LAW AND LAWYERS-C on tinued.

The necrology of the bench and bar for 1878, 20. Per-onalities in arguments before Supreme Court con. demned by C. J. Ryan 40.

The block in the Missouri Supreme Court; Governor Phelps' message, 60.

Judge Blodgett's case, 160, 200.

Was Shakespeare a good lawyer? 238,

The disbarment of F. J. Bowman, 268.

Judge Treat's visit to Europe, 348.

The resignation of Judge Dillon; interview with Mr. Justice Miller as to, 448; address of the Kansas bar, 508. Judge Treat in England, 488.

Where statute once commences to run, fraudulent concealment does not operate to interrupt the bar from be coming complete by lapse of time limited for the commencement of ction, 57.

Where agent living in one State collects money for principal living in another, and fails to pay over, statute does not commence to run until demand made, 78 What is sufficient promise to revive barred debt, 121. Delay not assented to by the surety in writing, does not prevent statute from running in his favor. Provision that the statute of limitation shall not apply "to any delay assented to by the surety in writing," is equivalent to declaring that it shall apply to any delay not so assente i to, 156.

An action is not "obstructed or hindered" within the meaning of the statute, by a verbal promise to pay the debt at a future date, 156.

The words "or otherwise obstruct or hinder his being sued," as used in the statute, import such acts as would hinder and prevent the creditor from bringing suit, notwithstanding he desired to do so, 156.

Statutes of limitation of a State can not bind the United States, 181.

When time commences to rnn on implied contract, 235. Statutes of Limitation as Applicable to Patent Rights. Leading Article, 491.

Statute of March 16, 1869, requiring actions for the enforcement of rights of individuals under acts of incor. poration or by operation of law, which accrued prior to June 1, 1865, to be brought before the 1st of January, 1870, does not affect claims against estates when the State law gives a certain time for administrators to ascertain the condition of the estate and creditors to file their claims. Mills v. Scott, 392.

LIMITATION-Continued.

Moneys collected by a collecting agent, and not paid over, do not constitute a trust fund such as prevents the running of the statute of limitations, 427.

In suits against stockholders in National Banks, 444.
In patent suits, 445.

May successive disabilities-such as infancy and the suspension of the statute by war-be taken advantage of to avoid the statute of limitations. Query, 240; answers, 288,308.

LIQUOR LAWS.

[See also "CIVIL DAMAGE” LAWS.]

Indictment for selling liquor to inebriate must allege that defendant knew that the party to whom he sold was an inebriate, 118.

Necessary averments in indictments for selling liquor without license, 118.

Construction of statute against selling liquor to one in

the "habit of getting intoxicated," 196.

Or in "place of public resort," 216.

Evidence of intoxication, 235.

Unlawful sale of liquor legalized by subsequently obtaintaining license covering day of such sale, 406.

LUNATIC.

[See INSANITY.]

LOTTERIES.

Scheme for the sale of a tract of land, in lots of unequal value, to be distributed among the purchasers by chance, by means of tickets or numbers bought at a fixed price greatly exceeding that of a majority of the lots, held to be within the law prohibiting lotteries. although according to the scheme there were no blanks, 371.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

[See also FALSE IMPRISONMENT.]

Malicious institution of bankruptcy proceedings ground for action, when, 134.

Failure of suit not evidence of want of probable cause,

134.

Action for malicious prosecution of civil suit will not lie unless defendant has been arrested, 204.

Advice of justice of the peace not being a person admitted to practice no justification, 286.

"A person cannot lawfully invoke the aid of the criminal process of the land to have decided a question of property or other civil right"" This instruction in an action for malicious prosecution held, corr ct, 347.

MANDAMUS.

The peremptory writ of mandar us will not, except under special circumstances. command a levy of taxes to pay a judgment against a municipal corporation, at any other than the time of its next annual tax levy. Wisdom v. City of Memphis, 109.

Mandamus is substantially a civil remedy only; and the consequences of a failure to make return to the alternative writ are similar to those following a failure to plead to a declaration at law. Such default can not enlarge the legal rights of the relator in the premises. Moore v. City of Memphis, 109.

Will not lie to compel mere voluntary associations to re store to membership persons who have been suspended from the privileges of such organizations, 264. Against county officers, 323.

When court can not grant, to compel payment of municipal bonds, 344.

Proper remedy for collection of indebtedness of school board, 426.

Stockholder ejected from corporation without notice will be restored by, 471.

Will be granted against the executive or administrative officers of the State, to allow inspection of the records in which the applicant has an interest, 495.

MANSLAUGHTER,

[See HOMICIDE.]

MARINE INSURANCE.
[See INSURANCE LAW.]
MARRIAGE.

[See also HUSBAND AND WIFE; DIVORCE.]

A marriage valid where made is valid everywhere, 370. Action for breach of promise of, always maintainable in America, 371.

In action for breach of promise of, bad character of plaintiff may be shown in mitigation of d mages, 427. In an action by woman for breach of contract of marriage, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to aver that she requested the defendant to marry her, a promise to marry on a particular day being alleged, 465.

MARRIAGE-Continued.

Evidence of preparations for performing the contract, made by the plaintiff in the absence of the defendant, and not in any way connected with him, inadmissible to prove the plaintiff's assent to a mutual promise of marriage, 465.

MARRIED WOMEN.

[See HUSBAND AND WIFE.] MASTER AND SERVANT.

[See also NEGLIGENCE.]

A, a salesman, contracted with B, a clothing merchant, to work for him for a term of three years, at a stated salary. Shortly after A entered upon his work, he was arrested and imprisoned for two weeks; Held, that this was an abandonment of the contract by A, which precluded him from recovering damages for B's refusal to take him back after his release. Leopold v. Salkey, 372. MAXIMS.

Omnia præsumuntur rite esse acta, 1

Nullus tempus occurrit regi, 181.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

[See DAMAGES.]

MECHANICS' LIEN.

Repairs on boilers situated in cotton mill give a, 177.
Can not be acquired on public building, 198.

Materials furnished for curbing, grading and paving streets in front of lot, 235.

Effect of conveyance of premises, 324.

Necessity of alleging, in petition, when work was to be performed and payment made, 446.

MEMBER OF CONGRESS.

See OFFICES AND OFFICERS.]

MINES AND MINERALS.

Location of mining claims, 445.

MISNOMER.

[See PLEADING AND PRACTICE.] MISTAKE.

Where land intended to be conveyed to wife is conveyed to husband, equity will relieve, 80.

Proof of mistake in a written contract must be clearly established, 283.

Money paid under mistake of law may be recovered back, 347.

When a mistake is made as to the interest intended to be conveyed, equity will relieve, 447,

MORTGAGE.

[See also RECEIVERS; REGISTRATION.]

Of Personalty.

Mortgages of chattels, mortgagor remaining in possession, 159, 346.

Mortgage of personalty invalid against subsequent mortg agee where goods remain in po-session of mortgagor, unless proved or acknowledged, 177.

Construction of proviso allowing mortgagee to take possession and sell, 236.

A mortgage upon a stated quantity of mixed logs in the drive is void for uncertainty as against third parties who have acquired rights, if it does not furnish the data for separating the mortgaged logs from the mass, Richardson v. Alpena Lumber Co., 297.

Of Realty.

Where a bidder, at a public sale of real estate under a mortgage, transfers his bids to another and directs the deed to be made to such person, if there be no fraud in the transaction, and no loss to the mortgagee thereby, it can not be set up in action of ejectment against remote purchasers without any notice of the irregularity to defeat their title. Johnson v. Watson, 26. Deed with contract of defeasance constitutes a mortgage, 39.

In a foreclosure suit, in which plaintiff seeks to hold a vendee upon a clause in the deed in which vendee has assumed to pay a mortgage debt, the action is upon the contract of assumption and not upon the note. Any defense may be given by defendant, though the note be negotiable, and plaintiff an innocent holder. Mansur v. Bartholomew, 72.

A person who takes a mortgage to secure a pre-existing debt, the time of payment not being extended, or noth ing of value being parted with, is not a "purchaser for a valuable consideration"; but otherwise if the time of payment is extended in consideration of obtaining the mortgage. Gilchrist v. Gough, 166.

Strict foreclosure of mortgage allowed in Illinois, only in extraordinary cases, 217.

MORTGAGE-Continued.

A mortgagee of certain property transferred the mortg. age and certain notes which it was given to secure for a valuable consideration to C, and afterwards entered satisfaction of the mortgage upon the proper record. On the same day, but after the entry of the satisfaction, the mortgagor conveyed the property covered by the mortgage to A for a valuable consideration, A at the time he received the conveyance having no knowledge that C held the mortgage and notes, nor that the mortg agee had no authority to enter the satisfaction on the record. Held, that the rights of C were not lost by the unauthorized act of the mortgagee and the conveyance of the mortgagor. Catherwood v Burrows, 342.

A holder of a note secured by a deed of trust, and having knowledge of it, is bound by the terms of the deed of trust. The note and deed of trust are to be read together as one instrument. Noell v. Graves, 353. W made and delivered to G two promissory notes, the one in question payable three years after date, upon which was the following indorsement: "This note is secured by a deed of trust, stamped according to law.” The deed of trust provided that the non-payment of interest on the notes should have the effect of making the notes due and payable. The notes were transferred by indorsement to N, who afterwards, on account of default in the payment of interest declared them due and payable, and sold the land thereunder. Subse quently, the note in question became due, and was then duly protested, in order to charge the indorser: Held, that as by the terms of the deed of trust, the note became due on default in payment of the interest, demand on the maker and notice to the indorser should have been made at that time, and this not having been done the indorser was discharged. Ibid.

A mere covenant by the purchaser of a mortgaged estate to indemnify his vendor, does not make it his personal debt, 367.

The words in a conveyance, "under and subject to a mortgage," do not import an assumption by the purchaser of the debt, unless there exist special circumstances to raise a covenant to that effect, 367.

Personal liability of a vendee of land" under and subject to" a mortgage, 406.

A mortgagee to whom a perpetual policy of insurance has reen assigned as collateral is entitled to the return premium upon a foreclosure of the mortgage and sale of the mortgaged premises for an amount insufficient to satisfy the debt, 425.

Power of sale in mortgage may be exercised by adminis trator of mortgagee. 463.

The effect of a stipulation in a mortgage as to collection fees, 489.

May a mortgagor by tax title and quit claim defeat claim of mortgagee. Query, 488; answer, 508.

MORTGAGE SALES.

[See MORTGAGE.]

MUNICIPAL BONDS.

[See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [See also NEGLIGENCE.]

Distinction between powers of a municipal corporation, which are governmental or political in their nature, and those which are to be exercised for the management of property, 17.

Defense to suit brought by contractor, that fund provided by legislative authority has already been expended, 17. Whether a municipal corporation possesses the power to borrow money, and issue negotiable securities theretor, depends upon a true construction of its charter and the legislation of the State applicable to it. Gause v. City of Clarksville, 358,

It has no incidental or inherent authority, under the usual grants of municipal power as a means of discharging its ordinary functions. Such authority may be inferred from special and extraordinary powers, which require the expenditure of unusual sums of money, when it is usual to execute such powers by means of borrowing, and when, upon the whole legislation applicable to the municipality, such appears to have been the legislative intent. Ibid.

These principles applied, and coupon bonds to borrow money to erect and repair wharves, and to open streets, issued under the general grants of municipal power in the charter: Held, not to be binding upon the city, while other bonds, issued under a special act of the legislature, in payment of stock in companies organized to construct macadamized roads from the city: Held, to be valid. Ibid

Where bonds of a city are issued without authority for money borrowed and actually received by the city, the remedy against the city is not by an action on the bond, but to recover the money. Ibid.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Continued.
Authority of city council can not be delegated, nor can
city abdicate control over public property held for
city purposes, 466.

The owner of a lot abutting on an unimproved street of a
city or village, in erecting buildings thereon, assumes
the risk of all damage which may result from the sub-
sequent grading and improvement of the street by the
municipal authorities, if made within the reasonable
exercise of their power. City of Akron v. Chamberlain
Co., 225.

The liability of a municipality for injury to buildings on
abutting lots exists only where such buildings were
erected with reference to a grade actually established,
either by ordinance or such improvement of the street
as fairly indicated that the grade was permanently fixed,
and the damage resulted from a change of such grade,
or where the buildings, if erected before a grade was so
established, were injured by the subsequent establish-
ment of an unreasonable grade. Ibid.
Whether a grade be unreasonable or not must be deter-
mined by the crcumstances existing at the time the
grade was established, and not by the circumstances
existing at the time abutting lots may have been im-
proved. Ibid.

Within the principle of municipal liability, as above
stated, is the case where a lot is improved in anticipa
tion of, and with reference to a reasonable future grade
which is afterwards established, and damage results
from a subsequent change in the grade. Ibid.
Right of, to use the public funds for the purpose of op-
posing inimical legislation, 329.

Have no power to expend public money in festivities to
visiting officials, 368.

Can not tax lands beyond corporate limits for corporate
purposes, 426.

Municipal corporations, in the absence of statute, have
no power to engage in commerce, or to make subscrip.
tions or donations to railroads, 427.

When court cannot grant mandamus to compel payment
of municipal bonds, 344.

Wrongful issue of municipal bonds by town officers, 422.
MURDER.

[See HOMICIDE.]

NAMES.

[See CRIMINAL LAW and PROCEDURE.]

NEGLIGENCE.

[See also EVIDENCE.]

Contributory Negligence.

In action against railroad for setting out fires, when con-
tributory negligence of owner a defense, 79.

Bank officers entrusting messenger with combination of
safe not, 96.

The law of contributory negligence as applicable to
children, 141.

In allowing cow to run at large near railroad track, 137.
A bar to action except when negligence of defendant was
willful, 238.

Rule that persons about to cross a railroad track must
stop, look and listen, and that the failure to do so is
negligence per se, not always applicable to persons leav-
ing a train, 307.

At what age infant's responsibility for negligence com-
mences, 307.

A person about to cross a street of a city in which there is
an ordinance against fast driving, has a right to pre-
sume, in the absence of knowledge to the contrary, that
others will respect and conform to such ordinance; and
it is not negligence on his part to act on the presump-
tion that he is not exposed to a danger which can only
arise through a disregard of the ordinance by other
persons. Baker v. Pendergrast, 334.

But where he knows that others are driving along the
street, at the place of crossing, at a forbidden rate of
speed, and he has full means of seeing the rate at which
they are driving, the existence of such ordinance will
not authorize a presumption which is negatived by the
evidence of his senses. Ibid.

Contributory negligence in driving wagon illustrated, 367.
Plaintiff, a man in full possession of his faculties, was in-
jured by a locomotive of defendant, whilst walking be-
tween the rails of defendant's track, in broad daylight,
with nothing to obstruct the view along defendant's
track for a quarter of a mile in the direction in which
the locomotive was coming: Held, that this was negli.
gence on plaintiff's part directly contributing to the in-
jury and precluding a recovery. O'Donnell v. Missouri
Pac. R. Co., 414.

Under the circumstances stated, the testimony of plaintiff
that he looked carefully for the engine at the proper
time and did not see it, is not evidence from which a
jury can draw a reasonable inference of proper care on
his part. Ibid.

NEGLIGENCE-Continued.

The doctrine of "comparative negligence" in Illinois,
427, 464.

One is not required to use "especial care" to guard
against the willful neglect of others, 427.
When the life of a fellow creature is in extreme danger,
the law does not realize that a person responding to his
calls for help should have acted with entire self-pos-
session, or that he should have taken the wisest and
most prudent course, with a view to his own self-pres-
ervation. that could have been taken. Linnehan v.
Sampson, 442.

In General.

Action against proprietor of mill for injuries caused by
escaping from fire therein; duty of owner to provide
means of extinguishing fire, and of escape, 1.

Damages recoverable from landlord who removes barrier
against danger from excavation, for injuries to infant
child of occupant of premises, 76.

Negligence in failing to record mortgage, 99.
Negligence in working coal mines, 98.
Negligence in drawing check, 137.
Defendants were owners of a public market, to which
plaintiff brought cattle for sale, and paid toll for so do-
ing. The defendants erected a spiked railing around a
statue in the market, which the jury found was of in-
sufficient height and dangerous to cattle. A cow of the
plaintiff was kille in attempting to leap the railing.
Held, that defendants were liable, 201.

Duty of tenants, occupiers and landlords of premises as
to travelers, 221.

Liability for damages caused by storing water on premi-
ses; effect of act of third person, 289.

Statutory obligation of riparian owner to maintain river
wall; common law liability; act of God, 385.

In an action to recover damages for injuries occasioned
to the plaintiff, by a bull belonging to the defendant,
and which, at the time of said injuries, was being led
through the streets of a city by the defendant's servant,
if the evidence shows that the injuries were caused by
propensities usual and ordinary in such animals as that
of the defendant, and also that in leading said animal,
the defendant's servant was negligent, in view of such
propensities, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, although
no specific evidence of any exhibitions of viciousness
or unruliness has been brought to knowledge of de-
fendant. Linnehan v. Sampson, 442.

Liability for damage resulting from use of gunpowder,
484.

Instructions on question of negligence in driving team
and causing collision, 486,

Liability of owner of leased premises for accident caused
by want of railing on walk, 503.

Liability of printer of newspaper for carelessness in
printing advertisement, 252,

Master and Servant.

Injury to employee through negligence of fellow servant.
O. & M. R. R. v. Collarn, 12.

The plaintiff was employed to tend machine in dye-house,
the gears of which were covered with boxing. A part
of the boxing was broken away rendering the liability
to be caught in the gearing very great. Plaintiff ap
plied to the defendant's agent to have it repaired, which
was refused, whereupon the plaintiff contrived a tem
porary protection of his own and continued in his work.
Held, that he could not recover for any injury from this
cause, 22,

Person not liable for negligence of contractor, 158.
Person voluntarily assisting servant of another cannot
recover against master for injury received thereby, 287.
Common employment; stevedore; independent employ.
ment of stevedore, 306.

English legislation as to injuries sustained by fellow ser
vants, 828.

Application of the rule as to employees to the case of a
consignee of goods injured while receiving them, 425.
In action for personal injury to employee, proof of due
case on part of employee essential, 427,

If the act of a servant be done in the execution of au-
thority given him by his master, and for the purpose of
performing what his master has directed, the master
will be responsible, whether the wrong done by the ser-
vant be occasioned by negligence, or by a wanton or
reckless purpose to accomplish the master's business
in an unlawful manner. Linnehan v. Sampson, 442.
Municipal Corporations.

Not liable for damages caused by defective plan of drain-
age, 287.

Not required to render its roads passable for traveling for
the entire width of their located limits. 287.

Not liable for damages sustained by traveler from the
fright of a horse at meeting cows in the road with
boards on their horns, and also from a defect in the
way, the combined action of both causes operating to
produce the accident, 287.

NEGLIGENCE-Continued.

Not liable for damages where act was done under legislative authority, 289.

Liability of, for damages caused by defective sewers, 355, 366.

Liability of city for the negligence of its fire department, 409, 469.

Notice to city of defect in sidewalk need not be actual when it is long continued, 426.

Charter exemptions from consequences of negligent acts of servants of, invalid, 486.

Liability of city for defect in premises adjoining highway, 503.

Proximate and Remote Cause.

Where defendant agreed to carry a number of horses to a certain point and failed to provide the necessary cars, in consequence of which the owner was forced to take them by the road whereby they were lamed and sold for less than they would otherwise have realized; but for some time previous the horses had been fed on soft food, and had they been in hard hunting condition they would not have been the worse of the journey. Held, that the injury to the horses was attributable to the defendants, and not to the condition in which the horses w.re; and that damages were not too remote. Waller v. M. G. R. Co., 29.

Railroad Companies; sce also Master and Servant.

A locomotive fireman is not as a matter of law incompetent to manage and run a locomotive engine, 12. The law presumes that a trespasser on a railroad track, when he discovers a train approaching, will, from a care of his personal safety, if not from a sense of duty, leave the track before an approaching train reaches him, and the managers of the train may act upon this presumption. Indianapolis, etc. R. Co. v. McClaren,

244.

Section 1289 of the Iowa code providing that railroad companies shall be liable for all damages by fires set out or caused by operating their roads, does not create an absolute liability regardless of the question of negligence, but makes the fact of causing the fire presumptive proof of negligence, and casts upon the company the burden of showing proper care. Small v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 276.

Street railway: what sufficient evidence of negligence to be submitted to jury, 306.

Duties of railroad companies as to carrying and landing passengers, 306.

The regulations of a railroad company that freight and passengers shall be carried on separate trains is a reasonable one; and a person who, in violation of such rules, intrudes himself upon a freight train and sustains injury, can not recover therefor, 347.

A railroad is not liable for an injury to a trespasser, 385. A railroad company using a track belonging to another person is liable for injuries to its employees resulting from the unfitness of the track for such use, 404. Requisites of an indictment for negligently running train, 405.

Right of railroad companies to eject passengers from cars because of non-observance of their regulations,

409.

While an employee of a railroad company may require the cars constructed by such company to be equipped with all practical appliances to insure the safety of those handling them, he is not entitled to demand the same degree of perfection in the cars of other companies which may be transported over the road in the ordinary course of its business, and the company is not liable for an injury which occurs by reason of the fact that the cars of other companies so transported are constructed differently from its own. If they are such as are in ordinary use upon other roads, it is the duty of the company to receive and transport them, and it can not be charged with negligence for so doing. Baldwin v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 497.

Weight of testimony of witnesses as to sounding of whistle at railroad crossing, 506.

NEGOTIABLE AND ASSIGNABLE PAPER.

[See also MORTGAGES.]

Promise by a supposed maker to pay a forged note not binding, when, 58.

Assignee of a note taken in part payment for land must use due diligence to collect it, in order to preserve his lien retained in his deed, as against the vendee who made the payment by the transfer or assignment of the note, 58.

When assignor of two notes, secured by a lien on land, has been released from liability on his assignment of one of the notes, by the laches of the assignee, the proceeds of the land in lien should be applied equally to the two notes, 58.

NEGOTIABLE AND ASSIGNABLE PAPER-Continued." Agreement to pay attorney's fee if note is "collected by suit" void, 75.

A note given to a railroad company to induce it to change the location of its road is not void as against public policy. First National Bank v. Hendrie, 165.

What is a "reasonable attorney's fee" in a note, 237. What constitutes and what are the liabilities of a guarantor of a note, 266.

Promissory note "payable after death," 284.

To an action by drawer against acceptor to recover the amount of the bill of exchange, the defendant pleaded that the consideration of the bill was tainted with illegality, inasmuch as a portion of that consideration was an agreement by the drawer not to institute criminal proceedings for an alleged forgery against B S, a relative of the acceptor. Held, that the defense could not be sustained, because the agreement not being one to stifle criminal proceedings already commenced, but to forbear from instituting criminal proceedings, that por tion of the consideration for the bill was nugatory but not illegal. Rourke v. Mealy, 319. Although there is a public interest that a prosecution already instituted, even without a probable cause, should be brought to a conclusion in due course of law. there is no such interest in a prosecution being commenced. ibid.

The giving of evidence by the plaintiff in a prosecution for forgery, instituted by other parties, would not be a breach of the defendant's agreement not to prosecute. Ibid.

Where place of payment in bond is in blank it is not a negotiable instrument, 402.

Note delivered to agent to obtain signatures, and instruction not carried out; bona fide holder entitled to recover, 462.

Promissory note given by stakeholder for stakes in his hands invalid except in hands of bona fide purchaser without notice, 465.

Bank not responsible for notes stolen after cashier had issued them and signature of president forged, 471. Removal of condition in promissory note a good defense to suit by holder unless maker negligent, 486. Where there are two indorsements in succession they are several, except in case of partnership, 485. Where indorser promises to pay note if allowed to run, omission of protest and notice will not discharge him, 485.

What are the rights of holders of coupon bonds of railroads. Query, 240; answer, 308.

Does a statute providing that bills ot exchange, drafts, etc., payable on Sunday, shall be payable on preceding day, apply to a post-dated check. Query, 367; answer, 488.

NEWSPAPER.

Liability of printer of newspaper for carelessness in printing advertisement, 25.

NEW TRIAL.

[See APPEALS AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE; PLEADING AND PRACTICE.]

NOTICE.

[See REGISTRATION.]

P was a member of a firm, and also a director of a bank He obtained at the bank the discount of a note belong. ing to the firm, which had been got of the banker by fraud. He had notice, as a member of the firm, of the fraud before the note was offered for discount, but did not communicate his knowledge to any of the officers of the bank. Held, that the knowledge of P was not constructive notice to the b ink, 181.

Of prior conveyance can not be inferred from fact that subsequent purchaser was a subscribing witness to the prior deed, 269.

Notice for Saturday, September 19, good for the Saturday meant, although the 19th is Sunday, 487.

Notice of eight days sufficient where no time specified by statute, 487,

NUISANCE.

A livery stable in the residence portion of a city is not, as a matter of law, necessarily to be considered as a nuis ance to the improved property adjoining or near it. Flint v. Russell, 67.

Where the facts stated in the bill showing that the erection and use of a livery stable would be a nuisance to the adjoining property were denied by the answer, a preliminary injunction to restrain the erection of a building, to be used as a livery stable, was refused. Ibid.

Owner of ground with whose consent adjacent proprietor occupies a portion of his premises on which to build a Joint wall, can not tear away such wall after a building has been erected thereon, upon the faith of his acquiescence in its location and construction, 98.

[See HIGHWAYS.]

OFFICES AND OFFICERS.

[See also JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.]

Liability of judicial officers for judicial acts, 25.

Civil liability of confederate military officers for official acts, 55.

Tax collector protected by his warrant in taking and selling property, notwithstanding illegality of the assessment, 97.

Certificate of clerk by deputy as effectual as if by clerk himself, 118.

Public agent, employing one on public works, not person. ally liable for his wages, 204.

Failure of officer to take oath does not exempt him from liability for official misconduct, 265.

Sheriff can not be amerced for failing to sell homestead on execution obtained on an old debt, 346. Litigation for an office closes with the office. If the term expires pending the litigation, no judgment can be rendered, 347.

A circuit court of the United States has jurisdiction of a suit brought against an officer of a State who is so using his official position as to invade the rights secured to the complainant by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Hancock v. Walsh, 393.

When a new county is formed a " vacancy "in its offices happens within the meaning of that word in the Constitution (Pa.), 425.

A sheriff, and at the same time ex officio tax collector is not personally liable for the payment of printer's bills for publishing delinquent tax list, 427.

A member of Congress is liable to service of civil pr cess during his attendance on the session of Congress, and in going to and returning, the exemption which his position gives him being only from arrest in private actions, 429.

The right to reopen and correct accounts of public officers, 449.

Abstract of settlement of county officers with collectors filed with the clerk of circuit court must be under seal of office, 484.

What constitutes a public office; distinction between officer and employee, 507.

Action against sheriff for failure to execute process, 506. OFFICIAL BONDS.

[See SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY.]

OPINION EVIDENCE.

[See EVIDENCE.]

OPTION CONTRACTS.

[See CONTRACTS.]

OUSTER.

[SEE CORPORATIONS.]

PARENT AND CHILD.

[See INFANCY.]

PARTIES.

[See PLEADING AND PRACTICE.]

PARTITION.

A partition will not be defeated merely because other persons may afterwards come in and be entitled to shares who are not now before the court. Reinders v. Koppelmann, 245.

Can partition be decreed of personal property. Query, 307; answer, 408.

PARTNERSHIP.

Final settlement of estate where one co-partner dies must be made under administration law in courts of probate, 18.

Circuit courts no jurisdiction in such cases uutil after final settlement has been made, 18.

PARTNERSHIP-Continued.

Joint and several liability of partners for partnership debts. Kendall v. Hamilton, 47.

The defendant was jointly interested in a contract made by the plaintiffs with the firm of W M & Co. The plaintiffs recovered judgment for breaches of that contract against members of the firm of W M & Co. other than defendant. W M & Co. subsequently became bankrupt, and the plaintiff's proved against their estate; but, afterwards, discovering that the defendant was jointly interested in the contract with W M & Co., brought an action on that con ract against the defendant. Held, that the action was not maintainable, as the cause of action against the defendant was merged in the judgments recovered against the other members of the firm of W M & Co. Ibid.

When one partner entitled to compensation for personal services rendered the firm, 77.

A and B being partners, A dies, The latter is individually insolvent. The firm, however, is solvent. The administrator of A's estate cites B to file an account as surviving partner in the probate court. B does so, and reports the payment of certain notes after A's death, given by A during the lifetime for his individual indebtedness, and for the payment of which B was surety, and he claims the right to set-off these payments and to retain a sufficient sum belonging to the estate to pay the balance. Held, that B has no right to set-off all he has paid, or may be compelled to pay, but that the estate of A being insolvent he can be placed upon an equality with the other creditors by setting of the same pro rata share of his claim that he would have received had it been proved and allowed in the probate court. Mack v. Woodruff, 129.

Right to use firm name passes with assignment of "good will and business," 161.

Rights of partners after dissolution of firm, 200.

Notes of firm fraudulently issued by one partner; liability of firm; bona fide holder, 324.

Rights of creditors in property; right to application of property to pay firm debt, 344.

Where one has induced another by false representations to enter into partnership with him, equity will relieve,

344.

Owners of trotting horse held not partners but tenants in common, 405.

PATENT LAW.

Effect of the extension of a patent on a previous assign. ment of the patent, 122.

Right of State to regulate sale of patented articles, 161. Patent Rights and State Rights. Articles by Wm. Ritchie, Esq,, 242, 270.

Measure of damages in action for infringement of patent, 269.

A suit between citizens of the same State can not be sustained in a circuit court of the United States as arising under the patent laws, where there is no denlal of the validity of the plaintiff's patent, where its use is admitted, and where a subsisting contract is shown governing the rights of the parties in the use of the invention, 384.

Relief in such an action is founded on the contract and
not on the patent laws of the United States. Ibid.
Jurisdiction of Federal courts in patent cases, 445.
Limitation of patent suits, 445.

Bill for profits after expiration of patent, 445.
Statutes of Limitation as Applicable to Patent Rights.
Leading article, 491.

PAYMENT.

Rule as to application of payments, 266.

P, for a consideration moving from K to him, assumed in a deed the payment of a debt due from K to B: Held, that the agreement enures to the benefit of B, and in a court of equity P is liable to him directly. The bring. ing of suit is a sufficient acceptance by B. Bissell v. Bugbee, 272.

Recovery of money voluntarily paid, 237, 305, 309. PETITION.

[See PLEADING and PRACTICE.]

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

[See also APPEALS AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE; CRIMINAL LAW and PROCEDURE.]