[225 N. Y.] Points of counsel. [Feb., free school district No. 9 of such town. (Mahler v. N. & N. Y. Transp. Co., 35 N. Y. 352; Matter of U. B. Material Co., 137 App. Div. 893.) The order of the district superintendent is not void because made without the consent of the trustees of the dissolved districts. The order was executed under section 129 of the Education Law, which does not require the consent of the trustees of the dissolved districts. (State Board v. Halliday, 150 Ind. 216; Kelly v. Multnomah Co., 18 Ore. 356; City of New York v. New York City Railway Co., 193 N. Y. 543; Grimmer v. Tenement House Dept., 205 N. Y. 549; Kings County Lighting Co. v. City of New York, 176 App. Div. 175.) The plaintiff having submitted the controversy as to the consolidation of district No. 7, Oyster Bay, with union free school district No. 9 of such town to the commissioner of education, he is bound by the decision of the commissioner on such appeal and the validity of the order of consolidation as affirmed by the commissioner may not be questioned in this action. (Code Civ. Pro. § 1926; Welker v. Lathrop, 210 N. Y. 434; People ex rel. Jennings v. Finley, 175 App. Div. 204; People ex rel. Bd. of Education v. Finley, 211 N. Y. 51.) William D. Guthrie for Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 9 of the Town of Oyster Bay et al., appellants. The territory of Centre island adjoins the Oyster Bay school district No. 9, within the intent and meaning of section 129 of the Education Law. (United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; Matter of United Building Material Co., 137 App. Div. 893; Mahler v. N. & N. Y. Transp. Co., 35 N. Y. 352; Brown v. Burt, 81 L. J. Rep. 17; Cunningham's Case, Bell's Crown Cas. 72; D. U. S. Cable Co. v. A. A. Tel. Co., L. R. 2 App. Cas. 394; Cave v. Horsell, 1912, 3 K. B. 533; Vestal v. Little Rock, 54 Ark. 321.) The consolidation order is not 1919.] Opinion, per CHASE, J. [225 N. Y.] void because made without the consent of the trustees of the dissolved districts. (McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593; Grimmer v. Tenement House Dept., 205 N. Y. 549; People ex rel. Werner v. Prendergast, 206 N. Y. 405; New Haven R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com., 200 U. S. 361; United States v. Hermanos y Compania, 209 U. S. 337; Copper Queen Mining Co. v. Arizona Board, 206 U. S. 474; Langto v. Raymond, 90 App. Div. 614; Pouch v. Prudential Ins. Co., 204 N. Y. 281; Caesar v. Bernard, 156 App. Div. 724.) William N. Dykman, Alfred T. Davison and James K. Foster for respondent. Common school district No. 7 and union free school district No. 9 are not adjoining school districts within the meaning of the Education Law. (Holmes v. Carley, 31 N. Y. 289; Matter of Ward, 52 N. Y. 395; Child v. Starr, 4 Hill, 369; Bechtel v. Village of Edgewater, 45 Hun, 240; Saranac L. & T. Co. v. Roberts, 208 N. Y. 288; Caddy v. Interborough R. T. Co., 195 N. Y. 415; Baxter v. York Realty Co., 128 App. Div. 79; Coventry v. L. B. & S. C. Ry. Co., L. R. 5 Eq. 104; Haynes v. King, 1893, 3 Ch. Div. 439; Matter of Bateman, 1899, 1 Ch. Div. 599.) The order of the district superintendent is void because made without the consent of the trustees of the districts sought to be dissolved. (People ex rel. Light v. Skinner, 159 N. Y. 162.) Section 880 (now 890) of the Education Law does not deprive the courts of this state of jurisdiction in this action. (People ex rel. Merrill v. Cooley, 75 Misc. Rep. 188; People ex rel. Underhill v. Skinner, 74 App. Div. 58; People ex rel. Light v. Skinner, 159 N. Y. 162; Haley v. Whitney, 53 Hun, 119; State ex rel. Bidgood v. Clifton, 113 Wis. 107; People ex rel. School Dist. v. Van Horn, 20 Col. C. A. 215.) CHASE, J. This action is brought by a taxpayer of former school district No. 7 of the town of Oyster Bay [225 N. Y.] Opinion, per CHASE, J. [Feb., in the county of Nassau to restrain the defendants from carrying out, perfecting or in any way enforcing an order of the district superintendent of the first supervisory district of Nassau county, comprising the towns of Oyster Bay and North Hempstead, by which said school district No. 7, and also school district No. 10 of said town of Oyster Bay were dissolved and the territory thereof united to union free school district No. 9 of said town. So far as appears before us all persons in any way interested in said districts or either of them assent to and acquiesce in carrying out said order except certain taxpayers of district No. 7. The order was made pursuant to the authority of section 129 of the Education Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 16), which is as follows: "Any school commissioner (now district superintendent) may dissolve one or more districts, and may from said territory form a new district; he may also unite such territory or a portion thereof to any adjoining school district, except a union free school district whose boundaries are coterminous with the boundaries of an incorporated village or city." The boundaries of school district No. 9 are not coterminous with the boundaries of an incorporated village or city. The plaintiff challenges the jurisdiction of the district superintendent to make the order, the enforcement of which he seeks to prevent because: 1. It is alleged that consent was not cbtained for the dissolution of school district No. 7 and its annexation to union free school district No. 9. No consent is required for the dissolution, reformation and consolidation of districts pursuant to section 129 of the Education Law that we have quoted. A distinction is made in the Education Law between an alteration of the boundaries of a school district (Education Law, sections 123 to 128) and the dissolution, reformation and consolidation of districts. (Education Law, section 1919.] Opinion, per CHASE, J. [225 N. Y.] 129.) The distinction existed in the statute of 1894 (Chapter 556), as amended by chapter 264 of the Laws of 1896. It was frequently recognized and proclaimed by the department of education through the superintendent of public instruction prior to the consolidation of the Education Law in 1909. (Matter of Dwyer, University of the State of New York, Judicial Decisions 18221913, page 699; Matter of Jones, Id. page 709; Matter of Stryker, Id. page 735.) The legislature with knowledge of the decisions of the department of education when it consolidated the school and educational laws continued the distinction between the alteration and the dissolution of a school district. The statutes have been practically construed as contended for by the appellants. Much weight should be given to the practical construction of a statute by the officers whose duty it is to enforce it. (Kings County Lighting Co. v. City of New York, 176 App. Div. 175; City of New York v. N. Y. City Ry. Co., 193 N. Y. 543; Grimmer v. Tenement House Dept. N. Y., 205 N. Y. 549; People ex rel. Williams v. Dayton, 55 N. Y. 367.) The doubt expressed in 1905 in Matter of Jones (supra) in regard to annexing the territory of a dissolved district to a union free school district without the consent of the school authorities of such district apparently led to the change in section 9 of title 6 of chapter 556 of the Laws of 1894, as amended by chapter 264 of the Laws of 1896, when in section 27 of the Education Law (Laws of 1909, chapter 21) the words "common or union free school" were inserted for the purpose, as stated in a note of the consolidators, of making the section conform to the usage of the department of education. Section 129 of the Education Law that we have quoted has been amended to authorize uniting the territory or a part thereof of a dissolved district to any adjoining school district, without [225 N. Y.] Opinion, per CHASE, J. [Feb., exception or limitation other than that it cannot be united to the territory of a union free school district whose boundaries are coterminous with the boundaries of an incorporated village or city. 2. It is alleged that the territory of school district No. 7 does not adjoin school district No. 9. The territory of the state of New York as it extends easterly over Long Island is bounded on the north by the territory of the state of Connecticut. The boundary line between the states is specifically stated in chapter 57 of the Consolidated Laws (State Law, section 2). The county of Nassau and the town of Oyster Bay as a part of that county each include a part of the northern shore of Long Island. In Mahler v. Norwich & N. Y. Transportation Company (35 N. Y. 352, 359) this court say: "We think there is no force in the suggestion, that, if the State owns to the center of the sound, a considerable part of our domain is not partitioned into counties and towns. Even if the statute, in declaring the bounds of the counties bordering on the sound, had limited them, in terms, to the line of low-water mark, it would indicate nothing but the mere fact that the legislature deemed their extension to the exterior water-line of the State a matter of no practical importance; but in the absence of any such limitation, we are clearly of the opinion expressed by this court on a former occasion, that the respective counties and towns, which are bounded generally on the sound, comprehend within their limits the waters between their respective shores and the waterline of the State. This is the usual and reasonable rule in the political apportionment of territory, for the purpose of fixing the limits of civil and criminal jurisdiction." (People v. Hulse, 3 Hill, 309; Matter of United Building Material Company, 137 App. Div. 893.) Oyster bay as a part of Long Island sound is a landlocked harbor. It opens into Cold Spring harbor on |