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In Macrow vs. The Railway Company, L. R. 6, Q. B. 611, Cockburn C. J. said that “whatever the passenger takes with him for his personal use or convenience, according to the habits or wants of the particular class to which he belongs, either with reference to the immediate necessities or to the ultimate purpose of the journey, must be considered as personal luggage,” and in giving instances of articles that would be considered baggage he mentions "the gun case or fishing apparatus of the sportsman," "the easel of the artist on a sketching tour," ""the books of the student." Again he applies this test, "that the use of the article is personal to the traveler and its taking urises from the fact of his journeying." In the case of Davis vs. the Cayuga & Susquehanna Railroad Company, 10th Howard's Practice Reports, page 330, the contents of a trunk consisted of ordinary wearing apparel, a gun, a set of harness-maker's tools worth ten dollars. Plaintiff was a harness-maker by trade, and it was proved that it is usual for those of that trade in going from place to place to take their tools with them in their trunks. Shankland, Justice, said: "I am of the opinion the tools were under the circumstances of the case properly included under the term baggage, and recovered for as such." In this case Porter vs Hildebrand, 2 Harris (14 Pennsylvania State), page 129, is recognized as authority and cited by the court.

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In the case of Porter vs. Hildebrand, 14 Penn. State, page 129 cited above, it was proven that the trunk contained $15.00 worth of clothing and $55.00 worth of carpenter's tools, and that the plaintiff was a carpenter moving to Ohio, etc. The jury found that the tools were the reasonable tools of a carpenter. Bell, J., said (page 133): "I do not percieve why the plaintiff may not call upon the stage proprietors to make good the value of the tools lost, upon the special finding of the jury. It is, it is said, a common thing for journeymen mechanics to carry in their trunks with clothing a small and select portion of their tools. To this practice I see no such objection as ought to put this kind of property out of the protection afforded to the necessaries a traveler is compelled by legitimate consideration to transport with his person." Hamilton Railroad vs. Swift, 12th Wallace, page 262, was a case wherein Swift, a surgeon in the U. S. army recovered for baggage lost. Under army regulations a surgeon was entitled to 800 pounds of baggage. The baggage consisted of the wearing apparel of plaintiff and family, table furniture including silverware to the value of $204.50, three buffalo robes, two deer robes, hair mattresses and pillows, writing desks, tables, engravings, pictures, statuary, numerous articles of household outfit, jewelry of the value of $787.50, a set of surgical instruments to the value of $350.00, and an unpublished manuscript on veterinary surgery. The property weighed 2,700 pounds. It was contended that the value of the surgical instruments should not be allowed as not properly baggage. On this subject Mr. Justice Field for the court said, page 274: "The value of the surgical instruments was properly included. Instruments of that character in the case of a surgeon in the army traveling with troops may properly be regarded as part of his baggage. He may be required to use these

instruments at any time, and must accordingly have them near his person where they can be had upon a moment's notice."

In the case of Olga de Mulato Fraloff vs. The New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company, 10 Blatchford, page 16, laces of immense value were held to be reasonable apparel, reference being had to plaintiff's social position and wealth, the state of her health, and the object of her journey abroad.

The case of Stinson and another vs. Connecticut River Railroad Company, 98 Mass., page 83, was for a valise containing samples of merchandise only, and the court says: "The contract with Edwards was a strictly personal contract for his safe transportation over the railroads, to which the carriage of suitable personal baggage was merely incidental. Edwards had no right to transport merchandise under cover of his personal baggage.'

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It cannot be said that a mechanic's tools could be styled merchandise; on the other hand it may not be successfully contended that the articles are usual personal baggage. The baggage of a traveler may consist of rare articles, such as laces, surgical instruments, etc. They may be wholly useless articles for comfort and convenience on the journey, yet if they are appropriate or essential articles to the purposes of the journey, whether it be one of pleasure or business. they are to be regarded as baggage, as "the easel of an artist on a sketching tour, or the books of a student, and other articles of an analogous character, the use of which is personal to the traveler, and the taking of which has arisen from the fact of his journeying."-Hutchinson on Carriers, sec. 687.

Now it is the claim of Mr. Dusey "that it should make no difference whether a man has his tools in a tool-box or a 'Saratoga house,' if it comes within the right number of pounds," It seems to us when the known habit of carpenters to carry their tools in a chest is established, that the principles laid down in the cases cited herein, give them a right equally with other passengers to carry one hundred and fifty pounds of baggage free, whether in a tool chest or in a trunk, and that there can be no difficulty in applying the test by which the question of whether they are baggage or not may be determined. If the carpenter or mechanic takes them with him for his personal use or convenience according to the habits or wants of the particular craft to which he belongs, either for the immediate necessities or the ultimate purpose of his journey, or if the articles are personal to the traveler and their taking arises from the fact of his journeying, it seems to us they constitute baggage, and to hold otherwise leads in our judgment to what amounts to an invidious and unjust discrimination against a class. We therefore respectfully recommend such an execution of your rules on the part of baggagemen as will remove all such causes of complaint.

By order of the Board.

E. G. MORGAN, Secretary.

DES MOINES, Iowa, July 10, 1885.

T. J. POTTER, ESQ., Vice President C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., Chicago, Ill.:

DEAR SIR-Having been informed by you in your letter of April 16th, 1885, that our decision in the complaint of H. Dusey, of Creston, Iowa, was deemed unsatisfactory and deeply affected your interests and the efficiency of your service, at your request, on a day fixed we heard Messrs. Blythe and Trimble, your counsel, in reference thereto. We have carefully examined all authorities cited, and endeavored to give full and complete consideration to all the reasoning offered. Mr. Dusey substantially set forth his complaint in the following words: "What I think is that it should make no difference whether a man had his tools and clothes in a tool-box or a 'Saratoga house,' if it comes within the right number of pounds.” In the case of Porter vs. Hildebrand, 14th Pennsylvania Statutes, 129, the court uses the following language: "It is, it is said, a common thing for journeymen mechanics to carry in their trunks with their clothing a small and select portion of their tools. To this practice I see no such objection as ought to put this kind of property out of the protection afforded to necessaries a traveler is compelled by legitimate considerations to transport with his person."

In our decision we say: "It seems to us when the known habit of carpenters to carry their tools in a chest is established, that the principles laid down in the cases cited herein give them a right equally with other passengers to carry one hundred and fifty pounds of baggage free, whether in a tool chest or in a trunk, and that there can be no difficulty in applying the test by which the question whether they are baggage or not may be determined." *

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"We therefore recommend such an execution of your rules on the part of baggagemen as will remove all such causes of complaint."

The complaint was that tool chests were excluded, even though containing a mechanic's clothes and tools, and refused checking, while large and weighty trunks passed without question. The Commissioners believed that under the law and decisions of courts construing the same, a reasonable quantity of mechanic's tools in a trunk, box or chest with his clothes constituted personal baggage, and that to the weight of one hundred and fifty pounds, the limit fixed by your rules, the mechanic was entitled to the same baggage privileges as any other passenger. Upon hearing, Messrs. Blythe and Trimble, counsel for respondent were understood to contend that the company could, by rule or regulation, exclude all articles except strictly personal baggage, such as wearing apparel, and refuse to carry anything else; that the decisions such as Porter vs. Hildebrand, were made in cases where, without rule or regulation, or any attempt to exclude, carriers had received trunks, etc., containing the articles, and thus having received them to carry as baggage and failed to deliver, that they would be held liable. But that where a carrier had, by regulation or rule, given notice that it would alone carry as baggage, wearing apparel and personal effects neces

sary to the journey, it might direct its baggagemen to refuse to check as baggage, trunks, etc., known to contain articles other than baggage as defined in the rule, without any reference to what the courts may have held in cases of loss of articles received as baggage under circumstances seeming to establish on the part of the carrier either acquiescence or a neglect to do something to limit his liability, which he might have done. The authorities. cited by counsel may be grouped under two heads:

First. Those which hold that carriers may make reasonable rules and regulations with regard to their method of doing business. The cases cited were: State vs. Overton, 4 Zabriski, 441; Commonwealth vs. Porter, 7 Metc., 596; Crocker vs. New London, Will & Palmer R. R. Co., 24 Con., 260; Fraloff case, 100 U. S., 24; Slate vs. Choerte, 7 Iowa, 204.

The Iowa and Connecticut cases maintain the power to charge by regulation an additional sum, where a passenger enters a car without purchasing a ticket. The laws of Iowa expressly recognize while limiting this power. The other cases recognize the power to make reasonable rules and regulations as one inherent, and necessary to the proper conduct of their business. The Commissioners have never doubted the power of the carrier to make reasonable rules and regulations with reference to the conduct of its business. See T. & C. Van Hooser, Cedar Falls vs. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., Commissioners report, 1881, page 135. But they understand, as in the case of bylaws of a corporation that they must be in consonance with the cha.ter and the laws of the land.

The question then is whether the courts, having held that certain articles are to be considered as personal baggage, by a rule of the carrier such articles may be excluded.

In a case cited by counsel (Phelps vs. L. & N. W. Ry., 19 Common Bench, N. S., p. 321). Story on Bailments, Sec. 499, and a note thereto is cited.

In that note, after referring to articles which, in various cases have been held to be baggage, it is said: "So far as these rulings go, the doctrine may be considered as settled, and it must be considered as settled in all cases falling within the reason of these rulings." This conclusion commends itsself to us as sound.

Applying it we believe it to be settled as a matter of law that the reasonable tools of a mechanic, constitute, with his clothing, articles of baggage, which properly go with him as baggage, and whether in tool-chests or trunks it seems to us, can make no difference, if the other requisites be found. A rule or regulation which would seek to exclude articles given by authoritative decisions of courts the character of baggage, would, in our opinion, be in derogation of law, and invalid.

The other group cited seems mainly to be a class of cases where the carrier has been relieved from liability because of some fraud or concealment of contents by the passenger. We most heartily endorse the correctness of such rulings, as, if a passenger, because he may carry a watch in his trunk, should surreptitiously attempt to have watches and jewelry go as baggage, or as if one, because reasonable tools may be carried in his trunk or chest, should, by fraud or concealment of the facts attempt to have tools not hav

ing the character of baggage carried as such. It is evident that each case as it comes up must be determined on its own peculiar facts.

Hence the Commissioners in their former decision did not attempt any detail, but contented themselves with recommending such an execution of your rules by your baggagemen as shall not exclude articles declared to be proper articles of baggage, among which the Commissioners found were the reasonable tools of a mechanic as herein set forth. We are still satisfied with our former holding, and see no reason to change therefrom.

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On the 20th of October, 1884, a fire set out by employes of the Chicago & Northwestern Railway near complainant's farm, burned ten tons of hay and damaged a hay-stacker, the whole loss amounting to $18.50. Mr. Barslow made claim for the amount of the damage, but payment was refused by the company, they offering him, however, $6 in settlement. As section employes of the company had placed the amount of damages at the figure claimed by Mr. Barslow, the Commissioners recommended the payment of the full amount by them, which was done.

E. H. GIBBS, OSKALOOSA, Iowa,

VS.

CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY,
BURLINGTON & WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

Filed February 20, 1885.

Overcharge.

To the Railroad Commissioners of Iowa;

OSKALOOSA, IOWA, February 19, 1885.

GENTLEMEN-I wish to call the attention of your honorable Board to the inclosed correspondence which explains itself. The goods mentioned in the bill were sent me from the Haxtun Steam Heater Company of Kewanee, Ill., with freight charges attached of $49.45, which I paid under protest. I corresponded with the Heater Company, and the conclusion was that I paid $30 as freight, and they would ask for a rebate, which you will notice has been refused. I wish to call your attention to the Haxtun letter dated February 17, 1885, In

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