decree, even though the party obtaining it has married again since the time of its rendition. It is hardly an open question, now, whether courts will hesitate to expunge from their records decrees which have been obtained by fraud, because such action might involve innocent parties. If the objection to such action be urged upon the ground of public policy, it is difficult to see why it is not a matter of more importance to preserve judicial proceedings from the taint of fraud, than to prevent, by anticipation, possible unfortunate consequences to innocent third parties. Sympathy for individuals ought not to render inviolable a decree which rests upon fraud. Let the consequences be ever so disastrous to individuals, the courts will declare the law as they find it. Crouch v. Crouch, 30 Wis. 667; Edson v. Edson, 108 Mass. 590. "It may seem an arbitrary act to expunge a decree of divorce with a stroke of a pen, bastardize after-begotten children, involve an innocent third person in legal guilt, and destroy rights acquired in reliance on a judicial act which was operative at the time. But the legitimate husband, also, has rights; and if any one must suffer from the invalid marriage, it is he who procured it." Allen v. Maclellan, 12 Pa. St. 332; True v. True, 6 Minn. 458.

It is unfortunate, perhaps, that, in the principal case, a defect of jurisdiction obviated the necessity of determining other questions presented by the record. The grounds of the motion to vacate the decree, which are set forth in the opinion, are suggestive, at least, of fraud in its procurement. It may not have been without benefit to have thus recurred to adjudicated cases, where the right of self-protection. inherent in courts, has been exercised without hesitation, in view of facts establishing fraud, deceit or collusion. C. H. K.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE REVISION OF THE MISSOURI STATUTES. To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

The legislature of this state is disposed to revise the laws; but how to do it, is a much vexed question. The senators seem to favor a commission, while the members of the house, being less experienced, perhaps, and taking a more appreciative view of their collective capacity for so important a work, have resolved that the work of revision should be intrusted to a committee of six senators and fifteen representatives. The best that could be expected of a committee so constituted would be, that it could not make the laws much more obscure and contradictory than at present. What is needed, however, is careful and thorough revision by some one man of learning, plodding patience, and large experience in work of that character. Important and material alterations have crept into many sections, wholly destroying their original meaning, and, in some cases, reducing them to complete nonsense; in other cases sections have been transposed from one chapter to another, thereby making references to the original chapter apply to that to which the section has been transferred, working, in many instances, a complete change in the application of the law, and in some cases Joining incompatible sections in most unnatural wedlock. A committee of twenty-one law-makers in the raw would not have the patience, if they had the ability, to search out all these hidden, lurking defects. It is the work of years for one specially skilled and qualified for the task.

The General Assembly will do well if it makes the changes in the laws made necessary by the provisions of the new constitution. Many laws now in force will stand repealed in July next, by force of that instrument; and it is highly important that other laws, conforming to the requirements of the constitution, should be enacted in their stead before that time. To do this well, will require no little time and thought. After this work of necessity is disposed of, there will, we think, be little disposition to undertake a revision of the laws of the state in committees of the General Assembly. M. A. L.

BOOK NOTICES.

ENGLISH REPORTS-MOAK'S NOTES. Reports of Cases Decided by the English Courts, with notes and references to kindred cases and authorities. By NATHANIEL C. MOAK, Counselor at Law. Volume 13. William Gould & Son: Albany, N. Y., 1876.

The Reports of the English Courts, issued by the Law Reporting Society, are for several reasons not generally found in the library of an American lawyer. They are sold at a high price, and contain many adjudications on subjects of no practical interest to the bar or courts of this country. At the same time, they contain some decisions of great value here, which, from their high authority, are frequently followed in our courts. It is to the credit of the bench of this country, that prejudice has not been able to shut the eyes of our jurists to the reasonings of the English judges, on account of their being the decisions of a foreign tribunal. It took the English judges a good many years to overcome their national prejudices; but a reference to the late volumes of the English Reports, and the number of American cases cited in argument and judgment, will suggest that the old Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench, who could never be induced to make a note of a case decided on this side of the water, must have been gathered to his fathers, and that his successors have recognized that it would be quite as absurd for them to ignore the labors of Story and Kent and Bishop, as it would be for us to refuse to consult the Commentaries of Blackstone or the Precedents of Chitty.

To place within the means of the American bar the decisions of the English courts applicable to this country, has been the aim of the editor. In addition to this, he has collected in foot-notes the cases decided in this country on like subjects; including in one volume a report of select English cases, and a digest of American decisions. All that could be of any use to the bar here, he has included; and every decision on topics of no interest to us, he has wisely excluded. This volume contains nearly nine hundred pages, over eighty cases reported in full, and an accurate index and table of cases. Among the leading ones we notice the following:

CRIMINAL LAW-COERCION OF WIFE.-Reg. v. John, p. 443. This was an indictment against a man and his wife, for having, by threats of violence, induced the prosecutor to write and affix his name to a valuable security. The prosecutor was the president of a German relief society. The female prisoner called on him requesting assistance, and, on his refusing, she stated that she had a very fine dog which she could not afford to keep, and which she wished to sell. He said that he would call at her address, which she gave him, on his way home in the evening, and see it. On his arriving at the house, the door was opened by her, and he was conducted to an upper room. Here he found several dogs, which, she stated, belonged to her hus. band. The prosecutor declined to purchase, and was about leaving the room, when the door opened and the male pris. oner and another man entered. "Auguste John (the male prisoner) locked the door at once, and put the key in his pocket. He then said to Emile John (the female prisoner): 'Have I caught you at last?' She did not say anything, but sat down and put her hands before her face. He then said: What business have you here with my wife?' I said: 'I am here at the invitation of your wife, looking at dog.' He said: 'That is all nonsense; you have been seducing my wife, and you will have to pay for it; I have got a witness here.'" Notwithstanding the proscutor's protestations of innocence, he was compelled to affix his name to a paper in the following form: "I agree to pay you £100 sterling on the 27th instant, to prevent any action against me," before he was allowed to leave the room. On the trial, the jury were instructed with reference to the defense which had been set up on behalf of the woman, that she had acted under the coercion of her husband; that, if they were of opinion that she took an independent part in carrying out the crime, the fact of her being the wife would not absolve her. Anything done by her in the presence of her

husband, and under his control, the law would excuse; but if she took an independent part in the matter when he was not there, she would be answerable, although she was his wife. Both defendants were convicted.

The editor, in his note, cites the American cases on this subject, that, to exempt the wife, the presence of the husband and his direction must be concurrent. Cassin v. Delaney, 38 N. Y. 178, 6 Abb., N. S., reversing 1 Daly, 224; State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298; Com. v. Neal, 10 Mass. 52; Com. v. Burk, 11 Gray, 437; Com. v. Eagen, 103 Mass. 71; Com.v. Garrison, 97 Mass. 547; State v. Williams, 65 N. C. 398; State v. Potter, 42 Vt. 495; Com. v. Wood, 97 Mass. 225. The presumption of coercion is only prima facie, and, like other presumptions, may be repelled. Wagener v. Bill, 19 Barb. 321; Cassin v. Delaney, supra; State v. Cleaves, supra; State v. Williams, supra.

TRESPASS-MASTER AND SERVANT-CHAIRMAN AT PUBLIC MEETING-Order to REMOVE PERSON MAKING DISTURBANCE.-Lucas v. Mason, p. 379. This was an action of assault. On the trial the plaintiff proved that he was present in the gallery of a large hall where there was a meeting convened by members of an association, and that the defendant acted as chairman. There was an interruption in the gallery, near to the place where the plaintiff was standing, upon which the defendant said: "I shall be obliged to bring those men to the front who are making the disturbance. Bring those men to the front." The plaintiff was making no disturbance, but was seized by a man with a white ribbon in his coat, and two policemen, and dragged over some benches to the front part of the gallery, and thereby injured. There was nothing to show the position or duty of those who seized him, or whether any instructions as to keeping order had been given them by the defendant before the act complained of. It was held, in the Court of Exchequer, that there was no evidence to go to the jury of any liability on the part of the defendant, as there was not the ordinary relation of master and servant between him and those who assaulted the plaintiff; but only a particular direction as to a particular matter, and that the words used by the defendant did not authorize the officers to act upon their judgment as to who were the persons making the disturbance.

To this case the editor has added a lengthy note containing the cases in this country as to disturbances of public meetings. A person disturbing a religious meeting, and interrupting its order and decorum, may be removed therefrom by the application of force sufficient for the purpose. Wall. v. Lee, 34 N. Y. 141; Reid v. Inglis, 12 U. C. C. P. 191. Disturbance by singing loudly; see State v. Linkhard, 69 N. C. 214; Owen v. Hinman, 1 Watts and Serg. 548. As to criminal prosecutions for disturbing singing schools, see State v. Oskins, 28 Ind. 364. For disturbing religious meetings, State v. Hopper, 27 Mo. 599; State v. Edwards, 32 Mo. 548; Brown v. State, 46 Ala. 175; Harrison v. State, 37 Ala. 154; Kenney v. State, 38 Ala. 324; State v. Townsell, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 6; Warren v. State, id. 269; Lockett v. State, 40 Tex. 4; People v. Degey, 2 Wheel. Cr. Cas. 135; Com. v. Arndt, id. 236; Farrell v. Warren, 3 Wend. 253; Foster v. Smith, 10 id. 377; People v. Fuller, 17 id. 211; Bigelow v. Stearns, 19 Johns. 39.

RECEIVER-DISTURBANCE OF POSSESSION-CONTEMPT. Ex parte Cochrane, p. 802. Where a receiver of a bankrupt's property has been appointed by the court of bankruptcy, it is a contempt of court, for the holder of a valid bill of sale of goods of the bankrupt, to oust the receiver from possession which he has taken of such goods. The only person who may interfere with the possession of a receiver, is a landlord distraining for a year's rent. Any other person who claims a better title than the receiver, ought to apply to the court of bankruptcy for leave to enforce his rights.

The editor says that it may be stated as a general rule, that any unauthorized interference with the possession of a receiver appointed by the court, or suing him without leave of the court, is a contempt. High on Receivers, Kerr, Edwards, Albany City, &c., v. Schermerhorn, 9 Paige, 372; Noe V. Gibson, 7 Paige, 513; 2 Southern Law Review, (N. S.) 576. To these cases we would add Thompson v. Scott, 3 Cent. L. J. 737, and Allen v. Central R. R. of Iowa, id. 434; Henny v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 75, contra. So an assignee in bankruptcy, though defendant was in possession at the time of the bankruptcy. Re Dornville, I. L. R., 9 Eq. 456. So a receiver appointed over property belonging to a person not a party to the cause discharged, notwithstanding the abatement of

the suit by the death of the sole defendant. Lavender v. Lavender, L. R. 9 Eq. 593.

SOLICITOR AND CLIENT-NEGLIGENCE IN INVESTIGATING TITLE-British Mut. Invest. Co. v. Cobbold, p. 557. In this case it is held that a bill will not lie against a solicitor for negligence in investigating a title. The editor, in an exhaustive and learned note, has collected almost all the American and English cases on the liability of an attorney for negligence in the management of business entrusted to him, referring also to the case of Page v. Trutch, 3 Cent. L. J. 559, 665, and the extraordinary ruling of Judge Deady, of the U. S. District Court of Oregon, therein.

CONSPIRACY TO ENFORCE WORKMEN TO QUIT EMPLOYMENT, AND EMPLOYER TO ALTER MODE OF CARRYING ON BUSINESS-Reg. v. Hibbert, et al. p. 433. On an indictment for conspiracy to molest and obstruct workmen, with a view to coerce them to quit their employment, and to molest and obstruct employers with a view to coerce them to alter their mode of business, the evidence being that the defendants had continually watched and walked up and down before the prosecutor's premises, and had accosted their workmen, inviting them to quit their employment, and promising them money if they did so, and threatening, if they refused, they would be known as " black sheep,' and would not be able to get employment elsewhere, it is held that the question whether the watching and besetting was carried on in such a manner and to such an extent, that it would operate on the will by giving rise to apprehension or annoyance, and that, if the watching and besetting had been done with the intention to coerce, the defendants should be found guilty.

The learned editor's note to this case is a complete digest of the law of conspiracy. Conspiracy, he states, consists in an agreement or common design to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act for an unlawful end; it is then indictable; but it is not the subject of a civil action unless some act be done to give effect to the purposes of the conspirators, either of extortion, or mischief. Hinchman v. Richie Brightly's N. P. Rep. 143; Com. v. Currens, 3 Pitts. Rep. 143; Com. v. Chew, 7 Am. Law Jour. (1 Hall. N. S.) 225; Reg. v. Bunn, 4 Eng. Rep. 504; Com. v. Tack, 1 Brewst. 511; 1 Wheelers Crim. Cas. 222; State v. Harris, 38 Ia. 242. A conspiracy is an indictable offense, though nothing be done in pursuance of it. Rep. v. Ross, 2 Yeates, 1; Com. v. Corlies, 3 Brewst. 575; Com. v. Currens, supra; Com. v. McKisson, & Serg. & Rawle, 420; Landingham v. State, 49 Ind. 186; State v. Young, 37 N. J. Law Rep. 184. It may be proved by eircumstantial evidence, and parties performing disconnected overt acts, may be shown to be confederates in the original offense. Kelly v. People, 55 N. Y. 566; Reg. v. Cope, 1 Strange, 144, and a number of other cases cited by the editor. The combination being shown, every act and declaration of each member of the confederacy, in pursuance of the original plan, is the act and declaration of all, and is original evidence against all. Scott v. State, 30 Ala. 503; U. S. v. McKee, 3 Cent. L. J, 95, and other cases cited. A party is a party to every act done, notwithstanding at what time he came into the conspiracy. Hinchman v. Richie, supra, and other cases. In Reg. v. McMahon, 26 U. C. Q . B. 195, a priest, who had accompanied the Fenians into Canada, was held to be a co-conspirator if he were there to sanction by his presence what the others were doing. Mr. Moak concludes his note with a reference to the cases of conspiracy for different objects. To confine in Lunatic Asylum: Hinchman v. Richie, supra. To compel a strike among workmen: People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9; People v. Melvin, Yates' Select Cases, and numerous other authorities. To entrap a liquor seller to sell on Sunday in violation of law: Com. v. Leeds, 9 Phil. Rep. 569. To cheat and defraud the government: U. S. v. McKee, ante; U. S. v. Bryden, 1 Lowell, 266. To depreciate the value of property to the injury of another: State v. Clary, 64 Me. 369. To make real and pretended sales of stock, to induce brokers to advance money and thus defraud them: Com. v. Wrigley, 6 Phil. Rep. 169. By public officers illegally to lease public property: People v. Wood, 4 Park. 144. To incite the publie to crime: Reg. v. Boulton, 12 Cox's Crim. Cas. 87. To influence public to buy book by false representations: Reg. v. Stenson, 12 id. 111. To sell lottery tickets: Com. v. Gillespie, 7 Serg. & Rawle, 469. To sell a horse as gentle which was not: Reg. v. Kenrick, Dav. & Merr. 208. To cheat by betting: Reg. v. Hudson, 8 Cox, 305; Reg. v. Bailey, 4 Id. 390. To obtain money from an insurance company on a policy: 7 Cox Cr. Cas. Appendix, 24; Reg. v. Lyon, 19 U. C., Q. B. 48. To procure return of member of parliament by bribery: 7 Cox App. 15. By directors

of a corporation for issuing fraudulent prospectus to procure subscriptions: Reg. v. Brown, 7 Cox, 442; Reg. v. Gurney, 11 Id. 414. Not to prosecute for a crime, or to obstruct justice: Reg. v. Hamp, 6 Cox, 167; Municipality v. Horseman, 16 U. C., Q. B. 556. To induce creditor to take less than debt: Reg. v. Carlisle, 6 Cox, 336. To defile a woman: Reg. v. Meares, Temple & Mew, 414; 4 Cox, 473; 2 Denison, 79; 5 Cox Appendix, 8; 6 Id. 78. By bankrupt and others to conceal his property: 8 Cox App. 1432; 7 Ib. 14. By one partner and others to cheat his co-partner on division of the assets: Reg. v. Warburton, 11 Cox, 584; L. R., 1 C. C. Res. 274. To induce one to purchase goods as solid, which were plated: Reg. v. Levine, 10 Cox, 374. To cheat a corporation generally: State v. Young, 37 N. J. Law Rep. 184. To cheat at a mock auction: Reg. v. Lewis, 11 Cox, 404. To cheat by false entries in a stock book: 7 Cox App. 51; Reg. v. Kenigan, 9 Cox, 441. To liberate a prisoner: Reg. v. Desmond, 11 Cox, 146. To go out house-breaking: Reg. v. Thompson, Id. 362. To rob: People v. Vasquez, 49 Cal. 560; Landingham v. State, 49 Ind. 186; State v. Sterling, 34 Ia. 443. To fraudulently enter a judgment as an apparent lien: Com. v. Gallagher, 4 Penn. L. J. 58; 2 Penn. L. J. Rep. 297. To steal title deeds: 4 Cox App. 18. To obtain a ride on a railroad: 4 Cox App. 38. To give false evidence or obstruct the course of justice: 5 Cox App. 9. By servants, to use master's property for their gain: Reg. v. Button, 3 Cox, 229. To abduct a woman: Wakefield's Case, 2 Lewin, 1d; I. 279; Bennett & Heard's Lead. Cas. 282; 2 Townsend's State Trials, 112. To have certain persons personate voters: Reg. v. Haslam, 1 Denison's C. C. 73. To raise the price of stocks: Lord Cochran's case, 2 Townsend's State Trials, 1; 1 Townsend's Lives of the Judges, 357. To murder: 2 Townsend's State Trials, 156; Warren's Misc. 414. To induce one to gamble: Reg. v. Bailey, 4 Cox, 390. By public officers to obtain public money: Horseman v. Queen, 16 U. C. Q. B. 543. To give or obtain a false verdict: 1 Stark Cr. Pl. 33; 2 Hawk. Pl. Cr. Ch. 25 & 89, To convict an innocent person: Com. v. McLean, 2 Pars. Sel. Cases, 367; Elkin v. People, 28 N. Y. 177. To acquit one charged with crime: State v. McKinstry, 50 Ind. 465. By A. to draw false checks on bank, B. a book-keeper to pay them and make false entries: Com. v. Toering, Brightly's N. P. 315; 6 Penn. L. J. Rep. 29. To assist girl to escape and marry: Miflin v. Com., 5 Watts & Serg. 461; 6 L. Rep. 219. To affect the government: O'Connell's Case, 2 Towns. St. Tr. 392; Curran's Speeches, Am. Ed., p. 106. To defraud government by false vouchers: Hedge's case, 28 How. St. Tr. 1315. To raise the price of produce: Com. v. Tack, 1 Brewst. 511. To destroy and injure the property of a railroad: Railroad Conspiracy Case, Pub. at Detroit 1851. By the president and cashier of a bank to defraud it: Baltimore Conspiracy Case, Pub. at Baltimore 1823. In going into another's house and wrongfully taking his property: People v. Bradford, 1 Wheel. Cr. Cas. 219. To take property by replevin: State v. Harris, 38 Ia. 242. To drive an actor from the stage: Gregory v. Duke of Brunswick, 6 Scott N. R. 809; 7 Id. 972. To unjustly appraise property taken for public use: State v. Young, 37 N. J. L. Rep. 184.

Such is the plan of Mr. Moak's edition of the English Reports. The extracts, which our limited space has allowed us to present from his notes to the different cases, give a very good idea of the thoroughness and accuracy of the collection of American decisions which he appends to the principal cases. Many of the notes are as learned and valuable as a text-book on the subject would be; some are complete digests of the particular branch of the law treated. We are sure that this edition must have a very large sale. Next to the reports of his own state and the Supreme Federal Court, we know of no series of reports that would be more useful to the practicing lawyer, containing,as it does, (1) all the English cases of value to the American lawyer; (2) references to all the American cases on the points of law decided.

GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE, 13TH EDITION.-A Treatise on the Law of Evidence. By SIMON GREENLEAF, LL.D. Three vols. Thirteenth edition. Edited by JOHN WILDER MAY, author of "The Law of Insurance." Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1876. A thorough examination of these volumes enables us to state that the present edition is superior, both in

matter and arrangement, to any of the previous editions. The text has been restored to the exact condition in which the learned author left it. The additions are in the notes-and the more important notes of the late Judge Redfield, by whom the work was carefully edited, are indicated so as to distinguish them from those of the other gentlemen who have successively edited the work since the death of Professor Greenleaf. Full-face, indicative catch-words preceding each section, and very full cross-references, are among the minor improvements. Almost every lawyer has had occasion to feel how defective the index to Greenleaf originally was. This has been remedied by the enlarged and complete index furnished by the present editor. But the principal value of this edition, after all, consists in the careful manner in which the editor has gone over the recent cases in Great Britain and this country, and judiciously selected and cited them whenever it was necessary to qualify, or further illustrate, or add to the text, or the matter contributed by previous editors. It is no slight or easy work to edit well three important volumes like the present; and we note with pleasure that Mr. May has not discharged this duty in a perfunctory manner, but with conscientious care and laborious industry.

A re-examination of this work has suggested some pleasant reflections and recalled pleasant associations and memories. The author was the contemporary and friend of the illustrious Story, to whom he dedicated, in 1842, the first edition. He was also his co-laborer in the law department of Harvard University. Both have long since been gathered to their peaceful rest; but their names are as familiar as household words to every lawyer in the country, and to every jurist of learning in Great Britain. Their fame shows no sign of decay. On the contrary, their trans-Atlantic repu tation is greater than it was at the time of their death. Kent, Story and Greenleaf are constantly referred to in terms of the highest respect by the judges in Westminster Hall-much more frequently now than formerly. Of the value in which the work of Prof. Greenleaf is held in British estimation, we have the most conclusive proof. The English work known as Taylor's Evidence is (as Mr. Taylor in his preface admits) actually Greenleaf, with such changes and additions as were necessary to adapt it to that country. Mr. Taylor's reference to the decisions of the British courts seems to have been carefully and critically made; and a very useful feature in the present edition is the judicious use which Mr. May has made of the material contained in the last edition of Taylor. It is unneces sary to enlarge upon the merits or distinctive characteristics of this work of Prof. Greenleaf. It has stood the severe test to which five and thirty years will inevitably put any law treatise, and it stands as high in professional estimation as ever, and it still keeps its place in the foremost rank of American law productions-with those of Kent and Story. D.

HENT'S FORMS AND USE OF BLANKS.-Forms and Use of Blanks. By R. W. HENT, Counselor at Law. Second edition. Greatly improved and condensed. By J. C. BATES, of the San Francisco Bar. San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft & Co. 1877.

This is a book of five hundred pages, containing over nine hundred forms in ordinary legal and business transactions, drawn strictly in conformity with the laws of California, Nevada, Colorado, Oregon, Washington, Montana, Idaho, Utah, Arizona and Wyoming. To the lawyers and conveyancers of the states and territories to which this publication is particularly appli cable, it will, we have no doubt, be of the greatest value. This is the second edition; the compilation having first appeared over ten years ago. A feature of

CRIMINAL LAW-FRAUDULENT VOTING-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.-An indictment against a person for unlawfully, knowingly, wilfully and feloniously casting a ballot, at a municipal election in the city of St. Louis, under an assumed name, not being a qualified voter of said ward nor entitled to vote under said assumed name, is defective for the reason that it does not state that defendant knew that he was not entitled to vote in such ward. Held, further, that defendant voting under an assumed name could not be held amenable to the punishment prescribed by statute-Wag. St., p. 489, § 27, or § 6 of act March 20, 1875-the latter of which declares that "whoever shall * * vote, when not entitled thereto, at any election held under this act, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding five years"-the act being for the registration of voters in the city of St. Louis. Constitutionality of the act not passed upon. Judgment reversed. Opinion by GANTT, C. J.-State v. Miller. alias Wheeler.

PRACTICE BEFORE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE-STATEMENT JURISDICTION—AMENDMENT-LIMITATION.-In an action brought before a justice of the peace, Sept. 13, 1870, under the statute, for double damages for killing stock, the statement failed to show that the stock was killed within the jurisdiction of the justice. Judgment for plaintiff, and appeal by defendant to Circuit Court; motion by defendant to dismiss; and on the following day plaintiff moved to amend his account so as to show jurisdiction. Defendant's motion was sustained, plaintiff's overruled, and suit dismissed December 27, 1872. On January 11, 1873, a stipulation was filed to reinstate cause, but as having been originally instituted on the day next after the day of dismissal, and that plaintiff might insert the necessary allegation to show jurisdiction. At the trial, the court instructed the jury that plaintiff could not recover. Plaintiff took non-suit, with leave to move to set aside, which motion was overruled, and plaintiff appealed. Held [citing Hansberger v. P. R. R. Co., 43 Mo. 196], that, as the njury was committed more than two years prior to reinstatement of suit as per stipulation, the statutory action was barred. Wag. St., 521, § 6. The amount was in excess of the justice's common-law jurisdiction, and the proofs did not establish a common-law right of recovery. Judg. ment affirmed. Opinion by LEWIS, J.-Alexander v. Pacific R. R. Co.

LIFE INSURANCE-NON-FORFEITING POLICIES-EFFECT OF REPRESENTATIONS—EVIDENCE.- Where an ordinary life policy is issued providing for forfeiture in case the premium was not paid when due, a circular issued by the insurance company, while such policy was in force, declaring that all its continued life policies then in force, or thereafter to be issued, should be non-forfeiting, would have the effect of changing such continued life policy to a non-forfeiting policy in the manner described in the circular, provided such circular came to the knowledge of the assured, and he failed to pay his premiums on the faith of the representations contained therein, and it would be competent to go to the jury as evidence of such knowledge and action on the part of the assured, that large numbers of such circular were issued and sent to the policy holders, and were piled upon the counter over which assured was in the habit of paying his premiums. Citing Henning v. U. S. Ins. Co., 47 Mo. 430; Horwitz v. Eq. Ins. Co., 40 Mo. 360; Thompson v. St. Louis L. Ins. Co., 52 Mo. 470; Pelkington v. Nat'l Ins. Co., 55 Mo. 172. Judgment will not be reversed for error in giving an instruction that does not prejudice appellant.

Judgment affirmed. Opinion by BAKEWELL, J.-Steele v. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co.

AUTHORITY OF AGENT TO COLLECT—“QUI TACET CONSENTIRE VIDETUR "—EVIDence of ageNT'S AUTHORITY. -When the maker of a note pays the same to another than the holder, in order to discharge the debt, it must be paid to some one authorized to collect it, or whose action is subsequently ratified. Such authority or ratification may be proved by circumstances, such as leaving the note in the possession of an agent, or silent acquiescense in the payment to the agent; but mere silence will not be sufficient to establish a ratification unless the jury believe that the principal intended by such silence to ratify his agent's act. Nor will the mere fact of the agent's having loaned the money and received the note for the principal, warrant a finding that the agent was authorized to collect. The mere possession of an unindorsed promissory note is not of itself sufficient to authorize a payment thereon to the holder, when said note is not exhibited to the payer. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by GANTT, C. J.—Hannon v. Sullivan.

SCHEME AND CHARTER-WRIT OF PROHIBITION TO JUDGE OF CIRCUIT COURT-When Power of SUPERVISORY COURT INVOKED-POWERS OF CIRCUIT COURT— ORAL DECLARATIONS OF JUDGE.-Before applying to this court for a writ of prohibition to the defendant to permit the issuance of a writ of mandamus, it was proper for plaintiffs first to ask to be made parties to the mandamus proceeding. The appointment of commissioners to examine the ballots cast at the scheme and charter election, as preliminary to a writ of mandamus requiring the proper parties to announce the result, was within the power of the circuit court; it could not be rendered the proper subject of prohibition by the filing of the report. If a certificate would be inoperative and void, it would be harmless. The oral declaration of the judge on the bench could amount to no more than private counselings, and the prohibitory writ will not issue upon the mere conjecture that sworn officers will be satisfied upon the question of fact, without proper investigation, because the judge informed them that they might do so. "An application for this extraordinary writ must show unequivocally every fact requisite to justify its issuance." It appears that the respondents in the mandamus proceeding are to certify such a result only as they themselves may find to be true. Writ of prohibition refused. Opinion by LEWIS, J.-Barnes et al. v. Gottschalk.

NOTES.

A STATEMENT of the business done in the English law courts for the ten months ending October 31, 1875, which has just been published, shows the following summary proceedings in the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer: Process Issued-writs of summons issued, 60,062; appearances entered, 20,461; judgments, 21,834; executions, 13,088. There has been a large decrease in the rate of issue of summons each year for some years. The changes in the mode of procedure will probably hereafter cause an in

crease.

COUNTRY PRACTICE.-One of our contributing editors, in apologizing for not annotating certain decisions sent to him, writes: "Our court has been in session here for the last ten days, almost day and night. It is not run like one of your kid-glove city courts. It convenes at the healthy hour of eight A. M., and adjourns at noon long enough for one to bolt his dinner-if he has little to bolt; and evening sessions are held continuing until ten or eleven o'clock at night." The position of judge of such a court is as bad as that of editor of a law journal, and about as unremunerative.

A CORRESPONDENT in Texas tells us the following "joke," and vouches for the truth of it: A few years since, two Mexicans, who were unable to speak English, were on their way back home from Kansas, whither they had gone with some stock-men from Southwestern Texas. When they reached Clay County they were arrested for horsestealing and taken before a J. P., who was unable to speak "Mexican." After several ineffectual attempts at a mutual understanding, the J. P. concluded to bind them over to appear at the next term of the District Court, and made them sign the following bond: "THE STATE OF TEXAS,

County of Clay.

Know all men by these presents, that we, two Mexicans, whose names and residences are to us unknown, hereby

acknowledge ourselves bound to pay to the State of Texas one thousand dollars, the condition of which is as follows: We have been arrested this day for horse-stealing. Now, if we shall make our appearance at the next term of the District Court of Clay County, to answer any indictment that may be preferred against us at said term for horsestealing, then this obligation shall become null and void; otherwise it must remain in full force and effect. Witness our hands this, the 3d day of June, A. D. 1874.

their

Two X MEXICANS. mark.

NOTWITHSTANDING the continual complaints of hard times which have been heard during the last year, and notwithstanding that business has experienced a serious interruption in consequence of political excitement, the trade of St. Louis has exhihited a steady and gratifying increase. According to the tables published in the St. Louis Republican on New Year's day, the increase in receipts of corn was 8,297,117 bushels; of wheat, 500,000 bushels; of cotton, 73,378 bales; of tobacco, 16,094 hogsheads; of lead 12,000 pigs; of cattle, 16,866 head; of hogs, 248,609 head; of sheep, 111,515 head; of coffee, 84,627 bags; of wool, 1,785,801 pounds. The same table exhibits large and unexpected gains in many other articles. In dollars and cents these gains are represented in round numbers by the following sums. In corn, $4,445,000; in wheat $1,125,000; in cotton, $3,368,900; in tobacco, $1,600,940; in lead $60,000; in cattle, $505,980; in hogs, $8,936,866; in sheep, $555,575; in coffee, $4,231,450; in wool, $715,320; in minor articles, $2,000,000;-making a total gain of $23,580,239. During the most of this period, two of the great railroads entering St. Louis from the west have been in the hands of receivers, and have been sold under the auctioneer's hammer to foreclose mortgages; but notwithstanding this interruption of title, and change of ownership, not the slightest interruption, inconvenience or danger, either to freight or passenger traffic, has occurred. The above tables certainly afford much matter for congratulation and hope; nevertheless, if there is one man in St. Louis who does not habitually grumble about the dullness of trade, we should like to see that man's face.

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"If you will not say anything more about it, we will not." Since writing the editorial of last week upon the subject of fencing railroads in Missouri, we have been obliged to detail a special clerk to read and reply to the letters and postal cards, which are pouring in upon us, explaining that the very law, the passage of which we recommended, has been passed, and is to be found in the Acts of 1875, at page 131. The aforesaid clerk is under instructions to write in reply to each of the said letters and postal cards, the legend with which this paragraph commences. We may be per mitted to say in vindication of ourselves, however, that the editor of this journal sat as referee in two fiercely contested cases involving the liability of receivers of a railroad for killing stock. Able and experienced counsel were arrayed against each other, and one of them was one of the most acute and thoroughly trained railroad lawyers in the state; and yet the statute in question was entirely overlooked, and the cases were tried upon the law as it stands in Wagner's statutes. One of those gentlemen actually drew a bill, such as we recommended, and sent it down to the Legislature last week! He now declines to be interviewed on the question; but our railroad brother takes shelter behind the assertion that the existence of the statute was not known to a single railroad lawyer in Missouri, nor even to the judges of the Supreme Court. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. "If you will not say anything more about it, we will not."

A PROPHET IS NOT WITHOUT HONOR, SAVE IN HIS OWN COUNTRY." Allow me to congratulate you on the great improvement in the new volume of your excellent JOURNAL."-Albert A. Outerbridge, editor Weekly Notes, Phila. "It has been edited with great judgment, and merits the cordial support of the bar in the East, no less than in the West."-American Law Times. "I am delighted, and so are our judges, with the new dress and appearance of the JOURNAL."-Hon. Norman L. Freeman, State Reporter, Springfield, Ill. "The make-up, dress and general appearance are superb-far more pleasing to the sight and to the touch than the more cumbersome or rather unwieldy form of the old quarto. I think the present style, as a whole, will be very satisfactory to the subscribers in this locality.”— John F. Baker, New York city. "I like its dress and make-up very much. Am sorry, now, that I ever became attached to the old one."-Hon. James O. Pierce. "We

read your editorials with a great deal of interest and satisfaction, as they do not follow the old beaten track, but embody the spirit of reform; and in no other journal can we find decisions of the federal courts so fully reported-a matter of growing importance to the bar at large."-Frank W. Penwell, Danville, Ill. "I am more than ever pleased with the manner in which the JOURNAL is got up, and I don't think that I should like, or that I could afford, to do without it."-Uriah Bruner, West Point, Neb. "A considerable improvement in style and amount of contents."-James Bond, Mobile, Ala. "We are much pleased with the looks of the new edition for 1877. The first number contained one decision that was worth to us five times the year's subscription."-Karnes & Ess, Kansas City, Mo. "I like the improvements you have made, both in size, type, arrangement, etc."-Lewis A. Groff, Kearney, Neb. "We are very much pleased with it."-Birchett & Gilland, Vicksburg, Miss. "I am so thoroughly pleased with its appearance that I not only do not see how it can be bettered, but I am sincerely glad that you did not take the advice of your 'conservative' friends, including myself, about changing the old form. It is clear that you knew best about it.” -Henry A. Chaney, Detroit.

THE SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTION AND THE FEDERAL COURT.-In the case of Ex parte Hayne et al., recently before the United States Circuit Court of South Carolina, the petitioners, the board of canvassers for that state, had been committed for contempt, in not complying with the order of the State Court, directing them to canvass the vote of the state. They thereupon fapplied to the Federal Court for a habeas corpus, and on the return of the writ were discharged from custody. The Court, Bond, J., held that the proceeding of the Supreme Court of the state was beyond its jurisdiction; that the board of canvassers were clothed, under the law, with discretionary powers, which required them to discriminate the votes, to determine and certify the candidates elected, after scrutiny, and that they were a part of the executive department of the government, and were in no wise subject to control as to what they should do after they had commenced to perform that duty, to the judicial department; and that, as this was a general election, at which members of Congress were to be elected, and electors of president and vice-president of the United States to be chosen, they were acting in a federal capacity, or, in other words, in pursuance of a law of the United States, and, therefore, if disturbed in the exercise of their functions, they were entitled to the protection of the courts of the United States.

The following authorities were cited in the opinion: 1. The Circuit Court can look behind the return of the officer and the commitment, and examine into the cause of the detention. Rev. Stat. U. S., section 753; U. S. ex rel. Hendricks v. J. O. Harris, Atlanta Whig, June, 13, 1872; Ex parte Dock Bridges, 2 Cent. L. J. 327; Opinion of Bradley, J., in same case; 21 Int. Rev. Record, 214; Ex parte, Jenkins, 2 Wall, Jr., 521; Ex parte Mattison, Manuscript; Opinion of Bond, J., U. S. Circuit Court, Dist. of S. C.; Bigelow v. Forrest, 9 Wall. 339; Ex parte, Lange, 18 Wall. 163; People v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y., 573. 2. The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to control, by mandamus, the action of the board of state canvassers in matters within their discretion. Const. of S. C., Art. IV, sec. 4; Const. of S. C., Art. I, secs. 26 and 33; Gen'l Stat. of S. C., chap. 8; Astrom v. Hammond, 3 McL., 107; Elliott v. Pier. sol, 1 Pet., 328; People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 560; Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall. 347; Secretary v. MeGanahan, 9 Wall. 298; Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475; Att'y Gen'l v. Bartow, 4 Wis. 567; State of Ohio ex rel. Grissel v. Marlow, 15 Ohio, 114; Rice v. Austin, 19 Min. 103; see as to executive officers in S. C. Gen. Stat., chap. 16, sec. 1. 3. Mandamus will not lie where there is any other remedy. People v. Cover, 50 Ill. 100; Bassett v. School Directors, 9 La. 514. 4. Board could not re-assemble after adjournment sine die. Cooley Const. Lim., 622; Clark v. Buchanan, 2 Minn. 346, 33 N. Y. 603. 5. Board can not be punished for disobedience to a void order. Walton v. Deneling, 61 Ill. 201; Dickey v. Reed et al., 3 Cent. L. J. 568; Ex parte Grace, 12 Iowa, 207. 6. Board was acting under constitution and laws of the United States. Const. U. S., art. I, sec. 2, art. II, sec. 1; Rev. Stat. U. S. secs. 5520 and 5511; Hurd on Habeas Corpus, 412; Ex parte, Kearney, 7 Wheat, 38; New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 20 Wall. 392; U. S. v. Johnson, 3 McLean, 96; Norris v. Newson, 5 McLean, 100; Tarble's case, 13 Wall. 407; Alleman v. Booth, 21 How. 523; Ex parte, Cabrera, 1 Wash. c. c. 237; Ex parte, Watkins, 3 Peters, 201.