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WILL- CONSTRUCTION - BANKRUPT LEGATEE.-1. The general rule is well settled that a bequest or devise to the "heirs" or "heirs at law" of the testator will be construed as referring to those who are such at the time of the testator's death, unless a different intent is plainly mauifested by the will. Abbott v. Bradstreet, 3 Allen, 587. 2. Where a legatee, who is one of the heirs at law of the testator, to whom property is to be paid over by trustees appointed under the will, after the death of A. without issue, has, since the death of the testator, become bankrupt, his interest passes to his assignee. Gardner v. Hooper, 3 Gray, 398; Blanchard v. Blanchard, 1 Allen, 223; Nash v. Nash, 12 Allen, 345; Dunn v. Sargent, 101 Mass. 336. And if it is not shown that such interest has been reconveyed to the bank rupt by the assignee, it can not, as matter of law, be presumed that it was so reconveyed; and it can not be decreed to be paid over to him, his administrator or heirs, but must be retained in the hands of the trustees till it is ascertained to whom it belongs. Opinion by MORTON, J.-Minot v. Tappan.

SHERIFF'S FEES-TAXATION OF COSTS.-1. The fees to which sheriff's and their deputies are entitled for service of processes are fixed by law,- Gen. Stat., ch. 157, § 4, as amended by Stat. 1865, ch. 101,—and are not the subject of contract, so far as concerns the taxation of costs. Items, therefore, in such taxation, for the expenses of a "keeper" put over attached property in the house or place of business of the defendant, or for "custody," by which is understood a charge for the responsibility which the officer is under when he thus places a keeper over the property, not being included in the statutes, are not legal fees which may be included in the costs to be taxed. 2. If personal property liable to attachment can not be removed without injury or inconvenience, the statutes provide a way by which the attachment may be made without such removal; otherwise the attachment by an officer contemplates the immediate taking and keeping possession of the same by him, in order to enable him to seize the same upon any execution which may issue in favor of the plaintiff, in the suit iu which the attachment is made. Gen. Stats., ch. 129, §§ 32-49, 57. See also, Malcolm v. Spoor, 12 Metc. 279; Boynton v. Warren, 99 Mass. 172; Williams v. Powell, 101 Mass. 467; Shattuck v. Woods, 1 Pick. 171; Davis v. Stone, 120 Mass. 228; Weston v. Weston, 102 Mass. 514; Briggs v. Taunton, 110 Mass. 423; U. S. Manuf. Co. v. Clark, 119 Mass. 163. Opinion by LORD, J.-Cutler v. Howe.

SALE-EVIDENCE-SUBSEQUENT INSOLVENCY AS PROOF OF FRAUD.-1. In an action of replevin against a deputy sheriff who had attached, in favor of one W., as the property of A., some flour, sold by the plaintiffs to A., who soon afterwards became a bankrupt, the assignees of A. being the real parties defendant, it was competent for the plaint iffs to put in evidence the schedules of A., filed in bankruptcy, for the purpose of proving that he was insolvent at the time he filed them, if that fact was admissible to show the sale fraudulent and void. Wellington v. Jacobson, 121 Mass. 157. 2. But the fact that A. was insolvent at a time subsequent to the sale to him by the plaintiffs was not competent to prove his insolvency at the time of the sale, unless it was shown that his situation had not materially changed between the two dates; or unless the insolvency was so near, in point of time, to the sale as fairly to lead to the inference that he was insolvent at the time of the sale. 3. Whether, in the absence of proof that A.'s situation had remained the same, or that his insolvency was not caused by losses after the sale, the insolvency was so near the sale as to make it admissible, was a question within the discretion of the presiding justice, to be exercised in view of all the circumstances of the case as they appeared at the trial. Opinion by MORTON, J.-Hosmer v. Oldham.

CERTIORARI-PROCESS OF SELECTMEN OF TOWN.-On a petition to quash the proceedings of the selectmen of a town, claiming to act under Statutes of 1873, ch. 214, in making certain public improvements, and in assessing the expenses thereof on the estates benefited, it was held: 1. That a writ of certiorari lies only to correct the errors and restrain the excesses of jurisdiction of inferior courts, or officers acting judicially. R. v. Lediard, Sayer, 6; R. v. Lloyd, Cald. 309; In re Constables of Hipperholm, 5 D. & L. 79, 81; R. v. Hatfield Peverel, 14 Q. B. 298; R. v. Salford, 18 Q. B. 687; Parks v. Boston, 8 Pick. 218; Farmington v. County Com., 112 Mass. 206. 2. The selectmen of a town are not a court, and, independently of the Statutes of 1873, ch. 214, exercise no judicial functions which could be reviewed by

writ of certiorari. Young v. Yarmouth, 9 Gray, 386, 390; Robbins v. Lexington, 8 Cush. 292; Hooper v. Bridgewater, 102 Mass. 512. 3. Section 9 of said act providing that "this act shall take effect at a legal meeting called for the pur. pose," the meeting at which said statute was accepted by the town, having been held on the second day after its passage, under a warrant served on the inhabitants some days before its passage, was not legally called; the statute never took effect; the selectmen never acquired any judicial powers, and the petitioners have their appropriate remedy by action. Ewing v. St. Louis, 5 Wall. 413, 418; People v. Court, 1 Hill, (N, Y.) 674; In re Daws, 8 A. & E. 736; s. C., 1 P. & D. 146. Opinion by GRAY, C. J.-Locke t. Lexington.

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STATUTE OF FRAUDS AS A COVER TO FRAUD.- Where the statute of frauds has been used as a cover to a fraud, equity will relieve against its provisions. 19 Ind. 313; 26 Id. 415; 36 Id. 27. An administrator having made default, it was verbally agreed between him, his wife and one of the sureties on his bond, that the latter should pay one-half of his defalcation as administrator, and certain other of his debts; in consideration of which said administrator was to convey to said surety two 80-acre tracts of land, one of which said surety was to reconvey to the former's wife. The conveyance of the two tracts was made to the surety, who thereupon refused to execute the deed to the wife as agreed upon. Held, the agreement to reconvey should be enforced. Judgment reversed. Opinion by PERKINS, C. J. -Tague v. Fowler et al.

PROMISSORY NOTE-AUTHORITY TO FILL BLANKS.Where a party to a negotiable instrument intrusts it to another, with blanks not filled up, such instrument carries on its face an implied authority to fill up the blanks and perfect the instrument; and as between such party and innocent third parties, the party to whom it is intrusted must be deemed the agent of the former, and his act is the act of the principal. 22 How. 96, 107. But a party, to whom a note has been thus intrusted by the persons who have signed it, has no authority to alter it in those respects in which it was complete at the time of its signing. And where the note was complete and perfect when signed, as to the payment of interest, the insertion of the words, "after maturity," by the party to whom it was intrusted, invalidated the note as to the original signers. Judgment reversed. Opinion by WORDEN, J.-Coburn et al. v. Webb.

POWER OF EXECUTORS TO SELL PERSONAL PROPERTY OF DECEDENTS.-At common law, an executor or administrator could dispose of the assets of the decedent, and had the same power over them that the decedent had in his life. But under the statute, the personal property of the decedent must be sold at public auction, and an executor or administrator can not sell such personal property at private sale, unless authorized. to do so by an order of the proper court; and where one purchases such property, as bank stock, belonging to a decedent's estate, from a person claiming to be the executor or administrator, at private sale, the purchaser is bound to know that such sale has been authorized by the proper court, and he buys at his peril. Where bank stock belonging to a decedent's estate was sold by the executor at private sale without an order from the proper court; held, the sale was invalid. Judgment reversed. Opinion by HowK, J.—Weyer, Admr., etc., v. Second, etc., Bank of Franklin et al.

MANUFACTURED ARTICLE-IMPLIED WARRANTY.-When a manufacturer undertakes to manufacture an article at a fair price, for a special purpose, there is an implied warranty that the article is reasonably fit for the purpose designed; but the implied warranty will not go beyond the thing warranted, and the use for which it is applicable and designed. Where the article manufactured and sold was "a Chandler & Taylor Curved Slide Muley Saw-Mill," there was no implied warranty that it would saw and work as

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well as an ordinary muley saw-mill, nor that it would saw lumber in its general sense, but only that it would saw and work as well, and saw such kinds of lumber as ordinarily that particular make of saw-mill would saw and work. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by BIDDLE, J.-Robinson Machine Works v. Chandler et al.

CONVEYANCE-RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE-PERSONS NOT IN BEING ESTOPPEL.-1. A deed which "conveys and warrants" to the grantee "during her life, in remainder to the issue of her body, their heirs and assigns forever," falls within the rule in Shelley's case, which is a law of property in Indiana, and vests the fee simple in the grantee. The words "issue of her body" are words of limitation and not of purchase. See 26 Ind. 251; 35 Id. 262; 45 Id. 295. 2. A deed which conveys to the grantee "and her children and their heirs and assigns forever," conveys a fee simple to such of the vendees as can take, as tenants in common. A child in ventre when such deed was made can take, but not the children born after the execution of the deed, the deed expressing no trust, nor limiting an estate for life, nor in remainder. 3. When a married woman joins with her husband in conveyance of lands held in her own right, which purports to convey the whole estate therein, she is estopped from afterwards setting up any title to the lands so conveyed, whether it existed at the time of making the conveyance or was subsequently acquired. 7 Mass. 14; 2 Hill, 554; 11 How. 297: 52 Ind. 68. Judgment reversed. Opinion by BIDDLE, J.-King v. Rea et al.

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DAMAGES INTEREST. -Interest can not be allowed on the value of cattle killed by a railroad. 63 Mo. 99; 63 Mo. 367. Where the action is based upon the common-law liability of defendant, and not upon the statute, the defendant can not be held liable by reason of a failure to sound the whistle or ring the bell within eighty rods of the public crossing. 26 Mo. 143; 43 Mo, 196; 45 Mo. 255. Opinion by NORTON, J.-Meyer v. A. & P. R. R. Co.

SHERIFF'S DEED.-In this state, at least, a sheriff's deed which fails to show by what authority it was made, or what court ordered the sale on which it was made, is admissible in evidence to show title in an ejectment suit, and the fact that a particular court made the order may be shown by proof outside of the deed and of the records. Warner v. Sharp, 53 Mo. 599. Opinion by NORTON, J.-Davis v. Pender. JURISDICTION-KILLING STOCK.—In a suit against a railroad for killing stock it must appear that the stock was killed in the township where the action was brought. Hazzard v. A. & P. R. R., 63 Mo. 502; Hamberger v. P. R. R., 43 Mo. 43. Opinion by NORTON, J.-Riggs v. St. L.. G. & T. R. R.

[Quære by Reporter.-Could not the action be maintained in any township under subdivision 2 of section 2, or subdivision 3 of section 3, pp. 807, 808, Wag. Stat., where the damages claimed do not exceed the justice's jurisdiction ?]

COMMON LAW OF CORPORATIONS-" DAYS OF GRACE."The common-law doctrine, that after the civil death of a corporation all debts due to and from it are utterly extinguished, has no force in this state under the statute, sec. 21, page 293, Wag. Stat. A note was dated January 1, 1861, at four months after date, and suit was instituted May 1, 1871. Held, that the right of action was not barred by the statute because suit could not have been brought on the note for three days after the maturity of it. Turk v. Stahl, 53 Mo. 437. Opinion by NORTON, J.-McKay et al. v. Farmer et al.

CATTLE GUARDS ON RAILROAD TRACK.-Where the evidence shows that the plaintiff's cow was killed at a point on the road where the same was legally fenced, and that she got on the track at a public road and station where there were no cattle-guards, and the evidence also showed

that such cattle-guards could not be maintained at that point without obstructing access by the public to the railroad station, the company was held not to be liable for the injury in the absence of proof of negligence in the killing, and it was error to refuse an instruction to that effect. Loyd v. Pacific R. R., 49 Mo. 199; Morriss v. St. L., K. C. & N. R. R., 58 Mo. 78, and Swearingen v. M. K. & T. R. R., 64 Mo. 184. Opinion by NORTON, J.-Robertson v. A. & P. R. DEATH CAUSED BY ACCIDENT-NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROAD EMPLOYEES.-A boy eleven years of age, while sitting under a car in a freight train, gathering wheat which had sifted through the cars, was killed by the movement of the train. Held, that it was not error for the court to assume in the instructions that the boy occupied an unusual and unsafe place, and was guilty of negligence in doing so, and that the case was properly submitted to the jury on the question, whether there was negligence on the part of the company's servants, without which the accident would not have occurred. Opinion by NAPTON, J.Ostertag v. Pacific R. R. Co.

TAXATION. —Legislative bodies may divest themselves and their successors of the power of taxation by selecting some subjects of taxation and excluding others, where there is no constitutional restriction upon the exercise of such a power. 16 How. 369; 18 How. 331. Rights vested under a special charter to a railroad corporation are not repealed by subsequent constitutional provisions; and such provisions, when inconsistent with the preservation of vested rights, are held to be prospective in their operation. Provisions of the general corporation laws of the state do not render invalid special privileges conferred by subsequent charters. Opinion by NAPTON, J.-Scotland Co. v. M. I. & N. R. R. Co.

WHERE IS THE COURT-HOUSE?-Although the statutes, (chapter 40, Wag. Stat.) do not in express terms make provision for a case in which the court-house and all the buildings at a county seat had been destroyed by fire, the spirit of the law embraces such a case; and in such a case, the county tribunal, having charge of such matters, may designate a place where the circuit court might be held. A judgment rendere l at the designated place is not void, and it was error to exclude a sheriff's deed based on judgment and execution so issued and entered, in an ejectment suit concerning the lands conveyed by such deed. Bouldin v. Ewart, 63 Mo. 330. Opinion by NAPTON, J.Herndon et al. v. Hawkins et al.

PRACTICE-EVIDENCE-NEW TRIAL.-Although the admission of a certified copy of a paper to prove that the defendant was a corporation, without accounting for the original, may be a technical error, the judgment will not be reversed therefor, because the corporation was sued as a corporation, and its appearance to the action waived the necessity of proof of that fact. The case of Cocker v. Cocker, 56 Mo. 180, is not authority to establish the point that the supreme court should reverse a case because the bill of exceptions does not set forth the plaintiff's instructions, and alleges that they were taken by the jury or the lawyers and not returned, in a case where the judge who overruled the motion for a new trial was the same judge who tried the case. Opinion by NORTON, J.-Withaus v. A. & P. R. R. Co.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-SURETY.-Although an attorney at law has not authority to compromise a client's case by virtue of his employment as attorney, yet, if he by way of compromise makes an agreement to give the debtor fur ther time and obtains additional security by doing so, the principal, who knowingly accepts the benefit of the arrangement, ratifies it and is bound by it. 10 Paige, 126. Where plaintiff got judgment and execution against the debtor and his surety, and the execution was levied on real estate and a threshing machine of the debtor, the real estate being exempt from execution under the homestead law, and the debtor gave a new note for the whole amount of judgment and costs, payable six months after date, secured by deed of trust on the real estate, and, thereupon, the plaintiff's attorney surrendered the threshing machine to the debtor, and ordered the execution to be returned, the plaintiff knowing the arrangement, it was held that the surety was discharged. Smarr v. Schmitter et al., 38 Mo. 478. Opinion by NORTON, J.-Semple et al. v. Atkinson et al.

THE total expenses of the Tichborne prosecution, according to the return of the Home Secretary to the House of Commons, amounted to £60,070 or over $300,000.

NOTES.

THE Bar Association of New York has a membership of 722, and a balance in the treasury of $10,501.17.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL DEVENS has been made a LL.D. by Columbia College.

THE Court of Appeal at Lincoln's-inn is, according to a recent order, for the present to be composed of Lord Coleridge, and Lords Justices Mellish and Baggallay.

A CLERK of the Incorporated Law Society of Great Britain has confessed to having appropriated at different times over $45,000 of the funds of the society.

BABOO ROMESH CHUNDER MITTER is the euphonistic name of a recently appointed judge of the Supreme Court of Judicature of India.

THE Supreme Court of Tennessee, in State v. Brown, Legal Rep. 39, held that a dog was personal property, and therefore the subject of larceny. In Ward v. The State, 48 Ala. 161, the contrary doctrine was held, which is in accordance with the English decisions on the subject.

HON. JOHN PETTIT, at one time a judge of the Supreme Court of Indiana, died at his residence at LaFayette, in that state, on the 17th inst. He was at different periods United States Senator, Representative in Congress and the Legislature, Mayor of his city, Judge of the Circuit Court, besides holding numerous subordinate positions. He was United States District Judge of Kansas Territory at the time of the border ruffian troubles in 1854.

MRS. MARY LIVERMORE says: "In Iowa I saw a law sign, Foster & Foster.' It meant Mr. and Mrs. Foster. They attended the same law school; became attached, became partners for life. The man looked up the cases; the woman pleaded them before the court and jury. In a certain difficult case where a woman was concerned, he doubted his ability to do it justice, and carried it to his wife, and she proved it to be a case of insanity.

THE Iron Era is authority for the following: Horace Greeley and Thomas McElrath once stopped at a hotel at Columbia, Warren County. Horace talked and wrote all night, and tradition saith he got one subscriber. This was the time that they came from Stroudsburg and crossed the Delaware up in Pahaquarry. Arriving at the river bank, they signaled for a boatman to bring them over, and a man in his shirt sleeves responded. While crossing, Greeley said: "Ferryman, perhaps you don't know that you have the honor of carrying Mr. McElrath, of the Tribune." McElrath replied: "And you have the honor of crossing Horace Greeley." The boatman said: "Gentlemen, perhaps you don't know you have the honor of being ferried over by Judge Ribble," which was a fact.

AN English lawyer in a tract recently published, entitled "The Patient, the Physician and the Fee," states that the total gross paid by persons now alive to the state for permission to study and practice law is estimated at from £4,000,000 to £5,000,000. He then proceeds to consider the two following very pertinent questions: Whether high and unequal imposts without application of the fund to educational purposes, or moderate uniform imposts with high education provided, would tend most to elevate the standard of legal knowledge, integrity, and excellence in the professions? Whether, in consideration of the fact that there is no class who could derive greater advantage from a digest and code of the law than solicitors, it might not be in their interest to have continued for a limited term of three or five years the payment of certificate duty on an understanding that the fund should be applied to producing either digest or code?

THE New Zealand Jurist says: "A valuable lesson has recently been taught to a class of illegal practitioners in the shady branches of the law, in the shape of an action for damages at the suit of one of their victims. The Melbourne Trade Protection Society undertakes, as a part of its business, the collection of debts for subscribers; and the newspapers relate that recently, in effecting a transaction in this line, an officer of the society by some means blundered, and caused a levy to be made on the property of a person who had already satisfied the judgment issued against him. The victim took proceedings, and recovered

damages-the presiding judge (Mr. Justice Fellows) delivering a strong opinion in his favor. When the plaintiff was asked why he did not communicate with the manager of the society, when an officer came to levy for a debt which had been already paid, Mr. Justice Fellows interposed, and said: Why should he write to a parcel of conspirators? If he prosecuted the lot, it would only serve them right; for if ever there was an illegal society, this Trade Protection Society is one.""

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THE Daily Times makes a valuable suggestion as to a method for preventing losses by forged and raised checks, which is, in brief, that the dealer should send every day a list of the checks he has drawn, with their numbers and amounts, to the paying teller, who would thus have notice. This, with the rule that no check should be paid on the day of its date, without inquiry, would, it is suggested, secure detection in any attempt at forging or raising. The usages of large dealers are such that this system might be of great practical use. But why not go a step further? If the local telegraph companies, such as the Stock,&c., Telegraph, or the American District Telegraph, or the Lawyers' Telegraph Co., should extend their system for this purpose, a dealer in connection with his bank might maintain an an. tomatic register before the teller's eyes of every check drawn, with the number and amount. The dealer, in other words, would keep his own ledger at the bank by telegraph; and the bank ledger would be greatly aided by this. We might even imagine the bank's ledgers to be kept by telegraph, and only verified by the constant supervision of the bookkeepers. Such a method would afford immediate disclosure of the peculations of messengers, and instant means of stopping payment of checks.-[Daily Register, (N. Y.)

A CORRESPONDENT of the Albany Law Journal, writing from London on "The Crime of Murder in England," reaches the following conclusions: (1.) That the sensational manner in which crimes of violence are reported in American newspapers has impressed foreigners, and especially the English, with the idea that lawlessness prevails throughout every grade of American society, and that no man's life is safe, even in the streets of New York, unless he can defend it himself in any chance quarrel or contact with any bloodthirsty desperado, with a whole arsenal of pistols and knives. (2.) That for every man killed in the heat of affray in America, some man, woman or child is murdered in England barbarously, deliberately in cold blood. (3.) That in England the man who commits a murder is " past praying for," whenever the evidence is conclusive that he did kill. If A kills B to-day, a coroner's jury renders its verdict to-morrow, A is examined before a magistrate and committed the same or next day, tried next week, and hanged three weeks hence, within the walls of the county jail, unknown, unrecognized, unapplauded; and a brief paragraph in the newspapers announces when, how and why he paid penalty to the law, and that is the last of him. (4.) That in England there are no long delays, and frequent postponements, and new trials, and reprieves, and public demonstrations of sympathy, and speeches upon the scaffold, and departures with great eclat, surrounded by an admiring staff of newspaper reporters, and celebrated, to the slightest detail, in columns of tumid newspaper sensationalism. (5.) That England punishes her murderers with certainty and fitting circumstance, while we either let them go free or waft them from the gallows to the clouds amid the pæans of admiring friends. (6.) That the English method of treating murderers is greatly superior to the American, with its delay, uncertainty, and, at the end, senseless and demoralizing publicity. If people must be killed, let it be done quietly, sadly, solemnly, as becomes the terrible example sought to be conveyed, and the great responsibility assumed.

The Central Law Journal.

SAINT LOUIS, JUNE 29, 1877.

INDEX.

ABATEMENT OF ACTIONS.

Action on the case maintainable by a woman against a man for deceit by which she is led into a void marriage with him, 185.

Such action, in Maine, survives against his administrator, 185.

Action for nuisance, for permitting dead animal to remain on premises, does not survive on death of husband, 189.

ABORTION.

Evidence in case of; dying declaration, 501. ACCIDENT INSURANCE.

Assurance against" bodily injuries effected through external violent and accidental means;" proviso against "any death or disability which may have been caused wholly or in part by any surgical operation, or medical or mechanical treatment for disease," 313.

ACCOUNTS.

[See also REFEREE.]

Mode of ascertaining present value of a debt payable at a future time, 359.

ACTIONS, LOCAL AND TRANSITORY.

Actions for injuries resulting in death not transitory; personal representative of intestate, appointed under the laws of Kansas, can not maintain action for personal injury to intestate committed in the state of Missouri. McCarthy v. C., R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 465.

ACTION TO QUIET TITLE.

Requisites of averments in; evidence of delivery of deed to plaintiff the only question, 480.

ADMINISTERING CANTHARIDES.

Case where an acquittal was directed because amount administered was so small that the dose could not be considered "noxious," 458.

ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW.

[See also CHARTER PARTY; GENERAL AVERAGE; SALVAGE.]

Marine torts; master of scow taking possession of lighter without authority, using her in getting wood from the shore of Lake St. Clair, and neglecting to return her, the scow held liable in rem for conversion, although the lighter was originally seized in a fish-pound staked off from Detroit river. The Florence, 249. Libel against ship subsequently released on bond under act of March 3d, 1847; libelant's remedy is upon the bond alone, 262.

Maritime Liens.

No lien for supplies or repairs to domestic vessel. The Albany, 16.

Whether a vessel is foreign or domestic depends on residence of owner, and not upon enrollment; this principle illustrated by the facts of the case. Ibid.

Pleading in Admiralty Cases.

In a libel by the insurer, who has paid the loss to the assured, against the carrier by whose wrongful act the loss occurred, the respondent is not permitted to set up as a defense that the insurer was not legally bound to indemnify the assured for the loss sustained by such wrongful act. Amazon Insurance Company v. Steamboat Iron Mountain, 103.

Such libel is properly filed in the name of the insurer, and should not be brought in the name of the assured for the use of the insurer. Ibid.

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION.

Effect of decision in case of Genesee Chief (12 Howard) declaring that the admiralty jurisdiction of the U. S. extends to the great lakes and navigable rivers. Barney v. Keokuk, 491.

ADULTERY.

Under joint indictment for, female defendant can not urge that her lawful husband had married again, and that she was therefore free from guilty intent, 185. Vol. 4.- No. 26.

ADULTERY-Continued.

State may nol. pros. and make witness of co-defendant, 214.

Evidence of custom in cases of, 214.

Evidence of indecent familiarities at other times than that of the adulterous act, admissible, 592.

Does not disable wife from inheriting from child, when, 503.

ADVANCEMENT.

[See PARENT AND CHILD.] ADVERSE POSSESSION. [See also LIMITATIONS.]

Possession of real estate as notice of adverse title. Article by W. P. Wade, Esq., 122.

Effect of constructive possession of unoccupied land; habere facias possessionem against actual occupiers, 333. What adverse possession ripens into title in Wisconsin, 501.

AFFIDAVIT.

Facts in, how stated; before whom sworn, 575. AGENCY.

[See also BANKS AND BANKING; LIFE INSURANCE; FIRE INSURANCE.]

Conversion of property of principal by agent; agent, when liable in trover, 330.

Agent's knowledge is notice to principal, 502. Possession of unindorsed note not evidence of authority to collect; silence of owner of note, not ratification of act of collector, 71.

Taking property from possession of agent may be described in return as taking it from possession of principal, 189.

Notice to agents. Article by W. P. Wade, Esq., 195. Liability of principal for acts of his agent; illustration,

240.

Power of agent selling goods on commission, 548. Member of partnership, after dissolution, can not act as agent of creditor, 550.

Authority of agent to sell his principal's goods in his own name; evidence of such authority; when buyer may set off, as against principal, debt due from agent, 380-1.

ALTERATION.

Of written instrument, defined, 311. Whether there has been alteration, a question of law for the court, 311.

AMENDMENT.

[See PLEADING AND PRACTICE.] AMERICAN DECISIONS.

How regarded in England; letter of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn to Judge Dillon, 267.

APPEALS AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE.

[As to appeals, petitions of review and other appellate proceedings in bankruptcy, see BANKRUPTCY. As to writ of certiorari, see CERTIORARI. As to appeal from judgments of justices of the peace, see JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.]

The making of a conveyance ordered by a final decree does not cut off right of appeal. O'Hara v. MacConnell, 20.

Nor does a petition in the nature of a bill of review, nor anything set up in answer thereto, on which no action has been had by the court. Ibid.

Case of refusal to set aside judgment and dismiss appeal, upon showing that defendant was not administrator at the institution of the suit against him as such, 23. Practice in St. Louis Court of Appeals; diminution of record, 95.

Instructions not specifically excepted to, not reviewed on appeal; nor can exceptions be taken for the failure to give an instruction not specifically asked. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 106.

In Missouri, supersedeas refused in criminal cases where clerk certifies up imperfect record; defendant's remedy is against clerk, 120.

Appellate court will review exercise of discretion by inferior court in proper cases; as where counsel are allowed to open a case improperly. Scripps v. Reilly,

128.

When action of court below in refusing to set aside a non-suit will not be revised on appeal, 142.

Duty of justice of the peace in Missouri in sending up perfect transcript, 143.

Writ of error in Illinois to review judgment of county court assessing benefits for improvements, 167.

In Illinois, right of appeal a statutory right, 167. Appeal from order sustaining demurrer in equity, 574.

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APPEALS AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE-Continued. Appeal from order committing for contempt; advisability of judge's ruling, not subject to review; the only question is a question of power, 575.

Circumstances under which, in Kansas, a judgment will be afirmed without any discussion of the questions involved in the case, 192.

Supreme court can not pass upon sufficiency of affidavit, nor upon town ordinance, not set out in record, 238. Affirmance of appeal from justice, in Missouri, for want of notice, 238.

Appeal from judgment of county court in Illinois against lands for taxes, 263.

Appeal from probate court; exceptions and other incidents of appellate jurisdiction unnecessary, 572. Affirmance for failure to set out motion for new trial, 572. Necessity of declaration of law by judge who tries all issues; appellate court will not weigh questions of evidence, 573.

Presumptions in support of court below. Ibid.

Presumption in appellate court, that complaint does not set out facts constituting a cause of action when judgment was rendered, 573.

Entry of an order of default, not a final judgment, 263. Finding of court below as to whether a challenged juror has paid his taxes, not subject to review, 333.

Case will not be reversed for erroneous instruction, where the proper result was reached. Lundy v. Pierson, 167; Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co. v. Cary, 167.

No appeal lies from action of county committee in Indiana making allowance to contractor to compensate him for loss sustained in carrying out a contract, 240. Order defaulting a defendant not subject to an appeal,

263.

Filed one day too late, no part of record. Walker v. Woollen, 248.

Court below may not at term subsequent to rendering of decree permit new evidence to be incorporated in bill of exceptions, 263.

What objections must be taken in the court below; objection for want of parties, 286.

Regularity of appeal not inquired into collaterally, when, 311.

Reversal for erroneous verdict, 311.

No reversal for erroneously sustaining objection to preliminary question, when, 311.

Affidavit impugning bill of exceptions receivable when; not receivable when, 336.

Office of bill of exceptions; original bill of exceptions not filed, no part of the record, 407.

Finding of judge, how far sustained in appellate court,

336.

Appeal by guardian dismissed by executrix; error to award costs against the wards, 382.

Commission of Arbitration established in Tennessee to relieve supreme court, 337.

Writ of error from Supreme Court of the U. S. to Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah allowed by act of 1874. Wiggins v. People, 348.

Effect of record which fails to contain motion for new trial, 359.

Waiver of errors by amending, 596.

Reversal, because bill of exceptions does not set forth plaintiff's instructions, 599.

Appellate court will not consider objections to which the attention of the trial court was not called, in a motion for new trial, 381-2.

When an abatement of proceedings will be held a dismissal of appeal only, 382.

Affirmance of judgment for failure to assign errors and file statement and brief, 405.

Appeal from order taxing costs, 359.

Order continuing cause not appealable, 359.

Supreme court will examine whole record in capital cases, though there be no brief or assignment of errors filed, 500.

Appeal as to part of the defendants, 528.

Dismissal of appeal for failure to file transcript in time, 357, 429.

Appellate court acquires no jurisdiction, even by consent, where appeal has not been taken in time, 429.

APPEARANCE.

[See PLEADING AND PRACTICE.]

APPRENTICESHIP.

Effect of void indenture of, 310.

ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

Specific performance of covenant to renew lease on agreeing to submit to arbitration, 382.

Defense of action upon award; arbitrators proper witnesses, 479.

ARBITRATION AND AWARD-Continued.

State may arbitrate disputes between itself and citizens, 502. Submission under which all arbitrators must join in award, 502.

Specific execution, where rental is to be fixed by arbitration. Tscheider v. Biddle, 323.

ARREST.

Non-liability of one partner to arrest for fraud of other partner, 214.

When a policeman may arrest without warrant, 215. Under what circumstances a party may resist unlawful arrest, 215.

Right of police officer to handcuff citizen in making arrest, 254.

Liability of aiders and abettors in unlawful arrest, 383.
Effect of counseling and advising unlawful arrest, 383.
Circumstances under which $500 was considered excess-
ive damages for unlawful arrest, 383.
ASSAULT.

[See also INDECENT ASSAULT.]

Chairman of public meeting not liable for acts of police officers who had injured an innocent person after being called upon to bring disorderly persons to the front; the relation of master and servant not subsisting in such a case, 69.

In Texas, pointing an unloaded pistol at another within shooting distance, accompanied with an order to kneel down, which through fear is obeyed, is not an assault, 141.

Averments in indictment for assaulting policeman, 214. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT MANSLAUGHTER.

Indictment for assault with intent to commit manslaughter, good, 450.

Upon an indictment for assault with intent to murder, jury may convict of assault with intent to commit manslaughter, 450.

Where indictment charges in one count assault with intent to murder, and in another assault with intent to commit manslaughter, error to quash second count, but no ground of reversal, because the defendant might have been convicted of the lower offense under the first count, 450.

ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO MURDER. Physician may testify what would be the probable results of the intended injuries, 312.

ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO RAVISH.

Is not committed where female consents, although female be under age of 12;-illustration and discussion of the subject, 525.

ASSESSOR.

Necessity that assessor in Nebraska shall take and subscribe oath required by law, 574. ASSIGNMENT.

[See also BANKRUPTCY.]

Assignment of a part of a debt without consent of a debtor; power of original claimant to compromise claim, 212.

Assignment of debt due as salary of officer from municipal corporation; mode of procedure on the part of assignee to subject such debt, 262.

Right of action by holder of railway bond for refusal of company to convert same into stock not assignable separately from bond, 570.

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.

In Indiana such assignment is void until recorded, and property may be taken in execution, 167. ATTACHMENTS.

[See also GARNISHMENT; BANKRUPTCY.] Construction of Illinois statute that all attaching creditors at the same term shall share ratably, 166. Affidavit for, when amendable, 288.

Effect of answer not under oath, denying allegations of complaint and affidavit, 310.

Motion to discharge attachment on the ground that the property does not belong to defendant, 311.

Bond for a sum equal to amount of plaintiff's claim may be sufficient, 597.

Proof that one appraiser was not qualified will not dissolve attachment, 597.

Expense of keeper of attached property not taxable; duty of officer to take property into his own custody, 598. Necessary to plead attachment bond, in order to recoup for damages sustained by attachment in the same action, 240.

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