1919.] Opinion, per, CRANE, J. [225 N. Y.] How possibly does this corroborate the woman's statement that the man she brought there was the defendant? Does this testimony of the doctor identify the defendant or tend to connect him with the offense? The only word we have that the defendant was present in the doctor's office is the word of the woman. His connection with the case is dependent entirely upon her story. This is not slight evidence of corroboration; it is no evidence whatever. Section 2177 provides that no conviction can be had for seduction under promise of marriage upon the testimony of the female seduced unsupported by other evidence. The other evidence must tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, as stated in section 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the testimony of accomplices. (People v. Plath, 100 N. Y. 590.) In People v. O'Farrell (175 N. Y. 323, 325) it was said of corroborating evidence: "What appears to be required is, that there should be some fact deposed to, independently altogether of the evidence of the accomplice, which, taken by itself, leads to the inference not only that a crime has been committed, but that the prisoner is implicated in it." It was also said that corroboration must be of a character which tends to prove the defendant's guilt by connecting him with the crime, and that if there be no such evidence tending to connect the defendant, a question of law is presented reviewable by this court. In crimes of this nature the woman must be corroborated in two particulars: First, as to the marriage; second, as to the seduction. The corroborating evidence upon this latter point must be such as tends to connect the defendant with the sexual act. (People v. Page, 162 N. Y. 272; People v. Hooghkerk, 96 N. Y. 149–162.) In People v. Cole (134 App. Div. 759) it was said of a doctor's testimony regarding the pregnancy of the [225 N. Y.] Opinion, per CRANE, J. [Feb., woman that it simply proved that she had had sexual intercourse with some man, but was not corroborative of the plaintiff's testimony against the defendant. The court in People v. Flaherty (27 App. Div. 535-546), a trial for rape, charged the jury "the fact that the child was born is no evidence corroborating the claim of the people that this defendant is the guilty man." This was held to be correct. This case was reversed in 162 New York, 532, but this point was not mentioned. The rule in Massachusetts as stated in Commonwealth v. Holmes (127 Mass. 424) is not quite in accord with our own, although it is intimated that in charging juries the practice is the same. The measure of corroboration required in the so-called sexual crimes (Penal Law, sections 2013, 2177, 2460, subdivision 9) is more than that demanded by section 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure respecting confessions. The confession of a defendant is not sufficient to warrant his conviction without additional proof that the crime charged has been committed. The independent proof need only establish the corpus delicti; it need not connect or tend to connect the defendant with it. (People v. Deacons, 109 N. Y. 374, 378; People v. Roach, 215 N. Y. 592, 600.) That the prosecutrix had with her some man as her husband was no evidence of corroboration against this defendant, unidentified. As the other evidence of corroboration in this case was somewhat slim at the best, it cannot be said that this error in the refusal to charge was harmless. Neither can it be said that the request only applied to corroboration of the prosecutrix generally and not to the element of seduction. The request was preceded by the following, which was charged by the court: I request your Honor to charge the jury that the law is that before they can convict they must find such 1919.] Opinion, per CRANE, J. [225 N. Y.] corroborating evidence in this case, both as to the fact that there was sexual intercourse and that there was a promise of marriage which was used to accomplish the sexual intercourse.' After this follows the request above quoted and about which I am writing. It is clear to see, therefore, that the corroboration referred to was the corroboration of the testimony required by the Penal Law. Just what is meant by general corroboration as distinguished from that required by section 2177 I do not quite comprehend. The posing of some man as the lady's husband without identifying him in any way is neither corroboration of the promise to marry or of intercourse as against the defendant. What does it corroborate? If the doctor had said she were pregnant, his testimony might help to establish that she had been with some man, so too, if he had said that she were no longer a virgin. But there is no such evidence in this case. The doctor fails to give the result of his physical examination, merely repeating Miss Levine's conversation with him, and his advice to them in these words: "I told him what was to be done, or I said if she was willing to suffer pain a little longer, it probably may pass off." In fact it is apparent that the evidence of the doctor was only sought for the purpose of proving an acknowledgment by Miss Levine's companion that he was her husband. Such attempted corroboration comes fairly within this sentence from the Page case: "A witness cannot generally be corroborated by proving declarations made out of court of the same facts testified to in court." (p. 275.) One other request was made which we also think should have been charged. It appeared from the testimony of one Mildred Slote that she was at the dining-room table having a meal with Miss Levine and Mr. and Mrs. [225 N. Y.] Opinion, per CRANE, J. [Feb., Levine and the baby when the defendant who was present stated in reply to a question as to the time of his marriage with Miss Levine that "Physically, spiritually, bodily and morally they were married, ritually they would be married very soon." No attention apparently was given to this remark by any one present; the conversation went on just the same without comment. It was said upon the trial that this was a confession by the defendant of his guilt and an acknowledgment of sexual intercourse with Miss Levine. The court was asked to charge as follows: 'I ask your Honor to charge that if they find that the words 'spiritually, physically and morally married' were employed, still, if they find that they were used at a time and under such such circumstances as to indicate that they were not intended by the defendant as an assertion that he had had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, that they cannot then consider such testimony as being corroborating evidence of the act of sexual intercourse. "The Court: Refused." If the statement made by the defendant were meaningless or stated as a joke, or under such circumstances as to indicate to any one that it was not a confession of guilt, certainly the jury would not be justified in considering it as corroboration or as an admission of a fact. To refuse this request in our opinion was error. error. People will indulge occasionally in silly talk and joke by exaggeration. Such remarks could not be taken as admissions of actual occurrences if so stated that nobody would or did believe them. The request, we see, assumes them to be so spoken. The next request, which was charged, did not cure this error, as the jury were simply told that they might determine for themselves what the words meant. If they should determine, however, that they meant nothing mere idle talk - yet, the court said they could use them 1919.] Dissenting opinion, per MCLAUGHLIN, J. [225 N. Y.] as corroborating evidence required by the law. This is what the two requests amount to read together. We need not discuss the other exceptions. Sufficient has been stated to lead us to the conclusion that a new trial should be granted. All that Miss Levine says may be true the defendant did not take the stand and her story is not improbable or suspicious. Yet the law for years has required that the most likely story of the woman in these cases must be corroborated, and we are not justified in weakening this wise provision in order to reach a man whom all may think to be in the wrong. The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted. MCLAUGHLIN, J. (dissenting). The defendant was convicted of the crime of seduction under promise of marriage. The judgment of conviction has been unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division and defendant now appeals to this court. * The statute under which the conviction was obtained provides as follows: "A person who, under promise of marriage, * * seduces and has sexual intercourse with an unmarried female of previous chaste character, is punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both." (Penal Law, section 2175.) A conviction, however, cannot be had upon the testimony of the female seduced, unsupported by other evidence. (Penal Law, section 2177.) The unanimous affirmance of the judgment of conviction by the Appellate Division conclusively establishes, so far as this court is concerned, that the testimony of the female seduced was supported by other evidence. (People v. Willett, 213 N. Y. 368; People v. Sweeney, 213 N. Y. 37.) But it is urged that certain errors, to which exceptions |