The country would be richer if they incurred the expense necessary for buying up the great interests involved in railway monopolies, so as to allow the inhabitants in different places the advantages of cheap intercourse.

Mr. THOMAS WEBSTER, Q.C.: The question before the section amounts to this -Is it right to interfere with a practical monopoly? There can be no doubt that this is a case which does require some strong interference, and it is a case in which a middle course ought to be adopted. I should view with apprehension the placing of the railway system under government control, as the railway system ought to improve day by day, and the railway companies and officials are the persons best qualified to carry out the improvements required upon the system. The progress of the railway system would be materially imperilled if it were all placed under government control; but that there is an absolute necessity for an amount of interference with railways in some respects nobody can doubt. Some railway companies have working men's trains, which carry working men to and from their work at a very moderate rate. More attention ought to be paid to providing facilities for taking working men to their homes by rail at cheap rates, as well as to providing buildings for their accommodation. As to the existing abuses or defects of the railway system, want of punctuality has been referred to as the most common source of mischief and complaint. Now it is utterly hopeless to expect that the railway companies will enforce punctuality, as all the officials are interested in smoothing over any deficiencies in that respect. The directors have not a sufficient interest in the matter to do more than manage the general details, and it is a great system, without adequate inspection and management. What is the great cause of that want of punctuality? It is these excursion trains. Excursion trains may be termed the great blot of our railway system. If the companies can afford to carry masses of people at rates so low, and derive a profit from the trains, then the public are much too highly charged in other respects. Then it must be kept in view how much these great accidents and the want of punctuality is due to these excursion trains. On some lines, where great pains are taken, the system is adopted of not allowing one train to pass a station till the other is clear-a system which, owing to the electric telegraph, is the most perfect that ingenuity could devise. But when you have one of these large excursion trains between London and Brighton, or any other two towns, in the multitude of trains on the line, the excursion trains must get between two fast trains. Why, then, should the ordinary trains not be increased in size at certain hours to suit these people? Why should not return tickets be extended in time? Why should not people be induced to travel in great numbers by the ordinary trains, by means of cheap rates for return tickets, and the system of excursion tickets be abolished altogether? Excursion trains are the real source of the mischief; they are a great pest to the places where they go to. They are a pest to the locality. Why should railway companies be allowed to inflict such a pest on these places? Mr. PLIMSOLL: But the passengers enjoy themselves-you forget that. Mr. WEBSTER: But the passengers would enjoy themselves on any other day, and in fewer numbers. If excursion trains are profitable to the railway companies the public are wronged; but I have great doubts of their being profitable. There is no doubt that carrying masses of people, inasmuch as they move themselves, is more profitable than carrying goods and coals at a low rate which do not move themselves. But if that be so, then our whole system in that respect wants revising. How is it possible to get these defects of unpunctuality remedied, and these daily and hourly neglects of regulations prevented? The companies are bound to look to the regulations being carried out; but the directors have not the time to overlook these matters. The railway directors do their duty with an energy which is most surprising, seeing the enormous amount of time they give to it; but you cannot have regulations of that sort enforced unless you have a power of inspection by the Government-unless you make it worth people's while to enforce these regulations. It is the interest of railway companies to have their lines in good condition. The costs of an accident are so frightful that they would be grossly culpable not only to the public but to every individual shareholder if they did not use every means to have their lines in the best possible condition. It is one of those cases in which you may safely leave

the efficiency of the thing to railway companies. There is one other matter which has not been referred to in which inspection would be valuable, and that is the arrangement of railway companies where competing systems touch upon each other, where the public are put to the most positive inconvenience because it suits a railway company to start its trains in one direction just five minutes before another train coming to that point has arrived. I think this is a matter in which there ought to be power lodged in the Board of Trade to receive the complaints of passengers. These are matters which it would be well for Government to deal with without entering on the question of whether the whole system should be consolidated. It will be the interest of railway companies-and they are coming gradually to it-that there should be a consolidation of the railway system. But that is a matter for the consideration of the shareholders of these companies; and just in proportion as these railway companies go together in that way, does Government inspection become more important, with a view to seeing that the interests of the public are not overlooked.

Mr. EDGAR: There is a power given to the Court of Common Pleas to regulate these matters referred to by Mr. Webster. That is an admission of the principle of regulation by another authority than the railway companies. But look how this has operated. The Act, giving the power to the Court, has been in existence for fourteen or fifteen years. They have also power to regulate with regard to the charges for the carrying of goods. There has been a considerable number of applications for regulating the charges as to goods; but with regard to the time of starting the trains, I do not believe there has been more than one single application, and in that case the Court refused to interfere. It is admitted that there is an evil; but a single man who is aggrieved cannot be expected to be at the expense of making an application to the Court of Common Pleas.

Mr. FREELAND: Railways are not necessarily a monopoly. They are perhaps practically so; but you may go to parliament for competing lines, and parliament may grant them; and the only reason why they are a monopoly practically is on account of the large power of these companies in parliament; but the constituencies can remedy that to-morrow, and, therefore, they are not necessarily a monopoly. As to there being no analogy between railways and steam-boat companies, I, for one, do not think that government has any right to impose upon railway companies conditions which they do not impose on steamboat companies.

Mr. W. C. LENG, Sheffield: In this discussion considerable stress has been laid upon the danger of swamping the independence of Parliament by the consolidation of the railways under Government. I apprehend that is hardly possible, for the independence of the House of Commons appears to be largely swamped already. The experience of the last session of Parliament on the Great Eastern line, and on the question of a local line, has shown that on railway questions Parliament represents the railways and not the people. On the question of the local line, ninety-nine out of every hundred of the people of Sheffield wanted a particular line, and they could not get it, simply because there were opposing interests in Parliament. When Sheffield got to Parliament, she found that, as opposed to the railway interest, she was nowhere. The opposing interests had it all their own way. It was the very same with the Great Eastern line. The people of London wanted it, South Yorkshire wanted it, and the counties through which the line would have passed, all wanted it; and yet it could not be got. That line was needed to complete a broken and imperfect system-it was needed to make a railway cul de sac into a through route-and it was needed to develop a vast agricultural district-yet the monopolists stopped the way. It would have cheapened the price of coal 2s. 6d. a ton to the people in the east of London; it would have served the whole of the populous agricultural districts through which it would have passed; it would have brought in their produce, and would have taken back in return our minerals; it would have taken off a monopoly tax on coal to the extent of 2s. 6d. a ton from probably about a million and a half of people; and yet, though three millions of people were, in one way or another, directly interested in that line, when the matter came before the House of Commons it was not even treated with civility. It was almost yelled down in one of those disgraceful scenes

which, with all respect for the Members of Parliament now present, I will say sometimes take place in the House of Commons.

Mr. PLIMSOLL, in reply, said-I do not advocate the purchase of the railways by the government in my paper; but I recommend some tentative course in the meantime, with the view of trying a great experiment as to the results of the greatest possible cheapness of fares. One gentleman connected with railways objected very strongly to any interference with them as unjustifiable on the part of the government. His position seems to me very much like that of a man who wore another man's coat so long that he objected to having it taken back to its rightful owner, since most people are of opinion that internal communication ought never to have been in the hands of private companies. We have simply drifted into the present position of matters on account of the rapid development of railways. Objection was made to taxing poor people for the benefit of those who travel. All that I advocated was some small government subsidy to a railway company that would be willing to try this experiment for three years, limiting it both as to its amount and as to the time during which it should be given. But the objection founded on the fact that the poor do not travel so much as the rich is just as narrow and foolish as it would be for a man who did not keep a carriage objecting to pay for the maintenance of the roads. We cannot dispose of a great question of this kind on petty principles such as that to which I have just referred. The same gentleman who made this objection also spoke of many failures which had been made by government. I am not interested to defend the government, because I do not advocate any interference by government with the railways. I have said already that railways are better managed as they are, although I think that any further combination of them would probably lead to confusion. I cannot help remarking, however, that the style of the remarks made by Mr. Hawes had a very suspicious resemblance to the style of the diatribes against government in 1844, when the discussions were taking place on the subject of parliamentary trains. Before that time one railway would run a cheap train only to one point, and then passengers could not get on unless they took first or second class tickets; that was naturally the cause of many complaints, as the public could not then get the advantage of third class carriages for a long journey without being subjected to excessive delay in completing the journey. Railway companies were interested in maintaining that state of matters, but parliament interfered and provided a remedy in the interests of the public. Then there is a great deal said in the discussions upon this subject against government monopoly and in favour of free competition. Surely there is some confusion of thought in all this. It is really an inversion of the accurate position of the matter. Government monopoly! Why, the government never can have any interest except that of the community, and we act upon the government in the interest of the community. Then, again, to talk of free competition as to railways is really a misapplication of terms. There is, in fact, no competition. I hold in my hand an agreement which binds eight of the largest companies in the kingdom, and it applies to a list of important towns where the traffic is carved out among the different companies, and if any company gets a larger proportion of traffic than another, the excess has to be handed over to another company, minus so much per cent. for working expenses. The directors of these companies have a right to defend the interests which they are elected to protect; but the public have an equal right to try to get some additional advantage from the railway system. In the ordinary sense of the term, it is not a competition which company will supply the public with travelling accommodation, but a competition as to which company will charge the public as much as they like. I was very glad that Professor Fawcett destroyed that fallacy which was introduced into the argument by Mr. Freeland about steamboat companies, because there is no parallel in the cases whatever. What would be said if power was attempted to be given to the company of shareholders to bring the cotton of Charleston or New Orleans to Liverpool? Yet we practically give a similar power as between Manchester and Liverpool, because one railway had it at one time, and when a second route was proposed it was argued that the company had a right to the traffic. There are now three routes; but as far as the public s concerned the route is one. The monoply is just as great as if one company

served the public. I do not make these remarks in a hostile spirit to the railway companies. I believe that the spirit of the directors of railway companies is admirable; and if this discussion is conducted with good temper and moderation, and if some of our railway directors would put their views on the subject in writing, I have no doubt that great good will arise from the examination of this question.

The PRESIDENT: I must protest against the assumption that I am in favour of government management, meaning by government management the existing management, or anything like the existing management--that is to say, by the government directly appointing either officers or anybody else. I am wholly in favour of contract management. In my view, what we ought to get is an impartial tribunal, independent and trustworthy, that would settle conditions of contract, and apportion the railways out to contractors, upon a fair view of the public advantage, but letting out the railways to be worked, just as the Cunard line and other great undertakings are worked, by the parties who undertake to contract for the service. I mean such management as that of the post-office was before the railways-namely, the system by which the transport of letters was effected by contract throughout the country-the contract with Mr. Palmer for the conveyance of mails throughout the country; and I must say that was a great example of punctuality, such as has never been displayed by any other than an agency like that. I contemplate a state of things in which, if there be any railway management or any other management-if there be a railway Rowland Hill, or any other body who will come forward with a plan of improved mangement, there shall be an agency on behalf of the public who may decide upon it for the public advantage.

Mr. FREELAND: Then, as to the Cunard contract, you admit the analogy between railway companies and steamboat companies?

The PRESIDENT: In my view all means of internal communication are subject to the same conditions as railways. It is quite clear that in public policy, it is sometimes worth while, on the part of the community, to pay a subsidy to get the communication quickened between another part of the world and this country. If the communication between other important places and this country cannot be quickened by private means, let it be done by subsidy, and then let it out by contract, as is done with the Oriental and other great companies.

Professor FAWCETT: I simply understand that Mr. Chadwick meant centralisation.

The PRESIDENT: What I want is unity of management, with economy and efficiency.

THE LICENSING SYSTEM.

In addition to the paper contributed by the Manchester Sunday Closing Association, printed at p. 506,

The Rev. DAWSON BURNS read a paper on "The Licensing System and the Permissive Bill." He argued that while the prevalent preference for a licensing system over one of free trade in alcoholic drinks did not imply contentment with the present system, it did imply an approval of the principle of that system, viz., that the licences were required, not for fiscal purposes, but for the suppression of abuses. When the system was first introduced, the justices were selected as the fittest persons to provide for the prevention of abuses in each district, by deciding, 1st, whether any sale of drinks was needed; and, 2nd, who were to be entrusted with the privilege of sale. Now, if three centuries ago the justices were the fittest persons to be charged with this duty, with regard to the former, at any rate, of the two questions, the inhabitants were now

the best judges. The magistrates never did discuss that question, though it was emphatically the question they had to investigate. The Permissive Bill argument was that the power of bestowing all licences should be lodged, not in the magistrates alone, but in all the rate-payers, they were best qualified to determine whether any licences were required by the public wants, and whether, if granted, they would be likely to originate public nuisances.

The Rev. THOMAS HUTTON, M.D., contributed a paper "On the Licensing System and its needed Reforms." After describing the evils which both the beersellers and the licensed victuallers fostered, he proceeded to argue that the present magisterial control was a "monstrous farce." In General Cartwright's last "Constabulary Report" he found that in the 36 borough towns in his district, only two licences were withdrawn in 1864, although proceedings were taken against 389 houses for disorderly conduct, and against 5,340 disorderly drunkards. Very often the licensing justices were themselves public-house proprietors, and for their own pockets' sake shielded their tenants from prosecution. His suggestions for reform were as follows:-1. That an entire stop should be put to the increase of public-houses and beershops, save in the most exceptional circumstances, and with the consent of the rate-payers. 2. That all houses should be closed at 11 P. M., except to bonâ fide travellers. 3. That a majority of two-thirds of the ratepayers in each parish, town, or district, should be empowered to close publichouses entirely on Sunday. 4. That the owner of the house, as well as the tenant, should be liable to a fine for offences against the tenour of the licence. 5. That two-thirds of the rate-payers should be empowered to close the houses within their district. Should the objection be raised that this would be a law for the rich, not for the poor, seeing that the rich man could enjoy his bottle of wine, though the poor man's tankard of ale would be prohibited, the answer was, that the working classes would themselves be in each case the lawmakers.

Dr. MARTIN, of Warrington, read a paper "On the Amendment of the Licensing System." The amendments he proposed were, stated summarily, as follows:-1. That increased restrictions should be placed on the liquor traffic (a) by placing beerhouses under magisterial control; (b) by increasing the licence fee paid by the present holders; (c) by increasing the licence fee, and also the rating of the house to any new applicant. 2. That a certain amount of control should be granted to the rate-payers by entrusting them with power (a) to veto any additional licences; (b) to fix the hours during which the houses shall be open; (c) to close the houses entirely on Sunday; (d) to prevent the opening of singing or dancing saloons, &c.

THE MORAL EFFECTS OF THE POOR LAWS.

Dr. DREW contributed a paper on this subject. In agricultural districts, the labourer, as he pointed out, earned little more than he