says:

"A section of the fundamental law is self-executing when it prescribes a rule, the application of which puts into operation the constitutional provision. *** The amendment quoted, having expressly authorized cities and towns to provide for the manner of exercising the initiative and referendum powers as to their municipal legislation, the provision is therefore self-executing in respect to the class of enactments specified."

In Willis v. Mabon, supra, the Supreme Court of Minnesota says:

"The question in every case is whether the language of a constitutional provision is addressed to the courts or to the Legislature does it indicate that it was intended as a present enactment, complete in itself as definitive legislation, or does it contemplate subsequent legislation to carry it into effect?"

In Tuttle v. National Bank of Republic, In Tuttle v. National Bank of Republic, supra, the Supreme Court of Illinois, says: "Where it is apparent that a particular provision of the organic law shall go into immediate effect without ancillary legislation, and this can be determined by giving full force and effect to all its clauses relating to the same subject, and the language is free from ambiguity, then it becomes the imperative duty of the judicial tribunals to declare it self-executing; and where the provision is unambiguous and the purpose of the provision would be frustrated unless it be given immediate effect, it will be held self-executing."

Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, su

pra, says:

"A constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing, if it supplies a sufficient rule, by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced, and it is not self-executing when it merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by means of which those principles may be given the force of law."

The clause of the section of the Constitutiou under consideration which provides that such additional legislation as may aid in the operation of this section shall be provided by the legislative assembly, including a provision for payment, by the public treasury, of the reasonable special election campaign expenses of such an officer, is a direction to the Legislature to pass such act as may aid in the operation of said section, but the right to have an officer recalled, in accordance with the provisions of such sections, is not made dependent on the passage of such an act. It is the duty of the legislative assembly to pass such an act, but the right to recall an officer cannot be suspended or defeated

duty in the premises. There is nothing in said section indicating an intention that the right of recall should be dependent upon the action or will of the Legislature. The people adopted this section to enable them to have a remedy against corrupt, inefficient, unfaithful or unpopular public officers. The section provides a complete code for a recall of officers, and, according to the obvious meaning of the language used, the right was to be effective as soon as said section took effect.

to give effect to the intention of its framers, [6] This section should be so construed as and the electors who adopted it, and they should be taken to have intended what the language used means.

Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23, says: The framers of the "Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said."

Justice Lamar, in Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 670, 671, 9 Sup. Ct. 652, 32 L. Ed. 1060, says:

"The object of construction, applied to a Constitution, is to give effect to the intent of its framers, and of the people in adopting it. This intent is to be found in the instrument itself; and when the text of a constitutional provision ti tion thereto, are not at liberty to search for its is not ambiguous, the courts, in giving construcmeaning beyond the instrument. * * * The simplest and most obvious interpretation of a Constitution, if in itself sensible, is the most likely to be that meant by the people in its adoption."

Bearing in mind that this section provides a complete method of procedure for effecting a recall, and that its language indicates an intention that it should be operative immediately, we hold that it is self-executing as to all its provisions, except the clause that requires the Legislature to pass an act providing for the payment of the reasonable special election campaign expenses of the officer subjected to the recall. As to the latter provision, it is not self-executing, but the failure of the Legislature to pass such an act does not prevent the enforcement of the provisions for the recall.

[7] To hold that the failure of the lawmaking department to enact a law requiring the payment of the reasonable campaign expenses of the officer subjected to the recall out of the public treasury operates as a suspension of the right to recall a public officer would, in our judgment, defeat the intention of the electors who adopted said section 18. We believe that their intention was that the right to recall a public officer should exist as soon as said constitutional provision took effect.

It is hardly necessary for us to say that we have nothing to do with the wisdom of the provision for the recall. Obviously, it can be abused.

We hold that said section 18 of article 2 of

is overruled.

(73 Or. 451)

STATE v. LEONARD. (Supreme Court of Oregon.

Oct. 13, 1914.) 1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION (§ 125*)DUPLICITY-FALSE PRETENSES.

Under L. O. L. § 1964, making it an offense for any person, by false pretenses, to obtain, or attempt to obtain, with intent to defraud, the signature of any person to any writing, the false making whereof would be forgery, and section 1552 providing that in all cases the defendant may be found guilty of any crime necessarily included in that charged or of an attempt to commit such crime, an indictment charging that by false pretenses defendant obtained, and attempted to obtain, the signature of a person to a writing does not charge two separate offenses.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 334-400; Dec. Dig. § 125.*]

2. FALSE PRETENSE (§ 49*)-EVIDENCE-SUF

FICIENCY.

In a prosecution for false pretenses, evidence held to show that representations by the defendant as to the value of land covered by a mortgage, transferred to the complaining witness, were false, that defendant knew them to be false when he made them, that he made them with intent to defraud the complaining witness and his wife, and to obtain their signatures to a deed, that they believed the representations and acted on them, and were influenced by them and by an assignment of the mortgage to execute the deed.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see False Pretenses, Cent. Dig. § 62; Dec. Dig. § 49.*] 3. FALSE PRETENSES (§ 43*)-EVIDENCE-AD

MISSIBILITY.

Under L. O. L. § 1541, providing that, upon a trial for having, by false pretenses, obtained the signature of any person to an instrument, no evidence can be admitted of a false pretense expressed orally and unaccompanied by a false token or writing, but such pretense, or some note or memorandum thereof, must be in writing, where the false pretense is expressed orally and is accompanied by a false token or writing, it is not necessary that there be any note or memorandum thereof in writing.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see False Pretenses, Cent. Dig. § 57; Dec. Dig. § 43.*] 4. FALSE PRETENSES (8 6*)-ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE "TOKEN"-"FALSE TOKEN."

A token is a mark or sign, a material evidence of a fact, and cheating by "false tokens" implies the use of fabricated or deceitfully contrived material objects to assist the person's own fraud and falsehood in accomplishing the cheating, and a false writing may be a false token.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see False Pretenses, Cent. Dig. § 4; Dec. Dig. § 6.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, False Token; Token.j 5. FALSE PRETENSES (§ 7*)-ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE-FALSE."

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, False.]

6. FALSE PRETENSES (§ 7*)-ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE-NATURE OF REPRESENTATIONS.

A false pretense, to constitute a crime, must relate either to past or present facts, and representations or promises as to things to be done in the future by the promisor are not false pretenses, within the Criminal Code.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see False Pretenses, Cent. Dig. §§ 5-12, 25; Dec. Dig. § 7.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, False Pretense.] 7. FALSE PRETENSES (§ 43*)-ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE-FALSE WRITING.

An assignment by defendant of a mortgage for $4,500 on property which was practically worthless, which mortgage was taken for the purpose of applying it on the purchase of other land, was a false writing, though not a forgery, and was admissible in evidence in a prosecution for procuring a deed on the consideration for which the mortgage was applied.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see False Pretenses, Cent. Dig. § 57; Dec. Dig. § 43.*] 8. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 1134*)-APPEAL-EXTENT OF REVIEW-DENIAL OF NEW TRIAL. An order denying new trial, not being appealable, cannot be reviewed on appeal.

Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2587, 2653, 2986-2998, 3056, [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal 3067-3071; Dec. Dig. § 1134.*]

9. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 768*)-TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS-DUTY OF JURY.

In a prosecution for obtaining by false pretenses the execution of a deed, the court, in response to a question by the jury, properly instructed that the jury should not take into consideration any civil remedy that the complaining witness might have against the defendant.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1798-1802, 1941, 1995; Dec. Dig. § 768.*]

10. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 1186*)-APPEAL-DISPOSITION OF CAUSE TECHNICAL ERRORS.

Under L. O. L. § 1626, requiring the court on appeal in criminal actions to give judgment without regard to questions in the discretion of the trial court, or technical errors, defects, or exceptions which did not affect the substantial rights of the parties, a judgment can be reversed only for error prejudicial to the defendant.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3215-3219, 3221, 3230; Dec. Dig. § 1186.*]

Department 1. Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County; J. P. Kavanaugh, Judge. T. J. Leonard was convicted of obtaining the signature of two persons to a deed of conveyance by false pretenses, and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years, and he appeals. Affirmed.

RAMSEY, J. This is a criminal action for obtaining the signature of two persons to a deed of conveyance of real property by false pretenses, etc.

The following is a copy of the body of the indictment, to wit:

"T. J. Leonard is accused by the grand jury of the county of Multnomah and state of Oregon, by this indictment, of the crime of obtaining and attempting to obtain by false pretenses, with intent to defraud, the signature of a person and persons to an instrument and deed, the false making of which is and would be a forgery, committed as follows:

forty-five hundred ($4,500.00) dollars was not for a balance due and owing by said C. O'Donosaid lands, but said promissory note was caused van to said defendant on the purchase price of by said defendant to be executed by said C. O'Donovan, with the intent and purpose of him, the said defendant, of deceiving, defrauding, and ture of the said M. J. Denny and -—— Denny, obtaining and attempting to obtain the signahis wife, to a certain instrument and deed of conveyance to certain lands in Clackamas county, state of Oregon, hereinafter more fully described, and the said C. O'Donovan did not own the said lands and did not owe the said defendant the sum of forty-five hundred ($4,lands, and that said pretended mortgage had 500.00) dollars, or any sum whatever, upon said not been theretofore executed and delivered by said C. O'Donovan to said defendant as and for security of the payment of said pretended promissory note, but said defendant had caused said C. O'Donovan to execute said pretended mortgage with the intent of him, the said defendant, to deceive, defraud, and to obtain and to attempt to obtain the signatures of the said M. J. Denny and Denny, his wife, to a certain instrument and deed of conveyance to certain lands in Clackamas county, state of Oregon, hereinafter more fully described; that said pretended assignment of said note and mortage was not a true, real, actual, and bona fide assignment of a real, actual, and bona fide note and mortgage, but said pretended assignment was executed and caused to be executed by said defendant with the intent and purpose on his part to deceive and defraud and to obtain and M. J. Denny and attempt to obtain. the signatures of the said — Denny, his wife, to a certain instrument and deed of conveyance to certain lands in Clackamas county, state of Oregon, hereinafter more particularly described; and that there was not then and there due and owing upon said mortgage and note the sum of forty-five hundred ($4,500.00) dollars, or any other sum or amount whatsoever from the said C. O'Donovan to the said defendant, and the said defendant was not then and there the lawful owner of said mortgage and note and indebtedness, or any other note, mortgage, or indebtedness due and owing from said C. 'O'Donovan to said defendant by reason of any sale, trade, or other transaction relating to said Skamania county, Washington, lands, and there was not then and there due and owing upon said note and mortgage the sum of forty-five hundred ($4,500.00) dollars, with interest from November 2, 1912, or any sum or amount whatsoever, all of which facts were then and there well known to said defendant, but the said false and fraudulent representations and pretenses made and caused to be made by the said defendant to said M. J. Denny, his attorneys, agents, and employés, and the said fraudulent, false, fictitious, and collusive note, mortgage, assignment, and deed so executed and caused to be executed, as aforesaid, were made and caused to be made by the said defendant for the sole purpose of injuring, defrauding, and deceiving, and of obtaining and attempting to obtain from said M. J. Denny and Denny the signatures of them, and each of them, to a certain instrument and deed of conveyance to certain lands in Clackamas county, state of Oregon, hereinafter more fully described, and the said M. J. Denny and Denny, his wife, relying upon and believing to be true the said false and fraudulent representations and false tokens so made as aforesaid, were induced thereby to sign, execute, and caused to be signed and executed and delivered to said defendant a certain instrument and deed of conveyance to the following described lands in Clackamas county, state of Oregon: Beginning at a cedar post fifteen (15) inches in diameter, which is located twenty-three (23) feet five (5) inches

The said T. J. Leonard on the second day of December, A. D. 1912, in the county of Multnomah and state of Oregon, then and there being, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly, with intent to injure and defraud, falsely and fraudulently pretend and represent to one M. J. Denny, his attorneys, agents and employés, that a certain tract of land situate and being in Skamania county, state of Washington, to wit, all of lot eleven state of Washington, to wit, all of lot eleven (11) of section twelve (12), in township three, (3) north of range seven and one-half (72) east of the Willamette meridian, containing forty (40) acres, a more particular description of which said land is to this grand jury unknown, was then and there of the value of at least nine thousand ($9,000.00) dollars and that said defendant had theretofore sold and conveyed said lands to one C. O'Donovan for the sum of nine thousand ($9,000.00) dollars and that said C. O'Donovan had paid to said defendant forty-five hundred ($4,500.00) dollars as part of the purchase price for said land, and that a certain promissory note, purporting to be signed and executed by said C. O'Donovan to and in favor of the said defendant in the sum of forty-five hundred ($4,500.00) dollars with interest, a more particular description of which said note is to this grand jury unknown, was the balance due and owing by said C. O'Donovan to said defendant on account of the purchase price of said land, and that a certain mortgage, a more particular description of which is to this grand jury unknown, had theretofore been executed and delivered by said C. O'Donovan to and in favor of said defendant, as and for security for the payment of said promissory note, and that a certain assignment of said mortgage and note, a more particular description of which is to the grand jury unknown, then and there executed and delivered by said defendant to said M. J. Denny, his attorneys, agents, and employés, was a real, actual, and bona fide assignment and transfer of a real, actual and bona fide promissory note and mortgage for forty-five hundred ($4,500.00) dollars, due and owing by said C. O'Donovan to said defendant, and that he, the said defendant, was then and there the lawful owner and holder of said note and mortgage and indebtedness, and that there was then and there due upon said note and mortgage the sum of forty-five hundred ($4,500.00) dollars, with interest thereon from the second day of November, 1912. All of which said pretenses and representations, made as aforesaid, were false and fraudulent, and the said defendant then and there well knew them to be false and fraudulent. "Whereas in truth and in fact, as said defendant then and there well knew, the said lands in Skamania county, state of Washington, were not and are not of the value of at least nine thousand ($9,000.00) dollars, but were and are of the value of not more than one thousand ($1,00:0.00) dollars, and the said defendant had not theretofore or at all sold or conveyed the said lands to said C. O'Donovan for the sum of nine thousand ($9,000.00) dollars, and the said C. O'Donovan had not paid said defendant the sum of forty-five hundred ($4,500.00) dollars, or any sum whatever, as part payment for said lands,