militia of the State will be called out to sustain the nullifying act. They will march, Sir, under a very gallant leader; for I believe the honorable member himself commands the militia of that part of the State. He will raise the nullifying act on his standard, and spread it 5 out as his banner. It will have a preamble, setting forth that the tariff laws are palpable, deliberate, and dangerous violations of the Constitution. He will proceed, with this banner flying, to the custom-house in Charleston.

"All the while,

Sonorous metal blowing martial sounds."

10

Arrived at the custom-house, he will tell the collector that he must collect no more duties under any of the tariff laws. This he will be somewhat puzzled to say, by 15 the way, with a grave countenance, considering what hand South Carolina herself had in that of 1816. But, Sir, the collector would probably not desist at his bidding. He would show him the law of Congress, the treasury instruction, and his own oath of office. He 20 would say he should perform his duty, come what come might.

Here would ensue a pause, for they say that a certain stillness precedes the tempest. The trumpeter would hold his breath a while, and before all this military 25 array should fall on the custom-house, collector, clerks, and all, it is very probable some of those composing it would request of their gallant commander-in-chief to be informed a little upon the point of law; for they have, doubtless, a just respect for his opinions as a lawyer, as 30 well as for his bravery as a soldier. They know he has read Blackstone and the Constitution, as well as Turenne and Vauban. They would ask him, therefore, something concerning their rights in this matter. They would inquire whether it was not somewhat dangerous 35

to resist a law of the United States. What would be the nature of their offence, they would wish to learn, if they by military force and array resisted the execution in Carolina of a law of the United States, and it should 5 turn out, after all, that the law was constitutional. He would answer, of course, Treason. No lawyer could give any other answer. John Fries, he would tell them, had learned that some years ago. "How then," they would ask, "do you propose to defend us? We are 10 not afraid of bullets, but treason has a way of taking people off that we do not much relish. How do you propose to defend us?" "Look at my floating banner," he would reply; "see there the Nullifying Law!" "Is it your opinion, gallant commander," they would then 15 say, "that, if we should be indicted for treason, that same floating banner of yours would make a good plea in bar?" "South Carolina is a sovereign State," he would reply. "That is true; but would the judge admit our plea?" "These tariff laws," he would repeat, "are 20 unconstitutional, palpably, deliberately, dangerously." "That all may be so; but if the tribunal should not happen to be of that opinion, shall we swing for it? We are ready to die for our country, but it is rather an awkward business, this dying without touching the 25 ground! After all, that is a sort of hemp tax, worse than any part of the tariff."

Mr. President, the honorable gentleman would be in a dilemma like that of another great general. He would have a knot before him which he could not untie. He 30 must cut it with his sword. He must say to his followers, "Defend yourselves with your bayonets!" And this is war, - civil war.

Direct collision, therefore, between force and force is the unavoidable result of that remedy for the revision of 35 unconstitutional laws which the gentleman contends for.

It must happen in the very first case to which it is applied. Is not this the plain result? To resist by force the execution of a law, generally is treason. Can the courts of the United States take notice of the indulgence of a State to commit treason? The common say- 5 ing, that a State cannot commit treason herself, is nothing to the purpose. Can she authorize others to do it? If John Fries had produced an act of Pennsylvania annulling the law of Congress, would it have helped his case? Talk about it as we will, these doc- 10 trines go the length of revolution. They are incompatible with any peaceable administration of the government. They lead directly to disunion and civil commotion; and therefore it is, that at their commencement, when they are first found to be maintained by respectable men, and 15 in a tangible form, I enter my public protest against them all.

The honorable gentleman argues that, if this government be the sole judge of the extent of its own powers, whether that right of judging be in Congress or the 20 Supreme Court, it equally subverts State sovereignty. This the gentleman sees, or thinks he sees, although he cannot perceive how the right of judging in this matter, if left to the exercise of State legislatures, has any tendency to subvert the government of the Union. The 25 gentleman's opinion may be that the right ought not to have been lodged with the general government; he may like better such a Constitution as we should have under the right of State interference; but I ask him to meet me on the plain matter of fact. I ask him to meet me 30 on the Constitution itself. I ask him if the power is not found there clearly and visibly found there?

But, Sir, what is this danger, and what the grounds of it? Let it be remembered that the Constitution of the United States is not unalterable. It is to continue 35

in its present form no longer than the people who established it shall choose to continue it. If they shall become convinced that they have made an injudicious or inexpedient partition and distribution of power between the 5 State governments and the general government, they can alter that distribution at will.

If anything be found in the national Constitution, either by original provision or subsequent interpretation, which ought not to be in it, the people know how to get 10 rid of it. If any construction unacceptable to them be established, so as to become practically a part of the Constitution, they will amend it at their own sovereign pleasure. But while the people choose to maintain it as it is, while they are satisfied with it, and refuse to change 15 it, who has given, or who can give, to the State legislatures a right to alter it either by interference, construction, or otherwise? Gentlemen do not seem to recollect that the people have any power to do anything for themselves. They imagine there is no safety for them, any 20 longer than they are under the close guardianship of the State legislatures. Sir, the people have not trusted their safety, in regard to the general Constitution, to these hands. They have required other security, and taken other bonds. They have chosen to trust them25 selves, first, to the plain words of the instrument, and to such construction as the government itself, in doubtful cases, should put on its own powers, under its oaths of office, and subject to its responsibility to them; just as the people of a State trust their own State govern30 ments with a similar power. Secondly, they have reposed their trust in the efficacy of frequent elections, and in their own power to remove their own servants and agents whenever they see cause. Thirdly, they have reposed trust in the judicial power, which, in 35 order that it might be trustworthy, they have made as

respectable, as disinterested, and as independent as was practicable. Fourthly, they have seen fit to rely, in case of necessity or high expediency, on their known and admitted power to alter or amend the Constitution peaceably and quietly, whenever experience shall point out 5 defects or imperfections. And, finally, the people of the United States have at no time, in no way, directly or indirectly, authorized any State legislature to construe or interpret their high instrument of government; much less to interfere by their own power to arrest its course 10 and operation.

If, Sir, the people in these respects had done otherwise than they have done, their Constitution could neither have been preserved, nor would it have been worth preserving. And if its plain provisions shall now be disregarded, and 15 these new doctrines interpolated in it, it will become as feeble and helpless a being as its enemies, whether early or more recent, could possibly desire. It will exist in every State but as a poor dependant on State permission.< It must borrow leave to be; and will be no longer than 20 State pleasure, or State discretion, sees fit to grant the indulgence and to prolong its poor existence.

But, Sir, although there are fears, there are hopes also. The people have preserved this, their own chosen Constitution, for forty years, and have seen their happi- 25 ness, prosperity, and renown grow with its growth, and strengthen with its strength. They are now, generally, strongly attached to it. Overthrown by direct assault, it cannot be; evaded, undermined, nullified, it will not be, if we, and those who shall succeed us here as agents 30 and representatives of the people, shall conscientiously and vigilantly discharge the two great branches of our public trust, faithfully to preserve, and wisely to administer it.

Mr. President, I have thus stated the reasons of my 35