forensic labour; and if the appearance of arguing causes was kept up in his Court, however drowsily, the less he was called upon for an effort of thought, the better he was pleased.* At last he seemed to be under a sort of infatuation upon the subject; and after the motions against him in the House of Commons, and the appointment of the Chancery Commission, he was still more dilatory and inefficient. The heaviest charge brought against him in his lifetime was his habit of delaying judgment after the cause had been heard. This, although by no means without foundation, was dreadfully exaggerated. He lived in factious times, and, being himself a very keen and successful politician, he excited a good deal of envy and hatred among his opponents. "When Lord Eldon had passed the fifth part of a century in office, and made no sign of retiring, letters of marque were issued by the Whig Opposition to burn, sink, and destroy the old first-rate that lay so obstinately in the very mouth of the harbour, and obstructed their entrance."† Besides the annual motions made against him in the House of Commons, which I have mentioned, there was a constant succession of attacks upon him in pamphlets, reviews, and newspapers, and the grand topic was his "denial of justice by refusing to decide." This was boldly asserted as a fact, and to this mainly was attributed the enormous accumulation of arrears in the Court of Chancery, with all the evils, real and imaginary, prevailing there. Bands of litigants, wan, weary and wasted, whose suits, after many years of expectation, had been finally heard, were represented as still wandering about Lincoln's Inn Hall, and exclaiming, "Ah! little know'st thou, who hast never tried, Nay, it was asserted that many, who had large sums undoubtedly due to them, locked up in Chancery, had, by the doubts and delays of the Lord Chancellor, actually died of penury, or of a broken heart, and that their ghosts might be seen between midnight and cock-crow, flitting round the Accountant General's office. Ludicrous stories were likewise invented of one cargo of ice having melted away, and another cargo of fruit having all become rotten, while he was doubting what judgment he should pronounce on motions for an injunction.‡ * It is said that traps were sometimes laid for him to prove his want of attention to the arguments,—as a junior, about to repeat an argument for the fifth time, would say, "Now, my Lord, I am about to venture upon a new view of the case, which, may, perhaps, be deserving of consideration,"--when the Chancellor, having laid aside his pen for a time, would say, "That new view of the case does deserve and shall receive consideration." †2 Townsend, 410. There is no better foundation for these stories than what is to be found in On the other hand he was zealously defended in all that he did, and in all that he omitted to do-and if his advocates reluctantly admitted that at times he was a little given to the "cunctative," they exclaimed, "Tu maximus ille es Unus qui nobis cunctando restituis rem." Many returns on the subject were ordered by the House of Commons, and many volumes were written, invidiously or complimentarily comparing Lord Eldon with Lord Hardwicke and his predecessors, and with Sir John Leach and his contemporaries. But the interest of the controversy has almost entirely evaporated. It is very certain that Lord Eldon did defer his judgments most unjustifiably and unaccountably, although the blame to which he was liable for this habit was so much overcharged. It is the duty of a judge, in grave and difficult cases, to take time to consider; but it is his duty, as soon as is consistent with due deliberation, to make up his mind, and to deliver judgment,-further delay not only unnecessarily prolonging the suspense of the parties interested, but rendering the judge less and less qualified to decide rightly, as the facts of the case escape from his recollection, and the impression made upon him by the arguments at the Bar is effaced-to say nothing of the double time and labour required from him in vainly trying to make himself master, a second time, of what he once thoroughly understood. Lord Eldon, as soon as he had been informed of the circumstances of a case, formed an opinion upon it from which he hardly ever departed, and at the close of the arguments he would intimate this pretty plainly. Yet he not unfrequently expressed doubts-reserved to himself the opportunity for further consideration—took home the papers-never read them-promised judg ment again and again-and for years never gave it-all the facts and the law connected with it having escaped from his memory. I shall give a few instances of this infirmity. On one occasion, having spoken very luminously for two hours on the merits of a case which he had heard, and having intimated a strong opinion in favour of the defendant, he finished by saying, "However, I will take home the papers and read them carefully, and will tell the parties on a future day what my judgment will be." Sir Samuel Romilly, rising from his seat and turning round to the juniors, said, "Now is not this extraordinary? I never heard a more satisfactory judgment; and yet the Chancellor professes that he cannot make up his mind. It is wonderful; and the more so, because, however long he takes to consider a cause, I scarcely ever knew him differ from his first impression." Cousins v. Smith, 13 Vesey, 542, where the fruit was landed in good order and sold, the injunction applying to the proceeds. * The great controversy was whether the business of the Court of Chancery had increased since Lord Hardwicke's time? Notwithstanding some returns, showing the number of bills filed, I cannot doubt that it had increased most enormously, considering the increase in our population, commerce, and wealth; and that the sum of money in Court belonging to the suitors had certainly increased more than tenfold. The history of two cases between Ware and Horwood is detailed in the following letter, which was written by the solicitor for the plaintiff to the Lord Chancellor: "Ware v. Horwood. } ? My Lord,-My clients have great reason Same v. Same. to complain of the great injury suffered by them in consequence of these causes not keeping their station at the head of your Lordship's paper, agreeably to your Lordship's order, repeatedly given in my hearing. It is now nearly seven years since they have been waiting for your Lordship's judgment; and upwards of two years ago they had arrived at the top of the paper, at which place I humbly entreat they may, until you can decide upon them, remain. There is a fund of 10,000l. and upwards locked up in Court until your Lordship decides in these causes, and it is therefore matter of great importance to my unfortunate clients that your Lordship's decision may not be delayed by the circumstances to which I have above alluded. Ít is painful to me to state to your Lordship that I have learnt, from authority which I have no reason to doubt, that the infant, for whose benefit these suits were instituted twenty years ago, died of a broken heart on account of being kept out of his property, and that I have to contend against the bitter feelings of his relations. Under these distressing circumstances, knowing that your Lordship will pardon the liberty I have taken in thus addressing you, and which nothing but the imperious necessity of the case would have induced me to have done, I have the honour," &c. It is said by Lord Eldon's friends, that upon investigation the sum locked up was found to be greatly overstated, and that the death of the infant of a broken heart turned out to be a fable; yet, strange to say! the solicitor, instead of being committed to the Fleet Prison for a contempt of court, in fulfilment of a denunciation lately uttered by the Chancellor against the practice of writing private letters to him about pending suits, was sent for to the private room of the Chancellor, where he was most courteously received,-and his bill of costs to his client contained the following item, which, when read aloud, caused a deep sensation in the House of Commons: "To attendance on the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain in his private room, when his Lordship begged for further indulgence from me till to-morrow 16s. 4d." His Lordship, having begged and obtained a further respite, was at length as good as his word, and, with the spur in his side, actually did make a decree. But in the following case, verified by the oath of a member of Parliament before the Chancery commission in August, 1825, it would appear that no decree was ever made: "In a friendly suit, the sum at stake not being more than 25007., the Chancellor declared in November 1816, that he would give judgment in a few days.' The parties died; and after three years, the solicitor for some of the representatives, becoming impatient, followed the precedent in Ware v. Horwood, and wrote the following note to the Lord Chancellor : 'Erskine v. Gartshore.-The solicitor for the representatives of the parties in the cause is desired on their behalf humbly to entreat the Lord Chancellor's judgment in the above cause. The subject matter in question came on to be heard before his Lordship in the shape of exceptions to the Master's Report on the 20th and 22d November 1816. -May 22d, 1820.' "In two or three days the Chancellor returned the following answer: In the case of Erskine v. Gartshore, the papers were long ago taken from my table. I have desired Mr. Hand to make due inquiry for them, and, understanding from your note that I have been mistaken in supposing that the cause was arranged, as soon as I get the papers I will dispose of it. Yours, with much respect, 'ELDON.' "I have only to add," said the witness, "that, notwithstanding the promise contained in his Lordship's note, the cause still stands for judgment in his paper, and is still undisposed of." It has been asserted that "the materials for judgment were gone: the papers could never be recovered.”* I will only mention one other case of this class. Under a will it was doubtful which of two sons of the late Earl Somers on his death would be entitled to a considerable estate. With a view to his own will he wished the question to be decided in his lifetime, and for this purpose he directed that a friendly suit should be instituted in the Court of Chancery. The case being most learnedly and elaborately argued, the Chancellor promised a speedy judgment; but term rolled on after term, and year after year, without any judgment being given. Lord Somers several times spoke to him privately, [AUG. 23, 1825.] saying that he had no bias on the subject, but that it was of great consequence to his family, to have a decision one way or the other. "That you shall," said the Chancellor," and I take so much time to consider it that you may have one that will stand." Several times was a day appointed for giving judgment, and as often, on some pretence, judgment was postponed. At last, the case being in the paper for judgment, once more Lord Somers attended in person, in the hope of extorting it, and the Lord Chancellor actually began by reading the bill, the answer, and depositions, when he showed that he had utterly forgotten what the question was, and declared that, being obliged to attend a meeting of the Cabinet, he must postpone the judgment to a future day. Lord Somers thereupon intimated to him that he thought it would be better to allow the question to stand over till after his own death, and that he did not desire that any judgment should be pronounced. * 2 Townsend, 413. † I am not sure whether there be any notice of it in print, but I have it from an undoubted source. The cause, or perhaps the pretext, for these delays was a principle on which he professed to act, "that it was always his duty to read the bill, answer, depositions, and exhibits, and to consider not only the facts stated and the points made at the bar, but all the facts in the cause, and all the points that might be made on either side." "I know," said he, "it has been an opinion-a maxim-a principle-ay, an honest principle, on which several of those who have presided in this Court have acted, that a judge is obliged to know nothing more than counsel think proper to communicate to him, relative to the case. But for myself I have thought and acted otherwise: and I know, yes, I could swear upon my oath, that if I had given judgment on such information and statements only as I have received from counsel on both sides, I should have disposed of numerous estates to persons who had no more title to them than I have; and believe me that I feel a comfort in that thought--a comfort of which all the observations on my conduct can never rob "During my Chancellorship," says he, in his ANECDOTE BOOK, with his usual self-complacency, "I was much, very much blamed for not giving judgment at the close of the arguments. I persevered in this, as some thought from obstinacy, but in truth from principle, from adherence to a rule of conduct, formed after much consideration what course of proceeding was most consonant with my duty. With Lord Bacon, I confess I have somewhat of the cunctative," and, with him, I thought that 'whosoever is not wiser upon advice than upon the sudden, the same man is no wiser at fifty than he was at thirty.' I confess that no man ever had more occasion than I had to use the expression, which was Lord Bacon's ordinary word, You must give me time.' I always thought it better to allow myself to doubt before I decided, than to expose myself to the misery after I had decided of doubting whether I had decided rightly and justly. It is true that too much delay before decision is a great evil; but in many instances, delay leads eventually to prevent delay; that is, the delay which enables just decision to be made accelerates the enjoyment of the fruits of the suit: and I have some reason to hope that, in a great many cases, final decision would have been infinitely longer postponed, if doubts as to the soundness of original judgments had led to rehearings and appeals, that it was postponed, when infinite care, by much and anxious and long consideration, was taken to form an impregnable original decree. The business of the Court was also so much increased in some periods of my Chancellorship, that I never could be confident that counsel had fully informed me of the facts or of the law of many of the cases; and there may be found not a few instances in which most satisfactory judgments were pronounced, which were founded upon facts or instruments with which none of the counsel who argued the cases were acquainted, though such facts and instruments formed part of the evidence in the cause." Once he observed in the House of Lords," It will be a consolation "It Quarterly Review, xliv. 102. |