tent; but as to women, and minors under the age of eighteen, I do not hesitate to recommend that the law requiring the punishment of death be amended, so that, upon conviction of murder in the first degree, such persons shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.

THE STATUTES REGULATING THE HOURS OF LABOR OF WOMEN AND MINORS.

It was recently reported to me that, in consequence of being employed by day in one mill and in the evening in another mill, women and perhaps minors were being in fact employed in all more than fifty-eight hours in one week. This being a clear violation of the spirit of the statutes relating to the employment of such persons, I took active measures to prevent its continuance. The subject, however, is one of some difficulty, and the recent practice of textile factories to run their mills in the evening, and the failure of the laws as they stand adequately to deal with such a practice, make it, in my judgment, my duty to call the matter to the attention of the Legislature.

The clear intent of the law is to limit the hours of labor of women and children in manufacturing establishments. It was undoubtedly enacted in the belief that the welfare, not merely of such employees, but of the community, would not be promoted by allowing women and children to exhaust their energies and endanger their health by the long days of labor that formerly prevailed in the Commonwealth, and still prevail in some States. There is no statute relating to the hours of labor of men, and it is doubtful whether any such statute would be within the jurisdiction of the Legislature. It happens, however, that it is not profitable to run textile mills unless women are employed, so that the statute operates as a practical prohibition against the employment of any person, male or female, in such mills for more than fifty-eight hours a week; and in seasons of prosperity, like that which is now being enjoyed, there is more or less restiveness among manufacturers, and in some cases even among employees, on account of the strict provisions of the statute.

But, although the spirit of the law is the prevention of overwork by women and children, it does not seek to punish the employee, but only the employer. It only prohibits the latter from employing a woman or minor under the age of eighteen more than fifty-eight hours in any one week. It is scarcely necessary to say that under this law no employer can be held to know whether a person employed by him has been employed elsewhere, so long as he himself does not exceed the statutory limit; and that he cannot be prosecuted merely because the woman employed by him in fact works (including work elsewhere) more than fifty-eight hours during the week.

I felt constrained so to advise the officers in charge of such matters. But, as the statute requires in strict terms the posting in each room of a printed notice stating the hours of labor required of women (and minors) employed in that room, and as the running of the mills in the evening necessitates the posting of two notices, each stating the number of hours of labor required of women in the room in which they were posted, and as the two notices together require much more than fifty-eight hours of labor, and as, further, the object of the notice is to make it easy for the officers to prosecute for violations of the law, it is a serious question in my mind whether the law contemplates or permits two such notices, and whether the employer may not be prosecuted for employing women at all under such double notices. I accordingly advised the officers to make complaints therefor in any case where they found women were being employed evenings who worked there or elsewhere during the day. I did not advise complaints against all mills running during the evening; for it has long been the practice for manufacturers in various cities of the Commonwealth to run their mills evenings, employing women who have not worked during the day, and, so far as I know, without objection or criticism.

I believe the actual employment of the same women day and evening has ceased. But the law as it stands does not adequately deal with the case of mills running at night, for, assuming that they may lawfully so run, and may employ women, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the officers to

know whether the women so employed evenings are being employed in the day time. I recommend that suitable legislation be enacted to make clear the meaning of the law, and to remove the difficulties I have suggested.

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS BEFORE THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.

Among the cases conducted by this office before the Supreme Judicial Court, two involved the constitutionality of acts of the General Court. One concerned the habitual criminal act (St. 1887, c. 435); the other the land registration act, commonly called the Torrens act (St. 1898, c. 562). The constitutionality of both was upheld, Lathrop and Loring, JJ., dissenting in the latter case. Attempts have been made both in Ohio and Illinois to enact a land registration law which should be effectual in its provisions. The law enacted by the Legislature of Ohio was declared unconstitutional. The first statute in Illinois was also held unconstitutional, and the second statute drawn in consequence of the decision of the court contains no provisions like those contained in the Massachusetts statute making titles good against all the world. It is not improbable that the Massachusetts statute will be the basis of similar legislation throughout the United States.

The opinion of the chief justice points out some particulars in which the statute may be wisely amended. I propose hereafter to submit a bill tending in that direction.

The statute regulating the height of buildings upon Copley Square (St. 1898, c. 452) was also declared constitutional. This case was conducted by counsel for the relators.

REVISION OF THE STATUTES.

Res. 1896, c. 87, provided for the appointment of a commission to revise, consolidate and arrange the Public Statutes. The commissioners so appointed have prosecuted their labors with diligence and fidelity. The work of incorporating the legislation since the Public Statutes is being supplemented, as required under the provisions of the resolve authorizing the commission, by the substitution of

lucid and terse expressions for redundant and ambiguous language, by curing defects, by reconciling inharmonious provisions and by eliminating obsolete laws. This often requires minute and prolonged investigation, not only in the books but also in conference with the administrative officers. About three-quarters of the work is substantially completed, and I am informed that the commission will be able to present its full report to the Legislature of 1901. The report will thus cover a period of twenty years, the same as in the Public Statutes, and will have taken about the same time as was taken by the commissioners on the revision in 1836 and 1860, who were appointed respectively in 1832 and 1855.

The labor of the present commission covers a much larger and more intricate mass of material than any former revision. The laws embodied in the revision of 1836 were all contained, as I am informed, in volumes of 1,800 pages; in that of 1882 in volumes of 2,820 pages; while the legislation since the Public Statutes covers 6,017 pages, 3,526 of which are included in the supplements and 2,481 in the Blue Books of 1896-99 inclusive.

COLLATERAL INHERITANCE TAX.

The Supreme Judicial Court has rendered a number of decisions concerning the taxability under the collateral inheritance tax law (St. 1891, c. 425) of the property in other jurisdictions of resident decedents and of the property in Massachusetts of non-resident decedents, and the law upon these matters may now be said to be fairly well settled. It has been decided that the personal property of a resident decedent, which was in fact without the Commonwealth at the time of the death, was nevertheless liable to the collateral inheritance tax. Frothingham v. Shaw, 174 Mass., December, 1899. It has been further held that real and personal estate of a non-resident decedent which was in this Commonwealth at the date of his death is taxable. Callahan v. Woodbridge, 171 Mass. 595. Also that shares of stock in corporations organized under the laws of Massachusetts, shares of stock in national banks located in Massachusetts, and shares of stock in railroad corporations incorporated

under the laws of Massachusetts and also under the laws of other States, owned by non-resident decedents, are taxable in this Commonwealth, whether the certificates of such stock are in this State or elsewhere at the date of the death of the decedent. Greves v. Shaw, 173 Mass. 205; Moody v. Shaw, 173 Mass. 375.

It sometimes happens, however, that shares in Massachusetts corporations owned by non-resident decedents at the time of their death are transferred by foreign executors or administrators without payment of the tax to which such shares are liable. By the New York St. of 1896, c. 908, § 228, it is provided that, if a foreign executor, administrator or trustee shall transfer stock of his decedent, which is liable to a collateral inheritance tax, the tax shall be paid to the Treasurer on such transfer; and that no safe deposit, bank, nor any person, holding securities or assets of a decedent, shall deliver the same to such executor or administrator unless notice of the time and place of such intended transfer be served upon the Treasurer five days prior to such transfer; and that the Treasurer may personally or by representative examine such securities or assets at the time of such delivery; and that failure to serve such notice or to allow such examination shall render the corporation or person so negligent liable to the payment of the tax due upon such securities or assets.

I recommend that similar legislation be enacted as to persons and corporations within this Commonwealth.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS.

St. 1899, c. 479, is an act to revise the laws relative to the distribution of the estates of deceased persons. It is not a mere codification of existing laws upon the subject, but introduces some provisions radically new. The act does not take effect until April of this year.

It can scarcely be said that the act is so clearly drawn as to be easily understood by the ordinary man; or that it fully accomplishes its professed purpose of equalizing the rights of husbands and wives in the descent and distribution of property real and personal. The statute was enacted on the