If however, we compare the actions of brutes with those of men, we shall find that we observe a difference between them. We feel that the brute does not know better, or does not, and cannot know that it is wrong; while we feel that the man does, or can, know that it is wrong. Now, as the brute cannot distinguish between right and wrong, we do not consider his action a moral action; but as the man can make this distinction, we call his action a moral action.

Again, every one knows that we sometimes do things by accident, as, we may injure a person by throwing a ball, without seeing that he is in the way. In this case, we do not feel guilty, although we always should feel sorry. Our conscience does not accuse us, unless we intended to do harm, or were culpably negligent.

Again, we sometimes intend to do some one a kindness, and it turns out, in the end, that what we have done, is an injury to him. Thus, suppose I send some food to a sick man, and the food gives him pain; I regret his pain, but I cannot disapprove of my act, for I intended to do him a kindness. From these, and such like instances, any one may see, that we always judge of the moral quality of actions by the intention.

Our intentions may be wrong in several ways.

1. Where we intend to injure another. As when we strike a person in anger, or speak against another, for the sake of making other people think badly of him.

2. Where we intend to gratify ourselves, without any regard to the misery we cause to others. Such is the case, when one person makes sport of another, just for the sake of fun, without having any malice towards him. We have no right to gratify ourselves, at the expense of the happiness of any one else.

And, in general, we may lay it down as a universal rule, that our intention is wrong, whenever we intend to do any thing contrary to any law of God. This law is summed up in the two precepts, thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart; and, as ye would that others should do unto you, do ye even so unto them.

3. As the moral character of an action is determined by the intention; if we intend to do wrong, although we may not actually do it, this intention is wicked. And when we really intend to do good, though we may not be able to carry our intention into effect, this intention is acceptable to God. Thus God was pleased with David because he intended to build the temple, though he was not permitted to do it.

Thus the good wishes, and benevolent desires of the poor, may be as much charity in the sight of God, as the alms of the rich.

4. As a good intention is necessary to a virtuous action, if an action, which God has commanded, be performed without a good intention, the act is not virtuous in the sight of God. It is right to do justice to a poor widow. But the unjust judge, who neither feared God nor regarded man, and who avenged the poor widow because she troubled him, did not perform a virtuous action. His only intention was, to get rid of trouble. Thus a child may do what its parents command, but do it in a bad temper. Though he may do the action, he is not an obedient child, unless he does it from good will, and with love to his parents.

And, finally, every person must have observed, that our intentions are very much influenced by our previous feelings. Any one who allows himself to indulge in envious or revengeful or malicious feelings, is much more likely to do envious or revengeful or malicious actions, than another person who never suffers himself to indulge in such thoughts. Hence we see, that such feelings, as they lead us to do wrong actions, must, in themselves, be wrong. This is what our blessed Saviour means, when he tells us, that out of the heart proceeds all manner of evil.

QUESTIONS.

1. Do brutes and men both act?

2. What is the great difference between brutes and men?

3. Can we influence men, in any way different from that in which we influence brutes? 4. Can you illustrate this by an example? 5. What is the best way of influencing men? 6. If men will not be influenced by knowing that an action is right or wrong, what are they like?

7. Do young persons ever act thus ?

8. Is it honorable or disgraceful to act thus ? 9. If a person injure us by accident, ought we to feel as if he had done wrong? If not, why? Give an example.

10. If a person intend to do us a kindness and injure us, ought we to feel grateful or displeased? And why? Give an example.

11. Give an example of an action with a bad intention.

12. Give an example of a wrong action done thoughtlessly.

13. Do you ever do such actions?

14. Give an example of something wrong, when no action is really done.

15. Give an example of a right action, without any good intention.

16. Show how people make themselves wicked by indulging in wicked thoughts.

CHAPTER II.

OF CONSCIENCE.

SECTION I.

What we mean by Conscience; and how Conscience admonishes us.

WHENEVER We do any thing, there must always be something with which we do it. Thus if we walk, we must have legs to walk with. If we see, we must have eyes to see with. If we hear, we must have ears to hear with; and so of a thousand cases.

This is equally true of our internal, or mental actions. Thus if we think, or feel, we must have a mind, to think or feel with. If we remember, we must have a memory, to remember with.

Now every one knows that he has the power of observing the difference between right and wrong in the actions of men; and that he also is subject to peculiar feelings, in consequence of the existence of such qualities