How can my foul endure the lofs of thee? Without my sweet companion can I live? The dear reward of ev'ry virtuous toil, What pleasures now can pall'd Ambition give? For my diftracted mind What fuccour can I find? On whom for confolation fhall I call? Support me ev'ry friend, Your kind affiftance lend XVII. To bear the weight of this oppreffive woe. My dear departed love, fo much was thine, In ev'ry other grief, Are now with your idea fadden'd all: Each fav'rite author we together read My tortur'd mem'ry wounds, and speaks of Lucy dead. XVIII. We were the happieft pair of human kind! The rolling year its varying courfe perform❜d, And back return'd again, Another and another fmiling came, Still in her golden chain Harmonious concord did our wishes bind: Our ftudies, pleasures, tafte the fame. O fatal, O fatal fatal ftroke, That all this pleafing fabric Love had rais❜d Of rare felicity, On which ev'n wanton Vice with envy gaz'd, Yet, O my foul, thy rifing murmurs ftay, With impious grief complain. That all thy full-blown joys at once should fade Was his most righteous will, and be that will obey'd. XIX. Would thy fond love his grace to her controul, And in these low abodes of fin and pain Her pure, exalted foul No-rather ftrive thy grov'ling mind to raise Up to that unclouded blaze, That heavenly radiance of eternal light, Is every mortal blifs; Ev'n love itself, if rifing by degrees On On ANGE R. W QUESTION. HETHER Anger ought to be fuppreffed entirely, or only to be confined within the bounds of moderation? THOSE who maintain that refentment is blameable only in the excefs, fupport their opinion with fuch arguments as thefe : SINCE Anger is natural and useful to man, entirely to banish it from our breast, would be an equally foolish and vain attempt: for as it is difficult, and next to impoffible to oppose nature with fuccefs; fo it were imprudent, if we had it in our power, to caft away the weapons, with which fhe has furnished us for our defence. The beft armour against injustice is a proper degree of fpirit, to repel the wrongs that are done, or defigned against us: but if we divest ourselves of all resentment, we shall perhaps prove too irrefolute and languid, both in refifting the attacks of injustice and inflicting punishment upon thofe, who have committed it. We shall therefore fink into contempt, and by the tameness of our spirit, shall invite the malicious to abufe and affront us. Nor will others fail to deny us the regard, which is due from them, if once they think us incapable of refentment. To remain unmoved at gross injuries, has the appearance of ftupidity, and will make us defpicable and mean, in the eyes of many who are not to be influenced by any thing but their fears. AND as a moderate share of refentment is useful in its effects, fo it is innocent in itself, nay often commendable. The virtue of mildness is no less remote from infenfibility, on the one hand, than from fury, on the other. It implies, that we are angry only upon proper occafions, and in a due degree; that we are never transported beyond the bounds of decency, ог or indulge a deep and lafting refentment; that we do not follow, but lead our paffion, governing it as our fervant, not fubmitting ourselves to it as our mafter. Under thefe regulations it is certainly excufable, when moved only by private wrongs: and being excited by the injuries, which others fuffer, it befpeaks a generous mind and deferves commendation. Shall a good man feel no indignation against injuftice and barbarity; not even when he is witness to thocking inftances of them? when he fees a friend bafely and cruelly treated; when he obferves, Th'oppreffor's wrong, the proud man's contumely, That patient merit of th' unworthy takes; SHALL he ftill enjoy himself in perfect tranquillity? Will it be a crime, if he conceives the leaft refentment? Will it not rather be fomewhat criminal, if he is deftitute of it? in fuch cafes we are commonly fo far from being afhamed of our anger, as fomething mean, that we are proud of it, and confefs it openly, as what we count laudable and meritorious. THE truth is, there feems to be fomething manly, and we are bold to fay, fomething virtuous in a juft and well conducted refentment. In the mean time, let us not be fufpected of endeavouring to vindicate rage, and peevithness, and implacable resentment. No; fuch is their deformity, so horrid and manifeft are the evils they produce, that they do not admit of any defence or juftification. We condemn, we deteft them, as unnatural, brutish, unmanly, and monftrous. All we contend for, is, that it is better to be moderate in our refentment, than to fupprefs it altogether. Let us therefore keep it under a strict difcipline, and carefully refrain it within the bounds which reafon preferibes, with regard to the occafion, degree, and continuance of it. But let us not prefume to extirpate any of those affections, which the wifdom of God has implanted in us, which are fo nicely balanced, and fo well adjusted to each other, that by deftroying one of them, we may perhaps diforder and blemish the whole frame of our nature. To To thefe arguments, thofe who adopt the opinion that anger should be entirely fuppreffed, reply: You tell us, anger is natural to man; but nothing is more natural to man, than reafon, mildness, and benevolence. Now with what propriety can we call that natural to any creature, which impairs and oppofes the most effential and diftinguishing parts of its conftitution? fometimes indeed we may call that natural to a fpecies, which being found in most of them is not produced by art or cuftom. That anger is in this fenfe natural, we read ly grant; but deny that we therefore cannot, or may not lawfully extinguish it. Nature has committed to our management the faculculties of the mind, as well as the members of the body; and, as when any of the latter become pernicious to the whole, we cut them off and cast them away; in like manner, when any of our affections are become hurtful and ufelefs in our frame, by cutting them off, we do not in the least counteract the intention of nature. Now fuch is anger to a wife man. Το fools and cowards it is a neceffary evil; but to a perfon of moderate sense and virtue, it is an evil which has no advantage attending it. The harm it must do him is very apparent. It muft ruffle his temper; make him lefs agreeable to his friends, disturb his reason, and unfit him for discharging the duties of life in a becoming manner. By only diminishing his paffion, he may leffen, but cannot remove the evil, for the only way to get clear of the one, is by entirely difmiffing the other. How then will anger be fo ufeful to him, as to make it worth his while to retain it in any degree? He may defend his own rights; affift an injured friend; profecute and punish a villain; I say his prudence and friendfhip, his public spirit and calm refolution will enable him to do all this, and to do it in a much more, fafe proper, and effectual manner, without the affiftance of anger, than with it. He will be defpised and neglected, you fay, if he appears to have no resentment. You should rather fay, if he appears to have no fedate wisdom and courage; for thefe qualities will be fufficient of themfelves to fecure him from contempt, and maintain him in the poffeffion of his juft authority. Nor does any thing commonly leffen us more in the eyes of others, than our own paffion. It often expofeth us to the contempt and derifion of thofe, who are not in our power; and if it makes |