CHAPTER IX.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SENATE.

In examining the organization of the Senate, we shall consider (1) The election of the electors of the Senate—(2) Their proceedings in the choice of a Senate-(3) The qualifications for the office of Senator-(4) The mode of filling vacancies in the Senate (5) The tenure and compensation of the office of Senator-(6) The nature and tendencies of the present structure of the Senate.

(1) The election of the Electors of the Senate.

The Senate of Maryland is not chosen directly by the people, but by an electoral college, consisting of forty members, of whom two are chosen by each of the counties, and one by each of the cities of Annapolis and Baltimore. The Electors must have the qualifications necessary for delegates; and are elected by those only, who are entitled to vote for delegates. The elections are held on the first Monday of September in every fifth year, reckoning from the first Monday of September, 1806. (1) They are held at the same places, in the same manner, and by the same judges, as the delegate elections: and all the preceding remarks, as to the manner of opening and conducting the latter elections, the duties of the judges and clerks, the provisions to secure the purity and freedom of elections, and the manner of ascertaining the result at each poll and the aggregate result in the county or city, are here applicable, varying the proceedings only so as to designate the purpose of the election. There is a special form of return for the election of electors: but it is substantially the same with that for the delegate elections, except as to the time and purpose of the election. (2) In the

(1) Const. art. 14, and 1805, chap. 97, sect. 9th.

(2) 1805, chap. 97, sect. 15th, and supra, 455 to 463.

counties and Annapolis, the right to their electors is given absolutely but that of the city of Baltimore endures only as long as her right to elect delegates, which, as we have seen, ceases, whenever her inhabitants shall have so decreased, that the number of her voters for seven successive years shall be less than one-half of the number of voters in some one county of the State, but returns as soon as her voters shall have again increased to that number. (3)

(2) Their proceedings in the choice of a Senate.

The Electors thus chosen are required to meet at the city of Annapolis, or the place of the Assembly sessions, wherever that may be, on the third Monday of September next ensuing their election, to proceed to the election of the Senate. (4) Any twentyfour of them constitute a quorum, and may go into the election: but before the electors can act as such, they must qualify in the manner prescribed by the constitution. (5) If there be any doubts or contest as to the election of any person returned or appearing as an elector, these must be determined before the college goes into the election of the Senate; and when such contests arise, the college is the exclusive judge of the qualifications and election of its own members, and shall admit, as elector, the 'person qualified and appearing to them to have the greatest number of legal votes. (6)

When the members have qualified, and all cases of controverted elections are determined, the college must then proceed to elect fifteen senators, of whom nine shall be residents of the Western, and six of the Eastern shore: but this distribution being respected, they are subject to no other restriction, in choosing amongst persons qualified for the office of senator. The senators are chosen for shores, without respect to counties or other

(3) Const. art. 14th, and supra.

(4) Const. art. 15th.

(5) This qualification consists in taking the oaths of office, and the test declaration. Their oath of office is prescribed by the constitution, as amended by the act of 1822, chap. 204. The test declaration consists in making and subscribing a declaration, of belief in the Christian religion, or, if a professor of the Jewish religion, of a belief in a future state of rewards and punishments.-Const. 55, and act of 1824, chap. 205.

(6) Const. art. 17th.

civil divisions; and the college may, at its pleasure, select all the senators for either shore, from any one county. The distri bution of them amongst the several counties of either shore, is regulated entirely by its discretion. They are even permitted to select the senators from amongst the members of the electoral college. The election is by ballot; and the senators must all be ballotted for at the same time. Upon the ballot, out of those proposed and ballotted for as senators, the nine amongst the residents of the Western shore, and the six amongst the residents of the Eastern shore, having the greatest number of votes, shall be declared and returned duly elected. If, on the first ballot, two or more persons have an equal number of votes, and it is necessary to exclude some of them, a second ballotting shall be had as between these candidates only, before the electors separate; and if on the second ballot there is still an equal vote, the election must be made by lot. The election being completed, the electors must then certify their proceedings under their hands, and return them to the Chancellor. Their duties then cease; and with them, their offices. (7)

(3) The qualifications for the office of Senator.

The original qualifications for this office, relative to age, property, and residence, required that the senator elect should be above the age of twenty-five, should have resided in the State for three years next preceding his election, and should have real or personal property within it above the value of one thousand pounds. (8) The property qualification was abolished in 1810; (9) those as to age and residence are still requisite.

The causes of disqualification for this office are the same in all, respects, except as to age and residence, with those which exclude from the office of delegate; and it will therefore be sufficient to refer, for these, to the preceding remarks upon the qualifications for the latter office. (10)

(4) The mode of filling vacancies in the

Senate.

Vacancies in this body arise by death, refusal to serve, resignation, removal out of the State, or from some of the causes of

(7) Const. art. 16th.

(8) Const. art. 15th.

(9) 1809, chap. 198; and 1810, chap. 18.

(10) See page 448.

disqualification already alluded to. When they occur, the right to fill them devolves upon the Senate; which shall, immediately after they occur, or at its next meeting, elect by ballot, in the manner prescribed for elections by the original electors, another qualified person for the remainder of the senatorial term. (11) (5) The tenure and compensation of the office of Senator.

The Senators are chosen for five years, but are liable to removal for the causes of disqualification already described. We have remarked upon these, as constituting original qualifications for the office of Senator or Delegate; and their effect and manner of operation in vacating these offices, when they attach upon their incumbents after election and qualification, will be fully examined in one of the following chapters.

The compensation of the Senator is the same as that allowed to the Delegate. (12)

(6) The nature and tendencies of the present structure of the Senate.

In every well organized government, it has always been a cardinal object with its framers, so to constitute its legislature, that whilst it is the ever ready organ of the well ascertained and well regulated will of the people, it is yet, to a certain extent, above the reach of those momentary prejudices and passions, and hasty and short-sighted views, which at times pervade every community. To place the popular will as embodied in acts of legislation above such influences, is one of the most prominent and useful designs in the delegation of legislative power to representative bodies. In extended republics, this is necessary, because of the inability of the people generally to attend in person to its exercise yet it is recommended by the additional consideration of its tendency to purify the public will. Even in small republics or democracies, such as were some of those of antiquity, where there was no such inconvenience in the exercise of this power by the people in person, it was yet found salutary to delegate it to a select assembly. The utmost excesses, and the wildest anarchy, were found to flow from the exercise of it, by the community in mass. The effects of such a mode of legislation are

(11) Const. art. 19th.

(12) See 472.

strikingly exemplified in the Ecclesia or general Assembly of the Athenian people; which, being invested by Solon with the supreme powers of government in the last resort, deprived the government, by its irregularities, of every thing like uniformity or consistency in the public operations. Some checks were interposed, by the creation of the Senate, and the revival of the Areopagus: yet although its tendencies were thus, in some measure, counteracted, they have always been reckoned amongst the most prominent causes of the downfall of that republic. History is full of illustrations of the truth, that the people, for whose benefit government is instituted, find great advantage in distributing its powers amongst responsible agents, each having a few specific duties to perform, and each constituting a check upon the others.

In the creation of a representative body for the purposes of legislation, there is then a two-fold design. The one is to obviate the inconveniences of a personal discharge of this power by the people; and the other, to filtrate it, and give it a judicious direction. But the mere delegation of this power is not considered sufficient for the latter purpose. It has now become al most an axiom in the constitution of a legislature, that it should consist of two branches, the one of which is more permanent and less responsible than the other; and this principle has been adopted in all the best forms of government. Without going at large into the reasons upon which this doctrine of constitutional law rests, it may be proper to advert to a few considerations, which come home to every understanding. Every well organized government is but a system of checks and balances of power. Men cannot safely be trusted with absolute power; nor can a community safely commit themselves even to their own uncontrolled discretion. The great object in the constitution of governments, is to make their leading powers so many antagonist muscles, each in a certain degree independent of the others, and each drawing against a preponderance of power in the others. Hence they have been subdivided into the three great branches of legislative, executive, and judicial powers; and the endeavor is made to preserve their distinct existence, as far as possible, by confiding their exercise to separate agents. Thus each branch is made to watch over and to check the encroach