That the Board of Directors of the Poultry Fancier Publishing Company consisted of five members.

D. Sutton, the secretary of the company. as officers and Directors of the Poultry That E. D. Haney delivered said stock so as- Fancier Publishing Company. signed to F. D. Sutton, the Secretary of the Poultry Fancier Publishing Company, with instructions to said F. D. Sutton to deliver the same to the said Poultry Fancier Publishing Company on receipt by F. D. Sutton of seven notes in the sum of $1000.00said deferred payments to be secured by four of the Directors of the Poultry Fancier judgment. Publishing Company, to wit, F. W. DeThat the Poultry Fancier Publishing Lancey, C. N. Myers, C. S. Shirk and Company had notice of these instructions. F. D Sutton. That the Poultry Fancier Publishing

That the verbal agreement between the Poultry Fancier Publishing Company and claimant is established by the testimony of

These findings of fact are affirmed by the

Company refused to execute the said seven Court. notes to be secured by a judgment, and also The Auditor allowed the claim to particirefused to deliver the notes as agreed.pate in the distribution and awarded him That subsequently, C. J. Delone, counsel a pro rata dividend with the other parfor the Poultry Fancier Publishing Com- ticipating general creditors.

pany, was authorized by the said company Exceptions were filed to the auditor's to go to Philadelphia, and try to make findings and award on the claim by the definite arrangements with Mr. Haney for First National Bank of Hanover and the purchase of his stock. Charles J. Delone, other creditors.

That C. J. Delone, counsel for the In reviewing the evidence we find, as was Poultry Fancier Publishing, went to Phila- found by the auditor, that five of the memdelphia, met Mr. Haney, the claimant, and bers of the board of directors testified that discussed the proposition. That at no time the agreement in controversy was entered was there any difference as to the price to be paid for the stock, the only difference being that claimant wanted a judgment note to secure the deferred payment.

That claimant, on July 16, 1914, wrote to the Poultry Fancier Publishing Company saying that the proposition is withdrawnwould not consider anything but sale on cash basis.

into between the claimant and the Poultry Fancier Publishing Company for the purchase of his stock; and there was testimony that after the company had paid to claimant $2000.00 and that thereupon claimant assigned the stock to the Secretary of the company ostensibly for the company under the terms of the agreement. The company evidently knew of this, and refused or delayed the performance of the agreement on its part. The trend of the evidence strongly indicates that it, the company, was playing "fast and loose" with the claimant. The auditor, in his report, has observed, and the observation we consider as a fact, that the company, instead of repudiating its

That on the same date, to wit, July 16, 1914, the Poultry Fancier Publishing Com pany notified F. D. Sutton not to return or otherwise dispose of agreement, notes, stock, etc., or any correspondence relating to the purchase of stock of E. D Haney, but to produce the same at the directors' meeting to be held July 21, 1914. That no dir-contract, ratified it by keeping the stock and ectors' meeting was held on said day so far as appears by the testimony taken or exhibits filed.

That on July 20, 1914, the claimant sent to F. D. Sutton a telegram in which claimant stated, "Negotiations are off."

directing Mr. Sutton not to deliver it to the, claimant. The facts as the auditor has reported them are entirely warranted by the testimony as we have reviewed it, and under the authorities which he cites, we conclude, that his legal conclusions from those facts That on July 23, 1914, C. J. Delone as should be sustained. All the exceptions' attorney for the Poultry Fancier Publishing filed to this branch of the auditor's findings Company addressed a letter to claimant are, therefore, dismissed and the auditor is in which the Poultry Fancier Publishing sustained. Company expressed a willingness to have the negotiations terminated, and requested the return of the $2000.00 pa'd.

One set of exceptions was filed to the auditor's allowance of a claim for professional services rendered the creditors by That on October 12, 1914, E. D. Haney, John J. Bollinger, Esq. We are not conF. W. DeLancey and F. D. Sutton resigned I vinced by any argument brought before us

The auditor, after finding that D advanced Publishing Company-he took charge of the active money to C to buy A's stock, says:

of E. D. Haney for $975.00 is sustained by Where one obtains possession of a chattel upon the reasons set forth in his report, and a written contract in which he declares that he should not be disturbed. All exceptions thereto are dismissed.

The auditor is to be complimented on his careful and clear analysis of the complications which the testimony reveals in this adjustment.

All exceptions filed to the findings of the auditor are dismissed and his report is! hereby confirmed.

President and Director of the Poultry Fancier
Publishing Company, and

(c) By reason of his failure to assert any claim against the Poultry Fancier Publishing Company until after the appointment of a Receiver, and the conversion of the assets into cash.

has rented the chattel, that he is to pay a certain amount, in instalments, as rental and when paid the rental is paid no title is to be acquired by or the article shall become his property, but until vested in him, the contract is one of bailment and not a conditional sale. The absence of an express covenant to return a chattel at the end of the term does not turn a bailment into a

conditional sale.

Where the bailee of a chattel replaces a part of it, such new part does not become the property of the bailor and may be sold upon execution against the bailee.

There can be no judgment excepting one on the verdict, unless a point for binding instructions is refused or reserved.

Where an execution creditor levies upon a bailed chattel and disputes the title of the bailor, he cannot upon interpleader recover upon a con

From the testimony before him, your auditor tingent interest of bailee. finds the following facts:

That E. D. Haney loaned to the Company the following sums on the following dates:

May 13, 1913.

May 27, 1913.

June 30, 1913.

July 2, 1913..

July 8, 1913..

Aug. 28, 1913.
Aug. 20, 1913.

$200 00

200 00

200 00
150 00
100 00
75.00
50 00

Motion by defendant for judgment non obstante veredicto.

E. A. Howell for motion.

J. Borton Weeks, contra.

December 31, 1917. BROOMALL, J.This was a sheriff's interpleader issue to try the title of an automobile which the defendTotal 975 00 ants had levied on as the property of Joseph That in October, 1913, the plant of the Poultry A. Senior, on April 4, 1916, in his possesFancier Publishing Company was located at sion, and which was claimed by the plaintiff Sellersville, Pa. That during the month of Oct., 1913, the claimant, F. D. Sutton and F. W. to belong to him. On the trial it was adDeLancy, all of whom were officers of the Poultry mitted that the automobile belonged to the Fancier Publishing Company, interested Messrs. plaintiff unless title to it passed to Senior C. S. Shirk and C. M. Myere in the purchase of by virtue of a transaction between the plainstock of the company, and with the object of moving said plant to Hanover, Pa. That at said time F. W. DeLancey was President, claimant Treasurer, and F. D. Sutton Secretary of the said company. That in October, 1913, C. S. Shirk and C. M. Myers met the claimant, President and Secretary of the Poultry Fancier Publishing Company at Sellersville, Pa. That claimant stated at said meeting to Messrs. Shirk and Myers that the Poultry Fancier Company was not indebted to him, and that said statement of claimant s induced Messrs. Shirk and Myers to purchase stock in the said Poultry Fancier Publishing Company. Under the above findings of fact is claimant entitled to recover for money loaned to the company prior to the date of the purchase of stock in said Poultry Fancier Publishing Company by Messrs. Shirk and Myers, or are the foregoing facts sufficient to evoke a claim of estoppel so far as claimant is concerned?

trary of that which his conduct has induced the belief." The primary ground of the doctrine is that it would be a fraud in a party to assert what his previous conduct has denied when on the faith of that denial-others have acted; Gray's Appeal, 10 W. N. C. 458; Rettig & Son v. Becker, 11 Sup. Ct. 395 at page 399.

Claimant induced Messrs. Shirk and Myers to purchase stock from the Poultry Fancier Publishing Company on the strength of his own statement that the company was not indedted to him in October, 1913, after loans had been actually made by claimant to the company, and your auditor, therefore, holds that he cannot blow hot and c ld by now stating to the prejudice of Messrs. Shirk and Myers, stockholders of the company, that said loan of $975.00 had not been paid whether in fact it was actually re-paid or The rule of law is "that when the conduct of a not by the company to the plaintiff. Your auditor, party has been such as to induce action by an- therefore, refuses to allow the claim of E. D. other, he shall be precluded from afterwards, Haney in the sum of $975 00 to participate in the asserting to the prejudice of the other, the con- distribution of the balance on the account.

tiff and Senior, which was evidenced by a writing, signed by Senior, of which the following is a copy:

"This is to certify that I. Mr. Joseph Senior, have received and rented of Thomas Hughes, the article or articles described in the annexed schedule, valued at $515.00, for the use of the said article or articles, and as rent for the same have this day paid to the said Thomas Hughes the sum of $250 as deposit, and promise further to pay to his collector or authorized agent the sum of $265.00, with note as collateral, payable $40.00 monthly with interest until the above-named amount is paid, at which time said rent shall cease, and said article become my property.

The defendants now move for a general judgment in their favor. There can be no judgment entered, except a judgment on the verdict, except that where a party presents a point for binding instructions, which is refused or reserved, he may move for judgment on the whole rocord; Act of April 22; 1905, P. L. 286, Stewart's Purdon, Vol. 6, p. 7139, pl. 35. But even if this had been done the defendants could not have more than they have now, a verdict in their favor, upon which they can enter judgment. Their real complaint is that the jury was not instructed to include in their valuation of property, the value of Senior's interest in the automobile. The remedy for this would be a motion for a new trial. "The above-named article or articles to But even if such motion had been made it remain the property of Thomas Hughes and would not avail them, because there was no no title thereto to be acquired by or vested issue as to Senior's interest in the automoin me until this obligation is fully complied bile. The defendants did not levy on with on my part, and in event of failure to Senior's interest in the automobile. They meet promptly any of said payment, I agree would have had a right to do so; Meyers on demand, to surrender said article or vs. Prentzell, 33 Pa. 482. They levied on articles to Thomas Hughes without process the automobile. The plaintiff claimed title of law, and said T. Hughes is authorized to it. Then the defendants had another to enter my premises by his agent or agents opportunity to assert their right to proceed to remove the same, and to retain the sums to sell Senior's interest in it. If they had already paid as rent or hire for the use of said article or articles while in my possession. And I also agree not to remove said article or articles from the premises I now occupy, or part with the possession thereof, without first obtaining the written consent of Thos. Hughes."

done so, the interpleader would have been quashed, because a sale of Senior's interest could not effect the plaintiff; Logan v. Gest, 6 Del. Co. Reps. 242. And the defendants could have proceeded to sell Senior's interest. Even this would have passed nothing, after the bailee was in default; Cobb Chase The rights of the parties depended upon v. Deiches, 7 Pa. Supr. Ct. 252. Instead the construction of this writing. Hence it of pursuing their right to sell Senior's interwas necessary for the court to construe it,est in the automobile they took issue with and we did construe it as a bailment for hire and not a conditional sale. We see no error in this; Reading Automobile Co. v. DeHaven, 53 Pa. Supr. Ct. 344. The absence of an express covenant to return the property at the end of the term does not turn a bailment into a conditional sale; Id. At this stage of the case the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict but it appeared that the top of the automobile was not the top

which was on it at the time of the bailment, but was subsequently attached to it by the bailee. There was no dispute as to this. Evidence was introduced as to the value of this top which belonged to the bailee, and the jury was instructed to render a verdict for the defendant and to determine the value of the top, which was accordingly done and the value of the top was fixed at thirty-five dollars.

plaintiff's claim of ownership, by categorically denying it, and this was the only issue presented at the trial and this issue has been properly decided. We, therefore, refuse defendant's contention and direct judgment to be entered on the verdict.

C. P. of

Brendle v. Schmehl

Berks Co.

Negotiable Instruments Accomodation
Maker-Liability of Holder in Due

Course.

H. P. Keiser for plaintiff. November 19, 1917. defendant asks for a new trial upon the third reason therof, which is that

"The Court erred in directing the jury to render a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against defendant for at least $1,386.

communication of an alleged agreement WAGNER, J.-The between him and the defendant that Mr. Hoverter alone was to be liable. On the contrary it is evidence that Brendle, the plaintiff, depended upon Mr. Schmehl's rating therefor, his name on the note, with the additional personal promise of Hoverter It was admitted by the defendant that he that he would also be liable. This promise signed the note for $1,200. The principal to pay by Hoverter is not a release of of this note, with interest thereon, consti- Schmehl's liability. The position of the detuted the basis for the direction by the fendant as contended for in this third reason Court of a verdict for plaintiff for at least for a new trial is not supported by the this sum. The defendant claims that this evidence. Mr. Schmehl in his letter of note was given upon an agreement between April 25, 1914 to Mr. Brendle, in writing the payee and the defendant, which agree with reference to this note, distinctly says ment was communicated to the plaintiff. when he sends to him his check for $12.50 That is, there was an agreement between for a renewal of the note, "I would like to the payee and the maker at the time pay note in full but cannot do so at this of the giving of the note that the maker time." He hereby acknowledges his liability was never to be called upon for the pay- on the note. Under the evidence the Court ment thereof. The evidence on this agree- could not do otherwise than direct that as to ment is that of N. S. Schmehl. He this one note the jury would have to bring testified that at the time he gave these notes in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. to Mr. Hoverter, Mr. Hoverter had said that he would take care of them. This, as we view it, is a mere promise between the two that the payee would take care of the notes; and not an agreement that if these notes got into the hands of a third party that the sole person who was to be liable on the note was Mr. Hoverter, the payee. Defendant claims that this agreement as contended for by him was communicated to Mr. Brendle, who discounted the note. We fail to find any evidence of any communication of such an agreement even if the agreement be considered as one under which Mr. Schmehl was under no circumstance to be held liable for the payment of the note.

Defendant called Mr. Hoverter as a witness to show the communication of this agreement to Mr. Brendle. He testified that at the time the note was transferred by him to Mr. Brendle for a valuable consideration, he gave to him (Brendle) Mr. Schmehl's rating. He says "Mr. Brendle, of course was not acquainted with Mr. Schmehl. On the strength of the rating he discounted the note with the understanding that I was to make payment." He further says, "I showed Mr. Brendle the rating, and I told Mr. Brendle I considered Mr. Schmehl good, but that I would make payment on them as they matured, because I realized that Mr. Schmehl couldn't make payments on these notes at that time. That is what I said to Mr. Brendle." This is not evidence of a

Rule for new trial discharged.

C. P. of

Northampton Co. Raeder v. Stewart Silk Mill Co. Practice-Question of law-Pleading of statute-"The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915"--Constitutionality of.

affidavit of defense disposes of the whole ot the Where the question of law raised by the plaintiff's claim, the judgment should be for the defendant and not of nonsuit.

Where a statute is relied on for a defense, ative an exception or proviso unless it is conthe party relying on it need not refer to, or negtained in the enacting clause.

"The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915"

is constitutional.

Motion for a nonsuit.

A. C. LaBarre for the plaintiff. Aaron Goldsmith for the defendant. February 11, 1918. STEWART, P. J.Defendant in this case, by praecipe filed and upon argument, asks for a judgment of nonsuit. The "Practice Act, nineteen fifteen." page 483, provides as follows: "Section 4. Demurrers are abolished. Questions of law heretofore raised by demurrer shall be raised in the affidavit of defense, as provided in section twenty. *** Section 20. The defendant in the affidavit of defense may raise any question of law, without answering the averments of facts in the statement of claim; and any question of law, so raised, may be set down for hearing, and disposed