days, for purposes of identification, and that, after having been used for the promotion of anatomical science," the remains shall be decently buried." This requirement, which is one of the conditions of the bond to be given, prohibits the return of the body.

I enclose a form of bond which I have had printed for use of institutions included in the provisions of the act. It is not for this office to fix the amount of the bond, but I see no reason why a penalty of one hundred dollars for each body which, I understand, has been the usual sum in such cases, is not sufficient.

The authority of a person duly appointed by an insurance company, and licensed by the insurance department of the Commonwealth, as an insurance agent, is ordinarily personal in its nature, and cannot be transmitted to another.

The question whether the authorized agent of an insurance company can delegate to another the power of countersigning a policy, is one which does not concern the insurance department of the Commonwealth.

Hon. FREDERICK L. CUTTING, Insurance Commissioner.

JAN. 10, 1899.

DEAR SIR: Your letter of Dec. 16, 1898, requests the opinion of the Attorney-General upon the following question: "Can the authority of a person duly appointed by an insurance company, and licensed by this department as an insurance agent, be delegated to another by power of attorney?"

It is impossible to answer your question generally. I can conceive of cases where the agent might act by attorney, clerk or subagent. Ordinarily, however, such an appointment is personal in its nature, and cannot be transmitted to another.

The specific question in your letter, intended to illustrate your general question, to wit, whether an authorized agent can delegate to another the power of countersigning a policy, is one that does not concern your office. Whether the policy is duly issued is a question for the parties, not for you.

Yours very truly,

HOSEA M. KNOWLTON, Attorney-General.

County Accounts - Law Library Association - Title to Money from County Treasury.

The Norfolk Bar Association was organized in January, 1898, and was entitled to receive the full amount appropriated under Pub. Sts., c. 40, § 6, as amended by St. 1882, c. 246, on the first day of January, 1899, although its by-laws were not approved by the Superior Court until November, 1898.

JAN. 10, 1899.

CHARLES R. PRESCOTT, Esq., Controller of County Accounts.

DEAR SIR: - Pub. Sts., c. 40, § 6, provides that "County treasurers shall annually pay to the Law Library Associations in their respective counties all sums paid into the county treasuries during the year by the clerks of the courts, to an amount not exceeding fifteen hundred dollars in any year." St. 1882, c. 246, made the amount two thousand dollars, instead of fifteen hundred dollars. I am informed that this statute is so construed as to make the amount so appropriated payable on the first day of January.

The Norfolk Bar Association was organized in January, 1898, but its by-laws were not approved by the Superior Court until November. It was, however, in existence, and entitled to the provisions of law made for its benefit, in January, 1899, and is entitled to the amount appropriated under the section quoted.

The fact that it has not been in existence during the entire year is not, in my judgment, of consequence; nor the fact that the county commissioners have, under appropriations therefor, purchased books during the year for the law library. The full amount provided by the statutes is nevertheless payable to the association. Yours very truly,

HOSEA M. KNOWLTON, Attorney-General.

A woman who acquired a settlement by marriage in one town, could not acquire one on her own account, under St. 1879, c. 242, § 2, in another, so that she could become a charge upon the second town, after her husband's settlement and her own, acquired by marriage, in the first town were destroyed by St. 1898, c. 425, § 2.

JAN. 10, 1899.

STEPHEN C. WRIGHTINGTON, Esq., Superintendent, State Adult Poor. DEAR SIR: The case stated in your letters of Oct. 1, 1898, and Jan. 9, 1899, is this: A man, born in Massachusetts, had a settlement in Leominster, acquired prior to 1860. This settlement was lost by the provisions of St. 1898, c. 425, § 2. His wife had acquired settlement in the same place by her marriage.

Her settlement also was lost by the same statute. From 1874 to 1882, while married, she resided in Athol, without receiving aid.

The question submitted by your letters is, whether, assuming that her marriage settlement was lost by St. 1898, c. 425, § 2, her residence in Athol gives her a settlement under St. 1879, c. 242, § 2.

St. 1878, c. 190, § 1, cl. 6, re-enacting St. 1874, c. 274, § 2, provides that "Any woman of the age of twenty-one years, who resides in any place within this State for five years together, without receiving relief as a pauper, shall thereby gain a settlement in such place." It was held in Somerville v. Boston, 120 Mass. 574, that this provision applied only to unmarried women. By St. 1879, c. 242, § 2, it was further provided that the clause quoted should be held to apply to married women who have not a settlement derived by marriage.

An examination of these statutes makes it evident that a married woman, having a settlement derived by marriage, could acquire no settlement under the clause quoted. As to such, the

statute never existed.

St. 1898, c. 425, § 2, declares that all settlements acquired prior to 1860 are defeated, "provided that, whenever a settlement acquired by marriage has been thus defeated, the former settlement of the wife shall be thereby revived." This provision, however, does not revive a settlement which never existed. As above stated, the residence of the married woman in Athol did not give her any rights to a settlement: and consequently, no settlement in Athol was ever acquired by her.

The case is different from that stated in Fitchburg v. Ashby, 132 Mass. 495, which dealt with a statute retroactive only in so far as it permitted rights under the statute to be acquired prior to the enactment of the statute.

Yours very truly,

HOSEA M. KNOWLTON, Attorney-General.

Militia

Commissioned Officer - Provisional Militia.

An officer holding a commission in the active militia, who did not enter the service of the United States, in the Spanish War, but accepted an office in the provisional militia, authorized by St. 1898, c. 428, vacated his office in the active militia by accepting the office in the provisional. JAN. 10, 1899.

Maj.-Gen. SAMUEL DALTON, Adjutant-General.

DEAR SIR: Your letter of Nov. 18, 1898, requires the opinion of the Attorney-General upon the following question, to wit:

“Does an officer of the militia, holding a commission in the active militia, who does not enter the service of the United States, and who accepts a commission in the provisional militia, authorized under the provisions of chapter 428, Acts of 1898, vacate his former commission on accepting the latter?"

The provisional companies, battalions and regiments, authorized by St 1898, c. 428, § 6, are, in my opinion, subject to the provisions of the general militia law, St. 1893, c. 367 excepting as otherwise specially provided.

Section 50 of the general militia law provides that, "When an officer holding a military commission is elected or appointed to another office in the militia, and accepts the same, such acceptance shall vacate the office previously held."

This section answers your inquiry. An officer who accepts an election to office in the militia vacates his former commission, whether the new commission be in the active or in the provisional militia.

The right of the Commonwealth under the four-part agreement, to build Northern Avenue bridge and to extend Northern Avenue, is not impaired by St. 1880, c. 260, or by the deed made under authority of that statute.

JAN. 11, 1899.

Hon. WOODWARD EMERY, Chairman, Harbor and Land Commissioners.

DEAR SIR: I have your letter of Nov. 30, 1898, submitting certain inquiries relating to St. 1880, c. 260. The statute authorized the New York & New England Railroad Company to purchase the twenty-five-acre lot, so called, on the Commonwealth's flats at South Boston," subject to the right of the city of Boston to lay out Northern Avenue over said parcel as provided in an indenture of four parts between the Commonwealth, the Boston & Albany Railroad Company, the Boston Wharf Company and the city of Boston, dated the twenty-fourth day of June, eighteen hundred and seventythree," for the sum of one million dollars. The statute further provides that upon the payment of two hundred thousand dollars thereof," said New York & New England Railroad Company shall have all the rights of the Commonwealth under said indenture to build Northern Avenue bridge and extend Northern Avenue to some existing street on the northwesterly side of Fort Point Channel, for and on account of said city, and to reimbursement

therefor from said city, as provided in said indenture." The statute further provides : "Said railroad company shall also have authority to build, at its own cost, Northern Avenue Bridge, in anticipation of action by the said city, subject, however, to all rights of said city under said indenture."

The question submitted in your letter, in substance, is whether, under this statute and the deed given by authority thereof, the Commonwealth has parted with its rights as to the building of the Northern Avenue bridge under said indenture.

The Commonwealth, at the time of the execution of the fourpart agreement was the owner of a large tract of land situated easterly of Fort Point Channel, of which the twenty-five-acre lot referred to in the statute of 1880 was a small portion. Under the terms of the indenture, the city of Boston, in consideration of certain obligations entered into by the Commonwealth and the other parties thereto, covenanted and agreed, upon certain conditions stated therein, to build, within twelve months after the request of the Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners, approved by the Governor and Council, a bridge for public travel over Fort Point Channel, in extension of Northern Avenue. The indenture also provided for the laying out of Northern Avenue over the land of the Commonwealth and of the Boston & Albany Railroad Company, which corporation was the owner of land deeded to it by the Commonwealth.

The indenture further provided that, in case the city of Boston should fail to build Northern Avenue bridge and extend the avenue, the Commonwealth might build the bridge and extend the avenue; and in such case the city of Boston should pay to the Commonwealth the cost thereof, not exceeding a specific sum.

The building of the bridge and the extension of the avenue were necessary to the proper development of the land of the Commonwealth, not merely of the twenty-five-acre lot which was adjacent to the channel, but of all the other land lying to the eastward; and the plain purpose of the indenture was to secure the performance of the work, at the option of the Commonwealth, either by the city of Boston, or, by the Commonwealth, at its expense.

St. 1880, c. 260, § 1, par. 1, provides, in terms, it is true, that the railroad company "shall have all the rights of the Commonwealth under said indenture to build Northern Avenue bridge and extend Northern Avenue;" but, in view of the circumstances, which must have been known to the Legislature when the statute was enacted, I do not think that it was the intention of the Legislature to give up the rights of the Commonwealth, but rather to admit the New York & New England Railroad Company, it being the grantee of a portion of the tract to be benefited, to an equal right in the