P. Peterson. Appeal by plaintiff from a knew that the ground at the side of the road judgment for defendant, and from an order was covered with loose stones and boulders denying a new trial. Reversed. as far down as I could see. * * I disBien & Jackson and Anderson & Kaye, covered that fact at the time I drove down for appellant. C. L. Claflin, for respondent. there, and knew it before. * * * A man might reach the road with an empty stage. He night do it one time in ten.” While the ALLEN, J. Action for damages on account witness Pritchard stated that "the place outof personal injuries. Findings and judgment side the road where I drove down was not for defendant. Appeal by the plaintiff from bad looking from above," the entire descripsaid judgment, and from the order denying tion of the road over which he was compelled a new trial. to drive in turning out indicates that it was Plaintiff was a passenger for hire upon an exceedingly bad and dangerous point at defendant's stagecoach, such stagecoach hav- which to undertake to leave the road. It is ing capacity for nine, but was carrying only admitted that no notice was given to the passix passengers. The route being traversed sengers of the dangerous character of this was rough and mountainous. The stage was particular turnout. It further appears from driven by a thoroughly competent and skilled the testimony that after driving past the man, and all of the appointments were in team, in an effort to turn back into the road, perfect condition. The stage thus driven the right fore wheel struck one of these was met by a 10-horse team upon this moun boulders of which witness Pritchard speaks tain road, and the driver of the stage under and upset the stage; that after the stage took to pass the team by turning to the right. started to turn over plaintiff leaped thereThe evidence of Pritchard, the driver, is: from, and was caught and injured. "The place outside the road where I drove The court finds that there was no neglidown was not bad looking from above. As gence upon the part of the defendant, alfar as I could see, it was a rocky ridge that though it makes no specific finding as to the went down and narrowed up. At the point danger to be apprehended at the point where where we turned in it hadn't been very bad the driver undertook to turn out of the road, only for the big loose boulders. Looking on and pass the cement team. The court does down it got narrower and the hills broke off find, however, and there is testimony in its steep to the right, and the road was very support, that the place where he undertook abrupt on the left-hand side also until you to turn back into the road after having got further down. The embankment was passed the cement team was apparently a formed by throwing loose rocks out of the safe place. road. The rut where I turned in was about It is insisted by the appellant that there eight or ten inches deep and the bank had a is no evidence to support the finding that gradual slope toward it a distance of eight no negligence was attributable to the defendor ten feet. The slope was not steep, but ant. With this we are inclined to agree. The was gradual and easy. * * * The ridge care which defendant, as a common carrier, becomes narrower as you go down until it owed to plaintiff was the utmost care. Treadpinches out." well v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 588, 22 Pac. 266, The defendant, called in his own behalf, 5 L. R. A. 498, 13 Am. St. Rep. 175. The testified, and was asked whether it was pos passenger was injured by an instrumentality sible, by the exercise of care on the driver's used by defendant in the prosecution of his part, to have driven the coach into the road business, and the presumption is that it ocat that point without tipping over; his an curred by the negligence of the coachman. swer was: “I don't know of any way that he We find nothing in the evidence tending to could prevent it.” When asked if, by the rebut this presumption. "Moreover, where exercise of the highest degree of care, by the driver of a coach approaches a place of watching everything in the road, the driver particular danger to passengers, he is bound could "have driven that coach in there with to warn them of the nature of the danger, out turning over," defendant answered: to the end that they may choose whether "Well, I don't think he could.” To the fur they will run the risk of it or not." Thompther question, do you think any man could son's Carrier of Passengers, p. 240. We drive that coach in there where he turned think that the general tenor of the authorities off from the road without turning it over? cited by the appellant sustains the position defendant answered: “I don't think so." that it was negligence upon the part of the Again, he says: "Of course, I would try and driver, in view of the rough character of the be safe, but I might be turned over. I say turn out, which he must of necessity traverse I don't think it could be done with safety be- in order to pass this wagon, in not giving cause I had as safe a man as ever drove on the passengers notice of the danger apparent, the road." And to the further question: | that an opportunity might be offered them "Then it was a matter of impossibility to to alight and avoid the same. His omission have driven that coach around that cement in this regard was negligence. No contribuwagon and gotten in again without turning tory negligence is shown. Assuming as we over; that is a fact, is it not?” Answer: "It do that the driver drove his coach into a seems so." The driver further testified: “I dangerous place and exposed the passengers to peril, the act of the plaintiff in attempt- Bernardino. At the conclusion of plaintiff's ing to jump from the coach was not con- evidence, defendant's motion for a nonsuit tributory negligence. It is said by our Su- was granted. The plaintiff appeals from the preme Court in Schneider v. Market Street judgment which followed. Ry. Co., 134 Cal. 482, 66 Pac. 734, that "even The only question presented arises ujion if, in bewilderment, he runs directly into the the order granting the nonsuit. It is convery danger which he fears, he is not in fault. tended by appellant that, while the negliThe confusion of mind caused by such negli- gence of the deceased must be admitted to gence is part of the injury inflicted by the have contributed to his death, yet the defendnegligent person." There is nothing in the ant's engineer had notice of the negligence evidence to indicate that the action of plain- of the deceased in time to have avoided tiff in jumping from the stage contributed the killing if he had used proper care and in any degree to its overturning. for the stopped the train. The facts of the case are uncontradicted testimony is that the stage in many respects similar to the facts in the was overturning before he jumped. case of Green v. Los Angeles Terminal Ry. In our opinion, the judgment and order Co., 143 Cal. 31, 76 l'ac. 719, 101 Am. St. should be reversed, and cause remanded for Rep. 68, and may be briefly stated as folfurther proceedings; and it is so ordered. lows: The deceased was approaching the defendant's track from the west on the side We concur: GRAY, P. J.; SMITH, J. walk which traversed the south side of the street. The defendant's locomotive, with a train of cars attached, was approaching from (4 Cal. App. 1) the northwest, the same point to which the ROWE v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA deceased was going, at an angle of about 45 RY. CO. degrees with the course deceased was travel(Court of Appeal, Second District, California. ing. The speed of the train was five or six June 23, 1906.) miles an hour, and, as it was approaching 1. RAILROADS-CROSSING ACCIDENT-INJURIES the deceased partially from behind and to TO PEDESTRIANS – WILLFUL INJURY — CON the left, it could not be seen readily by him TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. Intestate approached a railroad crossing unless he turned his head. This was in the without paying any attention to his surround- evening, nearly dark. An oil lamp was burnings or to a train approaching at a speed of ing in the headlight of the locomotive. The from five to six miles an hour. The engineer saw intestate before he came on the track and engineer, leaning out the window from the blew three or four quick blasts. lle then called right-hand side of his cab, saw deceased passto deceased to "look out," and seeing that he ing along the south sidewalk, while the enpaid no attention immediately turned on the gineer was still north of the street. He whistle again and at the same time set the air brakes, but it was then impossible to prevent observed that deceased was walking slowly the collision, and intestate unheedingly stepped and without any attention to his surroundimmediately before, and into, the cowcatcher, receiving injuries from which he subsequently ings, and, for the purpose of attracting his died. After the brakes were set, the locomo attention, he blew three or four quick blasts tive and train stopped in about 30 feet. Held, upon his locomotive whistle. He then called that the engineer was not guilty of gross or to the deceased in a loud voice, "Look out wanton negligence in failing to stop the train in time to avoid the injury. there," and seeing that the deceased still [Ed. Note.-For cases in point. see vol. 41, paid no attention he immediately turned on Cent. Dig. Railroads, 88 1015, 1016.] the whistle again, at the same time setting 2. SAME-PROXIMATE CAUSE. the air brakes; but it was then impossible Intestate's contributory negligence, and not for the engineer to prevent a collision. The the negligence of the engineer in not bringing deceased unheedingly stepped immediately the train to a standstill when he first saw de before or into the cowcatcher. Both big ceased, was the proximate cause of the injury. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 41, legs were broken between the ankles and Cent. Dig. Railroads, $ 1028.] knees, and he was thrown back from the track upon the same side from which he apAppeal from Superior Court, San Bernar proached. A day or two later he died. After dino County; Benjamin F. Bledsoe, Judge. the brakes were set, the locomotive and train Action by Henrietta J. Rowe, as administratrix of the estate of Edwin Rowe, deceas were brought to a stop in about 30 feet. The engine bell was kept ringing from the ed, against the Southern California Railway Company. From a judgment for defendant, time the deceased was first seen by the en gineer. The deceased held the office of conplai. tiff appeals. Affirmed. , stable in the township where he was killed. Henry M. Willis, for appellant. T. J. Nor He was habitually given to spells of abton and E. E. Millikin, for respondent. straction and absent-mindedness, and was partially deaf in the left ear (the one nearGRAY, P. J. This action is brought by est the approaching locomotive). These physplaintiff to recover damages from defendant ical defects were not known by the engineer. for the alleged negligent killing of plaintiff's The contributory negligence of deceased husband by one of defendant's passenger is conceded by appellant, and the complaint is trains at a street crossing in the city of San framed and the trial proceeded on the theory that the recovery must be had, if at all, for the gross and wanton negligence of defendant's engineer. This gross and wanton negligence is alleged to consist in his not having stopped the train in time to avoid striking the deceased. We cannot agree with this. The engineer evinced no wanton desire to injure deceased, nor is there any evidence of a reckless disregard on his part of the safety of the deceased. The very contrary of this clearly appears from the undisputed evidence. He promptly resorted to, and industriously persisted in, all those means which are usually effective to all an absent-minded man to his senses, and this is all that the rule in such cases requires. When he sees that a person is walking into danger, he must use ordinary care to warn him of such danger and prevent the injury. The engineer had no notice that deceased was going to disregard all his warnings until he had given the warnings, and it was then too late to make the stopping of the train effective to avoid the killing. This was not the engineer's fault, but the fault of deceased arising from its physical defects which the engineer knew nothing about. The doctrine which makes a personal injury the fault of him who has the last clear opportunity to prevent it has coupled with it and in it the element of notice. And "under . this rule a defendant is not liable because he ought to liave known." Herbert v. S. P. Co., 121 Cal. 227, 53 Pac. 651. Here the engineer had no notice and no reasonable ground to think that it was necessary to stop his train to aroid running over deceased, until it was too late to do so. After he discovered that he must stop his train or kill a man he had no clear opportunity to do it. l'p to this time it would have been something beyond ordinary care for him to stop his train; it would have been extraordinary care. Trains are not ordinarily stopped, or even held stationary, to allow people on foot to pass in front of them. Another element of the rule with which we are here concerned is that circumstances must be such, and must appear to the party to be charged to be such, "that the deceased cannot, and the defendant can prevent the injury." “This principle cannot govern where both parties are contemporaneously and actively in fault, and by their mutual carelessness an injury ensues to one or both of them.” Holmes v. South Pac. C. Ry. Co., 97 Cal. 169, 31 Pac. 831. If we were to concede that the engineer was negligent in not bringing the train to a standstill when he first saw the decedent, still the plaintiff could not recover because of the fact that decedent was in no danger so long as he did not step upon the track. He brought himself into a position of immediate danger by so stepping upon the track, and this was the proximate and immediate (ause of his injury, and the previous failure to stop the train had only a remote connection therewith. To be sure, if the train had been stopped in time, the injury would not have happened. This is so, however, not because the engineer would have thus refrained from injuring the deceased, but because he would have thus prevented the deceased from injuring himself by walking into the pilot of the moving locomotive. It is not a reasonable deduction from the conduct of the engineer to say that he did know, or should have known, from the conduct of the deceased, immediately on the sounding of the whistle the first time, that he was going to thereafter walk upon the track heedless of all further warning. It is fair, however, to say that the engineer never for a moment thought that deceased was going finally to ignore the several warnings given him during that short few seconds of time until it was too late to prevent striking him, and the instant that he realized that those warnings were ineffective he did his best to stop the train. This is all the law requires. Green V. Los Angeles, etc., Ry, Co., 143 Cal. 31, 76 Pac. 719, 101 Am. St. Rep. 68. Even under the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice in the Green Case, and the principles therein laid down, the plaintiff herein shoull not recover, for it is plain that the dissent of the Chief Justice was largely influenced by the excessive speed of the train and the absence of all warning of its approach. The appellant cites many cases from this and other states. Some of the latter support her position, but we think them in principle at variance with the decisions of our own Supreme Court. In this state no case has gone to the extent of sustaining a recovery where, as here, the injury was the immediate, if not the sole, result of the negligence of the party injured. The case of Esrey V. S. P. Co., 103 Cal. 544, 37 Pac. 500, is a fair illustration of the California cases on this question; but, in that case the injured party was not only in a place of danger to the knowledge of the brakeman, but unable to extricate herself at the time the signal was given to start the train. The strongest case cited by appellant is Lee v. Market St. Ry. Co., 135 Cal. 293, 67 Pac. 765. This, however, was a street car case, and, in the nature of things, there is a difference between that and a steam railway case. A street car is more readily brought to a standstill than a heavy train; besides, a street car must necessarily be frequently operated among great masses of people. The Supreme Court has recognized this distinction. Clark v. Bennett, 123 Cal. 278, 55 Pac. 908. Moreover, in the Lee Case it was shown that the car was going at a high and "unusual rate of speed and sounding no gong nor alarm bell"; and that the motorman's attention was called by a passenger to the dangerous position of plaintiff. For these reasons, the case is not analogous to the one before us. Unless we are to bold that contributory negligence is never a question of law, but 85, the case was one in which, after the always a question of fact for the jury, we danger became imminent, there was a physimust hold in this case, as a matter of law, cal impossibility for the plaintiff to escape, that the injury was shown to be the direct but the language of the court seems to accord and proximate result of the negligence of with the more liberal doctrine. The preponthe deceased, and that the trial court was derance of authority would, therefore, seem warranted in granting the nonsuit to have been in favor of the more liberal The judgment is affirmed. application of the doctrine, prior to the de cision in Green v. Los Angeles Terminal Ry. I concur: ALLEN, J. Co., but that case seems to be in conflict with this view, and upon its authority I feel SMITH, J. I concur in the judgment of constrained to concur in the conclusion of affirmance. It appears clearly from the evi- my associates. dence that if the defendant's engineer, at I do not, however, concur altogether in the the time he hallooed at the plaintiff, had put view that the doctrine of last opportunity on the brakes instead of hallooing, the acci- can apply only where there is "gross and dent would not have occurred. The evidence wanton negligence" on the part of the enwas also of such a character as would have gineer, or "a reckless disregard on his part" justified the jury in finding that, at this of the safety of the deceased. This propopoint of time, the plaintiff was unaware of sition is true only in a qualified sense. But the approach of the train, and that the en- the term "ordinary care” as applied to the gineer knew of this fact, and that plaintiff engineer on a train in an emergency, means was about to step in front of the engine. the ordinary care of competent men in that On this appeal, therefore, which is from a position, and cannot be regarded as anything judgment of nonsuit, these facts must be less than great care (Henderson v. Los Anassumed as established. The sole question geles Traction Co. [Cal. Sup.] 89 Pac. 976); in the case, then, is whether the engineer, and, as has been expressed in several cases, being aware of the inevitability of the ac- the failure to exercise such care by a defendcident unless he stopped the train, was guilty ant may be regarded as amounting “to a deof such negligence as to bring the case within gree of reckless conduct that may well be the doctrine that "the party who last has termed willful and wanton” (Esrey y. Southa clear opportunity of avoiding the accident, ern Pacific Co., 103 Cal. 514, 545, 37 Pac. notwithstanding the negligence of his oppo- 500; Everett v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 115 Cal. nent, is considered solely responsible. Esrey 114, 43 Pac. 207, 46 Pac. 889, 34 L. R. A. V. Southern Pacific Co., 103 Cal. 545, 37 Pac. 350). 500. The doctrine in question, as above and else (4 Cal. A. 12) where expressed, is susceptible of two in BRETT V. BERGER. terpretations: The one is that the doctrine (Court of Appeal, Third District. California will apply only to cases where the negligence June 23, 1906.) of the injured party is wholly antecedent 1. LANDLORD AND TENANT-DUTY TO REPAIR. to the negligence of the party causing the At common law the burden of making rem accident; and hence that, where the negli- | pairs was on the tenant; the landlord being un der no obligations so to do, unless by express gence of the injured party is continued up agreement to that effect. to the time of the accident, it will not apply [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 32, if there be a physical possibility for him to Cent. Dig. Landlord and Tenant, $ 536.] escape. The other is that it will apply even 2. SAME — CONTRACT TO REPAIR CONSTRUCto cases where the negligence of the injured TION. party continues up to the time of the accident, Where a lease provided that, in the event of if it be known to the other party that he is any repairs being necessary, to the fences or buildings on the premises, the landlord should unaware of his danger and that the accident furnish all material necessary thereto, together will inevitably occur. The former doctrine with one man's labor, at his own cost and exis asserted in the following, and some other pense, and that the tenant should furnish all the additional labor necessary thereto at his Holmes v. South Pac. C. Ry. Co., 97 own cost and expense, the landlord was only reCal. 161, 31 Pac. 834; Everett v. Los Angeles quired to furnish materials for repairs and one Ry. Co., 115 Cal. 119, 43 Pac. 207, 46 Pac. man's labor when called on by the tenant to do so. 889, 34 L. R. A. 350; Green v. Los Angeles [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 32, Terminal Ry. Co., 143 Cal. 31, 76 Pac. 719, Cent. Dig. Landlord and Tenant, & 548.] 101 Am. St. Rep. 68. The latter is expressed 3. DAMAGES-CONTRACT–BREACH. in the opinion of the dissenting judges in Where a landlord agreed to furnish maEverett v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 115 Cal. 111, terials and one man's labor necessary for sub43 Pac. 207, 46 Pac. 889, 34 L. R. A. 350, sequent repairs on fences and buildings, the lessee could not stand by and see his crops deand in Herbert v. Southern Pacific Co., 121 stroyed by his own stock after the landlord had Cal. 232, 53 Pac. 651, and Lee v. Market St. refused to furnish material and labor on demand Ry. Co., 135 Cal. 293, 67 Pac. 765. In Esrey and seek compensation for the ensuing damage, v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, as in Harring but was bound to make the repairs and sue the landlord for the outlay in money. ton V. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 140 Cal. 514, [Ed. Note.For cases in point, see vol. 32, 74 Pac. 15, 63 L. R. A. 238, 98 Am. St. Rep. Cent. Dig. Landlord and Tenant, $ 649.) Appeal from Superior Court, Lake County; | tion to protect his said crops and control his M. S. Sayre, Judge. stock"; whether plaintiff made any effort to Action by T. I. Brett against L. P. Berger. obtain material by purchase or otherwise with From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff ap- which to make the repairs or that he was peals. Affirmed. financially unable to provide the necessary money, does not appear. It did appear, howBond & Haycock, for appellant. H. V. ever, that there were more than six miles of Kreling and Crawford & Crawford, for re fencing on the place which latter was divided spondent. into several fields and that much of the fence needed "extensive repairs to make it sufficient CHIPMAN, P. J. Defendant had judgment to control his stock and to protect his said on motion for nonsuit at the close of plain-crops, and that the necessary repairs would tiff's evidence. Plaintiff appeals from the have cost a large sum of money.” It also apjudgment on bill of exceptions. peared that defendant had a 40-acre vineyard, Plaintiff and defendant entered into a writ- reserved in the lease, and that defendant kept ten lease whereby defendant let to plaintiff the fence around it in repair; plaintiff also the premises called the "Mt. Carlo Ranche" testified that "he inspected the fences on said for the term of five years commencing October premises at the time he entered into the lease, 15, 1901, reserving to defendant the use of and that said fences and other improvements certain land and buildings thereon. The lease were in a poor state of repair at that time, was for a cash rental of $350, payable in as poor, in fact, as they have been at any equal semiannual installments. Among other time since.” provisions of the lease was the following: "It The motion for nonsuit was on the grounds: is also understood and agreed between the (1) That the complaint fails to state a cause aforesaid parties that in the event of any re- of action. (2) That under the covenant sued pairs being necessary to the fences or build- upon, defendant is under no obligation to ings on said premises and herein leased, that make any repairs and that the measure of the party of the first part shall furnish all damages, if any, is the reasonable value of material necessary thereto, together with one the services of a man, and the cost of the maman at his own cost and expense, and that terial necessary for making repairs, and that said party of the second part shall furnish no such damage has been alleged or proved; all the labor necessary thereto at his own that under the terms of the lease, or the said cost and expense.” The action is for al- covenant, plaintiff is not entitled to recover leged damage to plaintiff's crops during three anything for the value of the crops destroyed different years of the term; namely, to his or by reason of defendant's failure to make growing crops during the summer of 1902 by repairs to any improvements on the premreason of plaintiff's hogs breaking through ises. Appellant concedes that the complaint the fences by which they were inclosed; by does not state facts sufficient to constitute a certain hay stored in the barns on the prem cause of action if it be true, as held by the ises during the winter of 1902–1903 being in- lower court, that plaintiff's only remedy, on jured by rain beating through the alleged the breach of the alleged covenant, was to leaky roofs; by similar damage from plain- procure the material and labor necessary to tiff's hogs destroying his crops in 1904; by make the needed repairs, make them himself, loss of time in pursuing his cattle and hogs and to recover the cost of the material and labecause of their escaping from their inclo- bor of one man; for, as is admitted, the comsures through the dilapidated fences. Dam- plaint nowhere alleges and the proof fails ages are claimed solely "by reason of de- to show that plaintiff made any repairs, or fendant's breach of said covenant (above set furnished any material or labor for making forth) committed by the defendant in not fur- them. We are thus brought to consider what nishing material necessary to repair said seems to us the sole inquiry in the case barn and fences and in not furnishing a man namely: (1) Was defendant under any oblitherefor, as aforesaid.” It is alleged in the gation to do more than furnish the material complaint and was proved that plaintiff fre- and the labor of one man; and (2) failing to quently informed defendant of the condition do this was he liable for the damage to the of the fences and roof of the barn and called crops as the pleadings stand? upon him to furnish the material required for Appellant's contention is: (1) That the covnecessary repairs and the labor of one man to enant in question "is a covenant on the part make needed repairs, but defendant neglected of the landlord to repair"; and hence the tenand refused to do so. There is no allegation ant may make the repairs and recover the and no proof that plaintiff demanded of de- cost from the landlord; or, he may leave fendant that he make the repairs or do more the premises unrepaired, and recover any than to furnish the material and the labor of damage he may have sustained from the landone man therefor. Plaintiff testified that he lord's fault therein. Respondent's contention "did all he could to repair said fences, and is: That the lessor is not compelled to make used such material as he could find on the repairs unless there is some express agreeplace in repairing them, and also used his ment thereto, and that in the present case own material therefor, but that he did not the obligation of the lessor, as to repairs, is have sucicient material to put them in condi- limited solely to the furnishing of the neces |
