The remaining chapters of this first part are occupied with demonstrating, That some Being that is uncaused, necessarily existent, independent, must have existed from all eternity; that such a Being must possess active energy, and must possess all natural perfections in an absolute manner; and that no more than one necessarily existent Being or Essence is possible. Here there is less room for originality, and less temptation to be paradoxical. The first part of the argument is substantially that of Dr. Samuel Clarke and Bishop Hamilton; but Mr. Drew delights in exhibiting it under a variety of logical forms, as if he could never satiate his mind with the metaphysical beauty of the demonstration. In attempting to prove that no more than One necessarily existent being or essence can be possible, he ventures, however, on a mode of reasoning which is very inadequately guarded by a feeble saving-clause, from leading to conclusions subversive of the Christian faith. The chapter embraces five propositions: 1. No more than one Being or Essence is required to be necessarily existent. 342 ⚫ The manner in which a necessarily existent Being or Essence ⚫ exists, precludes all plurality. 3. Two necessarily existent Beings or Essences can neither operate alike, nor differently from each other, either by natural necessity or mutual agree ment. 4. Two necessarily existent Beings or Essences can⚫ not be different from each other; nor can they be alike without being the same. 5. Variety in perfections is perfectly consistent with unity of essence and of being. These are bold and in our judgement unauthorized positions; but, previously to examining them, we shall transcribe the savingclause alluded to. He has been shewing, that, if two necessarily existent Beings or Essences exist, their perfections cannot be specifically different: they must, then, be radically the same.' He proceeds!**

Then these Beings or Essences must be radically the same also; because the sameness of their perfections will prevent them from including any quality, property, or attribute that may not invariably be predicated of simple unity. Hence, no division, no alteration, no change, no diversity, can, under these circumstances, affect a unity fof essence, even though it were possessed by distinct perso nalities. The possibility of distinct personalities possessing the same essence, may be inferred from the doctrine which the Gospel inculcates, of a TRINITY in UNITY. Still, there can be but one essence; and, consequently, but one omnipotence, and but one omniscience, although possessed by three distinct persons.'

*

If, as we imagine, Mr. Drew is a believer in the doctrine of a Trinity in Unity, we must say that such language as this

is as strange, coming from him, as it is in itself grossly improper; for, to speak of inferring the possibility of a fact from the Scripture doctrine which reveals the fact, is very much like saying, As it is revealed, it may be true. This is not, we apprehend, our Author's meaning, but it is what his words imply. Then, if by one omnipotence and one omniscience, he means one kind of power and one kind of knowledge, it is obvious that absolute perfection can be but of one kind. But, if he admits a distinction of personalities possessing one Essence, there must be, to use his own words, an omnipotence and an omniscience thrice repeated in reference to the three persons in the Godhead. But, in fact, the whole of Section 3. makes as strongly against the doctrine of Three distinct Persons, which he seems to admit, as against that of a plurality of Essences. The last paragraph in particular is a quibble at variance equally with the dignity and sacredness of the infinite subject and with sound reasoning; and the passage cited from Locke might justify suspicions respecting the Author's religious sentiments, which we do not wish to entertain. Dr. Clarke himself is far more guarded on this point, and even more orthodox. The unity of God,' he says, and says justly, 'is an unity of nature for essence; for of this it is that we must be understood, if if we would argue intelligibly, when we speak of necessity or 'self-existence.' He then adds: As to the diversity of Per⚫sons in the ever-blessed Trinity: that is, whether, notwith'standing the unity of the Divine Nature, there may not coexist with the First Supreme Cause, such excellent Emana⚫tions from it, as may themselves be really Eternal, Infinite, and Perfect, by a complete communication of Divine Attributes in an incomprehensible manner; always excepting self⚫ origination, self-existence, or absolute independency of this, I say, as there is nothing in bare reason by which it can he demonstrated that there is actually any such thing, so, neither is there any argument by which it can be proved impossible or ⚫ unreasonable to be supposed; and therefore, so far as declared and made known to us by clear revelation, it ought to 1 be believed. This passage supplies an emphatic rebuke of the rash and flippant philosophizing which has been vented by the rational' on this transcendent subject. It intimates the Author's known dissent from the Athanasian, and his adoption of the Nicene Creed; but it shows how very far he was from going the length that even Locke went in reference to the doctrine of the Trinity.

察

“Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God." p. 51.

It is peculiarly difficult, in treating such a subject in the language of the schools, to steer clear of the appearance of impiety; and we are constrained to say that Mr. Drew has not -escaped from this danger. No part of his work is chargeable with so much crudeness and offensive impropriety; and we are sutterly at a loss to conceive how he could pen some of the paragraphs. It affords a strong presumption against the boasted proof of the unity of God from bare reason, that unassisted reason failed to conduct the acutest of reasoners to the discovery of the doctrine; and, but for Revelation, it appears to us, that our utter ignorance of the mode of the Divine Existence would for ever have prevented our attaining certainty on this inscrutable subject. The Unity of Jehovah is, it seems to us, as purely a doctrine of Revelation, as the Distinction which is revealed as existing in the Divine Nature. We wish to speak with submission and modesty on this point, aware that some of the wisest and best of men have thought differently*, deriving, as they have judged, a sufficient demonstration of the Divine Unity from the nature of a self-subsisting, necessarilyexisting Being. There can be, it has been said, but one All." One absolutely perfect Being will necessarily comprehend all perfection, and leave nothing to the rest. One immense and omnipresent Being must necessarily exclude, or else contain, every other Omnipresent Being. And Mr. Drew argues that, if there be more than one universality of existence, • these Beings or Essences must mutually penetrate one another, so that all always are, wherever one is.' Now, so entirely are we ignorant of the nature of Spirit, that it seems to us impossible to pronounce on what is compatible or incompatible with the Divine Nature. These positions, so far from being selfevident, convey to our minds a very indistinct meaning. We know not how the omnipresence of God consists with the existence of finite spirits, nor how the Divine Essence penetrates other essences without their being confounded. We may borrow an analogical illustration from the mutual penetration of the three distinct substances of air, light, and heat; but, after all, between matter and spirit there can exist but a faint analogy. We can have no conceptions whatever relative to the mode of the Divine Existence; nor can we, it seems to us, ascertain the unity of God in any other way than by Revelation, nor in any other sense than that which Revelation reveals, nor proceed a step further in our reasonings, than the data contained in the sacred volume warrant by way of legitimate in

* See in particular Howe's Living Temple. Part I. c. 4.

ference. He who alone knoweth the Father, has commanded us to baptize in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, the Undivided Godhead whom we adore; and yet, we believe, on the same certain and indisputable authority, that "there is but One God, the Father, of whom are all things, "and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things," "in "whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily."

We can only give the heads of the remaining contents of these volumes. Part II. consists of Mixed Arguments, and Arguments a posteriori.' The existence of an active and primary Cause is deduced from the nature of matter-of motion -the animal phenomena-the intellectual and moral powers of man-and the general laws of creation;—and it is inferred, that this First Cause must be spiritual, possessed of absolute liberty, omniscient, and immutable. A chapter follows, which has for its object to prove, that moral distinctions are not arbitrary introductory to a view of the moral perfections of God, and their harmony as displayed in human redemption. Part III. contains a Vindication of Divine Providence. It discusses the objection arising from the existence of Moral Evil, and adverts to other miscellaneous subjects connected with the general argument. Part IV. consists of Proofs from Revelation. An Appendix is subjoined, containing notes, on the words right and wrong; on the restitution of animals; on the perpetuity of future punishments; on two passages of Scripture; and on two letters received from sceptical objectors, which are deserving of attention merely as shewing the absurdity of atheistic speculations, and the spirit of dogmatism by which doubters and objectors, who, of all people, ought not to be dogmatical, are universally characterized. In reply to the assertion, that that which is infinite may be constituted by an accumulation of finites,' Mr. Drew acutely remarks, that it owes all its plausibility to confounding what is merely interminable, as number is, with infinity. He might have remarked, that the very opposite of this assertion has been made the ground of an infidel objection. There cannot, it has been said, be any such thing as infinite Time or Space, because an addition of finite parts cannot compose or exhaust an infinite. This, Dr. Clarke replies, is supposing infinites to be made up ⚫ of numbers of finites; that is, 'tis supposing finite quantities to be aliquot or constituent parts of infinite, when indeed they are not so, but do all equally, whether great or small, whether many or few, bear the very same proportion to an infinite, as mathematical points do to a line, or lines VOL. XXI. N.S. 2 A

6

to a superficies, or as moments do to time; that is, none at all.'*

Mr. Drew will give us credit for sincerity when we assure him, that it would have been much more gratifying to us, to bestow on his volumes an unqualified approval, had that consisted with our duty to him and to the public, and, we might add, to a higher tribunal. Our readers will have gathered from the tenor of this article, that while we have found so much that we deem unsound or objectionable in the Author's argumentation, we rate his abilities very high; and especially considering the circumstances already adverted to, they must be considered as of a very extraordinary kind. We rejoice that such a man has been rescued from obscurity, and cordially wish him all manner of success in the honourable avocation to which he is now devoting his talents as a Christian minister.

Art. II. 1. Travels, comprising Observations made during a Residencex in the Tarentaise, and various Parts of the Grecian and Pennine, } Alps, and in Switzerland and Auvergne, in the Years 1820, 1821, and 1822. Illustrated by coloured Engravings and numerous Wood-cuts. By R. Bakewell, Esq. 2 vols., 8vo. pp. 830., Price 11. 6s. London, 1823.

2. Switzerland; or a Journal of a Tour and Residence in that Coun try, in the Years 1817, 1818, and 1819. Followed by an Historical Sketch of the Manners and Customs of Ancient and Modern Helvetia. By L. Simond, Author of a Tour and Residence in Great Britain. 2 vols. 8vo. Price 11. 4s. London, 1822.

OW times are altered since the tour of Europe, the grand tour, was the ne plus ultra of gentlemen travellers! No one can now pretend to have seen the world, who has not made one of a party of pleasure up the Nile, or taken a ride on camel-back across the Syrian desert. As for France, and Flanders, and Switzerland, our next-door neighbours, they may serve John Bull very well for a country-house; but, to have seen those countries is no longer worth speaking of, for every body goes there. And as to living there, except for the sake of economy, and to escape from taxes and creditors, it will not do long. Our fashionables begin to be tired of Italy itself r Lord Byron has moved further backward into Greece; while Sir William Gell assures us that the Turks are the best sort of people to live with in the world, and that there is more real freedom at Constantinople than at Geneva, whose boasted li