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for use, and were designed more to assist in steering than in the expectation of adding to her speed, and her rudder had little, if any, power to control her movements. Most of her guns had to be dismantled, after arriving at Fort St. Philip, and shifted to pivots where they could be worked, and one of them was not in position in the action of April 24th, being dismounted. The crew of the Louisiana, aided by the men from the McRae, were employed constantly night and day, in arranging the battery for action. The decks were thus, from this cause and the presence of numerous mechanics employed in completing machinery for the propellers, the ironing of the decks, and calking wheel-houses, much incumbered, and being very cramped at best for room, prevented the proper exercise of the men at their guns. This condition of her motive power and battery ren dered her not only unfit for offensive operations against the enemy, but also for defence, as, being immovable, her guns all around could only command about 40 degrees of the horizon, leaving 320 degrees of a circle on which she could have been approached by an enemy without being able to bring a gun to bear upon him. Her guns, from the small si of her ports, could not be elevated more than 4 to 5 degrees, which with our best guns would not have given a range probably of more than 2,000 yards. The means for purchasing her anchors were inadequate, and it was utterly impossible to weigh them, when once they were let go, either from the bow or stern, and, indeed, her steering apparatus prevented her being anchored by the stern in the middle of the river, a position, under all the circumstances, I should have preferred to being tied to the river bank, by which more guns might have been used against the enemy, and the vessel might have been warped or sprung, so as to bring some of her guns to bear upon any given point. The quarters for the crew of the Louisiana were wholly insufficient, and for her officers there were none at all, except on the shield deck or roof, under a tented awning. Most of the officers and crew had to live on board two tenders, which were also required as tugs, without which the vessel could not be moved at all. The shield of the Louisiana was effective, for none of the enemy's projectiles passed through it; but as it only extended to the water line, a shot between wind and water must have penetrated the perpendicular pine sides. In addition to the Louisiana, the following vessels of the C. S. navy were under my command at the forts, viz.: The steamer McRae, Lieut. Com. Thomas B. Huger, with six light thirty-two pounder smooth-bore broadside guns, and one nine-inch shell gun pivoted amidships-total, seven; the steamer Jackson, Lieut. Com. F. B. Renshaw, two pivoted smoothbore thirty-two pounders, one forward and one aft; the iron-plated_ram Manassas, Lieut. Com. A. F. Warley, one thirty-two pounder in bow; launch No. 3, Acting Master Telford, and one howitzer, twenty men; launch No. 6, Acting Master Fairbanks, one howitzer and twenty men. Also, the following converted sea steamers into Louisiana State gunboats, with pine and cotton barricades to protect the machinery and boilers, viz.: The Governor Moore, Commander Beverley Kennon, two thirty-twopounder rifled guns; the General Quitman, Capt. Grant, two thirty-twopounder guns. All the above steamers, being converted vessels, were too slightly built for war purposes. The following unarmed steamers belonged to my command, viz.: The Phanix, Capt. tender to the Manassas;

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the W. Burton, Capt. Hammond, tender to the Louisiana, and the Landis, Capt. Davis, tender to the Louisiana. The following-named steamers, chartered by the army, were placed under my orders, viz.: The Mosher, Capt. Sherman, a very small tug; the Belle Algerine, Capt. small tug; the Star, Capt. La Place, used as a telegraph station, and the Music, Capt. McClellan, tender to the forts. The two former were in bad condition, and were undergoing such repairs as could be made below previous to the 24th. On arriving below I delivered to Capt. Stephenson written orders from Major Gen. M. Lovell, requiring him to place all the River Defence gunboats under my orders, which consisted of the following converted tow boats, viz.: 1st, the Warrior, under the immediate

command of Capt. Stephenson; 2d, the Stonewall Jackson, Capt. Philips; 3d, the Resolute, Capt. Hooper; 4th, the Defiance, Capt. McCoy, and 5th, the General Lovell, The R. J. Breckenridge joined the evening before the action. All of the above vessels mounted from one to two pivot thirty-two pounders each, some of them rifled. Their boilers and machinery were all more or less protected by thick double pine barricades, filled in with compressed cotton, which, though not regarded as proof against heavy solid shot, shell, and incendiary projectiles, would have been a protection against grape and canister, and ought to have inspired those on board with sufficient confidence to use their boats boldly as rains, for which they were in a good measure prepared with flat bar iron casing around their bows. In thus using them their own safety would be best consulted, as well as the best way of damaging the vessels of the enemy."

In the "Naval History of the Civil War," Admiral Porter says: "The machinery (of the Louisiana) consisting of twin screw engines, and central paddles, was unfinished, and her inactivity at the time of the fight was due to that fact." With that knowledge of the cause of the Louisiana's "inactivity, Admiral Porter, in the Century for April, 1885, attempts to cast an imputation upon Commodore Mitchell by saying:

"Fortunately for us, Commodore Mitchell was not equal to the occasion, and the Louisiana remained tied up to the bank, where she could not obstruct the river or throw the Union fleet into confusion while passing the forts."

On the 22d of April. Gen. Duncan wrote to Commodore Mitchell:

"It is of vital importance that the present fire of the enemy should be withdrawn from us, which you alone can do. This can be done in the manner suggested this morning under the cover of our guns, while your work on the boat can be carried on in safety and security. Our position is a critical one, dependent entirely on the powers of endurance of our case mates, many of which have been completely shattered, and are crumbling away by repeated shocks; and, therefore, I respectfully but earnestly again urge my suggestion of this morning on your notice. Our magazines are also in danger.'

Upon the receipt of that request Commodore Mitcnell held a consultation with his officers, and it was unanimously and wisely determined that it would be unwise to comply with Gen. Duncan's request, as Lieut. Whittle said:

"For the reason that it would place her under the fire of the whole Federal fleet commanded by Admiral Farragut without its being in her power to reach them by a single shot, in consequence of her ports not admitting of an elevation of more than five degrees, and, in addition, to the terrific fire of Admiral Porter's mortar fleet, 2,800 shells in twenty-four hours,' any one of which falling upon her unprotected upper deck would have gone through her bottom and sunk her under which combined fires it would be impossible for any work to be done on our machinery, which we so hoped to complete in time for service when the Federals should come up.

Fair and just criticism of the conduct of officers on either side of the late war, is proper, and useful to the avoidance of

errors and mistakes on future occasions, but the misrepresentation and unprofessional innuendoes of Admiral Porter are unworthy alike of an officer and of a historian.

It is not probable that Admiral Farragut would have steamed on to New Orleans and left the Louisiana' in his rear, if he had not been aware that she was unable to move from her position at the bank of the river, or if he had formed the opinion of her fighting power which Admiral Porter expressed.

In aid of the forts and the fleets defending the passage of the river there was a formidable obstruction placed between Forts Jackson and St. Philip, consisting of heavy logs between forty and sixty feet in length, lashed together by large chains across the river under the logs, and fastened on both sides of the river by planting very heavy anchors. There were also about thirty anchors let into the bottom of the river. So powerfully had this raft been built and fastened on both shores, and so thoroughly had it been anchored, that it was believed by those who constructed it that nothing save the giving way of the bottom of the Mississippi itself could break it. It was impossible for vessels to pass the forts while the raft was across the river. It held three months, but was swept away finally by the high water, the rapid current and the drift. A steamer and men were constantly employed to attend to the raft, and to keep away the drift, etc., which, however, it was found impossible to do. This raft cost not less than $55,000 or $60,000, and had it not been for the unprecedented high water, it is supposed that it would have answered the purpose for which it was intended.

1 Wm. C. Whittle, Jr., who was third lieutenant on the Louisiana during the contest against Farragut's fleet in the Mississippi, sent to the Century the following statement concerning her armament:

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"The hull of the Louisiana was almost entirely submerged. Upon this were built her heavy upper works, intended to contain her battery, machinery, etc. This extended to within about twenty-five feet of her stem and stern, leaving a little deck forward and aft, nearly even with the water, and surrounded by a slight bulwark. The structure on the hull had its ends and sides inclined inward and upward from the hull, at an angle of about fortyfive degrees, and covered with T railroad iron, the lower layer being firmly bolted to the woodwork, and the upper layer driven into from the end so as to form a nearly solid plate and a somewhat smooth surface. This plating resisted the projectiles of Farragut's fleet (none of which perforated our side), although one of his largest ships lay across and touching our stem and in that position fired her heavy guns. Above this structure was an open deck which was surrounded by a sheet-iron bulwark about four feet high, which was intended as a protection against sharp-shooters and small arms, but was entirely inefficient, as the death of our gallant commander, McIntosh, and those who fell around him, goes to prove.

"The plan for propelling the Louisiana was novel and abortive. She had two propellers aft, which we never had an opportunity of testing.

The novel conception, which proved entirely inefficient, was that right in the centre section of the vessel there was a large well, in which worked the two wheels, one immediately forward of the other. I suppose they were so placed to be protected from the enemy's fire.

"The machinery of these two wheels was in order when my father, Commodore W. C. Whittle, the naval commanding officer at New Orleans, against his better judgment, was compelled to send the vessel down to the forts. The vessel left New Orleans on the 20th of

April, I think. The work on the propellers · was incomplete, the machinists and mechanics being still on board, and most of the guns were not mounted. The centre wheels were started, but were entirely inefficient, and, as we were drifting helplessly down the stream, tow-boats had to be called to take us down to the point, about half a mile above Fort St. Philip, on the left side of the river, where we tied up to the bank with our bow down stream. Thus, as Farragut's fleet came up and passed, we could only use our bow-guns and the starboard broadside.

"Moreover, the port-holes for our guns were entirely faulty, not allowing room to train the guns either laterally or in elevation. I had practical experience of this fact, for I had immediate charge of the bow division when a vessel of Admiral Farragut's fleet got across our stem, and I could only fire through and through her at point blank instead of depressing my guns and sinking her."