RECENT LEGISLATION.

MISSOURI LEGISLATURE-SESSION OF 1877.

AN ACT requiring county collectors to pay taxes and licenses into the State and County treasuries monthly.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SECTION 1. Every county collector and ex-officio county collector (except in the city of St. Louis) shall, on or before the fifth day of each month, file with the county clerk a detailed statement, verified by affidavit, of all State, County, School, Road and Municipal taxes, and of all licenses by him collected during the preceding month, and shall, on or before the fifteenth day of the month, pay the same, less his commissions, into the state and county treasuries respectively. It shall be the duty of the county clerk, and he is hereby required, to forward immediately a certified copy of such detailed statement to the State Auditor, who shall keep an account of the State taxes with the collector. SEC. 2. If any county collector, or ex-officio county collector, shall fail or refuse to pay the taxes and licenses into the state and county treasuries as provided in the preceding section, he shall forfeit his commissions thereon, and in addition thereto shall pay a penalty of ten per cent. on the amount thereof; and it shall be the duty of the State Auditor to issue a distress warrant for such State taxes and penalties within thirty days as provided by law. It shall be the duty of the prosecuting attorney to proceed within thirty days to collect such County, School, Road, and Municipal taxes by suit on the official bond of such defaulting collector.

SEC. 3. An emergency exists for the taking effect and going into force of this act immediately; the emergency being that under the law as it now stands, large sums of money may be held by collectors until the 10th day of next October, and the financial condition of the state requires that said money should be paid into the state treasury each month as collected; therefore, this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.

Approved March 28th, 1877.

AN ACT in relation to erroneous assessments and collection of taxes, and to correct clerical errors in the assessment of property for the years 1875 and 1876. WHEREAS, clerical errors were made in certifying to the State Auditor the value of property as fixed by the State Board of Equalization at its session in the year 1875, whereby an undue proportion of taxes were collected on said property for the years 1875 and 1873, and WHEREAS, an emergency exists for speedy action in order that justice may be done to those who have been compelled to pay taxes on this erroneous assessment, and relief be afforded them on the tax-bills for the year 1877, therefore

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SECTION 1. If at any time after the passage of this act it shall be proven to the satisfaction of the State Auditor, that clerical errors were made in certifying to his office the value of property as fixed by the State Board of Equalization, at its session in the year 1875, whereby a greater amount of taxes were levied and collected for the years 1875 and 1876, on the property in any county or counties in this state, than would have been levied and collected, if no such errors had occurred, then it shall be the duty of the State Auditor to ascertain from the evidence produced before him, the kind of property erroneously assessed, together

with the amount collected thereon, and paid into the State Treasury for the years 1875 and 1876, and certify to the county court of the proper county the amount so erroneously assessed, collected and paid into the State Treasury; together with a statement of the kind or species of property upon which such erroneous assessment and collection was made.

SEC. 2. It shall be the duty of the county court of any county in this state, upon the receipt of such eertificates from the State Auditor as is provided for in section one of this act, to cause the amount so certified to be deducted from the tax levy for state purposes in their county in the year 1877; such deduction, however, shall only be made on such property as the State Auditor shall certify has been erroneously assessed for the years 1875 and 1876, or for either of those years. Approved April 7th, 1877.

AN ACT creating a board of commissioners, and appropriating money for the erection of a building for the use of the supreme court, state library, and attorney-general.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SECTION 1. There is hereby appropriated the sum of seventeen thousand dollars, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the purpose of erecting a building for the use of the supreme court, state library, and attorney-general.

SEC. 2. In order to carry into effect the foregoing section, the attorney-general, state auditor, and state treasurer are hereby constituted a board of commissioners, with authority to contract, in the name of the State of Missouri, for the erection of said building; which said building shall be erected within, and on the southeast corner of the grounds now owned by the state, and which enclose the capitol building.

SEC. 3. The commissioners shall advertise for plans and specifications for said building. Two hundred and fifty dollars shall be the maximum cost for said plans and specifications (to be paid to the architect whose plans shall be selected), and said commissioners shall select and adopt such plans and specifications, with such modifications as a majority of them may agree upon. The estimated cost of said buiding not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars.

SEC. 4. Upon the adoption of such plans and specifications, the commissioner shail appoint a superintendent, who shall make estimates as to the cost of the material to be used in the erection of said building, and shall purchase the same with the approval and consent of said commissioners. Provided, however, that any material belonging to the state, not set apart for any special purpose, may be utilized upon the requisition of said commissioners.

SEC. 5. The commissioners are authorized to call upon the warden of the penitentiary for any convicts not otherwise employed, whose labor shall be used in the erection of said building, and shall appoint such master-workmen as they may deem proper in the direction and control of such convict labor.

SEC. 6. The pay of the superintendent and masterworkmen shall be designated by the commissioners, and shall be drawn from the treasury from time to time, upon the requisition of the commissioners. And all amounts for purchases of material shall, in like manner, be approved and drawn from the treasury upon a requisition of the commissioners.

SEC. 7. Two thousand dollars of the money hereby appropriated is set apart for the purpose of paying for advertisements, plans and specifications, furnishing the court-room, judges' rooms, clerk's office of said court, library room, and such other incidental expenses as

may be necessarily incurred, and may be drawn by the commissioners at their discretion for the payment of such expenses-an account of which they shall render to the auditor, and by him reported to the next general assembly following the completion of the work.

SEC. 8. An emergency having arisen of the nature and character that the rooms now occupied by the supreme court, in the capitol building, are small and highly detrimental to the health of the judges of said court; that the clerk's office is inadequate as a depository for the valuable records now lying in the basement of the capitol building; that the library room is insufficient; that the rooms to be vacated are demanded by other departments, and committees and clerks of the Legislature; this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage. Approved April 9th, 1877.

PRACTICE IN COURT OF APPEALS.-When an appeal is perfected more than thirty days prior to the commencement of the term of this court, and no transcript is filed by the appellant at said term, on motion of respondent who produces a duly certified transcript of the record below, the judgment of the Circuit Court will be affirmed. Judg. ment affirmed. Opinion by LEWIS, U. J.-Gay v. Edgar. APPEALS FROM JUSTICES' COURTS JURISDICTION. When an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace is not taken in time, the appeal will confer no jurisdiction on the circuit court, although both parties appear and there is a trial. Consent will not confer jurisdiction. And although judgment is rendered against appellant who invoked the supposed jurisdiction of the circuit court, the Court of Appeals will reverse the judgment when the case is brought here on error. The doctrine of estoppel does not apply. Judgment reversed and appeal from justice's court ordered dismissed. Opinion by HAYDEN, J.-Moore v. Minckler.

CRIMINAL PRACTICE-KEEPING BAWDY-HOUSE-INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION-EVIDENCE.-The keeping of a brothel is a criminal misdemeanor at common law. The City of St. Louis has power to suppress bawdy-houses, and to enact an ordinance providing that the offense shall be a misdemeanor punishable by fine. Proceedings for the recovery of such fines may be commenced by the prosecuting officer of the city, by a written statement, which is a criminal information, and need not be under oath. The facts are presented by way of suggestion by a public officer, and not as in case of an indictment by the oath of the grand jury. Though the ordinance provides that the proceedings for the recovery of a fine in such cases shall be in the nature of a civil action, it being for the purpose of punishing for an offense malum in se, it is essentially a criminal prosecution, and the defendant was not a competent witness in her own behalf. These proceedings do not violate the law of March 28, 1874, which was not intended to grant keepers of brothels immunity from arrest after conviction; but merely that they should not be arrested for keeping a bawdy-house without warrant or affidavit before conviction. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by BAKEWELL, J.-City of St. Louis v. Melville.

NEGLIGENCE OF COMMON CARRIERS DILIGENCE BURTHEN OF PROOF-DEFECTIVE ROAD AND CARELESS SERVANTS-NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-Common carriers of passengers are required to exercise that degree of diligence which very cautious persons exercise. Unless the loss appears to be the result of inevitable accident, common carriers of passengers are not excused from liability. [Citing, 1 Duer. 233.] Proof of injury to passengers by upsetting of a coach makes a prima facie case of negligence that shifts the burthen of proof. [Citing, Christie v. Greggs, 2 Camp. 79; Stokes v. Salton

stall, 13 Peters. 181; Jerrymy on Carriers, 26, 27; Edw. Bailments, 589.] Though the petition did not allege any defective condition of the track, it was inseparably connected with the negligent act of the servants of the carrier in conducting and driving the car, and might be taken into consideration in connection with the rate of speed. The question of contributory negligence was for the jury, and there was evidence to support their finding. The new discovery of cumulative evidence no ground for new trial. Affidavits of facts to be proved on a new trial should be made by the witness to be produced. Facts alleged to be notorious among the neighbors of plaintiff should have been discovered before the trial. Judgment will not be reversed on account of improper statements by counsel to jury, which did not affect the verdict. The plaintiff being crippled for life, $2,000 not excessive damages. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by BAKEWELL, J.-Haderlein v. St. Louis Railroad Co.

PROMISSORY NOTE-INDORSER-DILIGENCE IN ISSUING EXECUTION. Where the plaintiff recovered judgment against the maker of a promissory note about the first of April and did not issue execution thereon until the 13th of June next, held, the plaintiff was guilty of such laches, in not issuing the execution sooner, that the indorser was discharged. Judgment reversed. Opinion by WORDEN, C. J. Wilson v. Binford, Admr., etc.

OFFICIAL BOND-RECOVERY OF MONEY VOLUNTARILY PAID-Where A was surety on the official bond of a consta ble, who collected money and left the county without paying it over, of which A had notice, and, after seeking legal advice, and with full opportunity to ascertain and know all the facts, A voluntarily paid the money, he can not recover it back, whether liable on the bond or not. (49 Ind. 469.) Judgment affirmed. Opinion by BIDDLE, J.-Ferguson v. Hirsch.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS- - PROMISE TO PAY ANOTHER'S DEBT.-A promise by A to pay B certain sums of money and transfer to him certain articles of property, if B would satisfy an execution which he held against A's son, was not a promise to pay the debt of another, but was an original promise to pay money and deliver property to B in consideration of a benefit to be conferred upon a third person, and the contract was valid, though not in writing. Judg. ment affirmed. Opinion by PERKINS, J. — Palmer v. Blaine.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS-SALE OF REAL ESTATE-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.-A agreed by parol to sell B certain real estate for $4,000 on certain terms. In order to make the purchase, B was obliged to sell property which he owned, worth $2,500, for $1,400, which he did at A's request, and A then refused to sell and convey his property according to his agreement. Held, that B's sale of his property was not a part performance of his contract for the purchase of A's property, and did not take the contract out of the statute of frauds. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by Howk, J.-Parker v. Heaton.

RECOVERY OF MONEY VOLUNTARILY PAID. - Where a liquor seller paid license fees to a town under an unconstitutional law, an action to recover back the money so paid will not lie, if the same was paid voluntarily. If such payments were made for the purpose of procuring the release of the payor's person or property from the power of the corporation's officers, they were not made voluntarily; but where the complaint alleged that the money was paid "for the purpose of avoiding the penalty and forfeiture provided for in said ordinance for the violation of the provisions thereof, and to save himself from arrest and imprisonment for violating the provisions of said ordinance, as provided by statute," it did not bring the case within the rule of involuntary payments. Judgment reversed. Opinion by HOWK, J.-Town of Brazil v. Kress.

PROMISSORY NOTE-ALTERATION-DISCHARGE OF PARTIES THEREBY.-Where A and B make a joint note payable to C, and the latter, discovering that no time or rate of interest is specified in the note, by direction of B inserts the word "days" in the proper place for time, and the words "at ten per cent." after the word "interest," A will be discharged by the alteration, not on the ground of fraud or forgery, but of want of authority on the part of B to bind him. Neither can the case be brought within the rule that where one of two innocent parties must suffer from the act of a third, the loss ought to fall on him who enabled the third party to commit the injury, because A executed a note which was complete and perfect, being for a sum certain and in legal acceptance bearing a fixed rate of interest, and C must bear the consequences of his own folly in changing the contract in the absence and without the authority or consent of one of the makers. Nor is Abound by the note as it was before the alteration. A material alteration in a note avoids it as to previous parties not consenting thereto; and if the note executed by A was destroyed as to him, it can not be revised without his consent by any act of C. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by HOWK, J.-Schnewind v. Hacket, Admr. of Johnson.

ACT OF BANKRUPTCY CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION — RIGHT TO SUE IN STATE COURT.-If a sheriff seize the goods of A, as the goods of B, at the suit of attaching creditors of the latter, and afterwards B is adjudged a bankrupt, and the court of bankruptcy, without notice to A, orders the sheriff to deliver the goods to the assignee of B, A having in the meantime instituted an action in the proper court of the state against said sheriff to recover said goods, such suit will not abate by reason of the proceedings in bankruptcy, nor will A be compelled to prosecute his claim to the property in the court of bankruptcy, but has a right to prosecute his suit to final judgment in the state Court. Under section 5,063 of the Bankruptcy Act, the claimant of property is entitled to notice of any intended application for an order of sale by the assignee; and if no notice is given him, the order will be a nullity as to him. The bankrupt law has nothing to do with such a suit. An assignee even can not go into a state court to set aside a conveyance made by the bankrupt in violation of the Bankrupt Act (47 Ind. 31). A sale of goods in violation of the bankrupt law may be good under the law of the state. The controversy here is between A and the attaching creditors of B, and if the property was transferred by B to A in violation of the bankrupt law, the creditors of B had no right to attach it, but should have sought their remedy by proper proceedings against him in the court of bankruptcy. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by WORDEN, C. J.-Stanly v. Sutherland et. al.

BASTARDY PROCEEDING-REASONABLE DOUBT.-The doctrine of a reasonable doubt does not apply in favor of the defendant in bastardy cases. The remedy is in the nature of civil redress, though enforced in the name of the State.-Stovall v. The State.

PUBLIC ROAD-INDICTMENT FOR OBSTRUCTING.-The allegation, in an indictment for obstructing a public road, that the road was laid out by the Couuty Court, is tantamount to the charge that it is a public highway.- The State v. Farrar.

CERTIORARI-PETITION FOR-MISTAKE NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN.-Plaintiff, in a petition for certiorari to bring up cause from a justice of peace, alleged that he had a good defense to the action, but understood the case to be set for the 26th, when it was tried on the 19th, and that he did not discover his mistake until too late to appeal. Held not sufficient to support the petition.-Cox v. Kent.

April Term, 1877.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - PLEADING-TRUSTEE. - 1. Where the statute of limitations operates only upon the remedy, it must be pleaded. 2. By borrowing without security, from a guardian, funds which C, the borrower, knew to be the ward's property, he became a quasi trustee of such funds, and can not avail himself of the statute of limitations while such trust relation continues. Opinion by SNEED, J.-—Merriman v. Cannavan.

LIFE INSURANCE-WAR.-The late civil war merely sus pended a contract of life insurance, between an insured domiciled in the territory occupied by the confederate forces, and an insurer domiciled in the territory occupied by the federal forces. No premiums could be paid during the war. The insured dying while the war was flagrant, revivor of the contract at the close of the war was, by the act of God, and without the fault of either party, made impossible. The beneficiary is entitled to recover the value of a paid-up policy on the day the premium was first omitted to be paid, with interest. Opinion by TURNEY, J.-Crac ford v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., and Crawford v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co.

XIV AMENDMENT-REBELLION.-Bonds issued by Shelby County In 1861 and 1862, under authority conferred by the act of May, 1861, entitled "An act to raise, organize and equip a provisional force and for other purposes," and negotiated at the banks, in order to raise in advance funds for the support of the indigent families of volunteers enlisting in the confederate army, are void under the 4th section of the XIV Amendment to the Constitution of the U. S. Coun. ties, as well as the state, are inhibited by that amendment from assuming a debt in aid of the rebellion, county gorernments being but parts of the state government. The cases of Adams v. Hardeman County, and King v. Sullivan County, (not reported,) are distinguished in this, that those were suits on county warrants, drawn on account of appropriations made under statutes long in force, to provide relief for the families of volunteers, who were already found to be indigent. Opinion by MCFARLAND, J.-May r. Bleckley.

RAIL ROAD MORTGAGE-TRUSTEE-FOREIGN ATTACHMENT.-1. A deed of trust on "the main line" of an Arkansas railroad, covering all rolling stock, appurtenances and income, does not cover real estate, depot buildings and trackways, having an actual situs in Tennessee, across the state line from the terminal point of the main railway line; and such property is subject to attachment in the Tennessee courts, at the suit of a creditor of the corporation. 2. Cars from the main line, found in Tennessee, are not subject to such attachment, but are protected as subject to the lien of the trust deed. 3. Monies, the earnings of the road, found in Tennessee in the hands of the treasurer of the corporation, are not subject to such attachment, when it was levied subsequent to the registration of the trust deed. The trustee's right, though confined by the terms of the deed to the net profits, does not require a vestiture by actual possession, nor the striking of a balance in order to ascertain the net profits,-but is conferred by the deed itself, and is superior to the rights of antecedent creditors who are not included in the deed. Acc. Pennock v. Coe, 23 How. 130. (Clay v. E. T. and Va. R. R. Co., 6 Heis. 430, distinguished.) Opinion by FREEMAN, J.—Buck v. Memphis & Little Rock R. R. Co. et al.

TRIAL BY COURT WITHOUT JURY-INS CRUCTIONS—PRACTICE.-Where an action is tried by the court without a jury, and one of the parties requests the court, in accordance with section 290 of the civil code, (Gen. Stat. 684) to state in writing its conclusions of fact found, separately from its conclusions of law, and the co art refuses so to do, and makes only one general finding of fact and of law, which finding is against the party making such request, and in favor of the other party, and judgment is rendered

according to such finding; held, that the court committed substantial error by refusing said request. Opinion by VALENTINE, J.-Briggs v. Eggen.

EXECUTORY PAROL CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF LANDS -STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-Where the owner of certain land sells the same and executes to the purchaser a title bond therefor, binding himself upon certain conditions to execute to the purchaser, his heirs and assigns, a general warranty deed therefor; and the purchaser under said title bonds is to have the possession of the land; and afterwards the purchaser sells said land to another person and delivers to such other person all his title papers; and afterwards the first purchaser makes an executory parol contract with the vendor to "surrender the title and title papers to said land" back to the vendor within three weeks thereafter upon certain conditions; and afterwards the second purchaser ratifies said executory parol contract, and then the two purchasers offer to perform such contract on their part, but the vendor refuses to perform on his part; held, that said executory parol contract, being a contract for the sale and transfer of an interest in land, is void under the statute of frauds. (Gen. Stat. 505). Opinion by VALENTINE, J.-Carr v. Williams et al.

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE-PURCHASE OF PROPERTY WITHOUT POSSESSION TAKEN.-1. As sustaining a demurrer to evidence works a final disposition of the case, the court does not err in overruling such a demurrer, whenever there is testimony which, although weak and inconclusive, yet fairly tends to prove every essential fact, and is insufficient to justify a court in overruling a motion to set aside a verdict based thereon. 2. Our statute of frauds (Genl. Stat. p. 504, sec. 3) does not imply that a party purchasing personal property without taking actual possession is, if there be creditors of the vendor, presumptively engaged in a fraudulent transaction, and his conduct scrutinized accordingly, but simply that one claiming under such a purchase takes nothing until he shows that he made such purchase in good faith and for sufficient consideration. In other words, the mere production of a bill of sale which would be sufficient as against the vendor is not sufficient as against a creditor or subsequent purchaser, and he must supplement that bill of sale with proof of good faith and payment of value. Opinion by BREWER, J.-K., P. R. R. v. Couse.

OMISSIONS

REQUISITES OF BILL OF PARTICULARS PLEADING.-1. While the statute reads that a bill of particulars in a justice's court "must state in a plain and direct manner the facts constituting the cause of action," yet no technical precision is demanded in such a pleading. On the contrary, the most liberal intendment will be given to it; and if every fact essential to the cause of action can be found in it, although stated in the most general way, or in the loosest and most indefinite manner, and no objection is raised to it at the trial, it will be held sufficient to sustain the judgment. 2. Where there is an absolute omission to state a fact essential to the cause of action, but it appears from the record that the case was tried without objection, as though this fact was alleged, and that the fact was duly proved and found, the omission will, on proceedings in error, be considered as waived. 3. But where there is such an absolute omission, and nothing to indicate any proof or finding or admission of the fact, or waiver of the omission, this court must regard the omission as error and reverse the judgment founded upon such a defective bill of particulars. 4. In an action under the stock-killing law of 1874, the plaintiff's pleading must allege that the defendant's road was not fenced. Opinion by BREWER, J.-K. P. R. R. v. Taylor.

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JUSTICE'S COURT-PRACTICE PROMISSORY NOTE STIPULATION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES.-1. In a justice's court the existence of a corporation may be put in issue by the defendant without a denial under oath, and even without a written denial of any kind. 2. On appeal from a justice of the peace to the district court each party may, without filing new pleadings, prove any cause of action or defense which he might have proved before the justice, and each may introduce any evidence which he might have introduced before the justice. 3. The district court may allow new pleadings to be filed, in cases appealed from a Justice's court, only "in furtherance of justice." 4. Where a promissory note became due April 4th, 1874, and the last day of grace was April 7th, 1874, and two demands for payment were made-one on April 7th, 1874, by a general agent of the holder of the note, and the other on April 8th,

1874, by a notary public, and no notice of the first demand was ever given to the indorser; but only a notice of the second demand was given to him, which second demand was one day too late; held, that the indorser was discharged. 5. The court below committed no error in rendering judgment for an attorney's fee, which attorney's fee was stipulated for in the note. Tholan v. Duffy, 7 Kas. 405, 409 et seq.; Sharp v. Barker, 11 Kas. 381. Opinion by VALENTINE, J.-Stanley et al. v. Farmers' Bank.

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ORSAMUS COLE, Associate Justices. WM. P. LYON,

JUDGMENT-MISTAKE.-1. The power of the circuit court to relieve a party from a judgment on the ground of mistake or surprise is limited to one year after notice of the judgment (R. S., ch.125, sec. 38); and it is not enough that the motion for such relief is made, but it must be brought to a *hearing, within a year. 2. Written notice of the judgment is not required by this rule, but actual knowledge is sufficient; and a party can not be relieved under this provision of the statute more than a year after he perfected an appeal from the judgment.-Opinion by COLE, J.-Knox v. Clifford. PLEADING TAX DEED - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.— In the action of ejectment, where plaintiff claimed under a tax deed recorded May 16, 1871, it is stated in the briefs of counsel for both parties that the action was commenced July 6, 1874, and the circuit court so found; but from the original papers sent up on the appeal, it appears that the complaint was verified June 16, 1873, and the answer July 25, 1873, though it does not appear when the summons and complaint were served. Held, that this court must assume that the action was commenced before July 25, 1873, and therefore before the three years' limitation had run in favor of plaintiff's tax deed. Opinion by COLE, J.-Hughes v. Libby. CERTIORARI-CRIMINAL INFORMATION.-1. Whether cer tiorari will lie in any case to remove a cause from a circuit court to this court, quære. 2. Where a criminal information prosecuted in the circuit court of a certain county, charges that the act complained of was committed in such county, neither the circuit court, nor this court upon certiorari to it, can treat the cause as one beyond the jurisdiction of such circuit court on the ground that evidence taken at a preliminary examination shows the offense to have been committed in some other county. That is a question of fact for the jury. Opinion by COLE, J.-Chittenden, Jr., et al. v. The State.

RAILROAD NEGLIGENCE-1. A railroad company is liable for injuries suffered by its servant where by its own negli gence or malfeasance it has enhanced the risk to which the servant is exposed beyond the natural risk of the employment; or has knowingly, and without informing the servant, used defective machinery which has caused the injury. 2. A railroad company is under a legal obligation to its servants engaged in running and operating its trains, to use all reasonable means to guard against defects in its locomotives and cars, which would endanger the lives and limbs of such servants while in the performance of their duties. 3. The complaint avers that plaintiff was in defendant's employ as a brakeman on a freight train, and it was his duty, whenever occasion should require, to go between the freight cars and couple them with such machinery, appliances, etc., as defendant provided; that on a certain day defendant negligently took upons its track, used and operated a car upon whose brake-frame or brake-beam at the end of the car, was a large and long bolt out of place, and which unnecessarily, carelessly and unskillfully projected beyond the frame, beam or brake head, in the way of the brakeman going to couple the cars; that the defendant negligently suffered the bolt to remain, without cutting off the projecting part thereof, and without informing plaintiff of its dangerous condition; and that while going between said car and another to couple them, the plaintiff was tripped and thrown down by said bolt, and thus sustained certain injuries. Held, that a cause of action is stated. Opinion by COLE, J.-Wedgwood v. C. & N. W. R. R. Co.

BQUITY-CLOUD UPON TITLE-PAROL CONTRACT-PRACTICE-1. A court of equity, in order to prevent a cloud upon the title to land, will restrain a sale thereof by the sheriff under a judgment against a former owner which never became a lien upon the land. 2. Where, before a judgment is docketed in a certain county, land of the judgmentdebtor, situated there, has been purchased by a third person in good faith, but no conveyance has been executed, the judgment does not become a lien thereon. 3. Under the exemption laws of this State (Tay. Stats. 1550, sec. 30) a sale and conveyance of his homestead by a judgmentdebtor does not render it liable to sale on execution. 4. In case of a parol contract of sale of a homestead, in which the wife does not join, where the purchase money is paid and possession given to the purchaser, though a specific performance by the execution of a conveyance could not, probably, be enforced against her, yet, if she subsequently joins in a conveyance pursuant to the contract, the purchaser must be held, as against a judgment-creditor of the husband, to have been the equitable owner of the land between the dates of sale and conveyance. 5. Action commenced in circuit court for V. county, relating to lands in that county. By consent of the parties in open court, an order was entered at the November term, 1872, of the circuit court for L. county, referring the case to a referee to take the testimony and report it to the circuit judge, and that, after the evidence was all taken, the cause should *| be tried by the Judge at chambers, and judgment entered as of that term. In respect to business of this character, the regular term for L. county was also, at that time, a special term for V. county, which was in the same circuit; but this arrangement was terminated in March, 1873. The evidence was taken by the referee in November, 1873; and in January, 1874, by stipulation of counsel, the cause was tried by the circuit judge at chambers; and he filed his findings and conclusions with the clerk of the circuit court for V. county on the 8th of May following, and judgment in accordance with these was entered by the plaintiff on the 16th of June, signed by the clerk, there being no term of said court on either of the days last named. Held, that if the judgment had been entered nunc pro tunc as of the November term, 1872, of the L. county circuit court, it would have been a literal compliance with the stipulation; and if it was irregularly entered, the irregularity was favorable to the defendants, or at least did not injuriously affect their substantial rights, and is not ground of reversal on their appeal. Opinion by COLE, J.-Goodel v. Blumer et al.

NOTES.

IN A case in an English criminal court recently, a witness was asked in cross-examination, by Mr. Serjeant Ballantine -You went to Surrey Sessions and deliberately committed perjury? Witness-Yes; and I hope the mayor and the jury will forgive me for doing so.

THE AMERICAN LAW REVIEW for April contains papers on the Washington "Safe Burglary' Conspiracy; The Right of Expatriation and Coroners; a digest of State Reports, of Cases in Bankruptcy and of English Law Reports for November and December, 1876, and January, 1877; Book Notices and a summary of recent legal events.

HARRIET MARTINEAU, speaking of Macaulay, said: "As a practical legislator, his failure was unsurpassed, when he brought home his Code from India. I was witness to the amazement and grief of some able lawyers in studying that Code of which they could scarcely lay their finger on a provision through which you could not drive a coach and six."

THE following curious advertisement appears in an Eastern law journal: "The advertiser, who is fairly entitled to make the offer, tenders his services in the trial and the arguments of causes, and in consultations. He will make no charge in any case; believing that the practice of accepting engagements upon this basis may be usefully revived. Gentlemen who employ counsel and who may favor the experiment will please address," etc., etc.

THE Albany Law Journal, of the 28th ult., charges that the newly formed New York City Bar Association, has adopted a religious test for admission to its membership, and cites two cases where individuals proposed as members were rejected for the avowed reason that they were Jews. "If this be true," it says, "the association can no longer

claim to represent the bar of New York City. That bar recegnizes neither creed nor race nor social rank, and it will not permit any organization which discriminates in such matters to speak for it, or to direct its action."

MESSRS. ROBERT CLARKE & Co., of Cincinnati, have just issued a Digest of Law Publications, being a catalogue of American and British Law Books. The works are classified according to their recognized legal titles, and also under the names of their authors. It embraces two hundred and forty-six pages, and contains, besides what we have mentioned, a list of American, British and Canadian Law Periodicals, Federal and State Reports, Digests and Statutes; tables of British Regnal Years and Law Terms; Chronological Lists of English, Irish, Scotch, and Colonial Reports and a list of abbreviations used in reference to American reports and reporters and English, Scotch and Irish Law Books. It is very true that lawyers frequently lose much time in searching to find who or whether any one has produced a work on the particular subject they desire to investigate. This little publication will fill this want completely, and should be on every lawyer's desk.

THE first number of the Southern Law Review for 1877, (St. Louis: G. I. Jones & Co., 1877) has been received by us. It contains the following articles: 1. Removal of Causes from State to Federal Courts; Hon. W. F. Cooper. 2. Election of Judges by the People for Short Terms of Office; Hon. J. M. Love. 3. The Effect of a Change in the Law upon Rights of Action and. Defenses; Hon. T. M. Cooley. 4. A Brace of Noted Cases, Stokes' Case and Tweed's case; Hon. Joel P. Bishop. 5. The Dartmouth College Causes and the Supreme Court of the United States, Fifth Paper. 6. Some Disputed Questions of Evidence, Relevancy, Presumptions of Law and Presumptions of Fact; Francis Wharton, L.L. D. 7. Riparian Rights; P. N. Bowman, Esq. The present number also contains several exhaustive reviews of recent legal publications; notes of legal topics, and a digest in brief of cases reported in the law journals since January 1, 1877. Formerly a quarterly, the Review will be published in future, bi-monthly.

THE GERMAN SUPREME COURT.-By a majority of about 70, the German Parliament decided the other day, that the Supreme Court of Appeal for the whole Empire, in accordance with the bill submitted to them, shall be located at Leipsic, and not at Berlin. The import of this singular vote will be understood by looking at the component ele ments of the majority. The Ultramontanes, Socialists and Poles voted to a man against Berlin. Being opposed to the institution of the German Empire, or, at any rate, to its present shape and aspect, they acted consistently, as they can not destroy the Empire, in depriving the Capital of its metropolitan character. But, without strong reinforcements from the Liberal benches, these anti-Liberal parties could never have hoped to secure the majority. This reinforcement they received from the Bavarians, Wurtemberg. ers, Saxons and Thuringians, who preferred Leipsic to Berlin, and also from a good many Prussians, whose inclinations took the same erratic direction.-[London Times.

THE VALUE of Legal DEFINITIONS.-" Definitions are said to be dangerous in law," observes Swinburn (Wills and Test. p. 1, § 3); and the Roman Digest, too, has noticed their perilous nature (Dig. b. 50). Their difficulty was not sufficiently appreciated by Oliver Cromwell, when, being bent on reform of the law, and having set his Parliament to make laws more plain and short, he complained that many months had been taken up in trying to settle the meaning of one word-namely, “incumbrance." (Carlyle, Crom., Vol. III., 274, 357). On this subject, we may notice the following observations by the Lord Chief Justice of the English Common Pleas, in Twycross v. Grant, Jan. 24, 1877: All arguments, at least when conducted in the English language, have to commence with a definition. It depends on what is your definition of " consequence." In one sense I quite agree with you; but in another sense it was a consequence of the fraud, that the purchaser obtained a worthless thing. In another case, Attorney-General v. Gasquet, (January 23, 1877), Baron Cleasby in the Exchequer Division said: I do not pretend to give any definition of "domicile " myself, because it has been said that, though so many great minds had applied themselves to it, there is no universally accepted definition, no agreed-on enumeration of its ingredients. I rather agree with the dictum: "In jure civili omnis definitio periculosa."