the amount of assessment, no ratepayer, under ordinary circumstances, can claim more than six votes. But in place of this I would suggest that, while one vote be given to all persons rated at less than £10, an additional vote, as in the case of joint-stock companies, up, say, to twenty, be allowed for every additional £10 of assessment; and if the practical result of such an alteration should show that even on this scale the more enlightened ratepayers have not sufficient influence, I would advise that the power of voting be brought into still closer accordance with the amount of assessment.

As regards the areas of rating, the measure of last session by which unions are substituted for single parishes, is certainly a great step in the right direction; and I am inclined to think that, if an Act were passed permitting unions in turn to coalesce on terms to be mutually agreed upon, in a manner corresponding with the amalgamation of railways, as much would be done towards enlarging rating areas as is at present expedient; though I believe that, ultimately, it will be found safe and practicable to do away with all local distinctions, and to place the care of the poor in the hands of the state.

The following is a summary of the conclusions to which the facts and arguments in this paper, and the general circumstances of the case, in my opinion lead:

1. That, in reply to the first question which we are called on to consider, the present administration of the poor law does create serious obstacles to the reform of criminals and the repression of crime.

2. That the great principle of the English poor law which directs that, with a provision for exacting work, every inhabitant of the country, who is in want, shall receive food and shelter, is perfectly sound, and ought to be fully carried into effect.

3. That under the present administration this principle is often violated, and that much unnecessary misery is thereby caused to the poorer classes, and much insecurity to the more wealthy; while many of the latter are unduly taxed in their endeavours to make good, by special provisions, deficiencies which, under a good administration of the poor law, would not be called for.

4. That the inhabitants of a country which, like our own, ungrudgingly pays more than six millions a year in support of the poor, and which would be willing, if necessary, to pay still more, ought not, and under a good administration of the poor law and police would not, be harrassed by beggars, have their feelings outraged by authentic accounts of deaths from cold and hunger, or their lives and property endangered by the temptations to crime which exposure to great misery creates; but that under present circumstances all these evils exist, and that in such a degree, so far at least as relates to mendicancy, that beggars seem to abound as much in England as in several countries where there is a far less comprehensive poor law.

5. That a liberated prisoner, unable to procure work from ordinary employers, or relief from private charity, and to whom also the

workhouse is closed, has no alternative but starvation or a return to crime.

6. That it is notorious, at present, that owing to difficulty in gaining admission to workhouses, especially at night, persons are often subjected, particularly in winter, to the severest distress; and that under pressure of this distress, offences are from time to time committed with the express purpose of entering a prison.

7. That every person willing to work to the extent of his power, and ready to obey the other rules of a well-ordered workhouse, ought to be instantly admitted thereto, or into a receiving-house in connection therewith, at any hour of the day or night; and that it ought not to be in the power of any person whatsoever to refuse him such admission.

8. That, in case of insufficient accommodation, it ought to be imperative on the parochial authorities instantly to hire additional rooms, in the same way as it would be obligatory on the police, or on those entrusted with the control of prisons, to provide special temporary accommodation, in case the number of prisoners exceeded the space requisite for their detention.

9. That, as a means of ensuring the practical observance of this rule, the police ought to have power, in case of its neglect in any instance, to give shelter to the applicant; with a right, on their part, to sue the parochial authorities for repayment of the cost; and that, in addition, these authorities should, on conviction, be subject to a penalty.

10. That considering especially that, as a general rule, a large portion of the inmates of a workhouse are children, or aged and infirm, it is highly desirable that boards of guardians should not be confined to members of the male sex; and that much of the bad management of workhouses, now so common, is probably attributable to the want of female co-operation.

11. That the system under which guardians of the poor are elected ought to be modified, so that the number of votes in each case may have a closer relation than at present, to the amount of each person's contribution to the poor rates.

12. That it is desirable that the areas of rating for the poor should be gradually enlarged, so as to diminish the motive to drive paupers from parish to parish, and to lessen the danger to the working man of losing his settlement; and, at the same time, to increase the desire to adopt comprehensive measures for the reduction, and, if possible, the extinction of pauperism; and to put it out of the power of any part of the wealthy class, in command of the means of locomotion, so to locate themselves as to escape their fair share of parochial burdens.

13. That it is desirable that the principle which has been applied with such success in the case of juvenile offenders should be extended to paupers; and that whereas, to make good the want of well-conducted prisons, reformatories under voluntary management have come into existence, to which offenders may be committed, instead of their

Deing sent to a corrupting gaol, so also it is expedient that, in any district where there is no well-regulated workhouse, magistrates should be empowered to send a pauper to any good asylum established by private exertions, and, like reformatories, duly licensed by a Government officer; and to compel the parish, where proper workhouse relief ought to have been afforded, to pay the cost of the pauper's maintenance.

What means is it desirable to adopt to prevent the passing of sentences inadequate to the proper repression of Crime? By T. B. LL. BAKER.

WHEN any system has obtained undisputed possession in a country for many years, it has acquired this prescriptive right that if any one seek to alter it or to substitute a new one, the innovator is bound to show, not only a probability that the new will succeed and be superior to the old, but that such probability is very strong, and that the advantages to be gained are of sufficient importance to compensate for the trouble and risk of a change. If, however, it can be shown, first-That the effect, if successful, would be not only a saving of a quarter of a million annually to the Government, not only a great increase of safety to the property of the honest, but more important still-a lessening to our weaker brethren of that temptation from which it is our constant prayer to be delivered: secondly-that experiments essentially similar have been repeatedly made on a smaller scale with unvarying success: and thirdly—that the proposed alteration involves no new outlay of money and no change in the law, and that if it be tried and found to fail, the old system may be at once resumed without loss or difficulty-if, I say, these conditions can be proved, I maintain that the proposer of such a system may claim an attentive hearing and a careful consideration, whether he be one who has a special claim to the attention of the public, or whether he be, as in the present case, simply a small country squire.

The offences against the laws may be divided into three classes: Firstly-Those which are the effect of sudden impulse, such as murders, violent assaults, &c.

Secondly-Those against property, which are usually habitual. Thirdly-Misdemeanours, slight assaults, drunkenness, and the

like.

The first of these classes I do not attempt to touch. The crimes are individually more serious, but are comparatively few in number. The second form the large proportion of our felonies, and to those I have directed my attention, and I have no doubt that they are capable of great reduction, not only in number, but still more in degree.

The third class I do not at present advert to, although I have no doubt that a nearly similar system would reduce these also as largely as the second class.

Our custom hitherto, in passing sentences on criminals, has been that the judge or magistrate should hear the evidence adduced, and should, to the best of his power, estimate from it the degree of moral guilt of the prisoner, and award a punishment as nearly as may be in exact proportion. If the value stolen be small-if it be taken from a stranger, and if there be nothing to show premeditation -the punishment is slight. If the value be large, or stolen from a master, or friend-or with the appearance of premeditation-the punishment is heavier. This is acting solely and literally on the principle of retaliation. I do not mean to imply a feeling or intention of revenge, but I mean simply what the word implies, the weighing back a quantum of punishment which, in the opinion of the judge, shall be equal or proportionate to the moral guilt of the offender. This is the system which has obtained so firm a hold on men's minds that it is thought almost an impiety to doubt it. Yet, if we consider the question, it will hardly stand the test of reason; still less that of practice. No one in the present day allows that we get either pleasure or profit from merely punishing a criminal. When at a deliberative meeting we discuss the principles of punishment-we profess that our object is solely the prevention of future crime-but when in court we discuss the sentence to be passed, we talk much of "natural justice "-(though no one can define exactly what that means, or what law, human or Divine, ordains it,) much of the criminal's deserts; much of the necessity of satisfying the respectable portion of the community by a sentence of proper severity; but very little of any calculation based upon a knowledge of the feelings of the lowest, and poorest, and weakest, which may show either how those weak ones may be best kept out of temptation -or how the honest man can be saved from having his goods stolen, and then being heavily taxed to punish the thief who has robbed him. Our profession, our theory, our real intention is Christian and philosophical, but our practice is neither one nor the other.

The most striking evil in our present system is its utter uncertainty. All allow that, if deterrence is our object, certainty of punishment is of far more avail than severity. Yet those who talk most of the value of certainty seem to forget or ignore this most palpable truism-namely, that if we are to prevent a crime we must prevent it before it is committed, and not after.

If certainty of punishment is to prevent it, that certainty must exist before the crime which it is to prevent. Yet we hear it strongly urged, that when a judge has passed a sentence, that sentence should be certainly carried out, as if that would prevent the crime which has preceded it—it is only the punishment of the past crime which we have even professed to make certain. No thief, while meditating a crime, can give the most remote guess what will be its consequence -only after the crime is committed, the thief caught, and the sen

tence passed, we talk greatly about the punishment being certain ; yet this gives no certainty to the punishment of any future crimes. If every judge-every magistrate, out of many thousands-is to sentence on his own theory of justice, without some definite principles laid down and acknowledged, there cannot fail to be such a difference in practice, as to prevent any possibility of a thief even guessing at the punishment which any future crime will receive. Do not imagine that I impute a want either of care or talent to our judges or magistrates. I believe that, as a body, they act as conscientiously, as carefully, and as uprightly as men can do. It is but the system, or rather want of system, which renders their action ineffectual.

But if the present system be, by its uncertainty, a negative evil, in that it robs punishment of its deterrent power, it inflicts a positive evil by shortening the sentences of old offenders, and returning them to society to employ their increased skill in robbing the honest, to instruct beginners in the art of theft, and to give positive proof of the utter inefficiency of our present system to really put down crime.

I say, without hesitation, that three-fourths of our clever thieves have been hardened and trained to crime by a long course of three months' imprisonments: that a repetition of three months' imprisonments is the direct cause of nearly all the habitual crime of the country and that practically in every district where a repetition of three months' sentences has existed, crime is rife, and wherever 'cumulative and fixed sentences have obtained, crime has decreased. But not only does our reason tell us that sentences on our present system are likely to be varying and irregular, but, practically, we see they are so in the highest degree. Many of our most thoughtful and experienced chairmen of quarter sessions—many of our judgesmake it an almost universal rule on a second conviction, to commit to penal servitude; others hold that a first conviction should be most heavily punished, in order to terrify beginners; others on a fifth or tenth conviction, award from six to twelve months' imprisonmentthough with what object such sentences can be passed, I cannot imagine. Let me quote an account I have just received, of sentences at a recent quarter sessions, as they stand by their numbers in the calendar. No. 5, E. J., with five previous convictions (two of them penal servitude), nine months. No. 6, J. J., five convictions (twice in reformatory), nine months. No. 7, C. B., fourth conviction (once reformatory, once penal servitude), twelve months. No. 10, S. L., three times summary, three times for felony, once penal servitude, now nine months. No. 13, J. D., eleven times imprisoned, once six years' penal servitude, now twelve months' imprisonment. No. 17, W. J., once to a reformatory, once three months, once three years, now fifteen months. And so on throughout the calendar of above a hundred. Let it not be thought for a moment that I intend to impute blame, or carelessness, or incompetence, to the gentleman who passed these sentences; he probably considered attentively the

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