the hostile intentions of France.

had no connec

tria and Prussia

tack on France.

Upon this part of the subject, the proofs which | our peace establishment in the year 1791, and Facts showing contradict such an insinuation are in- continued to the subsequent year, is a fact from numerable. In the first place, the which the inference is indisputable; a fact which, evidence of dates; in the second I am afraid, shows not only that we were not place, the admission of all the different parties waiting for the occasion of war, but that, in our in France; of the friends of Brissot, charging on partiality for a pacific system, we had indulged Robespierre the war with this country, and of ourselves in a fond and credulous security, which the friends of Robespierre charging it on Bris- wisdom and discretion would not have dictated. sot, but both acquitting England; the testino- In addition to every other proof, it is singular nies of the French government during the whole enough that, in a decree, on the eve of a declainterval, since the declaration of Pilnitz and the ration of war on the part of France, it is expresspretended treaty of Pavia; the first of which ly stated, as for the first time, that England was had not the slightest relation to any project of then departing from that system of neutrality partition or dismemberment ; the second of which she had hitherto observed. which I firmly believe to be an absolute fabrication and forgery, and in neither of which, even as they are represented, any reason has been assigned for believing that this country had any share. Even M. Talleyrand himself was sent by the constitutional king of the French, after the period when that concert which is now charged must have existed, if it existed at all, with a letter from the King of France, expressly thanking his Majesty for the neutrality which he had uniformly observed.12 The same fact is confirmed by the concurring evidence of every person who knew any thing of the plans of the King of Sweden in 1791; the only sovereign who, I believe, at that time meditated any hostile measures against France, and whose utmost hopes were expressly stated to be, that England would not oppose his intended expedition; by all those, also, who knew any thing of the conduct of the Emperor or the King of Prussia; by the clear and decisive testimony of M. Chauvelin himself | in his dispatches from hence to the French government, since published by their authority; by every thing which has occurred since the war; by the publications of Dumourier; by the publications of Brissot; by the facts that have since come to light in America, with respect to the mission of M. Genet, which show that hostility against this country was decided on by France long before the period when M. Chauvelin was sent from hence ;13 besides this, the reduction of

But, sir, I will not rest merely on these testimonies or arguments, however strong Direct proof and decisive. I assert distinctly and that England positively, and I have the documents tion with Aus in my hand to prove it, that from the on their first at middle of the year 1791, upon the first rumor of any measure taken by the Emperor of Germany, and till late in the year 1792, we not only were no parties to any of the projects imputed to the Emperor, but, from the political circumstances in which we stood with relation to that court, we wholly declined all communications with him on the subject of France. To Prussia, with whom we were in connection, and still more decisively to Holland, with whom we were in close and intimate correspondence, we uniformly stated our unalterable resolution to maintain neutrality, and avoid interference in the internal affairs of France, as long as France should refrain from hostile measures against us and our allies No minister of England had any authority to treat with foreign states, even provisionally, for any warlike concert, till after the battle of Jemappe; till a period subsequent to the repeated provocations which had been offered to us, and subsequent particularly to the decree of fraternity of the 19th of November; even then, to what object was it that the concert which we wished to establish, was to be directed? If we had then rightly cast the true character of the French Revolution, I can not now deny that we should have been better justified in a very different conduct. But it is material to the present argument to declare what that conduct actually was, because it is of itself sufficient to confute all the pretexts by which the advocates of France have so long labored to perplex the question of aggres

had done so, and failed through the violent councils of the French Assembly, she would have stood blameless before the world in the contest that followed that, having neglected to do so, she was justly to be considered as in part, at least, the author of the war; and that Mr. Pitt, at all events, had no right to go back to these questions, and the subsequent atrocities of the French, as a reason for re-cial system, by declaring that their vessels shall not fusing now to negotiate.

12 This was at the time when the mediation was requested, which has just been spoken of in the preceding note.

13 In Genet's secret instructions (which he published at a later period), it is stated that France had a particular interest in acting efficiently against England; and America was, if possible, to be drawn into the contest. As a preliminary step, the American government were to be induced to unite with France in a league, “to befriend the empire of lib. erty wherever it can be extended-to guarantee the sovereignty of the people-and to punish those powers who keep up an exclusive colonial and commer

sion.

be received in the ports of the contracting parties." The last clause was pointed particularly against En gland. Whether Mr. Pitt referred to any thing be yond the disclosures in these instructions is uncer tain. The instructions themselves prove but little for they were drawn up January 4th, 1793, only three weeks before Chauvelin was sent out of England, and five months after his functions as minister were suspended. Mr. Pitt had, perhaps, forgotten the dates when he said "long before the period when M. Chauvelin was sent hence;" or perhaps he fairly inferred that a systematic attack of this kind upon England, through her commerce, must have taken & considerable time in its preparation.

Ground taken in

At that period Russia had at length conceived, | as well as ourselves, a natural and communica just alarm for the balance of Europe, tion to Russia. and applied to us to learn our sentiments on the subject. In our answer to this application we imparted to Russia the principles upon which we then acted, and we communicated this answer to Prussia, with whom we were connected in defensive alliance. I will state shortly the leading part of those principles. A dispatch was sent from Lord Grenville to his Majesty's minister in Russia, dated the 29th of December, 1792, stating a desire to have an explanation set on foot on the subject of the war with France. I will read the material parts of it. "The two leading points on which such explanation will naturally turn are the line of conduct to be followed previous to the commencement of hostilities, and with a view, if possible, to avert them; and the nature and amount of the forces which the powers engaged in this concert might be enabled to use, supposing such extremities to be unavoidable.

"With respect to the first, it appears, on the whole, subject, however, to future consideration and discussion with the other powers, that the most advisable step to be taken would be, that sufficient explanation should be had with the powers at war with France, in order to enable those not hitherto engaged in the war to propose to that country terms of peace. That these terms should be the withdrawing their arms within the limits of the French territory; the abandoning their conquests, the rescinding any acts injurious to the sovereignty or rights of any other nations, and the giving, in some public and unequivocal manner, a pledge of their intention no longer to foment troubles or to excite disturbances against other governments. In return for these stipulations, the different powers of Europe who should be parties to this measure might engage to abandon all measures, or views of hostility against France, or interference in their internal affairs, and to maintain a correspondence and intercourse of amity with the existing powers in that country, with whom such a treaty may be concluded. If, as the result of this proposal so made by the powers acting in concert, these terms should not be accepted by France, or being accepted, should not be satisfactorily performed, the different powers might then engage themselves to each other to enter into active measures for the purpose of obtaining the ends in view; and it may be considered whether, in such case, they might not reasonably look to some indemnity for the expenses and hazards to which they would necessarily be exposed."

The dispatch then proceeded to the second point, that of the forces to be employed, on which it is unnecessary now to speak.

Now, sir, I would really ask any person who has been from the beginning the most desirous of avoiding hostilities, whether it is possible to conceive any measure to be adopted in the situation in which we then stood which could more Avidently demonstrate our desire, after repeated

provocations, to preserve peace, on any terma consistent with our safety; or whether any sentiment could now be suggested which would have more plainly marked our moderation, forbearance, and sincerity? In saying this I am not challenging the applause and approbation of my country, because I must now confess that we were too slow in anticipating that danger of which we had, perhaps, even then sufficient experience, though far short, indeed, of that which we now possess, and that we might even then have seen, what facts have since but too incontestably proved, that nothing but vigorous and open hostility can afford complete and adequate security against revolutionary principles, while they retain a proportion of power sufficient to furnish the means of war.

ing out their

II. I will enlarge no farther on the origin of the war. I have read and detailed Atrocities of tla to you a system which was in itself French in carry a declaration of war against all na- revolutionary tions, which was so intended, and system. which has been so applied, which has been ex emplified in the extreme peril and hazard of almost all who for a moment have trusted to treaty. and which has not at this hour overwhelmed Europe in one indiscriminate mass of ruin, only because we have not indulged, to a fatal extremity, that disposition which we have, however, indulged too far; because we have not consented to trust to profession and compromise, rather than to our own valor and exertion, for security against a system, from which we never shall be delivered till either the principle is extinguished, or till its strength is exhausted.

the subject

I might, sir, if I found it necessary, enter into much detail upon this part of the subject; Extent of but at present I only beg leave to express my readiness at any time to enter upon it, when either my own strength or the patience of the House will admit of it; but I say, without distinction, against every nation in Europe, and against some out of Europe, the principle has been faithfully applied. You can not look at the map of Europe, and lay your hand upon tha: country against which France has not either declared an open and aggressive war, or violated some positive treaty, or broken some recognized principle of the law of nations.

France upon

war with Ea

This subject may be divided into various periods. There were some acts of hos- Aggressions of tility committed previous to the war Various counwith this country, and very little, in- tres before her deed, subsequent to that declaration, gland. which abjured the love of conquest. The attack upon the papal state, by the seizure of Avignon, in 1791, was accompanied with specimens of ak the vile arts and perfidy that ever disgraced a revolution. Avignon was separated from its lawful sovereign, with whom not even the pretense of quarrel existed, and forcibly incorporated in the tyranny of one and indivisible France." The

14 This city with the adjoining province, lying on the Rhone, in the south of France, had been for more than four centuries the property of the papal gov ernment. For seventy years (from 1305 to 1377) it was the residence of the popes, and was afterward

that no offensive intention was entertained on the | trolled in the Mediterranean, and (while our part of the latter power.

War was then declared against Austria, a war which I state to be a war of aggresPrussia's unit sion on the part of France. The

Reasons for

mg with Austria.

fleets were yet unarmed) threatening destruction to all the coast of Italy.

It was not till a considerably later period that almost all the other nations of Europe and the other found themselves equally involved in Italian states actual hostility; but it is not a little material to the whole of my argument, compared with the

King of Prussia had declared that he should consider war against the Emperor or empire as war against himself. He had declared that, as a coestate of the empire, he was determ-statement of the learned gentleman, and with ined to defend their rights; that, as an ally of that contained in the French note, to examine at the Emperor, he would support him to the ut- what period this hostility extended itself. It most against any attack; and that, for the sake extended itself, in the course of 1796, to the of his own dominions, he felt himself called upon states of Italy which had hitherto been exemptto resist the progress of French principles, and ed from it. In 1797 it had ended in the destructo maintain the balance of power in Europe. tion of most of them; it had ended in the virtual With this notice before them, France declared deposition of the King of Sardinia; it had ended war upon the Emperor, and the war with Prus- in the conversion of Genoa and Tuscany into sia was the necessary consequence of this ag- democratic republics; it had ended in the revo gression, both against the Emperor and the em-lution of Venice, in the violation of treaties with pire. the new Venetian Republic; and, finally, in transferring that very republic, the creature and vassal of France, to the dominion of Austria. I observe from the gestures of some honorable gentlemen that they think we are pre- Reply as to cluded from the use of any argument Austria's re founded on this last transaction. I from the already hear them saying that it was as criminal in Austria to receive as it was in France to give. I am far from defending or palliating the conduct of Austria upon this occasion. But because Austria, unable at last to contend with the arms of France, was forced to accept an unjust and insufficient indemnification for the conquests France had made from it, are we to

Case of next.

The war against the King of Sardinia follows The declaration of that war was Sardinia the seizure of Savoy by an invading army -and on what ground? On that which has been stated already. They had found out, by some light of nature, that the Rhine and the Alps were the natural limits of France. Upon that ground Savoy was seized; and Savoy was also incorporated with France.

Spain.

ceiving Venice

French.

Here finishes the history of the wars in which France was engaged antecedent to the war with Great Britain, with Holland, and with Spain. With respect to Spain, we have seen nothing which leads us to suspect that either attachment to religion, or the ties of consanguini-be debarred from stating what, on the part of ty, or regard to the ancient system of Europe, was likely to induce that court to connect itself in offensive against France. The war was evidently and incontestably begun by France against Spain.

The case of Holland is so fresh in every man's Holland and recollection, and so connected with the Portugal. immediate causes of the war with this country, that it can not require one word of observation. What shall I say, then, on the case of Portugal? I can not, indeed, say that France ever declared war against that country. I can hardly say even that she ever made war, but she required them to make a treaty of peace, as if they had been at war; she obliged them to purchase that treaty; she broke it as soon as it was purchased; and she had originally no other ground of complaint than this, that Portugal had performed, though inadequately, the engagements of its ancient defensive alliance with this country in the character of an auxiliary—a conduct which can not of itself make any power a principal in a war.

France, was not merely an unjust acquisition, but an act of the grossest and most aggravated perfidy and cruelty, and one of the most striking specimens of that system which has been uniformly and indiscriminately applied to all the countries which France has had within its grasp? This only can be said in vindication of France (and it is still more a vindication of Austria) that, practically speaking, if there is any part of this transaction for which Venice itself has reason to be grateful, it can only be for the permission to exchange the embraces of French fraternity for what is called the despotism of Vienna.1

17 Austria, being worsted in the contest, made peace with the French in 1797, and, as a recompense for her sacrifices, and for leaving the German states on the Rhine at the mercy of the conqueror, received I have now enumerated all the nations at war Venice and the adjacent territory, which had just at that period, with the exception only of been seized, under circumstances of great perfidy Naples, Naples. It can hardly be necessary to and violence, by the French. Alison, with all his call to the recollection of the House the charac-partiality for the allies, says of this transaction, "It is darker in atrocity than the partition of Poland, and teristic feature of revolutionary principles which has only excited less indignation in subsequent was shown, even at this early period, in the per-years because it was attended with no heroism or sonal insult offered to the King of Naples, by the dignity in the vanquished."-Vol. iii., p. 276, third commander of a French squadrop -iding uncon- edition.

her numerous

price of peace,

France.

quests were produced by the operations of the practiced against the other countries of Europe. allies. It was, when they were pressed on all The House will recollect that, in the year 1796, sides, when their own territory was in danger, when all these horrors in Italy were beginning, when their own independence was in question, which are the strongest illustrations of the genwhen the confederacy appeared too strong, it eral character of the French Revolution, we had was then they used the means with which their begun that negotiation to which the learned gen power and their courage furnished them, and, tleman has referred. England then The offer of Ex "attacked upon all sides, they carried every possessed numerous conquests. En- gland to restore where their defensive arms." I do not wish to gland, though not having at that conquests as the misrepresent the learned gentleman, but I un-time had the advantage of three of rejected by derstood him to speak of this sentiment with ap- her most splendid victories, England probation. The sentiment itself is this, that if a even then appeared undisputed mistress of the nation is unjustly attacked in any one quarter by sea. England, having then engrossed the whole others, she can not stop to consider by whom, wealth of the colonial world; England, having but must find means of strength in other quar- lost nothing of its original possessions, England ters, no matter where; and is justified in attack- then comes forward, proposing a general peace, ing, in her turn, those with whom she is at peace, and offering-what? offering the surrender of all and from whom she has received no species of that it had acquired, in order to obtain-what? provocation. Sir, I hope I have already proved, Not the dismemberment, not the partition of anin a great measure, that no such attack was cient France, but the return of a part of those made upon France; but, if it was made, I main- conquests, no one of which could be retained, tain that the whole ground on which that argu- but in direct contradiction to that original and ment is founded can not be tolerated. In the solemn pledge which is now referred to as the name of the laws of nature and nations, in the proof of the just and moderate disposition of the name of every thing that is sacred and honora- French Republic. Yet even this offer was not ble, I demur to that plea; and I tell that honora-sufficient to procure peace, or to arrest the progble and learned gentleman that he would do well to look again into the law of nations before he ventures to come to this House to give the sanction of his authority to so dreadful and execrable a system.18

ment, at least,

I certainly understood this to be distinctly the The note of the tenor of the learned gentleman's arFrench govern gument, but as he tells me he did justified those not use it, I take it for granted he did atrocities. not intend to use it. I rejoice that he did not; but at least, then, I have a right to expect that the learned gentleman should now transfer to the French note some of the indignation which he has hitherto lavished upon the declarations of this country. This principle, which the learned gentleman disclaims, the French note avows; and I contend, without the fear of contradiction, it is the principle upon which France has uniformly acted. But while the learned gentleman disclaims this proposition, he certainly will admit that he has himself asserted, and maintained in the whole course of his argument, that the pressure of the war upon France imposed upon her the necessity of those exertions which produced most of the enormities of the Revolution, and most of the enormities 18 Mr. Erskine here said across the House that he had never maintained any such proposition. His line of argument was certainly a very different one, as will be seen from the passage of his speech alluded to. 4. Was it imagined that a powerful nation, so surrounded, would act merely on the defensive, or that, in the midst of a revolution which the confederacy of nations had rendered terrible, the rights of nations would be respected? No; we gave the different French governments, by our conduct, a pre

text for jealousy of every other European state, and, in a manner, goaded them on to the accomplishment of all the conquests which had since been the subject of just lamentation and complaint.''- Parl. Hist., vol. xxxiv, p. 1291.

ress of France in her defensive operations against other unoffending countries!

Answer to Mr. the causes which termin uation of 1796

Erskine as to

ated the negn.

From the pages, however, of the learned gentleman's pamphlet (which, after all its editions, is now fresher in his memory than in that of any other person in this House or in the country), he is furnished with an argument, on the result of the negotiation, on which he appears confidently to rely. He maintains that the single point on which the negotiation was broken off was the question of the possession of the Austrian Netherlands, and that it is, therefore, on that ground only that the war has, since that time, been continued. When this subject was before under discussion, I stated, and I shall state again (not withstanding the learned gentleman's accusation of my having endeavored to shift the question from its true point), that the question then at issue was not whether the Netherlands should in fuct be restored; though even on that question I am not (like the learned gentleman) unprepared to give any opinion. I am ready to say, that to leave that territory in the possession of France would be obviously dangerous to the interests of this country, and is inconsistent with the policy which it has uniformly pursued at every period in which it has concerned itself in the general system of the continent. But it was not on the decision of this question of expediency and policy, that the issue of the negotiation then turned. What was required of us by France was, not merely that we should acquiesce in her retaining the Netherlands, but that, as a preliminary to all treaty, and before entering upon the discussion of terms, we should recognize the principle that whatever France, in time of war, had annexed to the Republic must remain inseparable forever. and could not become the subject of negotiation. I say that, in refusing such a preliminary, we