answers just fit the case; that they are just what was wanted, and neither more nor less. True, they are; but the reason is because truth always fits. Truth is always congruous, and agrees with itself. Every truth in the universe agrees with every other truth in the universe; whereas falsehoods not only disagree with truths, but usually quarrel among themselves. Surely Mr. Colman is influenced by no bias, no prejudice. He has no feelings to warp him, except, now that he is contradicted, he may feel an interest to be believed. If you believe Mr. Colman, then the evidence is fairly in the case.

I shall now proceed on the ground that you do believe Mr. Colman. When told that Joseph had determined to confess, the defendant said: "It is hard or unfair that Joseph should have the benefit of confessing, since the thing was done for his benefit." What thing was done for his benefit? Does not this carry an implication of the guilt of the defendant? Does it not show that he had a knowledge of the object and history of the murder? The defendant said: "I told Joseph, when he proposed it, that it was a silly business, and would get us into trouble." He knew, then, what this business was. He knew that Joseph proposed it, and that he agreed to it, else he could not get us into trouble. He understood its bearing and its consequences. Thus much was said, under circumstances that make it clearly evidence against him, before there is any pretense of an inducement held out. And does not this prove him to have had a knowledge of the conspiracy? He knew the daggers had been destroyed, and he knew who committed the murder. How could he have innocently known these facts? Why, if by Richard's story, this shows him guilty of a knowledge of the murder and of the conspiracy. More than all, he knew when the deed was done, and that he went home afterwards. This shows his participation in that deed. "Went home afterwards!" Home from what scene? home from what fact? home from what transaction? home from what place? This confirms the supposition that the prisoner was in Brown street for the purposes ascribed to him. These questions were directly put, and directly answered. He does not intimate that he received the information from another. Now, if he knows the time, and went home afterwards, and does not excuse himself, is not this an admission that he had a hand in this murder? Already proved to be a conspirator in the murder, he now confesses that he knew who did it, at what time it was done, that he was himself out of his own house at the time, and went home afterwards. Is not this conclusive, if not explained? Then comes the club. He told where it was. This is like possession of stolen goods. He is charged with the guilty knowledge of this concealment. He must show, not say, how he came by this knowledge. If a man be found with stolen goods, he

must prove how he came by them. The place of deposit of the club was premeditated and selected, and he knew where it was.

Joseph Knapp was an accessory, and an accessory only; he knew only what was told him. But the prisoner knew the particular spot in which the club might be found. This shows his knowledge something more than that of an accessory. This presumption must be rebutted by evidence, or it stands strong against him. He has too much knowledge of this transaction to have come innocently by it. It must stand against. him until he explains it.

This testimony of Mr. Colman is represented as new matter, and therefore an attempt has been made to excite a prejudice against it. It is not so. How little is there in it, after all, that did not appear from other sources? It is mainly confirmatory. Compare what you learn. from this confession with what you before knew: As to its being proposed by Joseph, was not that known? As to Richard's being alone in the house, was not that known? As to the daggers, was not that known? As to the time of the murder, was not that known? As to his being out that night, was not that known? As to his returning afterwards, was not that known? As to the club, was not that known? So this information concerns what was known before, and fully confirms it.

One word as to the interview between Mr. Colman and Phippen Knapp on the turnpike. It is said that Mr. Colman's conduct in this matter is inconsistent with his testimony. There does not appear to me to be any inconsistency. He tells you that his object was to save Joseph, and to hurt no one, and least of all the prisoner at the bar. He had probably told Mr. White the substance of what he heard at the prison. He had probably told him that Frank confirmed what Joseph had confessed. He was unwilling to be the instrument of harm to Frank. He therefore, at the request of Phippen Knapp, wrote a note to Mr. White, requesting him to consider Joseph as authority for the information he had received. He tells you that this is the only thing he has to regret, as it may seem to be an evasion, as he doubts whether it was entirely correct. If it was an evasion, if it was a deviation, if it was an error, it was an error of mercy, an error of kindness,—an error that proves he had no hostility to the prisoner at the bar. It does not in the least vary his testimony or affect its correctness. Gentlemen, I look on the evidence of Mr. Colman as highly important not as bringing into the cause new facts, but as confirming, in a very satisfactory manner, other evidence. It is incredible that he can be false, and that he is seeking the prisoner's life through false swearing. If he is true, it is incredible that the prisoner can be innocent.

Gentlemen. I have gone through with the evidence in this case, and

have endeavored to state it plainly and fairly before you. I think there
are conclusions to be drawn from it, the accuracy of which you cannot
doubt. I think you cannot doubt that
there was a conspiracy formed
for the purpose of committing this murder, and who the conspirators
were; that you cannot doubt that the Crowninshields and the Knapps
were the parties in this conspiracy; that you cannot doubt that the pris-
oner at the bar knew that the murder was be done on the night of
the 6th of April; that you cannot doubt that the murderers of Captain
White were the suspicious persons seen in and about Brown street on
een in
that night; that you cannot doubt that Richard Crowninshield was the
perpetrator of that crime; that you cannot doubt that the prisoner at
the bar was in Brown street on that night. If there, then it must be
by agreement, to countenance, to aid, the perpetrator, and, if so, then
he is guilty as principal.

Gentlemen, your whole concern should be to do your duty, and leave consequences to take care of themselves. You will receive the law from the court. Your verdict, it is true, may endanger the prisoner's life, but then it is to save other lives. If the prisoner's guilt has been shown and proved beyond all reasonable doubt, you will convict him. If such reasonable doubts of guilt still remain, you will acquit him. You are the judges of the whole case. You owe a duty to the public, as well as to the prisoner at the bar. You cannot presume to be wiser than the law. Your duty is a plain, straightforward one. Doubtless we would all judge him in mercy. Towards him, as an individual, the law inculcates no hostility; but towards him, if proved to be a murderer, the law, and the oaths you have taken, and public justice demand that you do your duty. With consciences satisfied with the discharge of duty, no consequences can harm you. There is no evil that we cannot either face or fly from but the consciousness of duty disregarded. A sense of duty pursues us ever. It is omnipresent, like the Deity. If we take to ourselves the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, duty performed or duty violated is still with us, for our happiness. or our misery. If we say the darkness shall cover us, in the darkness, as in the light, our obligations are yet with us. We cannot escape their power, nor fly from their presence. They are with us in this life, will be with us at its close; and in that scene of inconceivable solemnity, which lies yet farther onward, we shall still find ourselves surrounded by the consciousness of duty, to pain us wherever it has been violated, and to console us so far as God may have given us grace to perform it.

82

THE DEFENSE OF LORD GORDON

By Thomas Erskine.

[Delivered in the Court of King's Bench, before Lord Chief Justice Mansfield and a special jury, 1781.]

The occasion which led to the prosecution of Lord Gordon will be familiar to readers of Dickens' "Barnaby Rudge." Lord Gordon, an enthusiastic young Scottish nobleman, had been chosen president of the Protestant Association, whose object was to procure the repeal of Sir George Saville's act in favor of the Catholics. This statute, which simply relieved the Roman Catholic subjects of England from some of the penalties to which they had long been subject, did not apply to Scotland. The winter following its passage, a movement was begun to extend its provisions to Scotland. This produced tumult in Edinburgh, in which some popish chapels and mass houses were destroyed, and further efforts in this direction were abandoned. A great number of Protestant societies were soon formed in Scotland and in England for the purpose of petitioning parliament to repeal Sir George Saville's act, which was represented at their meetings, and branded in their publications, as fraught with danger to the constitution. Their resolutions and petitions were publicly printed and distributed for several months, with a view to influencing parliament. At length, as president of the London Association, Lord Gordon directed the members to meet him in St. George's Fields, and proceed thence to the parliament house with a petition for the repeal of the bill. Accordingly, on the second of June, 1780, about forty thousand persons, composed mostly of the middle classes, assembled and blocked up all the avenues to the house of commons. They were not armed, and most of them were orderly in their conduct, though individuals among them insulted some members of parliament who were passing into the building, requiring them to put blue, cockades on their hats, and to cry, "No popery." Lord Gordon presented the petition, but the house refused, by a vote of 192 to 6, to consider it at that time. The multitude then became disorderly, and the whole affair took a serious turn. Bodies of men proceeded to demolish the Catholic chapels at the residences of the foreign ministers. Desperate men took the lead; the London prisons were broken open and destroyed; thirty-six fires were started at various points during the night; Lord Mansfield's house was destroyed; breweries and distilleries were broken open, and the mob became infuriated with liquor. The government was taken by surprise, and for several days the city was completely in the power of the mob. The militia were at last called in from the country, and the riot put down; not, however, until nearly five hundred persons had been killed or wounded, exclusive of those who perished from the effects of intoxication.

THOMAS (LORD) ERSKINE. Born at Edinburgh, January 10, 1750; educated at St. Andrews University; called to the bar at Lincoln Inn, London, July, 1778; in 1806 was made Lord Chancellor and elevated to the peerage; died at Linlithgowshire, Scotland. November 17, 1823.

Lord Gordon was promptly arraigned for high treason. The trial came on before Chief Justice Mansfield and a special jury in the court of king's bench. The attorney general appeared for the crown. Lloyd Kenyon (afterwards chief justice) and Thomas Erskine represented the defendant. The prosecution contended that the prisoner, in assembling the multitude round the houses of parliament, if he did so with a view to overawe and intimidate the legislature, and enforce his purposes by numbers and violence, was guilty of treason in levying war against the king in his realm, within the statute of treasons of Edward III.,-a doctrine which was fully confirmed by the court. It was contended, moreover, that the overt acts proved might fairly be construed into such a design, being, in fact, the only evidence by which a traitorous design, in such a case, could be shown. After Kenyon had opened the case for the prisoner, Erskine having claimed the privilege of speaking to the whole evidence, the witnesses for the defense were called. The Rev. Mr. Middleton, a member of the Protestant Association, testified to the prisoner's loyalty to the king and attachment to the constitution; that his speeches at the meetings of the association never contained an expression tending directly or indirectly to a repeal of the bill by force; that he desired the people not even to carry sticks in the procession, and begged that riotous persons might be delivered to the constable. Dr. Evans, an eminent surgeon, declared that he saw the prisoner in St. George's Fields, and that his conduct and expressions indicated that he wished and endeavored to prevent all disorder. This was confirmed by others; and it was proved that the bulk of the people around the parliament house and in the lobby were not members of the association, but idlers, vagabonds, and pickpockets, who had thrust themselves in, so that the persons who had insulted the members were of a totally different class from those who formed the original gathering. The Earl of Lonsdale, who took the prisoner home from the house in his carriage, swore that Lord Gordon, in reply to inquiries from the great multitudes surrounding him as to the fate of the petition, answered that it was uncertain, and earnestly entreated them to retire to their homes and be quiet. It was past midnight when the evidence was all in. Erskine then addressed the jury in the following speech. It will be observed that Erskine did not take issue with the authorities as to what constituted treason. "If it had been proved," he said, "that the same multitude, under the direction of Lord George Gordon, had afterwards attacked the bank, broke open the prisons, and set London in a conflagration, I should not now be addressing you." In other words, such acts would have been treason by levying war, and actually were so in the case of those who committed them. The defense was that Lord Gordon had nothing to do with the riots, which were, so far as he was concerned, the unintended and unexpected consequences of his imprudent conduct in putting himself at the head of a mob for the purpose of tumultuous petitioning. And Chief Justice Mansfield charged the jury that, "if this multitude assembled with intent, by acts of force and violence, to compel the legislature to repeal the law, it is high treason." The jury withdrew at three o'clock in the morning, and promptly returned with a verdict of not guilty.' Veeder's "Legal Masterpieces," pp. 44-46.

GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY: Mr. Kenyon having informed the court that we propose to call no other witnesses, it is now my duty to address myself to you as counsel for the noble prisoner at the bar, the whole 121 Howell, St. Tr. 485.