time, we are happy to admit, that in our country no such presumptuous speculations have attained any publicity, or been heralded forth to the world as philosophic discoveries. On the continent, however, the case has been lamentably different. Germany, during the last half century or more, has been prolific in wild and visionary systems of every kind: but in no kind more abundant than in speculations concerning religion. Hitherto, indeed, the writers of that nation have chiefly been known to us as laborious critics on the classics,-but latterly, an anxiety has begun to manifest itself amongst us for a more intimate acquaintance with the general literature of the country. Its language has been more studied; its poetry, its philosophy, and its divinity, have been more generally read. In this state of things, the noxious tendency of many works on the last subject, which have obtained a celebrity, and which have not unfrequently been inadvertently recommended in conjunction with others of high character and eminent utility, imperatively demands the notice of those, who are at once competent to the investigation of the subject, and are justly sensible of the duty imposed on every sound believer, of guarding inviolate the sacred deposit of the faith.

The author of the volume before us, seems to have been peculiarly impressed with the importance of pointing out the mischief arising from these sources to English students, and to have diligently availed himself of the opportunities afforded by a tour in Germany, for collecting information, and acquiring a knowledge of the works in which the obnoxious principles are inculcated. The result of his inquiries has been embodied in the form of discourses, delivered before the University of Cambridge: and, as the subject is one of considerable interest, a sketch of their contents will, we trust, be not unacceptable, while it may serve as an introduction to the perusal of the volume itself.

Mr. Rose commences with some good general observations on the prevalence, in the present age, of pretensions to exclusively rational views of religion. He observes the common propensity to ascribe to reason unlimited power;---a propensity, which leads to its undue elevation at the expense of faith: not only the moral right, but the full capacity of every individual to judge for himself, being assumed by those who adopt such license of discussion. Such pretensions are usually associated with the idea of advance in philosophical illumination:---and it is probably to the general diffusion of superficial attainments in science, that their prevalence is to be ascribed. Were it possible to ensure a real and solid ground-work of philosophical instruction, wherever attempts are made to introduce scientific education, we should not see the name of philosophy degraded, and its principles perverted and abused, to the purposes of

discrediting or refining away the truths of religion. It is to the deficiency, not to the excess of sound philosophical principles, that we are convinced these evils are mainly owing.

The progress of rash speculation on the subjects of religion is very happily depicted by our author. The following passage conveys, we think, an admirable illustration of the way, in which the illusions of what is termed reason conduct the self-called philosopher to the entire perversion, and virtual rejection, of every thing usually esteemed essential to Christianity:

"The advocates for the supremacy of the human understanding, to whom I allude, not content with judging of the evidences offered in support of the truth of the Christian system, proceed much farther, and first establish reason as the sole and sufficient arbiter of the truth or falsehood of the various doctrines which that system contains, the umpire from whose judgment there is to be no appeal in matters of religious controversy. First, I say, for this is indeed only the preliminary step to that long career on which they are entering, reason, which is to be the sole judge, must, if its office be rightly bestowed, at least be capable of deciding on every thing offered to her examination; that is to say, in religion thus subjected to the decision of human reason, there must be nothing which it is beyond the power of human reason to comprehend, for without comprehension there can be no decision. Those things in religion which to others are obscure and difficult, to those who pursue this road must be as clear as the windows of the morning. They must explain them, or explain them away. But when religion is thus placed at the mercy of reason, it is manifest that the first step will be to treat religious matters like any other science within the province of reason. Questions will arise, not only as to the value or truth of particular doctrines, but as to the meaning and scope of the system itself. It may have come down to us clogged with many human additions, and distorted by many human views. may perhaps never have been rightly understood from the beginning, and may be still an unknown country to reward the labours and the penetration of future discoverers. The same methods which the natural philosopher pursues in arriving at the knowledge which he presumes he possesses of chemistry or geology, must be employed by the religious philosopher in arriving at Christian truth. Truth (according to the scientific plan of religion) as set before us in Scripture, is the raw material which is to be worked up by human ingenuity, or rather the hieroglyphic system, the solution of which is to be ́achieved by human penetration. The doctrines which have commanded the assent, directed the faith, and warmed the hopes of the great, the wise, and the good, in every age of Christianity, may, perhaps, in every age of Christianity have been misunderstood or not understood at all. The theologian must mine for the long hidden treasure of truth, and, like the naturalist, must make new discoveries, and modify his belief accordingly. When a sufficient number of facts is discovered, a system must be formed, to which reason can form no objection; that is to say, a system which contains nothing transcending her powers. But as the name of Christianity is still to be

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written upon this system, it must at all events profess to rest, as we have said, on the basis of Scripture; and as the words and the facts of Scripture are occasionally somewhat more refractory than the imaginations of the human heart, new systems of interpretation must be devised, and the words and facts of Scripture must change their meaning at the omnipotent command of reason, and must be made to accord with the system which her wisdom has erected; or when this is impossible, portions or rather masses of Scripture must be wiped away from the canon, and branded with spuriousness and imposture. Truth must no longer be recognized by external characters, but by its coincidence with the dictates of reason. And probabilities from external circumstances must afford us no matter for thought or conviction, but the system must itself be the measure and arbiter of probabilities." P. 3.

Mr. Rose then proceeds to state, that this representation is, in point of fact, an exact picture of the recent progress of theological speculations among a very extensive portion of the Protestant Church in Germany, and, not merely among the community in general, but among those who, by situation and profession, should have been active in endeavouring to stop the progress of error. This pretended system of purer Christianity has been taught by divines from the pulpit, and by professors from the chairs of theology; received by the better informed, as a part of philosophic illumination; and greedily swallowed by the low and illiterate, as a system which would liberate them from many inconvenient restrictions, and set them free from the dominion of many hitherto troublesome prejudices.

The operation, however, of this evil, as Mr. Rose goes on to shew, produced a strong reaction; and from the extreme of rationalism, it was an easy transition, by which large numbers were carried into the opposite extreme of mysticism and enthusiastic extravagance. The author makes some very judicious observations on the imperfect constitution of the German churches, as in no small degree tending to the extension of these evils. The total want of any controuling power over the clergy, and the absence of any restriction upon the doctrine they might teach, were causes, which not only precluded the possibility of stopping the mischief, had the desire to do so existed, but also gave every facility and encouragement to the Clergy, to follow any casual novelty that might most powerfully solicit their attention.

These remarks are followed by some of an excellent practical tendency, on the importance of keeping strictly to the excellent formularies of our own church. To these we must be content to refer the reader (p. 12), and must hasten to the main part of the subject, to the view which is developed in detail of the system of the German rationalists. The author traces the origin of this system to the state of the German church since

the Reformation, in regard to its articles of faith. Though, as he observes, both the Lutheran and Calvinist churches of Germany nominally possess a declaration of faith, they virtually have none. The Lutheran church adopted, as its standard, productions which successively appeared in the statement and defence of the reformed tenets. To the Confession of Augsburgh was annexed Melancthon's defence of it: to this, the Articles of Smalcald, Luther's two Catechisms, and the Formula Concordiæ. And to the whole of this mass of documents, known by the name of the symbolical books, subscription was at first required. The very length of such documents, as might well be supposed, soon became an objection. And though they continued to be subscribed, a device was early introduced of virtually getting over the difficulty, by subscribing with the qualification" as far as they agree with scripture." In the other branch of the German church, for a long period, nothing more was required than a promise to teach the people "according to the Holy Scriptures*:"---a promise, which in many instances has been admitted as sufficient in the Lutheran church also.

Hence, then, the obvious origin of perpetual variations in doctrine: the main cause of the evil, however, is thus further explained:

"But this statement, although sufficient to show that the German churches have nothing in their constitution to check changes of doctrine, is not all. These churches boast of it as their very highest privilege, and the very essence of a Protestant church, that its opinions should constantly change. Hear the words of the most esteemed among their modern historians. 'Our divines recognize the necessity of enquiring, of correcting, and of ameliorating their belief as often as any new views require it; and they do not deny the possibility of making that belief more free from false explanations and arbitrary adjuncts, firmer in some parts, and more connected in all.' And I am not here using an accidental or careless declaration, but one, the spirit of which runs through every work of the rationalizing German divine. It is a declaration which, if it refers to matters of trifling importance, is deserving only of contempt, but if it applies to fundamentals, must inspire us with the greatest horror and disgust. We cannot in that case doubt for a moment that this is one of the out

* Dr. Hey mentions a similar fact with regard to the "metropolis of Calvinism," the Genevan Church. Speaking of the Genevese having in fact quitted their Calvinistic doctrines, whilst in form they retain them, he adds: "When the catechumens are admitted to the Sacrament, they only give an assent to the Scriptures and the Apostles' Creed; but when the minister is admitted, he takes an oath of assent to the Scriptures, and professes to teach them according to the Catechism of Calvin;' but this last clause, about Calvin, he makes a separate business; speaking lower, or altering his posture, or speaking after a considerable interval."-Lectures in Divinity, Vol. II. p. 57. 1822.

rageous attempts of reason to subject religion entirely to her decision; we cannot be blind to the obvious fact that if such a principle were recognized, every new school of philosophy would produce a revolution of religious opinion, and mould all belief according to its own views and principles, and that thus there would be nothing fixed or stable in religion while the world lasted. Such views could not be held for a moment by those who had any belief in the divine origin of our religion, or any confidence in God's promise, that he would always be with his church to the end of the world. In what sense, indeed, can such a promise be understood by one who supposes that, for eighteen hundred years, God has entirely concealed the truth which he promised to teach, and that he may continue to do so for an indefinite period? If then it be an essential principle of a Protestant church, that she possess a constant power of varying her belief, let us remember that we are assuredly no Protestant church. The dispute is not here whether we be right or wrong in our doctrines; but the principle, on which we separated from the Roman church, was, not that we had discovered any new views of Scripture doctrines, but that we desired to return to the primitive confession, the views held by the Apostles and early Fathers of the church. And as the founders of our church firmly and hopefully believed that God had led them by his Spirit into these views of truth, so they as firmly and hopefully believed that he would continue and strengthen the church in them to the end. And with these feelings they have given us a declaration of faith, without subscription to which, as, thank God, no one can be a teacher in the church, so, if he afterwards depart from it, he must depart also from communion with the church which holds it, and not disturb our peace by inculcating what his fancy dictates as a more excellent way. Here, then, is a marked difference between our own and other Protestant churches. Our church receives only what was received in those ages when truth must have been known; the others profess that perhaps in no age has truth yet been recognized, and that her genuine form may still remain to discover." p. 20.

In addition to the testimony already quoted in reference to the principles of the German churches, the following statements, given in the notes, exhibit the same thing in a yet more striking point of view. Wegscheider, describing the constitution of their ecclesiastical synods, continues,

"From these synods finally are to be constituted ecclesiastical colleges of clerks and laymen, who are to deliberate on ecclesiastical matters as reason is more cultivated, and the right use of scripture more understood: submitting their decrees to the approbation of the Sovereign." p. 118.

Add to this the assertion of Griesbach, that,

"The symbolical books are not to endure for ever; but that it is enough if divines follow the newest and best views." p. 119.

These curious statements afford a sufficiently clear and striking picture of German rationalism in its most improved state. are here presented with quite a new idea in religion, its gradual

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