riage on every part of that distance, and that a single and entire contract to carry for a gross sum from Peoria in this State to the city of New York, implies the same thing; and that, therefore, when it is shown that there is charged for carriage, upon the same line less from Peoria to New York, the greater distance, than from Gilman to New York, the less distance, and nothing is shown to the effect that such inequality in charge is all for carriage entirely beyond the limits of the State, a prima facie case is made out of unjust discrimination under our statute, occurring within our State. We hold that the excess in the charge for the less distance presumably affects every part of the line of carriage between Gilman and the State line, proportionately with the balance of the line. The judgment is affirmed." 12 Amer. and Eng. R. R. cases, page 10.

From an examination of the authorities it is quite apparent that the view that the law of this State, as found in sections 11 and 12, of chapter 77 of the Acts of 1873, prohibiting unjust discrimination and unreasonable charges for transportation, may be and is broad enough to include charges of transportation of property from a point within to a point without the State, and from a point without to a point within the State. Indeed, a close examination of the case of Risk v. The C. & N. W. R'y Co. above would seem to indicate that the Supreme Court of the United States holds a different doctrine from that laid down in Carton v. Ill. Cent. R. R., supra, wherein the power of the State to provide by law for a maximum charge to be made by railway companies for fare and freight upon the transportation of persons and property to be carried within the State, and from points within to points without, and points without to points within, is clearly denied. The Supreme Court of the United States says that it is competent for the State to enact such a statute, and that in the absence of congressional legislation in reference to the relations of the railway companies to inter-State commerce, such laws can be enforced, even though in so doing inter-State commerce be incidentally and indirectly affected.

But whatever difference of opinion may exist among courts as to the power of the State to provide by law for a maximum charge, etc., there does not seem to be any difference of opinion as to the power of the State to provide by law for the prevention of unjust discrimination and unreasonable prices in making rates for freight, even though the freight the subject of the rate cross a State line in transit.

The question bere presented between complainant and respondent is one of purely domestic concern.

The effect of the statute prohibiting unjust discrimination and unreasonable charges as a regulation of inter-State commerce, is confined to State commerce, or to such inter-State commerce as directly affects the people of this State. As is said by the court in Peck v. C. & N. W. R'y Co., supra: "Until Congress acts in reference to the relations of this company to interState commerce, it is certainly within the power of Wisconsin to regulate its fares, etc., as far as they are of domestic concern.

With the people of Wisconsin this company has domestic relations. In

cidentally these may reach beyond the State. But certainly until Congress undertakes to legislate for those who are without the State, Wisconsin may provide for those within even though it may indirectly affect those without."

This doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States is as good for Iowa as for Wisconsin.

Statute of this State commanding a reasonable rate in freight charges by railway corporations doing business within this State is not a regulation of commerce within the meaning of the United States Constitution. It is merely a statute for the prevention of extortion and for the protection of the citizens of this State, and in the absence of congressional action on the subject, applies with as much force to freight going from points within the State to points without, and vice versa, as to freight, the carriage of which is wholly within the State. The fact that this freight was shipped from a point without the State to a point within the State, instead of vice versa, can make no difference in law. The charge was made and collected in Iowa. If the charge is an unreasonable one and wrong, the wrong was committed in this State, against a citizen of this State, and that the wrong was conceived and the initiating steps that led up to it were taken in another State, makes no sort of difference.

If this view of the law be correct, the complaint in this case is well founded. We have in sections 11 and 12, chapter 77, laws of 1878, laws prohibiting unjust discrimination and unreasonable charges for the transportation of freight. These statutes are broad enough to include rates on freight going from points within to points without the State, and from points without to points within the State, in the absence of congressional legislation covering the matter, and there is no such congressional legislation. There is an excess in the charge made against complainant over the local Iowa tariff, for the same distance and on the same class of freight. The local tariff must be presumed to be a reasonable compensation for the carriage of this freight the distance charged for. The rate charged complainant under the inter-State tariff must therefore be presumed to be unreasonable, unless it is shown that the excess in charge under the inter-State tariff is all for carriage entirely beyond the limits of the State, as a single and entire contract to carry freight for a gross sum from a point without the State to a point within the State, implies necessarily that the sum charged is proportionately for the carriage on every part of that distance. There being no such showing in this case, defendant charged and collected of complainant in excess of a reasonable rate the difference in the sum charged him under the inter-State tariff and local Iowa tariff, which is twenty-seven cents per hundred pounds, or $5.40 gross.

Commissioner Coffin reaches the same conclusion by a somewhat different line of reasoning.

It is therefore ordered by the Board of Railroad Commissioners that the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, respondent herein, so revise and alter its inter-State distance tariff, so far as it relates to freight shipped

from points within this State to points without this State, and from points outside the State to points within the State, as to make it correspond to the Iowa local distance tariff, which it is here assumed is arranged on a sufficiently remunerative basis.

As the nature of the complaint under consideration is fully set out in the opinion of Major Anderson, and will also fully appear in the body of the opinion and reasoning here given, the discussion of the right, power and duty of the State to protect its citizens from overcharge imposed by common carriers upon articles of inter-State commerce, while in the State, is directly entered upon.

Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States, reads: The Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States and with the Indian tribes."

Commerce among the several States must mean the movement of the several commodities of one State into another for exchange for those of the other, or for sale or both, as the individual citizens of the States may desire. Boyond all doubt the conferring upon Congress by the States this power to "regulate commerce among the States," was to secure to each individual of each and every State the fullest possible freedom to seek whatever advantage there might be in this traffic between the States. In other words, the surrendering of this power of the individual State to impose a tax in the form of a duty or tariff upon the commodities of another State that sought a market within its boundaries, to Congress, was in effect the obliteration of all State lines as far as commercial transactions might be concerned. The entire Nation becomes as one State, and each citizen, wherever living, has entire liberty to seek a market anywhere in the domain of the Nation. It was tantamount to agreeing for all time that there should never be any restrictions whatever to the commerce of the Nation within itself or among its own citizens because of State boundary lines.

Placing this power in "Congress" leaves the States as related to each other in the whole compact of States, as far as commerce among them is concerned, as the counties of a State are to each other.

The idea conveyed by the words "The Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations," is altogether different from that con

veyed by the words " regulate commerce among the States."

The first is,

The

that Congress shall act, and act affirmatively-prescribe rules and regulations-but in the latter there is a mere negative, or non-acting idea. yielding up of this power to “Congress” was not that Congress should act, but merely to hold this power given to it by the States, so that the States should never act in any possible way to interfere with or hinder the freest possible commercial transactions among their citizens.

To express, if possible, the idea still more clearly the design thus had in making "Congress" the repository of this power which the States, as independent sovereignties, had prior to the confederation, to discriminate against the products of other States was in effect to annihilate at once and forever all distinctions between local, or commerce within a State, and that which we now designate as inter-State.

Now, keeping fully in mind the design had in view when the right or power to regulate commerce among the several States was given up to Congress, and there to forever sleep, was simply that no State should put any restrictions on inter-State commerce, one fails to see (if the States keep true to their pledge) any necessity or occasion for any congressional action as far as commerce between adjoining States is concerned. Perfect freedom in commercial transactions, or perfect equality to each citizen, of whatever State, being the end sought—this is secured by this very non-action of the States and of Congress. If the State of Iowa pass no laws impeding or hindering the citizens of this State or of those of Illinois from a perfect free exchange or sale of commodities, and the State of Illinois passes no such laws, then, of course, there is no need that Congress should act, for no citizen is aggrieved or abridged of his rights.

When all the States keep alike good faith, as pledged in the common constitution of the Nation, there arises no necessity for any national law.

If the State of Iowa, by a legislative enactment, publishes to every citizen of every other State that it has a highway from Davenport to Council Bluffs, and that all citizens of the Nation are free to use it, would any act of Congress strengthen any citizen's right to use that highway?

When Iowa came into the sisterhood of States under the Constitution of the United States, in which is Article 1, Section 8, Iowa virtually made such a publication. She threw open, not only her public roads and highways to the citizens of other States, but her markets, and solemnly pledged that those roads and markets should be forever free, for she, at that time, put the power of making them otherwise into the keeping of Congress. In the That power she can never take back only by successful revolution. surrender of that power to put toll-gates upon these roads in order to collect tribute of those who might wish to reach our markets, it was not designed or in any way expected that Congress would impose any tribute, or regulate for any. Congress was merely to hold that power away from the State.

Now, suppose Iowa, for the sake of inducing a free interchange of commodities of this and other States, should spend upon her roads money and

labor to make the movement of commerce and travel much easier, would such acts be at all at variance with the first act or pledge not to impose any restrictions upon inter-State commerce?

Let us go farther. Should it (the State) even put teams upon these roads and assist in the transportation of this commerce, would that be considered any regulation of commerce between the States, or would it in any way show bad faith as to her original pledge?

In our State, at the present time, the railroads are the common carriers of the commerce of the State.

The liberal policy of the State toward railroad enterprise has resulted in giving to the citizens of the State, in common with those of other States, well nigh perfection in the instrumentalities for the movement of com

merce.

Does this work which the State has done, and of which we all are proud, this work of aiding railroad building for this very purpose of giving to each citizen the best known instrumentalities for commercial transaction, at all in any way compromise her commercial relations with other States?

Suppose the State, to go further, let it, in its desire to help the commerce of the State, go to the extent of building State railroads, and propose to carry all the commerce of this State seeking a market outside, and all the commerce outside seeking a market within the State-at the bare cost, or at an extremely low rate, would such an act be at all in conflict with the Federal Constitution?

Now, what is the actual state of facts that confront us to-day, in the State? We find the State covered, so to speak, with railroads that have come into being through the aid and sufferance of the State. Every railroad in the State is, in a very important sense, a creature of the State-built in part by State, county, town and individual aid. These roads have been encouraged into being for the very purpose of facilitating travel and commercial transaction, both local and inter-State. If these railroads or the corporations or companies that control them are the creatures of the State, and are created as instrumentalities of commerce, does not this very fact carry with it this other fact, that the State is under obligations to so supervise and control them that the citizens, not only of our own State, but those of every other, may have all the advantages the making of railroads was expected to bring? The State has pledged to forever abstain from all interference with the freest possible interchange of commodities between this State and all others. It cannot so interfere by any direct legislation. Can it do so indirectly in the person of her incorporations or her railroads? Most certainly not. But what are the facts? Here is a case before us where the essence of the complaint is that a citizen of this State is made to pay $5.40 for the shipment of a buggy, over the Chicago & Northwestern Railroad, from Morrison, in Illinois, to Glidden, in this State, more than he would have been required to pay for the same shipment of the same buggy the same distance over the same railroad, had the distance been entirely within this State. This $5.40 is beyond all question an arbitrary and uncalled for