of her husband." The defendants were not alleged IGNORANCE OF RIGHTS, 121-122. to have been tort-feasors, neither was any concert
of action averred or shown. The testimony clearly showed that the husband defendant was not an ac- IMPROVEMENT BONDS, 179. tive tort-feasor; that he did not either actively or passively participate in the alleged assault by his INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, 156-157. wife upon plaintiff; that he was not present when INDICTMENT, 67-68, 123-124, 279. it occurred and that when he returned his only act was to take or pull his wife away from the scene. HELD, on a motion to take off compulsory non-suit that "upon the record as it stood at the time of the trial, and upon the plaintiffs' evidence, no verdict could have been properly rendered against anyone." Elkins v. Rosenberger, 142.
INDIGNITIES TO PERSON, 99, 101. INFORMATION, CRIMINAL, 67-68, INHERITANCE TAX, 300-301. INJUNCTION, 113, 136-139, 291. INSOLVENCY, 14-15.
INSURANCE, 125-127.
123. When a son purchased an improved town lot, for his own use, with money in part borrowed from his mother on his oral promise to repay the same in certain installments, and caused the deed 133. Judgment will be entered for plaintiff in an to be made in the mother's name as grantee, but action by a beneficiary under a beneficiary insurance without her knowledge or request, and for several policy where the defense was that plaintiff did not years lived on the premises in undisputed possession, belong to any of the classes designated as possible paying taxes and insurance, HELD, that the mother beneficaries under the constitution and by-laws of merely holds the legal title as trustee, while the ben- the association, and it appeared that all premiums eficial ownership is in the son, and as such the prop had been paid regularly and decedent was in good erty is liable to seizure for his debts, or other lia-tanding at the time of death, and there was no evi bilities in the nature of debt, when reduced to judg-dence to show that plaintiff was not the beneficiary ment either at law or in equity.-Jayne v. Jayne named on the books of the lodge.-Green v. Su- preme Lodge Knights and Ladies of Honor, 31.
130. In an action in equity where it is shown that such beneficial owner had wilfully deserted his wife and child without reasonable cause, removed to another state, and thereafter wholly neglected to provide for their maintenance, and he is directed to make certain monthly payments to the wife, the property may, in default of such payments, be seiz- ed and sold to recover the amount so awarded, and both mother and son be enjoined from disposing of or encumbering the same pending the sale.-Ib. 131. As to what standing, if any, the mother may have to reclaim an unpaid balance of the loan out of the property, in absence of any agreement relating thereto, is a question to be determined on the distribution.-Ib.
134. There is no rule or law that prevents a ben- ficial insurance association from waiving any of the provisions of its constitution or by-laws, if it sees fit so to do.-lb.
135. In an action on a policy of life insurance, where the defendant sets up alleged false answers as to the excessive use of spiritous liquors, and as to prior diseases, and as to the attendance of a phy- sician, and all these facts are contradicted by wit- nesses who knew the decedent, and were in a posi- tion to know the facts as to his use of liquors, and as to his health, the case must be submitted to a jury.-Bednar's Admr. v. Prudential Insurance Co.,
INSURANCE COMPANY, LIQUIDATION OF, 1.
132. Where one under sentence to pay his wife three, dollars per week for the support of his wife and daughtered petitioned the court for modification of the order, and it was made to appear that since sentence was imposed he was divorced and that the daughter had attained the age of fifteen years and was earning from three to three and a half dollars per week as wages, the court reduced the amount of 136. The use by a brewer of certain markings the weekly payment to two dollars.-Com. v. Rod-of his beer kegs in unnecssary and exact imitation of man, 150. the markings used by a rival brewer for many years
before the imitator came into the field, will be en- joined.-Pennsylvania Central Brewing Co. v. An- thracite Beer Co., 14.
137. As relating to the necessary daily recovery of empty beer kegs for refilling, peculiar to the brewery business, the defendant's act must be re- garded as mischievous, and tending to cause confu- sion of property, and to increase both the hazard of mistake in collection and the expense of handling in that branch of the service, and on that ground the complaintant is entitled to relief in equity.-Ib.
are proper for the consideration of a jury.-Berger v. McCluan, 119.
144. A copy of a letter was incompetent as evi- dence where it did not appear that the letter was mailed or how it was brought to the attention of plaintiff, and no demand was first made to have the original produced. Where such an exhibit was a part of a deposition taken on a rule to open a judgment, the court refused to consider it.-Ib. OPENING OR VACATING, 237-239.
138. Proof of actual deception is not essential. Plaintiff's right to relief by injunction is the liabil- 145. The Act of 14 March, 1876, authorizing ity of injury to his trade by means of deception.-the court to direct the prothonotary to mark judg- Ib. ment satisfied, applies only to a clear case of a paid judgment. If there is any dispute as to the fact of payment the defendant must move to have the judgment opened and the disputed facts decided by a jury.-Hoffman v. Marker, 92.
139. There is no rational ground of distinction, in respect to the need of relief, between an injury which operates to impose additional cost of service on another, and one which directly tends to take away his trade.—Ib.
INTENTION, MUNICIPAL, 184.
INTEREST, 127.
INTERPLEADER, 23. INTOXICATION, 194.
JOINT TORT FEASORS, 128. JUDGMENT, 22, 270.
FORM, ON PLEADINGS, 248. OPENING, 121-122, 238-239.
140. Where the defendant can neither read nor write and signed a judgment exemption note upon the representation that it was to secure a smaller sum than the face of the note the court will permit him to show such imposition.—Moskovitz v. Kat- such, 128.
141. A person cannot represent both parties to a transaction without the knowledge of such fact by both parties and if such agent deceives either of the parties he cannot recover commissions from either.-It.
142. The defendant in a judgment entered by confession in his promissory note has no standing to attack it on the ground that it was voluntary and without consideration, inasmuch as only the defend- ant's creditors are prejudiced in law by such volun- tary confession.-Mahon v. Mahon, 11.
143. A judgment entered on a judgment note given in payment of a contract for materials and la- bor in the erection of a house will be opened where
146. A plaintiff who accepts in full settlement of a judgment cash and and a note aggregating less than his claim, is estopped from afterward claim- ing the balance.-Ib.
147. Respondent and decedent's administratrix agreed upon a private sale to the former of dece- dent's real estate; but, upon exceptions filed, the Court refused to confirm the sale and ordered a public sale, at which petitioner bought the property. The sale was duly confirmed and deed executed and delivered; but respondent, having entered into pos- session before the public sale, refused to vacate, whereupon, a petition was filed under the Act of April 20, 1905, P. L. 239, and citation was granted. HELD, that judgment must be entered against the respondent.-Gettel's Petition, 151.
148. The facts plainly disclose that the petition- er is the owner of the real estate in question, having his title through an order and decree of the Orphans Court, and from all the facts, he has a present right of the possession thereof.—Ib. JUNK DEALERS, 33-34. JURISDICTION, 297.
APPPEARANCE TO CHALLENGE, 12.
OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, 149-151, 153. OF REGISTER OF WILLS, 272. JURY, QUESTION FOR, 163. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, 40-41.
149. A Justice of the Peace issued a summons the evidence is conflicting and the facts presented in trespass; the defendant filed an affidavit of de-
fense alleging that the title of the land will come LAND, CHARGE ON, 310. in question; the defendant tendered half the costs
but refused to enter into recognizance as required LANDLORD AND TENANT. by the Act of July 2, 1901, P. L. 608; after judg-
154. Plaintiff occupied a suite under a monthly ment for plaintiff a transcript was filed in the Com-lease from her landlord, directly below a suite with mon Pleas and a statement was served to which a kitchenette, occupied by another party, and brought plea of not guilty was entered; a rule was entered suit against defendant to recover damages done by to amend the plaintiff's statement to claim damages water trickling down from said suite above her, into to the amount of $2,500.00 instead of $300.00 her clothes' closet. The ground of recovery, as set HIELD, the rule must be discharged.-Reinbold v forth in the statement, being the alleged negligence Myers, 70. of the defendant landlord, the trial judge, holding 150. The Act of March 22, 1814, 6 Sm. 182, that the relation of landlord and tenant having ex- conferred jurisdiction on Justices of the Peace in isted, entered a compulsory non-suit, which it sub- actions of trespass brought for the recovery of dam-sequently refused to remove.- e.-Yost v. Hamilton ages for injury done or committed on real or per- Apartment Co., 125. sonal estate in all cases where the value of the prop- erty claimed or the damages alleged to have been sustained shall not exceed one hundred dollars and
155. As regards the liability of landlords to third persons, the tenant and not the landlord is lia- ble to third persons for accidents and injury occa- the Act of 1879, P. L. 194, increased such juris- sioned to them by the premises being in dangerous
diction to three hundred dollars.--Ib.
151. The Act of July 2, 1901, P. L. 608 pro- vides that in cases where the title to land comes in question the Justice shall not dismiss the suit but transmit a copy of the record to the Prothonotary of the county who shall enter the same on his docket and the suit shall proceed as if originally brought in
the Common Pleas; this act does not increase the
amount of the jurisdiction of the Justices and the amount cannot be enlarged after the case is in the Common Pleas and the statement cannot be amend- ed so as to show an action for a larger amount than that before the Justice.-1b.
152. After hearing the evidence, the Justice of he Peace, according to defendant's witnesses, said he would inform the parties when he rendered his judgment; the plaintiff's witnesses testified that the Justice said he would render his opinion on a fixed day. Judgment was duly given on that day, the defendant being absent. The defendant presented his petition sir months later, asking for a rule to file an appeal nunc pro tunc; but the Court below, Ross. J., refused the appeal. HELD, that the judgment must be affirmed.-Troupe's Appeal, 53.
156. A lessee cannot recover damages from the essor in an action of trespass for unlawfully enter- ng upon the demised premises and depriving him of the use thereof for a certain period during which the building was being lowered to comply with a new grade established by a city ordinance when the work was under the control of an independent con- tractor.-Hern v. Maeder, 61.
157. A lessor is not liable in damages for incon- veniences to his tenants where the inconvenienc? was caused by the work of a contractor, who em- ployed his own methods and men in lowering a building to comply with a new grade of a city street, when the lessor had no control over the work, and there is no evidence that the lessor knew or might have known, from reasonable inquiry, that his contractor, in doing the work committed to him, would infringe on any of the rights of his tenants.- Ib.
158. A municipality is not liable in damages tɔ a lessee in a building lowered to comply with a grade, where the inconvenience and damage complained of was not the change of grade, but the lowering of the building to comply with the grade.-1b.
159. In an action in assumpsit by two heirs of an estate against one who had occupied part of a building for several years under a lease with all the heirs for an adjoining building, it is no de- fense to claim that he received no notice and knew
153. In a suit before a Justice of the Peace, be- fore any testimony was heard, defendant filed an affidavit setting forth that the title to lands may and will come into question." Notwithstanding, the Jus- tice proceeded with the case, defendant offered no evidence, and judgment was entered for the plain-ething of a partition proceeding whereby the real tiff. On certiorari, HELD, that the proceedings must be set aside.-Lerew's Executors v. Bentzel, 67.
estate of an estate had been apportioned and the plaintiffs had been awarded the property for which a claim was made since the partition, and a verdict for plaintiff will not be disturbed.-Sutmeyer et al. v. Thornton, 82.
160. The owner of real estate is not estopped of May 9, 1913, P. L. 192. The defendant mov-
from recovering compensation for use and occupa- tion because he has not notified the one who is oc- cupying it to pay his rent.-Ib.
LEASE OF CHATTELS, 287-288, 289-290.
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES, 327.
OF CITY ON IMPROVEMENT BONDS, 180.
JUNK DEALERS, IN BORO., 33.
TO BREED FERRETS, 117.
FOR CURBING AND PAVING, 35. MECHANICS, 172.
RESTRICTION OF, 270.
ON GOODS FOR WORK, 272.
161. In the absence of a special agreement, a tradesman has a lien for work done on goods de- posited with him for manufacture.-Gorli & Co.. v. Perfect Silk Throwing Co., 9.
162. Where there is a contract to manufacture several articles at an agreed price, the tradesman has a lien upon any one or more of the articles in his possession for labor bestowed upon other arti- cles embraced in the contract.-Ib.
163. Where under a contract for finishing goods for manufacture by lots, it is disputed as to whether or not several separate shipments comprise a single lot, the question is for the jury.-Ib. LIFE ESTATE, 314, 326. LIFE INSURANCE, 125-127, 135. LIQUIDATION OF INSURANCE PANY, 1.
MAINTENANCE, OF WIFE, 130, 132. OF CHILD, 132, 215-221.
ed to quash the writ, because plaintiff was not a partly beneficially interested in the enforcement of the law. HELD, that the writ must be quashed.- Messiah Orphanage v, Monaghan Twp. School District., 141.
165. Plaintiff is not pecuniarily interested in the enforcement of the School Board's alleged public duty, as the cost of such tuition would be payable by the several school districts in which the respec- ive children have their legal residences.-lb.
166. Nor has it such a beneficiary interest, or is it such legal representative of the personal interests of these children, as will entitle it to sue out a writ of mandamus in its own name.- -lb.
167. The Act of May 9, 1913, P. L. 192, pro- vides that when an alternative writ of mandamus is sued out "to procure the enforcement of a public duty," the proceedings shall be prosecuted in the name of the Commonwealth on the relation of the Attorney General or of the District Attorney of the proper county, as the case may require.—Ib.
LIEN ON GOODS
FOR WORK, 161-162. MARKINGS OF OWNER, 136-139. MARRIED WOMEN.
168. Plaintiff sued to recover damages for the sale of her property, under an execution against her husband. At the trial the evidence showing the purchase of the property by the plaintiff, due no- tice of such ownership given to the defendant and ample opportunity for defendant to ascertain the truth of such claim before the day of sale, the jury found for the plaintiff the amount for which the mules were sold at the sale, interest and fifty dollars damages. On a motion for new trial, on the ground that there was no evidence to support the verdict for punitive damages, HELD, that the motion must be refused.--Tyson v. Tyson, 193.
169. There was admitted in evidence the note COM- given by plaintiff at the time she bought the mules, receipt for the payment of the same and statements of the party from whom she bought the mules. HELD, not to be grounds for a new trial.-Ib.
164. Plaintiff, a duly incorporated orphanage, sued out, in its cwn name, a writ of mandamus to compel defendant school district to furnish school- ing to certain of its minor inmates, under the Act
170. These papers and statements were not of- fered as complete and conclusive evidence of own- ership, but as corroborative of plaintiff's direct tes- tmony on the subject.-Ib.
171. In order to decide with accuracy upon the character of any phenomenon or transaction we must know all the facts of which it consists, and all the circumstances that are truly connected with, and influence it. Ib.
determine that question before a large expenditure of money had been made on the faith of the ordi- nance providing for the improvement.-lb.
177. The location of the population, the use made of the streets, and many other considerations enter into the question of how the payment of the
172. Section 10 of the Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 432, requires that the claimant in a mechanic's lien issue a scire facias against the owner within two years of the filing of the lien unless the owner in writing filed before the expiration of such time, waives the necessity for so doing for a further peri-improvement shall be made. This must be deter- od not exceeding three years; if the plaintiff fails to comply with this Act the lien may be stricken off. --Eroh v. Payer, 140.
MILITARY SERVICE.
PROCESS AGAINST, PERSON IN, 18.
EMPLOYMENT OF, 333-335.
ESTATES OF, 173, 209.
mined by the local government and courts should not interfere unless a palpable injustice warranted it. —Ib.
178. The Act of June 27, 1913, P. L. 582, is not unconstituional, as a whole, on the ground that it violates the provision against a bill containing more than one subject.-lb.
179. The Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 364, as amended by the Act of March 19, 1903, P. L. 42, requires, where the contractor performing the work is to be paid by assessment bills, the lien is to be iled to his use, and one month's notice must be given to the owner of the property to be affected. Im- 173. The Fiduciaries Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 447, vests the Orphans' Court with a new discretion that "the bonds shall rest alone upon and be pay- provement bonds were issued, containing a clause in minor's estates, so that where the legacy of fourable out of said assessment, ard from no other minor children amounted to $50 each, the court fund." The lien was filed by the city, and no no- direct that these legacies be paid direct to the moth-tice of filing given. For this reason the court below er without the appointment of a guardian.-Dailey's Estate, 132.
MUNICIPAL CLAIMS, TAXATION FOR 302.
MUNICIPAL INTENTION, 184-186.
174. Plaintiff city (appellee) paved the street in front of appellant's property, and assessed the cost thereof by the foot front rule. Other streets, prior to this, having been paved at the sole cost of the city, defendant contended that plaintiff was estopped from atttempting to collect the cost by assessments on the adjoining property owners; but the court be- low, Ross, J., entered judgment for the plaintiff. HEID, that the judgment must be affirmed.-Eyster's Appeal, 45.
was asked to find as a fact that the lien was void and enter judgment for the defendant, but refused. HELD, not to be error.-lb.
180. As between the bondholder and the city, the city's liability would not end if its officers were negligent or careless in their collection, and its re- ponsibility would not cease if there should be a diminution in the amount of those collections, occa- sioned through the voluntary act of the city.—Ib.
181. The ordinances authorizing paving need not contain the clause relative to reductions in assessment for irregularly shaped lots. If such reductions are not made the affidavit of defense should set forth that the amount of the lien is unjust by reason of such failure. -Ib.
182. Appellee (plaintiff below) on the trial of a sci. fa. sur municipal lien offered the lien in evi- dence and then rested. Appellant (defendant be- 175. There is nothing in the Act of June 27, low) proved that years before plaintiff had ma- 1913, P. L. 582, which by any reasonable construc-cadamized said street from curb to curb at its own tion changes the exiting law, that the city might use ether plan of payment. When the municipality led one system of pay .ent for certain streets it was not prohibiting from adopting another system for dif- ferent streets.-lb.
176. If a gross abuse of discretion is perpetrated in determining what streets or parts of streets should be paved wholly at the city's expense, and what streets should be paved at the expense of the abut- ting owner, the complaining parties should move to
cost, and had kept the street in repair ever since. The court below, Ross, J., gave binding instructions for the plaintiff. HELD, that the judgment must be affirmed.-Holtzapple's Appeal, 49.
183. Defendant offered to prove by the testi- mony of the street commissioner that he was quainted with the methods employed by plaintiff city in changing an ordinary dirt street to a permanent street, which offer was rejected by the court. HELD, not to be error.-Ib.
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