"This dangerous dispute was thus ended for that time. Its dangers were twofold. First, the Prince might have refused the regency with limited powers; in that case, the English Parliament would certainly have made the Queen regent, and the Prince might have accepted the Irish regency with unlimited powers; there would then have been two regents, and two separate kingdoms. Secondly, the Prince might have accepted the regency precisely on the terms offered him in each country; he would then have been a regent with limited powers in England, and with full royal prerogative in Ireland; unable to create a peer in England, but with power to swamp the House with new peerages in Ireland; unable to reward his friends with cer tain grants, pensions, and offices in England; but able to quarter them all upon the revenue of Ireland. The peril of such a condition of things was fully appreciated, both by Mr Pitt and by his able coadjutor in Ireland, Mr Fitzgibbon. They drew from it an argument for the total annihilation of Ireland by a legislative union. Others who watched events with equal attention, found in it a still sounder argument for total separation."1 Mitchell's position is inexpugnable, and no fact went further to convince British statesmen that separation or union were the only possible alternatives. After a pause, during which Europe watched the progress of the French Revolution, the next critical question that came to the front was that of Catholic Emancipation. The worst of the penal laws had been removed in 1778, but abundant disabilities remained. The question had hitherto lain like a sunken rock, on which schemes of parliamentary and other reform had suffered shipwreck, but it now showed above water. In the end of 1791 the claims of the Catholics were being pressed on the Irish Government by Pitt and Dundas. Burke threw his whole weight into the same scale, and sent his sonan alley only tolerated for the sake of his father-to Dublin. Grattan and his friends supported the same view, but the Protestant party at large were opposed to it. Pitt and Dundas tried argument and advice, but the relations between Catholics and Protestants were too embittered to be revolutionised peaceably without the intervention of direct force. In 1792 a small measure in favour of the Catholics was carried by Sir H. Langrishe, but a petition asking more complete relief aroused most violent opposition from the Ascendancy party through the kingdom, and was rejected by a majority of 208 to 23, though it had the countenance of the British Government. The following year, however, witnessed a marvellous change. Mr Pitt and the British Government by no means shared the views of the Ascendancy party and the Irish Executive. By their direct orders (Dundas to Westmoreland, 23d January 1793; Froude's English in Ireland,' iii. 73) a large measure of emancipation was early in 1793 introduced and carried through both Houses by the votes of the Court party, Dr Duigenan and Lord Clare alone, protesting audibly. By this measure the parliamentary franchise was given to Roman Catholics, and all the more oppressive restrictions that lay on them were removed. The chief disability that remained was that the right to sit in Parliament was still withheld. Pitt and Dundas were not anxious to maintain even this restriction; and there can be little doubt that, if the course of British affairs had continued smooth, this also would have been removed in no long time, and complete legal equality introduced. But now began the most severe 1 Mitchell, Hist. of Ireland, i. 177. Government, who were able, by the arrest of Keogh, Neilson, Russell, and others of the leaders on whom Wolfe Tone had relicd, to prevent concert between the invaders and the disaffected. In December a most formidable expedition under Hoche, one of the ablest French generals, set sail from Brest. It carried 15,000 troops, and artillery and arms for 45,000. By a wonderful succession of happy chances, the invasion miscarried completely. Through bad seamanship the fleet parted company the first night. Hoche and his staff were separated from the rest and never reached Ireland at all. The main part of the fleet reached Bantry Bay in safety; but fortunately for England, they were under Grouchy, the second in command to Hoche, who then, as twenty years after at Waterloo, ruined French hopes by his blunder. He hesitated and delayed. Not a man was landed. The weather became more and more tempestuous, till at length the fleet was fairly blown out to sea. They returned to France defeated by the weather, without having seen a single English ship of war either going or returning. his own flag-ship the Venerable, and the Adamant, a fifty-gun ship. With glorious audacity he anchored his two ships in the channel, which was so narrow that only a single vessel could pass out at a time. By numerous signals to seaward, he deluded De Winter into the belief that a large squadron was lying off shore, and thus for several weeks maintained with two ships a blockade of the whole Dutch fleet. By July a force of sixteen sail of the line, with ten frigates, and 15,000 troops with eighty guns, was lying ready at the Texel, but by this time the British fleet was also ready for service. Again the weather stood our friend. For two months the fleet was delayed by foul winds, until their supplies were exhausted. When at last, in October, the Dutch fleet put to sea, it was met by Duncan at Camperdown with a nearly equal force. After a desperate and bloody fight, ten Dutch ships of the line and two frigates were captured, and there was an end of all danger from Holland. Meanwhile, however, the victories and the bribes of Buonaparte had reduced Austria to peace, and within a week after In the following year the country Camperdown the Treaty of Campo was in even greater danger. The Formio left us without a single British cause was at its nadir. ally. On the very day on which The fleet our only efficient de- the treaty was signed, a decree fence was for three months in- was issued by the Directory for capacitated by successive mutin- the formation of an "army of ies, the outcome of mismanagement and neglect, whose fatuity almost amounted to treason. Meanwhile the Dutch, who were in alliance with the French, were throwing their whole national strength into the preparations for an invasion of Ireland on an equally large scale. Duncan, who was blockading the Dutch fleet in the Texel, was deserted by successive ships, till he was left with only England" at Boulogne, under General Buonaparte. The hopes of the United Irishmen reached their highest pitch. It is now known that this army was, probably from the first, intended for other purposes, but both Irish and English were completely hoodwinked by Buonaparte. The most desperate efforts were made on the one hand to welcome, on the other to repel, the expected in Officers were as bad as men. They became, as vasion. In this way passed the over these forces. Neither would it have been an invasion by a common foe. Abhorrence of French principles was only equalled by fear of the outrages of French revolutionary armies. Under these circumstances the sense of insecurity and terror which filled the minds of all friends of the connection, explains-little as it justifies the Protestant outrages of these years. As the same time, the Catholic revulsion against the dragoonings, the free quarterings, the plunderings, the murders of undisciplined troops, goes far to account for the ferocity of the rebellion of 1798. In the spring of 1798 matters came to a climax. The leaders of the United Irishmen understood the necessity of foreign aid, and desired to defer a rising until the French were in the country. They were, however, betrayed by one of their own number, and arrested at Government, who were able, by the arrest of Keogh, Neilson, Russell, and others of the leaders on whom Wolfe Tone had relicd, to prevent concert between the invaders and the disaffected. In December a most formidable expedition under Hoche, one of the ablest French generals, set sail from Brest. It carried 15,000 troops, and artillery and arms for 45,000. By a wonderful succession of happy chances, the invasion miscarried completely. Through bad seamanship the fleet parted company the first night. Hoche and his staff were separated from the rest and never reached Ireland at all. The main part of the fleet reached Bantry Bay in safety; but fortunately for England, they were under Grouchy, the second in command to Hoche, who then, as twenty years after at Waterloo, ruined French hopes by his blunder. He hesitated and delayed. Not a man was landed. The weather became more and more tempestuous, til at length the fleet was fairly blown out to sea. They returned to France defeated by the weather, without having seen a single English ship of war either going or returning. his own flag-ship the Venerable, and the Adamant, a fifty-gun ship. With glorious audacity he anchored his two ships in the channel, which was so narrow that only a single vessel could pass out at a time. By numerous signals to seaward, he deluded De Winter into the belief that a large squadron was lying off shore, and thus for several weeks maintained with two ships a blockade of the whole Dutch fleet. By July a force of sixteen sail of the line, with ten frigates, and 15,000 troops with eighty guns, was lying ready at the Texel, but by this time the British fleet was also ready for service. Again the weather stood our friend. For two months the fleet was delayed by foul winds, until their supplies were exhausted. When at last, in October, the Dutch fleet put to sea, it was met by Duncan at Camperdown with a nearly equal force. After a desperate and bloody fight, ten Dutch ships of the line and two frigates were captured, and there was an end of all danger from Holland. Meanwhile, however, the victories and the bribes of Buonaparte had reduced Austria to peace, and within a week after In the following year the country Camperdown the Treaty of Campo was in even greater danger. The Formio left us without a single British cause was at its nadir. ally. On the very day on which The fleet our only efficient de- the treaty was signed, a decree fence was for three months in- was issued by the Directory for capacitated by successive mutin- the formation of an "army of ies, the outcome of mismanage- England" at Boulogne, under ment and neglect, whose fatuity almost amounted to treason. Meanwhile the Dutch, who were in alliance with the French, were throwing their whole national strength into the preparations for an invasion of Ireland on an equally large scale. Duncan, who was blockading the Dutch fleet in the Texel, was deserted by successive ships, till he was left with only General Buonaparte. The hopes of the United Irishmen reached their highest pitch. It is now known that this army was, probably from the first, intended for other purposes, but both Irish and English were completely hoodwinked by Buonaparte. The most desperate efforts were made on the one hand to welcome, on the other to repel, the expected in vasion. In this way passed the winter of 1797 and spring of 1798; but all this time matters in Ireland had been going from bad to worse. Catholic emancipation roused Protestant bitterness and Protestant oppression. Protestant cruelty roused Catholic retaliation, In the north, the strife between Orange boys or Peep-of-day boys (so called from their visiting Catholic houses at peep of day to search for arms) and the Catholic defenders almost reached the magnitude of a war. Throughout Ireland the Protestants felt their weakness; and, as has happened since in India and Jamaica, as they became terrified they became cruel. The Irish Parliament entirely shared this feeling, and passed act after act of ever-increasing severity against the protest of ever-diminishing minorities, till Grattan and the constitutional opposition seceded in despair. The United Irishmen, whose leaders had long been Republican and Separatist, took full advantage of the opportunity to foment disaffection and prepare for invasion. Then (as always in Irish history), traitors were not wanting to betray the schemes of their friends to the Government, who were aware of the magnitude of the danger they had to meet from sedition at home and invasion from abroad, though not in a position to prove in the law courts what they knew from informers. Militia had been raised in the prospect of invasion, yeomanry had been embodied in the course of a few weeks to the number of nearly 30,000 men (Froude, iii. 178). These were necessarily Protestant, and and for the most part Orangemen of the most bigoted and ferocious description. The Irish Government was unable to maintain discipline Officers were over these forces. as bad as men. They became, as Abercromby, the Commander-in chief, publicly declared in a general order, and as Cornwallis, after the experience of the Rebellion and of Castlebar confirmed, "a terror to every one except their enemies"; and by their ravages, rapes, and murders, drove the peasantry wholesale into the arms of the United Irishmen. Providentially the threatened invasions of 1796 and 1797 miscarried by the weather without the Irish army being called on to strike a blow, and that of 1798 turned out to be a mere feint. During this period Camden had not, independently of the manry, 10,000 men on whom he could rely. If any of the three expeditions had succeeded in landing in one of the more disaffected parts of the island, there can be no reasonable doubt but that the forces of the Crown would have proved insufficient to repel the attack. Neither would it have been an invasion by a common foe. Abhorrence of French principles was only equalled by fear of the outrages of French revolutionary armies. Under these circumstances the sense of insecurity and terror which filled the minds of all friends of the connection, explains-little as it justifies the Protestant outrages of these years. As the same time, the Catholic revulsion against the dragoonings, the free quarterings, the plunderings, the murders of undisciplined troops, goes far to account for the ferocity of the rebellion of 1798. In the spring of 1798 matters came to a climax. The leaders of the United Irishmen understood the necessity of foreign aid, and desired to defer a rising until the French were in the country. They were, however, betrayed by one of their own number, and arrested at |