of Virginia. The cost of this work is estimated by the constructor and engineer in charge at $172,523, and, as time is of the first consequence in this enterprise, I have not hesitated to commence the work, and to ask Congress for the necessary appropriation."